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ABSTRACT 
This research, which was begun as part of the now defunct CargoLifter project, concerns the ground 
handling and support systems of the large rigid airships (commonly known as "Zeppelins") that were 
built between 1900 and 1940.7he intention was to assess the value of such historical information as has 
survivedfrom the previous generation of very large airships in order to minimise the physical and 
financial risks inherent in the development of anyfuture generations of such aircraft. 
The idea was to isolate and understand the fundamental issues that were actually encountered by the 
ground based personnel responsiblefor looking after the various British, German, American and Italian 
airships of the previous generation, and to gather as much information as possible about the techniques 
and operational procedures that were devised, tried and tested in the field. This information would then 
be used to establish guidelinesforfuture projects that are based on real experience rather than on 
prediction, assumption or theory. Sadly, the CargoLifterprojectfoundered in 2002; however the author 
had by then amassed sufficient research materialfor him to complete the study independently and to 
present it as a guidefor the ground handling of hitherto unrealised concepts such as the proposed new 
"Transport category" or "CargoLifter" type large airships. 
Such practical skills as those required by airship ground crew personnel are normally passed on byfirst- 
hand instructionfrom one experienced practitioner to the trainee. This option is not availablefor the next 
generation of very large airships because there are no personnel alive today with any operational 
experience of the previous generation of really large airships. The problem therefore is to examine the 
historical records and to evaluate the written infor7nation in order to interpret it and pass on knowledge 
that will reduce the risk offuture generations wasting their time in "re-inventing the wheel. " 
In the course of the study it wasfound that historical research (HR) enabled the results of the pre-war 
prototype projects to be usefully assessed despite thefact that very little of the material was written with 
that end in view. More specifically the analysis of historical airship activities (AHAA) revealed that it was 
possible to retrieve a considerable amount of lost orforgotten knowledge concerning the ground 
handling of very large airships, also to unearth ideas that were ahead of their time, which might be 
applicable today or in thefuture; and in addition to identify several areas worthy offurther investigation 
(e. g. ideas that were rejected at the time but which may now befeasible due to technological progress). 
The research and analysis also uncovered some ideas and suggested solutions which arefundamentally 
flawed and that should be avoided by designers of large airships and their support systems. 
The work includes a detailed analysis of the tasks involved in the ground handling of very large airships 
and concludes with a suggested strategyfor all those intent upon the design and planning of ground 
support infrastructuresfor anyfurther large airship development projects either today or in thefioure. 
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PREFACE 
In view of the fact that airships today are not in the mainstream of aviation development, and, that in the 
past they were only briefly so, it is anticipated that many readers, and especially researchers approaching 
the subject for the first time, will have a limited understanding of the fundamental principles by which 
these rare aircraft operate. 
"Only a few hundred airships have been built in the world, as against hundreds of thousands of 
airplanes, for as Charles G. Grey, the British aviation writer once observed, "Airplanes breed 
like rabbits, airships like elephants. " 
... 
" (Litchfield & Allen, 1945/1976: 79) 
As a consequence, airships remain relatively scarce in the skies of the world today, and the further 
consequence of this is that misconceptions, as to both their capabilities, and their limitations, are 
widespread within the sphere of Heavier-Than-Air (HTA) aviation. It is therefore deemed appropriate at 
the outset of this investigation to say something of airships in general and of the true nature of their 
characteristics. 
So, first, what exactly is an "airship"? The answer, officially, according to the British regulatory 
authorities, ' is that an airship is "A power-driven, lighter-than-air aircraft. " However, in view of the fact 
that the most obvious thing which distinguishes an airship from a simple balloon is its ability to be 
steered, then it would perhaps be more illuminating to define an airship as "A powered aerostat with 
dirigibility:, 2 or "A dirigible motor-driven balloon, usually of an elongated cigar-shaped form. 'J But 
while these definitions may be simple, and succinct, their brevity and use of unusual words once again, 
tends to hide the meaning from readers unfamiliar with the subject. Thus, a slightly more descriptive 
definition is needed: 
'The non-rigid airship is 
... 
a balloon specially shaped to facilitate its passage in a definite 
direction, having suspended from it a car or cars containing engines and propellers, and fitted 
with tail planes, rudders and elevators, which serve to direct its course. " (Spanner, 1929: 5) 
"AIRSHIP 
-A term applied loosely to any powered aircraft incorporating a significant element 
of aerostatic lift. Other terms used from time to time include dirigible, Lighter-Than-Air Vehicle (LTAV) and Air-Buoyant Vehicle (ABV). An airship with a substantial aerodynamic or powered 
lift contribution becomes a hybrid airship. " (Mowforth, 199 1: 10 1) 
Having thus established in essence what the word 'airship' means, it then becomes pertinent to ask by 
what means such aircraft actually work, and in what manner they differ from conventional HTA aircraft? 
In order to do so it is necessary to understand some of the fundamentals of the science of "Aerostatics. "
Obviously a detailed analysis of this complex science lies beyond the scope of this work, but a brief 
outline and sources of information available for further, deeper study can be found in: Appendix A- The 
Fundamental Principles Of Aerostatics. 
From this it can thus be seen that one of the major fundamental differences between HTA and LTA craft 
is simply that: 
I (CAA: CAP 471,1979: Chap. QI-2 Derinitions: 4) 
2 (Recks, 1977) 
3 (Stubelius, 1958 : 98) 
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"An acroplane or helicopter spends its life on the ground, punctuated by flights, but an airship is 
'flying' throughout its life, just as a seaship is always afloat even when in port. " (Netherclift, 
1993: 13) 
Therefore, it is evident that airships are far closer to free-flying balloons than they are to any other type of 
flying machine. Consequently, the piloting skills required are thus totally different from those usually 
associated with the "pilotincM of an HTA aircraft: 0 
Free balloons were extremely delicate to control and exquisitely sensitive to changes in 
weight, temperature, humidity, and pressure. An expenditure of only a handful of sand, for 
example, had an immediate effect on the altimeter, which probably surprised most novices. To 
descend, the cord to the valve atop the bag was pulled and the seconds counted off. Students 
found to their frustration that a balloon was seldom in an absolutely stable condition. It therefore 
was emphasised, repeatedly, that a balloon (and airship) pilot had to recognize the true aerostatic 
condition of his aircraft at all times, anticipate changes, and apply the proper control at the 
proper time 
- 
not wait for the ship to gather momentum or "run away. " The inattentive pilot 
found that his in-flight corrections demanded a greater application of control, thereby wasting 
gas and ballast. " (Althoff, 1990: 62/63) 
So, its ballooning ancestry gives the airship a capriciousness that is seldom found elsewhere in modem 
aviation. And the truth of this is confirmed by the pilot of one of today's modern blimps: 
"rake a procedure from an aeroplane flight manual, apply it during operations and if correctly 
exercised the aeroplane will respond in a predetermined manner. Apply a similar item from an 
airslýiip manual and it might respond how you hoped, or not at all, or in a totally different 
manner. " (Adams, 2001a: 29)1 
However, aerostatics are only one part of the story because, unlike a balloon, an airship, when in flight, is 
subject not only to aerostatics but also to aerodynamic forces. Indeed the unique operational abilities 
possessed by airships, and many of their advantages over HTA craft, depend upon the controlled interplay 
of both these forces. 
"When an airship is flown either light or heavy, use is made of aerodynamic force to balance the 
excess of buoyancy or of weight, as the case may be. The required positive or negative 
aerodynamic lift is obtained by flying with the longitudinal axis at an angle of pitch to the flight 
path; and the elevators are manipulated as necessary to maintain this angle. " (Burgess, 1927: 88) 
This is familiar territory to HTA aviators. The behaviour and control of an aircraft in aerodynamic flight 
is well understood. However, it is from this apparent similarity between airships and aeroplanes that most 
of the misconceptions arise, because the introduction and superimposition of this second, completely 
independent but equally powerful, lift-generating force, into the one flying machine, does have some 
surprising and counter-intuitive results. For example: 
"A strean-dined airship, if travelling through the air at a small angle to the axis of the ship, 
instead of tending to return to the direction with its centreline parallel to the line of motion, tends 
to increase this angle. This has a remarkable effect upon the controllability when the ship is 
being flown [aerostatically] light or heavy. Thus when a ship becomes light she appears to be 
nose-heavy and conversely when she becomes heavy she appears to be nose-light. This effect 
acts in favour of the pilot at certain speeds, but at high speeds 
... 
the effect becomes so great that 
the elevators cannot cope with it and the ship, if heavy, will continue to climb or if light will 
continue to dive. The correction in such case, should it occur, is to slow down the engines. " (Johnston, 1994: 44-45) [GC emphasis] 
Moreover: 
I Edited for brevity 
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"The ship [Graf Zeppelin] was almost always operated in trim 
... 
Paradoxically 
... 
this was not 
the most stable condition in which the ship could be flown. When flown statically heavy, the 
ship always tends to nose up and climb, while when light, she puts her nose down and tries to 
descend. The reason is that with the hull acting as an airfoil, and meeting the air stream at an 
angle, the center ofpressure on the hull movesfonvard, creating a pitching moment either 
upward or downward. To the elevator man, however, it appears that the center of gravity has 
shifted 
... 
" (Dick & Robinson, 1985: 69) 
While this, as the saying goes, is not rocket science, it is exceedingly strange behaviour from the point of 
view of newcomers to the LTA field. And it serves to illustrate the fact that in many instances there really 
is no valid comparison between LTA and HTA vehicles. 
Thus, notwithstanding that many readers of this work can be expected to be familiar with the 
Aerodynamics of HTA craft, it is deemed appropriate to include some brief information concerning the 
topic with regard to LTA craft, and more specifically how this impacts on the Ground Handling (GH) of 
them. This material can be found in: Appendix B- Airship Aerodynamics. 
As can be seen, both "Aerostatics" and "Aerodynamics" have profound influences on, and implications 
for, the ground handling of very large airships. However, for those unfamiliar with LTA flight, it is also 
instructive to bear in mind that there are actually far more similarities between airships and a completely 
different, and seemingly unrelated, form of transport, altogether. 
"The airship at rest supports the majority of its weight by buoyancy and achieves aerostatic 
stability in both roll and pitch by keeping its centre of gravity below its centre of buoyancy and 
in the same vertical; once under way it needs to achieve aerodynan-dc stability, which it does 
through after stabiliser surfaces, and flight controllability, which it does through rudders and 
ailerons; also when it is under way there is a need to minimise its aerodynamic drag, which it 
does by adopting an elongated tear-drop shape shown by research to be optimum for the 
purpose. Practically all these considerations and the research and development findings read 
across to the submerged submarine... " (Burcher & Rydill, 1994: 34/5) 
Strangely, this simple fact is regarded as a virtual heresy in most aviation circles, and indeed today, there 
are many even within the modem LTA world itself who find such comparison both uncomfortable and 
"old-fashioned. " Nevertheless, the link was widely accepted by some of the most knowledgeable and 
skilled airship designers in the past, (Upson & Klikoff, 193 1), 1 and, when considering the development of 
the Next Generation of Very Large Airships (NGVLAs), and endeavouring to understand the peculiarities 
of airship flight behaviour, it is illuminating to take note of the way a submarine behaves under water; 
2 also of the way in which nautical designers and theoreticians, (Burcher & Rydell, 1994), have dealt with, 
and produced equations of motion for, their almost identical problems encountered in a parallel universe 
- 
the maritime environment 
- 
albeit in a medium that is 800 times denser than air. 
iiffiffi .......... 
NACA Report 405 
- 
Application of practical hydrodynamics to airship design 2 
'r-oncepts in submarine design" 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Large airships are being proposed as solutions to some of the World's transportation, communication and 
other problems. ' Some of these airships will have to be very big indeed; many times larger than anything 
currently flying and far bigger than the previous generation of large airships 
- 
the giant rigid "Zeppelins" 
- 
which flourished briefly in the 1930s. 
As yet, none of these new aircraft actually exist; nor, it seems, (following the collapse of the German 
based CargoLifter 2 project in 2002), are any getting close to completion. However, it is already clear that 
all such schemes have one thing in common. Their success will be entirely dependent upon an extremely 
high level of operational performance. In addition, many of the tasks for which these aircraft are being 
proposed, are going to require as standard practice, operational procedures that have seldom (or never) 
been previously attempted by airships. These include: 
" Precision hovering 
- 
i. e. the accurate holding of position for prolonged periods of time 
" Lifting single indivisible loads that are too large or heavy for ground-based transportation 
" Picking up payloads or cargo directly from the ground whilst in flight 3 
" Placing carried objects exactly on defined locations with the correct orientation 
" Operating within the stratosphere 
Irrespective of how, in physical terms, such envisioned procedures will eventually be accomplished, and 
regardless of the actual mechanical systems involved, one thing is immediately obvious. If these tasks are 
to be accomplished safely, then they are going to require to be overseen by highly trained personnel who 
will need to possess some exceptional and very specialised skills. Thus it is evident that no matter what 
configuration is finally chosen for the Next Generation of Very Large Airships (NGVLAs), nor what 
structural solutions eventuate, it is an unavoidable fact that unless there are reliable and competent crews 
on-board from the very beginning, (individuals who simply know how to fly these gigantic aircraft 
"straight and level"), then there will be enormous risks, either of the airships themselves sustaining 
ruinously expensive physical damage, or of them endangering the safety of the public at large. 
This fundamental requirement for highly skilled personnel, both in the air and on the ground, creates 
some extremely serious and complex problems that are all too easily overlooked. Nowhere is this more 
evident than in the difficulties that will be encountered in the ground handling of the NGVLAs. However, 
such is the complexity and the obscure nature of these Ground Handling (GH) problems, that 
considerable explanation is required by the uninitiated in order to fully appreciate the seriousness of them. 
I See: Von Gablenz, 1996; Peeters, Tensen & Sleurink, 1997; Santistevan, 1997; Walker, 2000; Harris, 2001; Hochstetler, 2001; 
Valera, 2001; Chadburn & Stewart, 2002; Hodge, 2002; Scherbakov & Yakovleva, 2002; Tabo, Mori, Maruhashi & Oikawa, 2002; 
Kim. 2003; Prentice & lbomson, 2003; Warwick, 2006; 
2 The CargoUfter project attracted some 70,000 shareholders between 1996 and 2002. An enormous hangar was built at Brand, (south of Berlin) in eastern Germany but sadly their promised airship, the CargoLifter CL160, (intended to lift 160 tonne payloads), had not progressed beyond the conceptual design stage when the company went into voluntary liquidation in July 2002. 3 Despite rumours of secret and/or military trials, the only airships known by the author to date, which are publicly recorded as 
having successfully picked-up, carried and put-down again. suspended loads, on anything approaching a reliable commercial basis, 
are the Hot Air Airships built for the "Radeau de Cimes" project. (See Lowman, 1999: 144 & 146; and Hallt. F. 1990: 129/138). 
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Thus an initial brief look at some of the effects which untrained flight crew personnel will inevitably have 
on the NGVLAs is deemed to be a better starting off point for a largely HTA experienced readership. 
1.1 The Knowledge Gap 
The last very large airship of the previous generation (the German Zeppelin LZBO 1) was dismantled in 
1940 and nothing even approaching the size of the proposed NGVLAs has flown since that date. Anyone 
old enough at the time to have gained personal hands-on experience of these airships must today be in 
their nineties. Thus: 
"We now find ourselves at a point where we have lost the final generation that knew first hand 
how to fly these giants. " (Adams, 2001b: 22) 
So there is no one around today with any actual operational experience of the Previous Generation of 
Very Large Airships (PGVLAs) who knows how big ships really behave in flight, nor has any practical 
knowledge of how they were handled on the ground. There is thus no one who can pass on their "tips and 
tricks" to the new trainee crews. Yesterday's hard-learnt lessons have quietly been forgotten. 
parallel loss of expertise has recently been recognised. within the world of Heavier-Than-Air (HTA) 
aviation and the serious consequences of this have been noted: 
"There is clear evidence in the analysis of accidents and incidents that mistakes made in 
maintenance, design and operation of aircraft are continually being repeated, resulting in further 
incidents. This is despite the fact that the initial action taken at the time of the first accident or 
incident was thought to have been preventative for all time. 
... 
A contributory factor is 
undoubtedly the decline of inherent knowledge and know-how that comes with the early 
retirement of experienced staff causing a reduction in the overall industry knowledge and skill. " (Ratcliffe, 2001) 
But, in the case of very large airships there is not simply a reduction of experience and know-how, there 
is a complete absence of it. The entire large airship industry is now defunct and has been so since 1940. 
Therefore, the first 'Big Question, ' and the one that offers a common threat to all plans to build any very 
large airships in the future, is this: 
Q. 1 
- 
How will the flight crew of the first prototype NGVLA learn the skills necessary to operate it? 
The seriousness of this lack of skilled flight personnel must not be underestimated: 
"The Federal Aviation Commission of the United States summarized its findings on their airship 
losses, in these words: "While the record of the airship has been marked by a number of disasters 
as a matter of common knowledge, each of them appears to have been due either to errors in 
navigation or airmanship, which were in no way inevitable, or to a serious miscomprehension of 
the capacities of the airship. The operation of airships is a highly specialized art, requiring 
long experience and the highest order of skill 
.... . ... 
2 (Williams, 1974: 194/5) [GC emphasis] 
Statements from knowledgeable sources in Britain also endorse this conclusion: 
Lord Ventry: "It is no good having modem airships flown by inexperienced crews. Experience 
has shown that a good crew can do wonders with a "dud" ship, but there is no case on record of a 
bad crew making an efficient airship do anything worthwhile. " (Ventry, 1939) 
1 LZ130 (Graf Zeppelin H), shares with its much more famous (or infamous) sibling 
- 
LZ129 (Hindenburg) 
- 
the record of being the 
largest human-made object ever to have flown. They were 245 m (804 ft) in length and 41.1 m (135 R) in diameter. 2 Edited for brevity 
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However, there will initially be no way of knowing whether the first prototype NGVLA is perhaps 
performing badly because it just happens to be a "dud ship" or simply because its crew is inexperienced. 
At the outset all the crewmembers will be inexperienced and all the machinery will be untested. 
Furthermore, the problem is going to be aggravated by the simple fact that airships, which are large 
enough to carry out many of the tasks envisaged for the next generation of proposed "transport solutions, " 
are themselves absolutely unprecedented. Nothing with the dimensions and all-up mass of these 
monstrous aircraft has ever flown before. ' Even with a very experienced and completely competent flight- 
crew on-board there would still be enormous risks in getting them safely through a test flying programme. 
But, with a partially skilled or novice crew on-board a prototype airship it is going to be extremely 
difficult merely to obtain the certification for the first NGVLA to even begin to operate today in the exact 
same way its forebears did in the past. The incorporation into this process of additional complex 
procedures that have never ever been achieved, nor even previously attempted, by any Ughter-Than-Air 
(LTA) craft in history, makes the whole enterprise into a formidable challenge. 
Obviously, the risks associated with putting unskilled personnel onto any type of untested aircraft are 
very great. But, more importantly for the NGVLAs, the historical records reveal that when it comes to 
airships, even with tried and tested ones, the performance of their crew members was in the past of 
critical importance. This has been confirmed by responsible people who had a great deal of first-hand 
experience with the PGVLAs. Here is Lord Ventry, one year earlier than his previously quoted "dud ship" 
comment, once again hammering home the point: 
"It cannot be too often remembered that to get the best results out of airships they must have 
well-trained crews. A good crew can do wonders with an inefficient ship, but an untrained crew 
will soon smash up the best airship ever constructed. " (Ventry, 1938: 20) 
And there is further confirmation from the German cognoscenti, who had far more experience than 
anyone else with the PGVLAs, but who also came to the same conclusion: 
"... his [Scherzer's] work and success offer a fine example of how much can be done with a 
relatively poor ship [LZ85] in the hands of a good commander and crew. There are many other 
examples of how little a poor commander can do with a good ship. " (Lehmann & Mingos, 
1927: 215/216) 
Indeed the Germans' experience with their First World War Zeppelin programme offers ample evidence 
that these aircraft have a unique vulnerability when compared to all other flying machines, simply 
because their enormous physical size, combined with their inherent structural fragility, makes them 
exceptionally sensitive to errors of judgement by personnel. 
"On the morning of September Vh [ 1916] while returning from Ploesti the LZ86 was completely 
wrecked in landing. The commander and a number of her crew were killed instantly. I cannot 
recall all the details, but this accident resulted from an error in judgement. " (Lehmann & 
Mingos, 1927: 221) 
"In airship operations slight n-dstakes can easily lead to serious consequences. " (Korvettenkapit! in Peter Strasser, 2 quoted in Robinson, 1994: 236) 
I According to published figures the CargoLifter CLI60 would have had an overall length of 260 in, a diameter of 65 in and a gas 
volume of 550,000 mi. (Everding & Reich, 2000, Table 5: 234) 2 Uader of German First World War Naval Airship Operations. Comment made in February 1917 on receipt of news that the 
"height climber" Zeppelin LZ82 (German Navy No. L36) had been wrecked while attempting a forced landing. 
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The consequences of a novice flight crew making a "slight mistake" with the first prototype NGVLA, 
(which will inevitably have cost a fortune just to design and build), and inflicting irreparable damage to it 
on its first flight, would indeed be "serious. " Worse still, there can be little doubt that the wreckage of one 
of "tomorrow's transport solutions" appearing in the media, ignominiously wrapped around its mooring 
mast, as the result of a ground handling mistake before it has even tried its first take-off, will certainly 
reinforce the disastrous reputation of its forebears. 
Yet if the trainee flight crews for the NGVLAs are simply going to learn as they go, then an occasional 
mistake would appear to be unavoidable. After all novices learn by making n-dstakes. 
"Experience is the sum of many n-dstakes. " (quoted in Thompson, 1999) 
"The lamentable fact that experience is the best teacher, though often a most costly teacher, held 
true in the case of the Zeppelins. " (Lehmann & Mingos, 1927: 254) 
It is therefore quite unrealistic to expect that the novice crew of the first prototype NGVLA will be able to 
learn their trade without making any mistakes at all. On the contrary, the early flight crews will inevitably 
make some iiiistakes, and, furthermore some of their small mistakes will become big accidents, and just 
as inevitably, some of these will turn into full-scale disasters. In addition, a high proportion of all 
accidents, be they small or large, are costly in financial terms 
- 
and some of them are also physically 
dangerous, both to those personnel actively involved (crewmembers) and/or to innocent bystanders (the 
public at large). It is also inconceivable today, that the crash of any brand new, enormously large airship 
could be hidden from the gaze of the media or kept a secret for very long. Such an event, would 
undoubtedly be linked on world-wide television to repeated airings of the unfortunate LZ129 Hindenburg 
(famously filmed crashing in flames in 1937, ) thereby further undermining public confidence in airship 
projects in general. The airship industry has been here before: 
"rhe Doctor [Eckener] had been very successful in training operating personnel, first for the 
DELAG 1 and later for the German Navy. 
... 
The basic premise for Dr. Eckener was that one 
could not assume that a situation was satisfactory; one had to know that it was satisfactory and 
then one could go on. If an assumption was incorrect, and a disaster occurred, the whole airship industry could be destroyed. " (Dick & Robinson, 1985: 57) 
Thus it is evident that the success or failure of the NGVLAs really does hinge upon the knowledge and 
skills that will have to be possessed by, what may very well be, only a handful of exceptionally talented, 
and very highly trained, specialists. In other words, there is a real danger that one relatively small error, or 
even a minor misjudgement by a single person, could literally put an end to the whole NGVLA industry 
almost before it has really got going. This is another fact that has already been noted: 
"The [crashing of] R-101 in the UK and the Hindenburg on the world-wide stage during the 
inter-war years, drove a stake into the heart of an industry. Crew induced accidents in giants like 
the big Cargolifters and the big SkyCats could repeat the experience. Someone else's accident 
can damage everyone's business. " (Walker, 2001: 25) 
"DELAG 
- 
Deutsche Luftschiffahrt Aktien-GeseUschaft, was the commercial airship transportation company founded by Count Zeppelin in 1909. Its personnel played an important role in training German Army and flight crews before and during World War V (Dick & Robinson, 1985) 
- 
"Deutsche LArftschiffahrt Aktien-GesseDschaft (German Aerial Transportation Company), the pre-WWI German passenger Zeppelin service. Between 1909 and 1914, the hydrogen-inflated vehicles of this airline flew a total of 107,180 
miles carrying 34.288 persons without so much as a scratch. " Cropping & Brothers, 2001) 
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So, the "knowledge gap" clearly poses a very serious threat indeed to all future NGVLA projects, because 
the skill of an airship crew really is paramount. Consequently, the weight of responsibility on the 
shoulders of the individual flight crew members of the first NGVLA is going to be enormous. 
Nevertheless, regardless of what the very first NGVLA prototype actually looks like, and no matter what 
its intended purpose is, it will inescapably have to run this risk. Even if it were to be Lord Ventry's "best 
airship ever constructed7 there is no escape from the fact that at some point, it will have to make its very 
first test flight, and when it does so, then someone will have to operate it. Obviously, whoever these 
people are, they must be adequately trained. However, one thing is absolutely certain, the Knowledge Gap 
means that it is not going to be possible for them to be prepared for their tasks today in the same tried and 
tested way that their predecessors were in the past. 
"... Eckener, an original thinker much experienced with wind and weather, insisted on thorough 
training for all [Zeppelin] flight personnel in theoretical aerostatics and meteorology, and 
constant practice in ship handling in all weather conditions 
... 
" (Dick & Robinson, 1985: 15) 
[GC emphasis] 
But large airships are now extinct, so the initial training of the NGVLA crews, and the maintenance of 
their skills by such practical means, is currently impossible. Thus, while in the normal course of events, it 
is undeniably true that "Most learning is not the result of instruction. It is rather the result of unhampered 
participation in a meaningful setting. " (Illich, 1973: 44) In the specific case of learning how to operate the 
NGVLAs, the fact is that there is no "meaningful setting" within which the first crew can practise. 
Neither will there be any such place, at least until the first NGVLA is almost ready to fly. The only 
leaniing process that is proven to be effective is simply not going to be available for the first flight crew. 
Furthermore, whereas: "Education in the exploratory and creative use of skills 
... 
relies on the 
relationsl-iip between partners who already have some of the keys which give access to memories stored in 
and by the community" (Illich, 1973: 24) if, as now seems to be the case, all memory (i. e. first hand 
knowledge) of how to operate very large airships has faded away, then there are not even any potential 
candidates to become partners (instructors) available. As a consequence, the whole question of crew 
training for the NGVLAs becomes extremely serious and difficult to solve, especially as it is also now 
apparent that it is rather urgent too: 
"Part of the difficulty here is that training by its nature is an up-front activity. The trained crews 
need to be there, ready to go, as the new equipment is delivered. For that to be achieved not only 
have the training aircraft and the training organisation to be in place but the vital element on 
which the quality and style of the new-era force will fundamentally depend also has to be there, 
the Instructor Pilots. They themselves need to be trained before student training can commence. 
All that up-front capability equates to cost 
- 
up-front costl" (Walker, 2001: 24) 
Such recognition that flight crew training is of fundamental importance, and the realisation that the lack 
of suitably trained pilots is going to have a big impact on the budgets and construction schedules of all 
future NGVLA projects, is indeed welcome. However, the starting point for this thesis lies in what this 
seminally important article by Sir John Walker' does not say. There is no mention at all, anywhere within 
it, of the threat that is posed by the even further "up-front costs" that will unavoidably be incurred by the 
equally vital need to provide adequately trained ground crews. Yet all of the points raised thus far, 
Maining 
- 
overcoming the airship pilot shortage. " In Airship 131.2001: 24/5 
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concerning the risks, the costs and the consequences of an inept or incompetent flight crew for the 
NGVLAs arejust as valid for their ground based personnel. 
No one has any doubts that the pilots will need to be exceptionally talented people. Indeed. it is a fact that 
has long been recognised: 
"The smoothness ofa I large ri-id airship] landing depends on the sensitiveness of the pilot to 
kinetic energy. Ho,, v great the difference in this sensitiveness may be is illustrated bN the two 
following cases. One submarine commander brought his craft smoothly alongside the dock with 
three manoeuvres. while another commander gave 84 orders to accomplish the sarne result. " 
(Krell, 1928) 
And yet the equally vital need for similarly skilled ground crew goes unrernarked. Nevertheless. if the 
NGVLAs are going to attempt procedures that are unprecedented in the history of airship flight then 
clearly they are going to need "three manoeuvre" people at every level of their command hierarchy 
- 
and 
this must include their ground handlers too. 
1.2 The fundamental importance of Ground Handling (GH) 
It is an inescapable and unavoidable fact that some time before the first untested and untried prototype 
NGVLA sets offon its very first test flight, (with its novice flight crew nervously pushing button. s to scc 
what happens), it will first have to be brought safely out of the hangar in which it was built. 
This is it procedure that has caused serious problenis for large airships in the past. 
Figure 1.1 LZS -Ersatz 
- 
Deutschland" at Düsseldorf in 1911 (Gütschow, 1985) 
Figure I shows Dr Hugo Eckener. the man universally acknowledged as the greatest-e\er expert on large 
airship,,, learning the hard way, in his early years, that a GH error can bejust as disastrous as any other 
"small mistake. -This accident occurred while Eckener was bringing the airship out of the hangar on a 
windy day. His passengers escaped unscathed, thanks to the fire-brigadc's ladders, but the airship was 
totally wrecked. 
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Ofcourse the consequences ofa GH error may he more annovin- than disastrous hut nonetheless the risks 
are real and the results can still he enormouslY costly. Even the most modern airship has had its 
devclopment schedule clisruptcd hý a sniall GH mistake: 
'*Zcppclin NT-07 was damaged in March 119991 when part oflier tail fin struck the hangar door 
as she was being drawn out prior to further instrument testing 
... 
she has spent a month 
groujided* ... - (Airship. 1999a: 3) 
Scaling up such an incident. in ternis oftinic and costs. to it deNelopment plan for something the size of' 
the notional CargoLi r CL160 is a sobering thought. Furthermorc, it also underlines the reality that in 
, 
fte 
-- 
Z: ý
today's safety conscious world it is extremely unlikely that. upon compIction ofits assembly, the first 
NGVLA will come strai-ht out of its construction han,, ar and inimcchatelv IIN, off on a test tli,, ht. Such a 
large and complex machine will inevitably require a considerable number ofuround tests before it is 
ready to fly. 
This was also foreseen to be the case prior to the very first flight of its earliest ancestor, more than 100 
years ago: 
"Ofcourse, for such an experiment as (he first ascent. [ofCount Zeppelin's first "Air-Ship" LZI 
it will be necessary to await for the most faVOLIrable weather. as without doubt many trials Will 
be necessary before the craft is in a really workable condition. " (Aeronautical Journal, 1899: 78) 
In the e\ent. as history records. eight months later on I" Ju Iy 1900 LZI did act Lial Iy come straight out of 
its han-ar and immediately fly off on a test tliOht. Although it reportedly did not work very well, both it 
and its novice crew survived the experience and the airship was Put back into its floating hangar on Lake 
Constance that same evenin- without incident. However the world \ ic\N- of what is an acceptable risk has 
changed considerably in the last hundred years and it is certain that on completion ofthe first NGVLA, a 
protracted period of structural and systerns testing will initially ensue, in order to reassure the regulatory 
authorities and others that a test flying programme, under the control of what, at best, can only be a 
partially skilled flight crew, is really safe to allow. 
It is thus logical to assume that at least some parts of such a pre-flight test programme (possibly the 
en-ine tests for example) 1 will need to be done out ot'doors. But whatever happens, at some point. 
someone. somehow, will have to move the newly built airship out into the open air. It therefore follows 
that ifa new oeneration of very large airships is ever going to be built, then some group of people who 
really know what they are doing, are going to be required right from the very start, simply in order to 
nianoeuvre the first prototype NGVLA on the , round long before any attempt is made to fly it. 
Furthermore, no matter what type ofairship the first prototype turns out to be. nor for what purpose it is 
finally built, if it is to be a success then someone is going to have to prepare it for its first test flight. and 
someone will also have to take charge ofit when it touches do,, vn again 
. 
I Notwithstanding that at least one of the previous generation of large airships had its engines tested inside its construction hangar, it 
would seem inconceivable that present day health and safety regulations would allow a re-enactinent ofR 100 engine run-up inside 
the Howden shed on 25th September 1929: (see Meager. 1970 : 149 
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Thus, unless the first NGVLA prototype is going to be fitted with some exceedingly sophisticated 
systems which allow its pilots themselves, single-handedly to: 
a) top-up the liffing gas within it, and 
b) refuel it-, and 
c) establish an equilibrium by adjusting its static-lift to ballast-weight ratio; and 
d) taxi it out of the hangar under its own power, (or otherwise move it by some rernotely- 
controlled, mechanised means); then, 
there is no escaping the conclusion that it must have a fully trained, competent and reliable 'Ground 
Crew* long before there is anything very much for its 'Flight Crew' to do. 
It therefore becomes apparent that there is, in truth, a second fundamental "Big Questioný" which, 
although it lies hidden beneath the first one, actually precedes it and is consequently even more "up-fronf' 
and urgently in need of a solution. Simply stated, it is this: 
Q. 2 
- 
How are the ground crew for the first prototype NGVLA going to learn the skills they 
will need in order to handle it safely when they prepare it for its first Right? 
This second "Big Question" is obviously going to be just as difficult to answer as the first one, but in the 
author's opinion it is far more of a threat to all future NGVLA development programmes simply because 
it lies buried so deeply beneath the first question, that is almost completely obscured by it. Indeed, the 
whole topic of Ground Handling (GH) is so apparently dull and unexciting in comparison to Flight Ops, 
that it is commonly taken for granted, and in the author's experience it is difficult to get even confirmed 
airship enthusiasts to take the subject seriously. As a consequence, the danger of an unskilled groundcrew 
handling an NGVLA is generally ignored, and the true magnitude and real extent of the effects of the 
Knowledge Gap are entirely overlooked. 
Perhaps it is simply because this second "Big Question7' appears at first glance to be both obvious and 
innocuous, that the implications of it are so frequently underestimated? Whatever the reason, an answer to 
this question, or at least some way around it, will have to be found if the NGVLAs are going to survive 
and succeed. 
Therefore the primary objectives of this thesis are 
0 To raise the profile of GH generally and to explain the risks of neglecting or ignoring it. 
To make the case that Historical Research (HR) is vitally important to future NGVLA developers as 
it offers a practical way to minimise the impact and ramifications of Q2 and permits them to identify 
real PGVLA GH problems that remain as a serious threat today. Moreover, despite the fact that little 
archived material was written to that end, Analysis of Historical Airsl-iip Activities, (AHAA) can 
prevent NGVLA developers from "re-inventing the wheel" and enable a better understanding of the 
extent and proper context of the many obscure GH problems that stem from the "Knowledge Gap" 
However, before starting the investigation it is necessary to understand something of the true magnitude 
and complexity of the GH problems that the NGVLA development teams will have to face. 
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2 UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEMS 
The repercussions of the "Knowledge Gap" and the serious nature of this unrecognised "Second Big 
Question7' (Q2) first came to the author's attention in June 1998 when he was employed by the German- 
based CargoLifter (CL) company to assist with the design of the GH systems for the CargoLifter CL-160 
- 
the first of their planned cargo-carrying NGVLAs. However, it quickly became apparent that this 
question was itself only the tip of an iceberg. It was just one small part of a much more complex and far- 
reaching collection of inter-rclated, but essentially unanswerable, questions which started to accumulate 
within the company as CargoLifter began the task of recruiting a team to design and develop their 
prototype airship. 
These difficult questions centred on such things as what Ground Handling Equipment (GHE) was going 
to be "absolutely and vitally necessary" for the safe operation of the CL-160 (as opposed to being merely 
"useful") and, how long it was going to take to design and construct it all? Here are some examples of the 
difficult questions that were put to the author shortly after he joined the CL project: 
Is a mooring mast really necessary for the CL-160? 
If so, then should the first CL-160 mooring mast be mobile or a fixed structure? 
0 If mobile, then should the mast move on railway-lines or crawler-tracks? 
0 What would be the load on the wheels of a railway-based mobile mast large enough to 
handle the CL-160? 
0 Why can't the CL-160 pilots just "fly" the airship directly onto the mooring mast without 
any groundcrew assistance? 
0 What other ground-based infrastructure will be required for the CL-160 in addition to a 
mooring mast? 
" How long will it take to physically move the CL-160 into or out-of its hangar? 
" How many times each year will the CL-160 need to go into its hangar? 
" What will be the operational limits imposed by the weather for: 
a) Getting the CL-160 into and out of its hangar? 
b) Connecting and disconnecting the airship to its mooring mast (if used)? 
c) Taking-off and landing? 
d) Loading and unloading the payloads? 
Considering that the agreed norm for monitoring low-level wind and weather world-wide is 
via 10 m high masts, and that the top fin of the CL-160 when it is moored on the ground will 
be some 80 m high, how can meaningful, and locally accurate, short-term weather data be 
provided, at all potential operational sites? 
How can the reliability of weather forecasts be guaranteed so as to ensure that the complex, 
unprecedented and untried procedures can be planned, organised and carried out in safety? 
How long will it take for the CL-160 payload to be: 
a) Loaded, and 
b) Unloaded, or 
c) Exchanged for another payload or for some sort of ballast weight? 
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These initial questions quickly spiralled into further ever more complicated and detailed ones. Many of 
these concerned the people who would be needed to carry out the GH procedures. They included: 
How will the operators of the brand new Ground Handling Equipment (GHE) practise or 
rehearse their untried procedures, so that they can safely move the very first prototype CL- 
160 out of its hangar for the very first time? 
" How can the ground crew subsequently try a "walk-through7' of any improvements to, or 
theoretically advantageous variants of, any GH procedures without the risk of damaging, or 
perhaps destroying, enormously expensive equipment or even the airship itself? 
" How many people will be needed to operate the separate component parts of the GHE? 
" Who is in command of each GH phase? 
" What is the minimum number of groundcrew that will be required for each procedure? 
" What skills will be required by each of them? 
" What qualifications will be required by applicants wishing to join the CL-160 ground crew? 
This last revealed the need for some sort of licensing system for the groundcrew personnel, and that led in 
turn to yet further questions concerning the certification and testing of the GHE itself (regardless of what 
it or the airship using it rnight eventually turn out to be). And the unanswerable questions continued, ever 
further into the "up-front" problem areas that were to be publicly pointed out some two years later by Sir 
John Walker in his article on flight crew training (Walker, 2001). How long was it going to take to train 
the ground crew initially? Who was going to do it? And how? And to whose syllabus? And to what 
standard? And when? And where? And over-riding everything else 
- 
what was all this training and 
equipment going to cost? 
Obviously, getting the answers even slightly wrong, to some of the questions in this complex web, was 
going to have enormous financial implications. Again, this was a point which had previously been noted: 
'The trade-off between the number of handling personnel required and the technological 
sophistication of the installation they use is always a critical factor, conditioned predominantly by the type of operation envisaged and the number of airships involved. The significance of 
ground handling costs in the overall economics of airship operation is not always 
appreciated. " (Mowforth, 1991: 37) [GC emphasis] 
However, the author found that, at CargoLifter, shortly after he joined the project in 1998, it was not only 
the costs of GH for the CL-160 that were being overlooked 
- 
in many instances the whole topic was either 
taken for granted or simply ignored. Moreover, the longer the project ran, the worse this attitude became. 
One of the main reasons for this oversight was that, throughout the autumn of 1998, new team members 
were being enlisted to join the company in ever increasing numbers. While these new recruits brought 
with them much needed specialist knowledge from a wide range of disciplines, they also brought many 
preconceived ideas and prejudices from their various fields of expertise 
- 
and the majority of them had no 
previous experience of LTA aircraft. The result was that each influx of new personnel served only to add 
ever more difficult questions to the mixture. By the early part of 1999, these essentially unanswerable but 
urgently necessary questions were being passed round and round within the company, from department to 
department, and as they proliferated so the misunderstandings multiplied and the frustration increased. 
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There were no answers. There were simply too many unknowns, and in many departments, out of sheer 
necessity, design decisions for the CL-160 began to be made on the basis of unfounded assumptions. In 
particular, the author became acutely aware that the lack of sensible answers to the difficult GH questions 
also led to a general tendency at meetings for the whole subject to be dismissed as merely a detail, or for 
GH to be put on hold to be solved later. Through the following year, 2000, matters concerned with the 
airship's structure and the flight operations began increasingly to take precedence over the GH systems, 
and progress in the development of the GHE for the CL-160 came to a virtual standstill. As time passed 
so despondency within the GH Department grew, culminating in the memorable comment that the 
company seemed so intent upon flying the airship first and solving the GH afterwards that "perhaps the 
strategy is for a fly-and-forget airship? " (Girard, 2001) 
However, this same attitude to the problems of GH had been noted elsewhere, ten years previously. 
"Half the solution to any problem, however lies in knowing exactly what the problem is, and the 
modem airship groups are repeatedly seen to be rediscovering 
- 
usually by falling over them 
- 
technological and operational obstacles that were well known and documented many years ago. 
Nowhere is this tendency more evident than in the all-pervading indifference, already 
mentioned, to the importance of ground handling procedures in the assessment of operational 
economics. " (Mowforth, 1991: 41) 
These events at CL, led the author to the realisation that the "Knowledge Gap, " although it had not 
previously been publicly recognised as such, was actually an extremely serious problem. Not only would 
it offer precisely the same obstacle to all attempts to establish further large airship development 
programmes, but it would do so regardless of the purpose for which any ftiture very large airship was 
intended. Furthermore, the tide of unanswerable questions which resulted from the lack of experienced or 
suitably trained personnel, would unavoidably reappear, and in particular those questions related to GH 
would effectively sabotage every new attempt at NGVLA development. The subsequent collapse of the 
CargoLifter company in 2002, after some 300 million Euros of investment, merely served to underline the 
reality of this threat and to confirm the author in his suspicions. 
It was also apparent however, that there was an even bigger, much more immediate and far more 
insidious danger to the NGVLAs. It centred around the "all-pervading indifference" which seemed to the 
author at CL, to have spread to encompass all matters concerning GH 
- 
particularly towards the end of the 
project when one had only to mention the subject for the room to fill with groans, yawns and rolling or 
glazed eyes. To a large extent this attitude appeared to be based on, and compounded by, several popular 
misconceptions. These, in some cases, amounted to quite deeply held convictions, and in meetings at CL, 
arguments approaching the intensity of religious schism occasionally erupted, notwithstanding that many 
of these widely held beliefs were plainly wrong and did not stand up to scrutiny. 
Because of the depth and strength of these dogmatic views, and the fact that the disinterest which is 
engendered by some of the erroneous beliefs is of itself an obstacle, which, in the author's belief, is a 
dangerous and unrecognised threat to all future NGVLA development, it is deemed necessary, before 
embarking on a possible way of answering the Second Big Question (Q2), to pay some attention to 
understanding why some of these ideas are wrong, and why they also promote an attitude whereby the 
problems associated with GH are so frequently underestimated or even deliberately ignored. 
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2.1 The problem of the Cinderella profession 
To support the views held by the author, it must first be shown that there is genuinely a widespread lack 
of interest in airship GH. These, however, are deep waters because it is notoriously difficult to prove the 
lack of something merely by its absence. Nevertheless, the case can be made that the whole subject has 
been neglected in the past by the simple fact that it is hard to find one single airship history book that lists 
either "ground handling" or "ground crew" in either its glossary, or its index. 
Moreover, there is some evidence to support the case, and these quotes confirm, if nothing else, that a 
disinterested attitude was prevalent in France in the early 1900s and also in America in the late 1960s: 
"As these early airships [La France, Le Jaune, La Patrie, et a]] were being built, [1902 
- 
1909] 
little thought was spent on the means of mooring them, or on their housing when not in the air. 
For these reasons many ships that structurally were perfectly correct were disastrously wrecked 
when on earth. " (Hylander, 1931: 18 1) 
"20 Nov 69: Goodyear made their pitch. It involves marrying two ZPG-2 bags together side by 
side 
... 
It gives them the lift they need but the problems it creates in flight control, ground 
handling and mooring boggles the mind. As usual, its GAC [The Goodyear Aircraft Corporation] 
doing the talking and proposing and 
... 
there's no pilot or ground handling input. " (Moore, 
2004: 202) 
There are however two aspects to consider here. There are the personnel who carry out the tasks and then 
there is the actual work that they do. Of the former, it is a fact that the profession of ground-crew has 
never been treated with the respect it deserves. Indeed, there is a long tradition whereby ground-based 
personnel have generally been held in such low regard as to be scarcely worth a mention. Here is one 
example. It comes from the US Navy's report on their "Airship Accidents, World War IP in which there 
is to be found this damning statement 
"During the entire course of the War accidents occurred to fifty-six airships of all types, attached 
to both fleet and shore units 
... 
Seventy-seven lives were lost during the War, (excluding fatal 
accidents to ground handlers)... " (US Navy, 1946) [GC emphasis]. 
There is no further mention of them! 
Naturally, many reference books do make some mention in their text of the ground crew personnel and of 
their duties. However, this tends, in the main to be fairly dismissive, and, many airship history books 
actually neglect to make any reference at all of what must have become highly sophisticated and complex 
GH routines 
- 
procedures that were devised, refined and polished over some forty years of trial and error 
and which culminated in the great successes of the PGVLAs. This is a classic case of a Cinderella 
Syndrome, whereby the work that is acknowledged to be of vital importance is also taken for granted, 
while the people who do it are denigrated and treated with little respect, or even ignored. 
However, recognition that there is a problem does not solve a problem, and as far as the NGVLAs; are 
concerned, it is important at this point to distinguish between the recognition that there is going to be a 
GH problem for them and taking a serious interest in finding a solution to it. As Mowforth 1 has pointed 
out: "Half the solution to any problem, however lies in knowing exactly what the problem is 
... 
" But this 
I (Mowforth, 1991: 41) 
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is only hatf the solution. The other half is actually doing something about it and here again there is an 
evident lack of interest 
- 
notwithstanding the occasional dismissive mention of the GH of large airships as 
being "an unsolved problenf' 
- 
"... ground handling was an operational problem that was never entirely resolved. " (Althoff, 
1990: 68/9) 
"Although many ground handling techniques have been developed over the years, the problem 
of handling an airship with safety, rapidity and economy in the context of a commercial 
operating programme has not yet been solved. " (Mowforth, 1991: 37) 
"... while the principles and behaviour of airships in flight are now well understood and cause 
relatively few design problems, all weather ground handling remains a major concern On this 
the airships' future will stand or fall. " (Netherclift, 1993: 13) 
"Ground Handling of airships has always presented problems; it is almost certainly true to say 
that a fully satisfactory solution has never been achieved for larger craft. 
... 
There can be little 
doubt that the whole area of ground handling remains as the outstanding difficulty in airship 
design and operation. " (Howe, 1999: 298/9) [GC emphasis] 
This begs the question "why, in that case, is so little written about itT' Even the book in which this last 
statement appears devotes a mere 22 pages to the combined topics of "Ground Handling and Mooring. " 
This is compared to the flight-related topics of "Aerodynamics" (45 pages ), "Stability and Control" (33 
pages), and "Propulsion" (32 pages), all of which: 
a) are held to be not nearly so problematical, 
b) are far better understood, 
c) already have cost-effective solutions that are tried and tested in the field, and, 
d) are self-evidently of greater general interest. 
This is not to be taken as a criticism of the book, but merely as a demonstration of the low priority that is 
commonly given to GH in general. Doubtless it can be argued that this apparent lack of interest is 
perceived rather than real, and that the reason for the disparity is actually due to an absence of 
substantially new material to write about. It is undeniably true that: 
"In recent years the bulk of resources for research and development has been absorbed by 
redesign and upgrading of the airships themselves, ground handling being left largely to 
traditional 'bodies holding lines' methods. " (Netherclift, 1993: 29) 
However, this has echoes of the "fly first and solve the GH problems afterwards" philosophy that reared 
its head at CL, and it only serves to confirm the point that flight has been consistently given a higher 
priority than GH in many people's minds. Nevertheless this disparity is surprising, considering that lip- 
service has been paid to this same problem for such a long time, viz. : 
"It must be borne in mind also, that in the compromise between weight and strength, all rigid 
airships at present in existence, as well as those of the past, were designed and constructed with 
flying qualities and considerations predominant, whereas handling was left a secondary matter. 
We are certain that future design can and must yield more to handling considerations. " (Rosendahl, 1927) 
"rhe greatest problems of airship operation in the past have been those due to undeveloped 
methods and equipment for handling airships on the ground 
- 
in other words, terminal facilities 
for airships have been inadequate. " (Rosendahl, 1928) 
'The problem of handling is admittedly the vital key point of the whole development, and the 
future of the airship largely, if not entirely, depends upon its successful solution. " (Burney, 
1929: 214) 
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'The non-availability of satisfactory handling equipment is today a big handicap to airships and 
one that must be overcome. " (Fulton, 1929: 63) 
"The success of airship transport or any form of airship operation depends to a very large extent 
upon the efficiency of the ground organisations and equipment. In the past the lack of 
appreciation of this fundamental fact, has been the cause of the troubles encountered and to a 
large extent the reason for the comparatively slow development of the airships. " (Richmond & 
Scott, et al, 1930) 
... 
the major task facing the airship industry now 
... 
is to moor and handle airships on the C, 
ground reliably in all weathers, and economically in capital cost, maintenance, and manpower. " (Netherclift, 1993: 7) 
Clearly the problem is identified but where is the interest in doing something about it? It is plainly not in 
the aforementioned article by Sir John Walker, which is far from isolated in its failure to even 
acknowledge the existence of the ground crews; let alone to recognise the vital role that they will 
inevitably have to play in the development of the NGVLAs. 
Quite why, the specialised skills and knowledge of the ground crew should be seen as of less worth than 
the different skills and knowledge of the flight crew, is somewhat puzzling, especially as, it might be 
argued, that in order to be efficient at their job, the flight crew only really need to know how to use 
airship flight control systems, whereas, in order to save the airship in extreme circumstances, and in 
extremes of weather, the ground crew must have a thorough understanding of both flight and GH systems. 
For example, drooping the horizontal control surfaces to shed accumulating snow could save the ship, or, 
following the failure of an APU, it might be possible to use the flight engines to maintain ballonet 
pressure through a storm. But to do so requires those involved to understand both the normal functions of 
these systems and what their limitations are, as well as the consequences of going beyond them. Relying 
on flight crew to carry out all emergency GH procedures which involve flight controls, as is commonly 
done by today's small blimps, does not remove the need for the ground crew personnel to understand all 
the systems that are available. Thus the GH team must be familiar with the intricacies of both systems, 
whereas, the flight crew only need to be competent in the use of the flight controls. In other words, there 
are GH systems that are never used by flight crew to help fly the airship, but there are flight systems 
which can be used by ground crew personnel to help with GH. Therefore, it follows that in general terms 
the leadership of the groundcrew must have at least as extensive a knowledge as the flight crew. 
Plainly GH is an important and skilled occupation, and those who do the work are dedicated souls. Yet it 
is seldom acknowledged that every single one of the famous achievements of the PGVLAs, in terms of 
passenger carrying, and ocean crossing, and even their short-duration military missions, must each have 
been preceded by many hours of laborious preparation in the hands of highly skilled specialists. 
"Airships spent but a small part of their lives in the air, and for every man who flew there were 
perhaps a score who never left the ground but whose work was just as vital. " (Abbott, 1989) 
These were the multi-talented individuals who maintained, provisioned, weighed-off and launched, what 
were for their day, operationally complex and technologically advanced flying machines, and which still 
today remain the largest objects ever to have flown. These specialists, were the same dedicated souls who, 
while the airship was away from its base, turned their attention to cleaning, checking and testing a 
bewildering array of machinery and equipment, all of which was necessary for them to do their job. 
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It included, on occasion, everything from cavernous hangars and gigantic towers to massive mobile 
mooring masts pulled by specialised locomotive engines along hundreds of metres of purpose-built 
railway track. These people were responsible for the provision and smooth running of everything from 
winches and cables, to pumps and hoses; from the clips and clamps and couplings that joined them all 
together, down to the tiniest of nuts, bolts, washers and rivets, not forgetting the loo rolls and light bulbs. 
It all had to be kept ready, and in working order, for without it the airships could not function. 
Equally, at the end of every flight, regardless of the success or failure of its mission, there was inevitably 
a landing (of some sort) for every one of these enormous aircraft. And, for those that made it successfully 
back to base, the outcome of this "touch-dowW' depended to a large extent on the skill of the groundcrew. 
And again, afterwards, when the flight crews had gone off to celebrate, (or home to quietly try and 
forgeQ then these same specialist custodians were still hard at work. Behind the scenes they were 
repairing, replenishing, and re-designing, or perhaps manoeuvring, or even simply hanging-on to their 
physically enormous "babies" until some storm winds abated. If they got it right, the airship survived to 
fly again, but if they got it wrong, the airship was lost. Furthermore, if the flight crew got things wrong 
and the airship crashed, or if the designers erred in calculation and the airship broke away from its 
moorings, then it was always the ground crew who were left to clear up the mess. 
A further small point, but a very important one, is that everyone who has anything to do with aviation 
today is so used to seeing things from the conventional HTA viewpoint that their ways of seeing have 
now become entrenched. Consequently, the popular view of what constitute the main problems for GH 
airships and where the real difficulties lie has also become firmly fixed. An example of this can be seen in 
the Contents List of the first draft of the Transport Airship Requirements 1 (TAR) (Appendix Q. This 
valiant attempt in the late 1990s, by the combined Dutch and German aviation authorities, to provide at 
extremely short notice, regulations to govern all aspects of the NGVLAs, revealingly lists "Take-off' at 
paragraph number §51 and "Landing" at §75, but makes no mention at all of "Ground Handling" until 
§255. Even more revealingly there is no reference anywhere within the entire document of moving the 
airship into or out of a hangar 
-a procedure which has repeatedly been proven to be one of the most risky 
for airships of all sizes and types. 
Finally, this mention of regulation, brings up the interesting point that all the so-called "Ground Handling 
Manuals" for the airships currently flying are actually written as part of, and in compliance with, theflight 
certification process of the airship that each refers to. The purpose of these official documents therefore, 
is to satisfy a certification requirement of the individual aircraft type. They are thus written for the benefit 
of the aircraft they belong to, and not specifically to pass on techniques to ground crew personnel, nor to 
preserve knowledge of ground handling per se. The fact that they appear to fulfil this role, serves only to 
add further confusion to the blind spot. 
1 (LBA. 1999) 
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2.2 The problem of the Ground Handling blind spot 
It has been the author"s experience in conducting this research that one of the main reasons why the 
maanitude and the complexity of GH is neither recognised nor treated with the respect. and indeed the 
caution, that it deserves, is because there are several separate groups of people who each downpla-,. 
disregard or dismiss the seriousness of the GH problems for completely different reasons. 
Firstly there are those who genuinely do not know that there are any GH problems. These include the 
public at large who generally have no idea how LTA craft work. but who are used to a diet of television 
advertisements showing hot air balloons equipped with sand-bags, and images of the Hindenburg 
crashing in flames every time the word "airship" is mentioned. They are truly na: fve and, indeed, are 
genuinely puzzled by the whole concept of LTA flight. As a consequence, they usually take the GH of 
airships for granted and if asked about it. are apt to declare that they -never really thought about it. " 
However, such people "know that they do not know" and are consequently quite open-minded and ready 
to accept information, provided it is "interesting" and comes from an authoritative source. 
Then there are those who know that there are problems but are unaware of the magnitude, complexity and 
extent of them. They include administrators, engineers and other aviation experts, who come fresh to the 
subject of airships. often with extensive experience of other branches of aviation. They cannot see that 
there is much of a problem largely because a dozen or so -advertising blimps- are currently in operation 
around the world today, and although these are few in number, they have a great visual impact. Their role 
as an 'eye-in-the-sky' at sporting events attracts much attention. The result is that those familiar with 
HTA, see "aircraft" that are flown by licensed pilots, maintained by certified engineers and supported by 
a fully-functioning, up-to-date, quality control system 
- 
as is standard practice throughout the world of 
HTA aviation. This reinforces the erroneous belief that all airships of whatever size would like to behave 
as if they were to all intents and purposes "normal" (i. e. fixed wing) aircraft 
- 
taking-off and landing 
horizontally by "taxiing" along a runway using an "undercarriage. " However those who have first-hand 
experience of LTA flight know how very different airships really are. Airship pilot Paul Adams explains: 
-... aircraft fly by the book, airships do not. The way an airship behaves, on the ground and in 
the air, depends on many variables that have a small, inconsequential effect on most other types 
of aircraft. Minor changes in wind direction, speed or 
... 
variances in temperature, the lightest, 
shortest shower or even the passing of a cloud will change the condition of an airship and the 
way it handles. " (Adams, 2001a: 29) 2 
Thus airships really are very different from HTA craft and the NGVLAs are going to be even more 
different from them than the modern blimps are. 
Some further idea of the effects of this difference can be seen by making a comparison between the two 
sorts of aircraft and examining the percentage of accidents (where data exists) for different phases of 
HTA and LTA flight. It is immediately apparent that airships are far more vulnerable on the ground: 
I Nayler, 2003, "Airship activity and development world wide 
- 
2003" AJAA 6727 
2 Edited for brevity 
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BORDONI GRAPH 9- BY PHASE OF FLIGHT; PERIOD 1991-2000 
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Figure 2.1 
- 
Percentage of HTA accidents by phase of flight, 1991 
- 
2000 
(Bordoni, 2001: Aircraft Accidents Register) 
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Breakdown by category of 225 accidents involving 
fatalities and/or hull loss from 1987 to 1997 
Figure 2.2 
- 
Heavy air transport accidents involving fatalities / hull loss 
(Carbaugh et al, 2003 : Boeing Commercial Airplanes) 
From these charts it can be seen that despite the obvious disparities in their data handling the ground 
related categories for HTA "take-off, " "landing, " and "on ground" accidents add up to 23% in the first 
case and to 43% in the second. The picture for airships is rather different: 
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1 e70 20% 
Rigid Airship losses 1900 
- 
1940 
fire in shed 
22% 
flight 
43% 
yround 
10% 
Figure 2.3 
- 
Rigid airship accidents analysis 1906 / 1940 
- 
(data from Brooks & Griffin, 1973: 50) 
Although data on very large airships is harder to find than for 14TA aircraft, one study reveals that out of a 
total of 99 PGVLA rigid airships that met violent ends, 39 can be attributed directly to acts of war. If 
these arc discounted, (on the grounds that any projected figures for them must be conjectural), and only 
the known facts of the remaining 60 airships are used, (Figure 2.3) then 26 (431%) were lost in flight, 
while 34 (56%) were lost in ground related incidents. For the largest of the US Navy's blimps the picture 
was even worse (Figure 2.4) with over four fifths of recorded losses involving ground related events: 
US Navy blimp accidents 
- 
1946 11961 (Tripp, c. 1961) 
flight 
not incident 
18% to flight 
25% 
static 
land/take(-off 
8% 
49% 
Figure 2.4 
- 
US Navy Post war blimp losses (data from Tripp, c. 1961 
- 
US Coastguard) 
It is thcrct'orc clear that ground-handling was oftar greater importance to both the large rigid airships of 
the 1930s, and to the big blimps in the 1940s and 50s, than it is to the more familiar HTA aircraft flying 
today. Thus any misunderstanding by the designers of the NGVLAs as to the vulnerability of large LTA 
aircraft when on the ground could prove to be ,, cry expensive indeed. 
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To a large extent this misunderstandin- is exacerbated by the fact that airships generally are seen is 
something ofaJok-c in the xorld of modern HTA a\ iation. Ho\\c,, ci-, 1111111our frcquentlý ariscs from all 
internal conflict ofinforniation and x\ hen iic\\ data contradicts N\ liat is already known. then the recipient 
I, Mý1,11s. This is in contrast to those who knoxN nothim, to start with. The\ do not find ne\\ information 
funriv, thev find it interestin(a. However. supplying accurate inforniation to people who have none, is one 
thin-, whereas correctim! wholly en-oneous convictions is much more diffiCUlt. This fact has recently 
been ohserý ed to be such a serious problem for those attempting to drum up funding fOr the NGV I-As that 
it has even been given a nanic: 
"The reaction in Government of'ficials first presented with airships as Solutions to Wly giVC11 
problem is one ot'hLI11101-OUS incredulitý 
... 
The dit'ficulties of' getting over this initial barrier 
should not be underestiniated.... The scrious side ol'this is the almost total lack ot'data within 
oovernment rcoarding past and current airship acti\ itics, limitations and capabilities. Not onlý 
does this I'ucl the Gi-de Factor. but it also leads to misconceptions re. garding airships 
(Gottlieb. 2000: L- I 
The point here is not that experts fi-oni other fields see airship GH as I'LInny, but, simply that thcý have 
prior knowledge, some of which is wrong, and \\hich means they 1reqUently, jump to false conclusions. 
They get hold ol'the \vront, 
, 
end of the stick. Moreover. these assumptions and misconceptions make the 
second group, in many ways the most difficult to deal with, especially when some of them are eminent in 
their own fields of knowledge. 
For example, here are desciiptions ofthe mooring process used bv the RIOO and RIO]. 
"Attachment ofthe airship [RIOOI to the [Cardingoton] mast is made by dropping a cable from the 
ship on to the aerodrome -, this cable is linked to a similar cable laid Out Upon the ground from 
the mast head. The ship can then be hauled in to the mast and moored. floating in the air with her 
own buoyancy. " (Burney, 1929: 2 14) 
"Normally. when an airship [either RIOO or RIOI I approached the [Cardington] mast slowly 
against the wind, a mooring cable was let out from the nosc to the ground and linked, by a 
ground party, to the end ofthe mooring cable paid out from the mast head. The cable was then 
slowly wound in 
... 
" (Masefield, 1982: 490) 
But here, although the mooring process described appears to be identical. there has clearly been some 
misunderstanding, somewhere along the line: 
-The airship [RIO]] was flown onto the mast which often proved to be a long and tedious 
process. Masts were also developed in the United States. For exaniple. the last United States 
rigid airship, the 'Macon, ' used a large and substantial niast. The mooring line was attached 
prior to docking to enable it to be winched onto the inast. Such a technique is much less 
fraught with danger than that used by RIM. - (Howe, "Ground handling and rnooring" in 
Khoury & Gillett, 1999: 307) [GC emphasis] 
Then there are a third group. These are people who know that there really are sonie very serious problenis 
but who deliberately deny or downplay thern. In this category are frequently to be found those who have 
vested interests to protect. 
-Every new weapon has at least two enernies in addition to official conservatism: its rabid 
opponents and its violent enthusiasts. Both have vested interests to protect. The fornier ridicule 
it as expensive and useless. the latter see it as an almost universal panacea. Neither is of course, 
tight. " (Higharn, 1961: 9) 
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To a large extent this rutisunderstanding is exacerbated by the fact that airships generally are seen as 
something of a joke in the world of modem HTA aviation. However, humour frequently arises from an 
internal conflict of information and when new data contradicts what is already known, then the recipient 
laughs. This is in contrast to those who know nothing to start with. They do not find new information 
funny, they find it interesting. However, supplying accurate information to people who have none, is one 
thing, whereas correcting wholly erroneous convictions is much more difficult. This fact has recently 
been observed to be such a serious problem for those attempting to drum up funding for the NGVLAs that 
it has even been given a name: 
"The reaction in Government officials first presented with airships as solutions to any given 
problem is one of humorous incredulity... The difficulties of getting over this initial barrier 
should not be underestimated.... The serious side of this is the almost total lack of data within 
government regarding past and current airship activities, limitations and capabilities. Not only 
does this fuel the Giggle Factor, but it also leads to iiiisconceptions regarding airships 
(Gottlieb, 2000: L-1) 
The point here is not that experts from other fields see airship GH as funny, but, simply that they have 
prior knowledge, some of which is wrong, and which means they frequently jump to false conclusions. 
They get hold of the wrong end of the stick. Moreover, these assumptions and misconceptions make the 
second group, in many ways the most difficult to deal with, especially when some of them are eminent in 
their own fields of knowledge. 
For example, here are descriptions of the mooring process used by the R100 and R101. 
"Attachment of the airship [RIO01 to the [Cardington] mast is made by dropping a cable from the 
ship on to the aerodrorne ; this cable is linked to a similar cable laid out upon the ground from 
the mast head. The ship can then be hauled in to the mast and moored, floating in the air with her 
own buoyancy. " (Burney, 1929: 214) 
"Normally, when an airship [either RIOO or RIOII approached the [Cardington] mast slowly 
against the wind, a mooring cable was let out from the nose to the ground and linked, by a 
ground party, to the end of the mooring cable paid out from the mast head. The cable was then 
slowly wound in 
... 
" (Masefield, 1982: 490) 
But here, although the mooring process described appears to be identical, there has clearly been some 
misunderstanding, somewhere along the line: 
"The airship [R101] was flown onto the mast which often proved to be a long and tedious 
process. Masts were also developed in the United States. For example, the last United States 
rigid airship, the 'Macon, ' used a large and substantial mast. The mooring line was attached 
prior to docking to enable it to be winched onto the mast. Such a technique is much less 
fraught with danger than that used by RIOV' (Howe, "Ground handling and mooring" in 
Khoury & Gillett, 1999: 307) [GC emphasis] 
Then there are a third group. These are people who know that there really are some very serious problems 
but who deliberately deny or downplay them. In tl-ds category are frequently to be found those who have 
vested interests to protect. 
"Every new weapon has at least two enemies in addition to official conservatism: its rabid 
opponents and its violent enthusiasts. Both have vested interests to protect. The former ridicule 
it as expensive and useless, the latter see it as an almost universal panacea. Neither is of course, 
right. " (Ifigham, 1961: 9) 
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In thi.,, instance, it is the latter group. the rabid enthusiasts. \vho are the problern. This is because theý are 
so convinced that airships are the solution to all the world's ills that they trý desperately to mininlise any 
obstacle to their de\elopment. Naturally this includes GH problems. which are perceixed as a boring topic 
that will hopefully go away if ignored Adherents to this philosoph% certaink do not wish to take GH 
difficulties seriously and will frequently deny that any exist at all. 
"it is to be re2rettcd that a rabid few paint airships onk with the free unrestricted superlati\c and 
seem to have foraotten. if they ever, knew, that there are any difficulties in airship operation. ** 
(Rosendahl. 1927) 
This group includes a sub-group composed of those who are intent on drumming up finance for airship Z. 
- 
proJects. They are motivated to deny the problem or to hush-it-up for political reasons and are apt to make 
such statements as "we don't want to frighten off potential investors. - 
The fourth group might be termed - the disinterested. " They may acknov%ledge that there are -ome serious 
GH problems but in general they are not really interested in anything to do with airships. On the contrary, 
many in this group actively try to ignore the whole field of LTA and perceive airships as at least a waste 
oftinie, if not something of a nuisance. In the past, this group has included some. but certainlv not all, of 
the regulatory authorities and there remain many within these ranks who would much prefer it if airships 
in general just went away forever. Latterly this attitude has mellowed somewhat, however. the old 
pre udice still surfaces occasionally 
- 
especially with regard to GH: 
personnel [for the NGVLAs] will definitelv not be licensed bN the state. For their 
training the [operating] company has to accept the full responsibilit%. " (KrUger. 2000: 4) 
This statement comes from an LBA presentation which was given at a conference organised by the LBA 
in their hometown ot'Braunschxk, eig. Germany. It can thus be taken as an officialiv sanctioned. if not 
actually declared. policy. However, it is the author's opinion that this policy will change, either ký hen the 
regulatory authorities themselves start to think seriously about the consequences of a NGVLA GH 
accident. or. ,, ad to say, more probably, when some government department throxk s the problem at them 
followins, a major head-line-grabbing incident. 
Lastly. there are the over confident. These include experts from within the LTA field who think thev can 
easily cope with the size increase. Some are convinced that they already know all the answers and as a 
consequence usually underestimate the scale, the time, the cost and the complexity of the NGVLA GH 
problems, which they perceive as having a fairly low priority. Many of this persuasion are well aware that 
GH is indeed a big problem for all airships and would argue that there is a widespread acknowledgement 
ofits importance within the industry, as evidenced by statements such as these: 
-All airships require a ground support team. It is impossible to safely operate an airship without 
such a team and the job of the ground crew is as important as flight crew 
- 
neither can operate 
without the other. " (Flying Pictures (Airships) Ltd., c 1988: 3) 
However, there are those among this group who refuse to admit that the size difference and the 
unprecedented procedures are going to make things any worse for the NGVLAs than they are for todaý's 
blimps. This deliberate denial is occasionally founded on professional pride. which adds further 
complexity, because there is no doubt in the minds of some insiders that the : iecessary skills to operate the 
NGVLAs already currently exist within the modern blimp industry. Thus anyone who asserts otherwise is 
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seen to be attacking the competence or abilities of those who run what has plainly become a perfectly 
viable svsteni for the operation of small blimps, within a v., orld dominated by HTA flight. 
Consequently. there is a widespread failure by many people, and not only those inside the LTA inclustry, 
to appreciate the enomious difference in size between the small modern blimps and the NGVLAs, and the 
difficulties that this can cause showed itself at CL 
- 
as can be seen from the following 
1 1.1 Defining the Spatial Reference Point 
There is a problern with the Spatial Reference Point (also known as the DatU111 Point) \ iz. - it'a report 
concerning a large airship states that "the airship was 100 feet above the ground" then the question needs Zý 
to be asked "where exactly on a very large airship is this being measured from? " 
In the course ofthis investigation, the author discovered that different departments within CL 
Development all answered this simple question rather differently. and at one tinie there were at least five 
different datum points in simultaneous use. These were :- 
" The tip of the airship's nose, 
" The centre of gravity (C of G) within the gas envelopc. 
" The pilot's head, 
" The bottom of the gondola (i. e. the intcrfacc between under-carriage and ground. ) and 
" The lowest point on the airship structure (which changes as the airship pitch angle alters). 
TI F NOSE 0a4:: ý LOWEST POINT P2 
WHEN NOSE IS 
PITCHED UP 
I PILOT'S HEAD i 
UNDERCARRIAGE I 
Figure 2.5 
- 
The different Daturn Points 
For small blimps, perhaps this difference does not matter very much, but with really large airships there 
can be more serious consequences 
- 
although sometimes these may be more amusing than probIctuatical. 
As for instance, when Draft I (January 1999) of the Transport Airship ReqLIiI'CII1CutS (TAR) appeared for 
review, boldly stating that: 
-§ 51 Take-off 
Upon reaching a height of 50 ft above the takeoff surface, the airship niust have reached the 
recornmended climb speed-, and 
... 
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§ 75 Landing 
The horizontal distance necessary to land and come to a complete stop from a point 50 ft above 
the landing surface must be determined, 
... 
" (LBA, 1999) 
This, of course, quite overlooked the fact that, were the datum point from which the measurement is 
taken, 1 to be defined as either the nose, or the C of G, (or for that matter the pilot's head, in the three- 
deck-gondola version), then an airship the size of the notional CL-160,2 would at all times be 
considerably above a height of 50 feet 
- 
even when it was securely attached to its mooring mast or safely 
parked inside the hangar. 
However, for the GH team the datum point question does have real relevance. For instance, if an NGVLA 
which is itself more than 200 metres in length, were to arrive at its landing place, with its safe capture 
dependent upon the ground crew connecting up one or more mooring lines dangling from its nose, and the 
length of these lines had been measured so as to reach the ground when the airship was flying straight and 
level, then a large nose-up pitch angle would mean that the ropes might not reach the ground before the 
tail-fin did. Alternatively, if the airship were pitched steeply nose-down it would drag many meters, (or 
perhaps many tens of metersj of slack rope over the ground, and this would need to be wound onto the 
cable drum of a winch before the tensioning process necessary for the landing proper could even start to 
happen. If the winch drum had been not been sized to accommodate this extra slack (resulting from the 
altered pitch angle), then again, the consequences could be very serious, especially if the airship was not 
actually able to complete a safe landing in these circumstances. 
This is only one, perhaps extreme, example, but it demonstrates that, when dealing with a brand new type 
of aircraft which is of a size that the NGVLAs will per force have to be, then it is extremely important for 
everyone involved, to know, (and also to be in complete agreement), as to exactly from where all the 
measurements are being taken. Nfisunderstandings between departments or even mismatched 
measurements have the potential to be exceedingly costly to the NGVLAs if only because they can waste 
considerable time. But, this example does show how easy it is to make comparisons with HTA, or 
assumptions about LTA, that while they may perfectly valid for the small blimps are in reality 
unworkable for the NGVLAs. 
Thus all groups 
- 
the public (who are genuinely nave); the novices from other fields (who approach the 
topic with deeply ingrained misconceptions); the enthusiasts and entrepreneurs (who try to minimise it or 
deny the problem exists); the regulatory authorities (who simply want it to go away), and, most 
particularly, the LTA experts (who think they can easily cope with the size increase) 
- 
are inclined to 
downplay the importance of the ground handling and the crew training problems and to arrive at the same 
frequently asked question. 
' At that time undefined in the TAR 
2A hull diameter of 65 m (Le. 213 ft) wouM put the tip of the nose at least 100 feet ag. l. 
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23 The problem of scaling up existing procedures 
When considering ways in which the NGVLAs might be handled on the ground, the most frequently 
asked question is: "Why not take the tried and tested procedures that are already certificated and fully 
licensed for current use by the modem blimps and simply scale up them to suit the NGVLAs? " 
The answer is twofold. 
Firstly, because the difference in size is quite simply too great. The largest modem airship currently 
flying, the Zeppelin NT-07, is 75 metres (246 ft) long. This is many times smaller than either the last, and 
largest, of the old Zeppelins 
- 
LZ130, which was 245 metres (803 ft) long, 
- 
or the first, and smallest, of 
the unbuilt CargoLifter prototypes, the CL160, which promised to be at least 260 metres (853 ft) long. 
However the length of an airship gives no real idea of the inertial forces that its pilot has to deal with. A 
far better guide to this can be gained from a comparison of the internal volumes, and thus of the weight of 
air, that each airship displaces. ' 
15T FLEW LENGTH VOLUME MASS 
C: 
1936 245 m 200,000 m3 245 t 
1958 122 m 42,937 M3 50 t ZPG-3W 
SKYSHIP 600 
1984 59 m 6,666 rn 3 8t 
1995 39 m 1,940 M3 2t LIGHTSHIP A-60 + 
1999 75 m 8,200 M3 lot ZEPPELIN NT- 07 
/"ýýCARGOLIFTER C7L-160 TBD 260 m 560,000 m 670 t 
Figure 2.6 
- 
Comparison of NGVLA physical dimensions with PGVLAs and modern blimps 
Adapted from CargoLifter scale drawing DE 550018 by Ferris (30 April 1999) 
1 It is not commonly understood that despite their apparent "weightlessnese', all LTA craft, still do have "mase' and thaL for 
example, a relatively small 4-seater hot air balloon, (which typically has hardware and internal gas with a mass of some 3 tonnes. 
and which also displaces some 3 tonnes of air), when gently drifting along at walking pace, would need the same amount of effort to 
stop it, as a6 tonne truck fre-ewheeling, un-powered, along flat ground at the same speed. (See also Foot note I on page 40 
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Thus, in terms of the weight of air displaced, the modem Zeppelin NT- 07, with a volume of 8,200 cu m 
has a mass of gas and hardware of less than 10 tonnes. This compares with 245 tonnes for both the 
LZ130 and its sister ship LZ129 "Hindenburg" (each of which had a volume of 200,000 cu m) and, just 
for the record, had the CLI 60 (volume 550, OW cu m) got off the drawing board it would have weighed in 
with a displaced mass of more than 670 tonnes. In HTA terms this is worse than putting the flight crew of 
a small twin business jet (10 tonnes) straight onto a Boeing jumbo airliner (350 tonnes) with no 
intermediate steps. It is therefore quite unreasonable to expect that the NGVLA flight crews will be able 
to make such a large skill-jump in both the size and the complexity of their aircraft in one go. 
The second reason why the modem blimp operational systems currently in use cannot simply be scaled up 
for super-large airships is because many of the procedures are actually inappropriate. This fact is readily 
acknowledged by those few who have seriously thought about the problem: 
"Whilst adequate techniques have been devised for use with smaller, non-rigid, craft, these are 
unlikely to be satisfactory for application to large, heavy lift airships should these become a 
reality. " (Howe, 1999: 299) 
Nevertheless, the popular misconception persists that the safest, quickest, cheapest way to develop the 
NGVLA operational systems is to base them on "modem airship operating procedures. " To see why this 
will not work, and why attempting to use even modified versions of these widely accepted, standard4 
modem blimp procedures is really not going to be a practical solution for the NGVLAs, it is necessary to 
exaniine some of these procedures in a little detail, and also to look briefly at their origins. 
The modem blimp operating procedures are derived from, but essentially the same as, those devised by 
Goodyear for the US Navy's blimps in the 1940s. These procedures are often collectively referred to as 
"heavy operations" and their original purpose was to minimise the need for the US Navy pilots to "valve 
off' or vent their lifting gas (the rare and expensive helium). This system was introduced as an alternative 
to the method previously used by earlier blimps, and the giant rigid "Zeppelins, " whereby cheap, and 
readily-available, hydrogen was vented with impunity. 
"rhe high cost of helium (at that time' about 70 times that of hydrogen), and the consequent 
undesirability of valving off gas to reduce excess buoyancy in flightý led in the Goodyear blimps 
to the technique of "heavy" operation, in which the ship is kept at all times slightly heavier than 
its aerostatic lift. It then takes off, flies and lands on dynamic lift like an aeroplane (Mowforth, 1991: 9) 
However, operating in the Goodyear manner did require that the blimps be fitted with certain specialised 
equipment that no HTA aeroplane would ever carry: 
"Dangling from the bow [of the K-ships] were two sets of ground-handling ropes, a pair of short 
lines and a pair of long lines. The former, because they were too short to whip into the 
propellers, were allowed to trail and blow about in flight. The latter, long enough to entangle 
themselves with the blades, were stowed before takeoff in boxes, port and starboard, at the front 
of the car. " (Vaeth, 1992: 41) 
Modem blimps have dispensed entirely with the "long linee' and all current GH procedures are conducted 
using only the "short lines", (nowadays known as "Main Handling Lines") but the operational system 
they employ remains essentially the same. Here, by way of comparison, is the manner in which the US 
I 
c. 1940 
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Navy K-ships (vol. 12,036 cu rn = mass 14.7 tonnes) were made ready for flight using the Goodyear 
"heavy operations" system in the Second World War. 
'The ground party used the short lines to hold the ship and keep it pointed into the wind after de- 
masting and just prior to takeoff. " (Vaeth, 1992: 4 1) 
And here is what the GH manual for the modem Skyship 600 series (vol. 6,600 cu m= mass 8 tonnes), 
says regarding the same procedure: 
"Once released [from the mast] the Crew Chief will move the airship rearwards using every 
means to keep it under control and facing into the wind. At the take-off site the Crew Chief will 
re-ballast the ship taking into account the pilot's static weight instructions. " (Airship Operations 
Inc. 1998: 5-11) 
Thus it can be seen that there are actually two separate problems to be solved at this point. Firstly, the 
airship must be disconnected and moved a safe distance from its mooring mast, and then, secondly, it 
must be held with its nose facing constantly into wind, so that it can be "weighed off. " This latter 
procedure is necessary in order to accurately determine two things: 
a) the amount of static lift the airship has, and 
b) the trim angle it will adopt when released from its mooring restraints. 
Both these standard pre-flight procedures, of maintaining constant nose-into-wind position and of 
adding/removing trim ballast, are done manually, by teams of people, for all the modem blimps that are 
currently operating. Few would argue that this system would be either safe or sensible for the NGVLAs - 
even the smallest of which will be many tens of metres high and contain ballast weighing tens of tons. 
For example it is inconceivable that the Ground Crew Chief for the NGVLAs will stand under the nose 
rope and make hand signals to the ground crew in order to weigh off the airship prior to a flight, as is 
depicted in a Skyship 600 Ground Handling Manual, ' (See Figure 2.7 
- 
Skyship Hand Signals overleaf. ) 
To begin with, the physical distance from nose rope to the gondola looks likely to be in excess of 100 
metres so the NGVLA pilots and gondola crews will hardly be able to see if the Crew Chief has an arm 
raised, let alone how many fingers he/she is holding out. 
The idea that these procedures can simply be "modemised" and replaced by some alternative 
communication method, such as a radio-link or by CCTV, needs to be viewed against the question of 
why, if this is so, the small advertising blimps which are currently operating have not already done this? 
The truth is that visual signals, which are non-electrically dependent, are at the heart of the modem blimp 
GH systems, and it would be foolhardy to assume that these tested means can simply be dispensed with, 
at least until an alternative has been satisfactorily demonstrated to work safely and reliably in the field. 
T'his is not to say it is impossible, only that it has not been done yet, and the current operators and 
regulators seem convinced that the system they are using for weighing-off the blimps prior to flight, is 
both the safest and the most cost-effective. 2 
1 Airship Operations Inc. 1998 
2 It should also be noted that the majority of the world's highly sophisticated aircraft at even the most modern airports continue to be 
directed visually onto their loading ramps by hand signals from ground crew personnel waving "paddles" and "illuminated wands. " 
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Airship Operations, Inc 
Pan 4 Ground Handling Manual 
BEFORE FLIGHT, CREW CHlEF PERFORMS TI-M 
GROUND WE-IGH OFF AND BALLASTING: 
9) Arm extended, palm flat, facing upwards, the 
hand is moved up and down, then rotated palm 
downwards, and moved from side to side. 
Means: PICK THE SI-HP UP FOR THE WEIGH 
OFF 
This is followed by the "Hold" signal (8) to steady the ship 
CREW CHM-F REQUIRES BALLAST TO BE ADDED 
TO THE SHIP: 
Operations Manual 
Section 5 
i "Two In7 
10)Arm at shoulder level, fingers extended to 
indicate the number of bags or weight to be 
added, the hand is moved as shown by the arrow. 
CREW CH[EF REQTHRES BALLAST TO BE 
REMOVED FROM THE SHIP: 
I]) Ann at shoulder level, palm towards the crew, 
the hand is moved outwards with the palm still 
facing the crew. 
Means: REMOVED THIS NUMBER OF BAGS. 
CREW CHIEF HAS COMPLETED ALL CHECKS AND 
BALLASTING, AND IS READY FOR TAKE-OFF. BE 
ASKS THE PILOT IF FIE IS READY: 
12) Arm extended and towards the pilot. Thumb up 
as shown. The whole arm and hand above the 
head. 
OFF" 
Means: ARE YOU READY FOR TAKE- 
PILOT IS RE ADY FOR TAKE-OFF: 
131Pflot's hand extended towards the Crew 
Chief in the "Thumbs Up7'siM the hand is 
then moved upward sharply or the vectors 
are raised to 45". 
Means: I AM RE ADY FOR TAKE-OFF. 
It abo is an instruction to the Crew Chief to 
allow the ship to lift off in the event of the 
pilot wishing to take control and clear the ground. 
"Four Out" loo 
-- 
40 
1J 
13) 
12) 
Change N 5-19 Date 
Original Nov 98 
Figure 2.7 
- 
Skyship Hand Signals (Airship Operations Inc., 1998: 5/19) 
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However, after having separated the modem blimp from its mooring equipment, and established that it is 
correctly trimmed and loaded, the next problem is to get it airborne. There are essentially two ways in 
which this has been achieved 
horizontally (also known as the rolling take-off), and 
0 vertically (also known as an up-ship take off). 
The Goodyear system is based upon the former method and here is how the US Navy did things 
horizontally in 1942-44: 
"... K-ships customarily took off "heavy, " their total or gross weight exceeding what their gas 
alone could lift. To overcome this heaviness, they made a take-off run on their wheel, becoming 
airborne when the aerodynamic lift generated by airspeed, angle of attack, and hull form 
overcame the heaviness. 
... 
Z? VP-Ks, although designed for a maximum "heavy" take-off of 
1,500 pounds [680 kg], were commonly flown much heavier, 1800,2,000, even 3,000 pounds 
[816 
- 
1360 kg] heavier than the lift that their helium alone would permit. " (Vaeth, 1992: 39) 
But there are some fundamental laws of physics that make such a system unattractive for very large 
airships. To whit: 
"Scaling effects are disadvantageous at this point 
... 
the relative amount of heaviness, which can 
be taken dynamically, decreases with size. An A60+ 1 when taking off 10% heavy needs the 
same lift coefficient and speed as a CargoLifter CL 160 2 taking off 1.5% heavy. This effectively 
cancels out one major advantage of utilising "aerostatic" lift. 
... 
and 
... 
If large airships, which 
displace 500 tons of air and entrain the same amount more 
... 
(resulting in an inertial mass in 
excess of 1,000 tons) 3 are going to take-off and land horizontally, then they are going to require 
some enormously long runways. " (Camplin & Schaefer, 2002) 
Moreover, in contrast to their HTA competitors, the inherent inability of all airships to take-off, or make a 
landing, with any sort of cross-wind, will mean that the NGVLAs are also going to need their very long 
runways to point into every conceivable wind direction. Not only would this result in a formidable civil 
engineering project but it would also seem to undermine the very reason for building very large airs1iips 
in the first place. 
"... dependence upon aerodynamic control is in direct contravention of the primary advantage of 
aerostatic lift in conferring vertical take-off and landing. Some amelioration is possible by 
resorting to short take-off and landing, but any significant compromise in this respect removes 
one of the major operational advantages of the airship. " (Howe, 1999: 299) 
Thus STOL or VTOL procedures look far more attractive for the NGVLAs, rather than trying to scale up 
the Goodyear "heavy" operational methods for taking-off 
- 
or, indeed, for landing. 
"A normal landing [for the US Navy blimps] was made about two hundred to four hundred 
pounds [90-180 kg] heavy, the aircraft touching down and rolling out toward the ground crew 
with power just ample for control. Once well in hand, the ship was hauled in to the mobile 
mooring mast, then shunted to a mooring circle or towed to a hanger berth. " (Althoff, 1990: 215) 
I [Lightship A60+ has a volume of 1,940 cu m= mass of 2 tonnes] 
2 [estimated volume 550,000 cu m= mass of 670+ tonnes] 
3 
"Ibe development of the equations of motion follows standard aircraft practice where derivative notation is used to describe 
aerodynamic effects. 'Me major differences are due to the fact that the vehicle is buoyant and displaces a large volume. Ile 
buoyancy force B and virtual mass and inertia terms are significant additions to the familiar aircraft equations of motion. 
... 
The 
virtual mass and inertia effects are described by the derivatives of aerodynamic force and moment with respect to linear and angular 
acceleration perturbations. For this reason it is arguable whether these effects should be regarded as part of the aerodynamic 
description of the model or whether they should be regarded literally as additional mass or inertia terms. In the present context the 
latter description is preferred since in a practical situation it is impossible to distinguish between physical mass and inertia and 
added mass and inertia. " (Cook, IM: 76-77) 
39 
However, if the NGVLAs are going to land horizontally then their enormous inertial mass will mean that 
the airships themselves are going to require some very substantial (i. e. heavy) landing gear. This was 
foreseen to be a problem prior even to the first ever successful large airship ascent and was acknowledged 
again in the golden age of the large rigid airships: 
"Landing [Count Zeppelin's first Air-Ship LZIJ will also be a very ticklish manoeuvre, as 
anything like a bump might cause the whole framework, and especially the propeller 
connections, to be bent. " (Aeronautical Journal, 1899: 77) 
'It is impossible to conceive a large airship running at high speed along the flying field before 
taking the air; and still less would it be possible to construct an airship capable of sustaining the 
shock of striking the ground at high speed when landing. " (Burgess, 1927: 289) 
"rhe chief thing in landing is to expose neither the craft nor its occupants to harm. This applies 
to both air and water craft. The danger of the landing shock increases with the size of the craftý 
and still more with its speed at the moment it comes in contact with fixed objects on the earth's 
surface. " (Krell, 1928) 
Indeed, it should be noted that, whereas, the landing gear fitted to the majority of the small First War 
blimps was a simple "skid7', the large rigid ships used a "bumper bag" (with the exception of LZ129 
Hindenburg and its sister ship LZI30 Graf Zeppelin H which were unique among the PGVLAs in that 
they were equipped with retractable wheels). This was in contrast to the "Goodyear" three-wheeled, 
shock-absorbing, "tricycle undercarriage' that was used by all the US Navy's Second War blimps, which 
allowed them to behave more like normal aeroplanes. 
While the adoption of this system was fine in theory, and things undoubtedly worked well when 
conditions were "normal", in practice, the determination to cling onto the lifting gas at all costs often 
meant that when it came to a "light" landing in the heat of the day, the Goodyear system actually had 
little, if any, advantage over that previously used by the First World War airships. For example, here is 
the enormously experienced First War blimp pilot Capt. George Meager recalling his landing in the 
hydrogen-filled, Italian-built semi-rigid SR. 1 (vol. 12,489 cu m= mass 15.2 tonnes), at Aubagne Airship 
Station, near Marseilles, at 3 p. m. in the afternoon on 28h October 1918. 
"Although I valved a large amount of gas, the sun was still heating us up 
... 
and I had to go 
round again. We made a very wide circle under the lee of the mountains; I remember valving 
practically the whole way round; even then, when we turned in to make our landing we were still 
light, so I went very low, having to keep up a fairly high speed to do so. I had a good length of 
trail rope on the ground; one brave matelot, ahead of the main party, grabbed hold of it and was 
dragged some distance along the ground, but wouldn't let go until the main party manned the 
rope and hauled us down. " (Meager, 1970: 110) 
Compare this with the experiences of the helium-filled Goodyear/US Navy K-ships using the "heavy 
operatiome', some twenty five years later, during the Second World War. 
"Getting down by valving helium was strongly disapproved of 
... 
So landing approaches had to 
be made and repeated until, flying nose down to generate negative aerodynamic lift, the ship 
eventually came low enough to the ground to place its handling lines, car rail, and drag rope into 
the hands of the awaiting and long-suffering ground crew. When forcing itself down, it had to 
have a fair amount of airspeed, but to permit the ground party to grab the lines, it had to slow 
down. When it did, it began to rise again. One exhausted ground-handling officer reportedly 
broke down on the field and cried, frustrated beyond all understanding by the airship's 
unwillingness to come down. It was said at Lakehurst that one K-ship had made thirteen 
attempts before getting down. A South Weymouth airship was reputed to have made something 
like nineteen! " (Vaeth, 1992: 43/44) 
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Sixty years still further on, and the light landing remains a problem for small blimps today. Although 
operational techniques have developed in the meantime that ameliorate things for the smallest of them: 
"Landing when light 
- 
Another option, and a very effective one, is the "hooked" landing. This 
entails approaching the crew low to the ground at an acute angle and turning sharply into the 'V' 
at the last moment. The turn rapidly absorbs much of the airship's energy and momentum 
[Lightship A60+ volume 1,940 cu m= mass of 2 tonnes] and, if judged correctly, can bring the 
ship into the crew at a very slow speed, even if quite light. The crew must be quick to react as 
the airship will soon begin to rise, as speed is lost. " (Adams, 1999) 
However, no one could seriously consider scaling-up this particular manoeuvre for the super large 
airships of the future. Nevertheless it underlines the value of technique in overcoming some of these 
intractable problems, and it also demonstrates that there has been a steady evolution of blimp procedures 
since the advent of the Goodyear system. This is an important point, for it emphasises that, while modem 
procedures are "derived" from "heavy" operations, they actually differ from them in significant ways. 
Of these, perhaps the most obvious, and most influential, is the capability of some modem blimps to 
produce "vectored" or vertical thrust to counteract their excess lift. This is a system that was originally 
trialled and then abandoned by the British, in the very earliest days of their airship development 
programme, ' before the First World War. It was then re-invented, with some success by the Americans 
for the largest and most sophisticated of their helium-filled rigid airships (ZRS4 "Akron " and ZRS-5 
"Macon ") both of which used it as standard practice until their respective untimely demises in the early 
1930s. The idea was then ignored by Goodyear for the US Navy blimps of the Second World War, only to 
reappear at the start of the modem blimp revival with the British built Skyships in the 1970*s. 
However, even these modem airships, which now regard their vectored thrust capability as a vital part of 
normal operational procedures, still find the light landing problematical 
- 
although far less so than the 
large rigid airships of the past, which also suffered from, and had their own ways of dealing with, the 
same problems of superheating: 
"Today, [25h November 19241 Commissioning Day, [for Los Angeles] there are thirty-nine 
officers and men on board 
... 
The airship tries to land. 
... 
she cannot reach the ground 
- 
the ship 
is too "light. " The navy is operating its lighter-than-air program on a budgetary shoestring 
... 
if 
possible the captain wants to land without valving the precious gas. But the ground crew 
... 
cannot pull her down. The wind is gusty. A handling line snaps. Reluctantly, 
... 
seventy 
thousand cubic feet of helium are released 
... 
After several failed attempts, ZR-3 lands into the 
anxious hands of the ground crew. Navy men scramble aboard as ballast to help keep the ship 
heavy; the rest hold her down. The ceremony can finally proceed. " (Althoff, 1990: xi/xii) 
What this highlights, is that despite all their differences, the one thing that all these systems have in 
common is their total reliance upon the ground crew personnel to effect a safe landing 
- 
and the Goodyear 
system throughout and beyond the Second World War, did need a lot of people. 
"The long lines were essentially landing ropes. Released and dropped as the blimp reached the 
handling party, they were caught hold of and used to slow the ship and, in the case of a "light" 
landing, to haul it down. For unusually light landings or those being made in high winds, a drag 
rope was also carried, stowed under the deck, to be dropped to the ground handlers if an 
additional line was needed. In good weather, ground handling required about forty men, more, of 
course, if it was bad, particularly if it was gusty. " (Vaeth, 1992: 41) 
1 Swivelling or directional propellers were patented in England by Capt. W. Beedle whose unsuccessful blimp made its only flight 
with them in 1903. They were subsequently fitted to all four of the "Willows' blimpe' and also to Army Airship "Gamma" (HMA 
No. 18) in 1913. An extensively modified version of them was also fitted by Vickers to the British rigid airship 'HMA No. 9r. " 
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It was a similar story when it came to landing. the British blimps in the First World War. 
"When the flight ended, it was sometimes possible for the pilot to "ballast up" and adjust the 
trim before flying the airship very slowly upwind at a low height towards the landing party, who 
would attach their lines to the handling guys, take hold of the car and walk the craft back into the 
hangar. In difficult conditions or in gusty weather, however, such a simple procedure was not 
possible and it became necessary to drop a long and heavy trail rope, which was grabbed by the 
handling party, who then pulled the still-buoyant airship down within reach. Sometimes a loop 
of the trail rope was passed under the wheel of a "snatch block! ' 
-a form of swivelling pulley 
open at one side and set in concrete 
- 
in order to prevent the handlers from being lifted off their 
feet and to enable them to use their strength more efficiently. " (Abbott, 1989: 9/10) 
Of even greater concern to those intent on development of systems for the NGVLAs, is the fact that even 
with their vectored thrust capability, the modem Skyship 600 blimps, which are arguably the most 
successful of the modem blimp generation, but which are tiny' in comparison with the large rigid ships, 
still typically require a ground crew complement of some 15 or so people2 to grab hold of their ropes and 
bring them to a standstill a the end of their flights. 
Indeed, it is interesting to note that, despite the fact that the US Navy spent a great deal of time and 
money in the 1950s, developing "motorised mulee' for GH the largest blimps ever to have flown'3 that 
such vehicles are not used by any modem blimps today, apart from Goodyear 
- 
who only use them at their 
Wingfoot Lake home base. Furthermore, when given the opportunity to start with a clean slate, the largest 
modem airship currently flying has proudly become the single exception in the modem fleet and reverted 
to a vertical landing method. The Zeppelin NT07, (roughly half the length and one-fifth the volumelmass 
of the ZPG-3M claims a vastly reduced number of groundcrew as a result of its use of vectored thrust 
from swivelling engines 
- 
just as the giant rigids Akron and Macon did in the 1930s. 
Nevertheless the fact that all, except one, of the 20 or so airships currently operating world wide still rely 
on "people power" serves only to underline that even in today's hi-tech world there is nothing better for 
all-weather, all-terrain work than the human runner. No wheeled vehicle can accelerate or decelerate, and 
simultaneously change direction as quickly, on such a wide variety of different surfaces, as a person on 
two legs. Thus, notwithstanding that there have been some promising trials using "hover-cushione' with 
unmanned model airships, 4 and that airship ground crew personnel are commonly derided as little more 
than 'voice-activated, self-propelled sandbags, ' it is still the case in the modem world, that their 
replacement by mechanised (presumably robotic? ) means would seem to be a very long way off. 
However in today's highly regulated and safety conscious world, the idea of hundreds of people running 
around after dangling ropes, as a primary braking system for the NGVLAs, is laughably impracticable. 
Nevertheless some way of bringing the NGVLAs safely to a halt, unharmed, whenever they need to 
make a light landing will have to be found, if for no other reason than this: 
"Reliable mechanised ground handling systems will be essential with larger airships as they will 
be too big to be handled safely by any ground crew small enough to be economic. " (Netherclift, 
1993: 29) 
Skyship 600 volume 6,600 cu m= mass 8 tonnes. 
I ground crew chief, 2 licensed engineers, 13 general purpose crew (NethercM 1993: 67) 
The ZPG-3W was 122m (406 ft) long, displaced 42,000 cu m of air = mass of some 50 tonnes 4 F-g. The Advanced Technologies Group "Skykitten" which firv flew at Cardington in 2000 
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And, whatever this system is, it will have to include the development of a less frantic and much more 
reliable braking system, to replace the "aerodynamically" based methods currently in use after the modem 
blimp has touched down. 
As can be seen from the following (Figure 2.8/3) the problem for all airships is that the inherently high 
centre of gravity always results in the ship's nose pitching sharply downwards. 
1. A "superheated" or 
statically light airship starts 
to rise as it slows down aný\ 
the pilot also progressively 
loses aerodynamic control. 
0 
2. A strong (heavy) undercarriage 
is required for landing because 
airship has large inertial mass and2 
lightweight (Le. fragile) structure. 
3. Deceleration by brakes on wheel, C of G 
or thrust reversal, or tension on nose 
handling lines all result In big pitch 
angle because C of G is so high. 
Figure 2.8 
- 
The problems of deceleration when landing horizontally 
The faster the deceleration is, the greater the tendency to pitch forward, which puts greater loads upon the 
structure and increases reliance on the shock-absorbing capabilities of the undercarriage. This is 
regardless of whether the decelerating force is applied by means of brakes on the wheels (the First War 
blimps gave up and used a simple wooden "skid"), or by reversal of thrust from the engines (which are 
traditionally low-slung for ease of access/maintenance), or by teams of people pulling on the nose 
mooring lines 
- 
as is currently done by the blimps today. 
Deceleration in general will thus be quite a problem for the NGVLAs, even when making a normal 
landing, and this is especially so for those intended as cargo-carrying ships, where the stability will be 
strongly influenced by the "pendulune' effect of the many (I 00's? ) tons of payload (or ballast) on board. 
Clearly there are serious problems with using this horizontal method for very large airships and indeed 
better, and potentially more useful systems have been devised for, and were used by the PGVLAs. These 
"forgotteif' methods centre on the vertical rather than the horizontal approach, which has so dominated all 
airship development ever since it was adopted by Goodyear for the blimps of the Second World War. 
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For example. at the conclusion of their development programmes in the 1930s. the bi- figid airships. 
when tlleý' tOOk-Off. Used either their passive -aerostatic lift" or. in the case of the US Na\ ý giants ZR-4 
Akron and ZR-5 Macon, their active "vectored thrust" to climb \ertically from their -moorings. - Theý 
were subscclimitly "winched" vertically back down again when they -moored. - 
Vertical landing advantages 
1. Airship slows to zero ground-speed NOTE: One man can control winches and 
2. Airship weighs-off to neutral buoyancy 
both aircrew and groundcrew can relax 
after ropes are connected and tensioned 
3. Airship drops ropes when ready to land 
4. Ground crew connect ropes to winch lines. 
5. Airship tensions ropes by dropping ballast 
6. Airship is winched down vertically onto its mooring mast 
7. Winches control speed of whole process 
NOTE: Rope connection 8. Yaw lines prevent airship from surging forward onto mast 
marks hand over of 
control from pilot to 
qround crew chief 
NOTE: Landing gear is not 
required. Airship can be held 
temporarily on yaw lines alone if 
main winch has problem 
Yaw lines 
This was the method developed for landing the large rigid airships of the 1930's 
Figure 2.9 
- 
Vertical landing advantages 
Figure 2.9 shows some ofthe advantages for very large airships ofusing the vertical mooring method. 
Although this process was occasionally assisted by vectored thrust, it should be noted that very few of the 
PGVLAs were fitted with, orseerned to feel the need for, swivelling propellers. 
Indeed, a little closer examination of the next step in the mooring process, after deceleration, reveals a 
further serious problem for the NGVLAs. Irrespective of whatever method is used to slow them down, 
cven after a normal landing in standard operating conditions, there is still the problem of what to do with 
them after they have stopped 
- 
i. e. the actual "Ground Handling. " Figure 2.10 (overieaf) shows in 
diagrammatic form some ofthe fundamental difficulties of attaching airships to mooring masts. It also 
incidentally demonstrates the point that the airship and the mast are two parts of one system because the 
flexibility built into the mast is reflected in the loads generated in the airship structure. 
However, this passive, aerostatic method is a completely different pfinciple more akin to sea-going ships 
coming alongside ajetty than to any landing system currently in use by anything flying under the present 
rules ofaviation. ' But the vertical approach is obviously a far more realistic starting point when 
considering potentially suitable landing systems for the even larger NGVLAs envisaged for the future. 
Helicopters do not relv on ropes and winches to pull them down. ' 
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Comparison of horizontal and vertical masting 
1. Airship is "walked-up" to 
mooring mast by ground crew 
2. Approach must be slow 
because in theory airship has to 
stop dead when It tOLJChe% n13St 
3. In practice energy of impact is absorbed by 
mast oscillations and airship hull flexing to 
dissipate longitudinal shock waves. 
NOTE: Oscillations 
f exaggerated for effect 
Small pressurised blimp airships with flexible hulls can withstand these forces. 
2 Airship does not stop dead 
but has space to shed 
downward inertial energy. 
1. Approach speed 
governed and controlled 
by winches to suit weather 
conditions 
NOTE: Tail fins help 
cushion momenturn. 
3. Vertical impact puts mast into 
compression and airship nose cone 
into sheer. Both structures are 
designed for these forces. 
NOTE: Mast may 
contain very large 
shock absorber 
Figure 2.10 
- 
Comparison of horizontal and vertical mast operations 
Such thinking is alien to many of those who come fi-esh to the subject ofairships from other branches of 
aviation today. They see the modern blimps simply as rather peculiar aircraft that are the '*. successful" 
end-product of a continuous development process. which essentially evolved after the old, "failed. " rigid 
airships had become extinct. They see no reason why this evolutionary process should not continue and 
the procedures be adapted to the NGVLAs. What they fail to appreciate, and what this brief analysis has 
shown, is that the Goodyear -heavy" or horizontal operational systern is not so very different from the 
operational systems that were commonly used by the small blimps during the First World War. 
Consequently many of these so-called "modern" methods were indeed contemporary with the large rigid 
airships, and the reason that such systems were not used by the PGVLAs is therefore rather different from 
that which is commonly pre-supposed. 
- 
and it is directly related to size. An additional disadvantage of 
operating an aerostat as if it were an aerodyne is that it also significantly increases drag and this will both 
upset scheduled flight arrival times and increase fuel consumption for the NGVLAs 
- 
however these 
issues lie beyond the scope of this work. 
It is therefore evident that although the small modern blimps may outwardly resemble their extinct 
cousins, (and indeed are widely regarded by many people as merely smaller versions ofthe large rigid 
airships), they are actually completely different aircraft. and they possess very different capabilities and 
requirements. Consequently the GH procedures that are widely accepted, and most commonly used, by 
the "small" modern blimps are not going to be suitable for (lie comparatively '*enormous" NGVLAs. 
Thus, the current operational techniques cannot simply be "scaled up to plug the Knowledge Gap- and 
some other way will have to be found to train the NGVLA ground crews. 
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2.4 The problem of simulating prototypes 
In the field of education, it is commonly accepted, when it comes to job-training and the acquisition of 
skills, that: 
"Most skills can be acquired and improved by drills, because skill implies the mastery of 
definable and predictable behaviour. Skill instruction can rely, therefore, on the simulation of 
circumstances in which the skill will be used. " (Illich, 1973: 24) 
It follows therefore, that one frequently suggested, possible way around both the "Knowledge Gap" and 
the "Problem of Scale" would be to train both the flight and ground-based personnel using an airship 
flight simulator. Indeed an Advanced Flight Simulator (AFS) for airships has already been established (in 
1995) thanks to the combined efforts of the Ministry of Defence, Cranfield University and DRA Bedford 
(as it was then called). This has been used with some success for small blimp airships. However, the 
paper describing its development, given at the Airship Association's Convention in 1996, reveals the 
Achilles Heel of adapting this, or any other AFS, for very large airships: 
"rhe validation of the accuracy of any simulation is key to confidence in the simulation trial 
results. Again, unlike fixed wing and rotorcraft simulations, where core model validation has 
been an ongoing process for a number of years, the airship programme presents special 
challenges in this area. " (Martyn & Brown, 1996) 
And here is one example of just such a 'special challenge': 
"Dedicated flight trials on the DTEO Boscombe Down S600 [Skyship 6001 were planned to 
gather validation data, but when the vehicle was involved in an accident in Spring 1995 the 
validation flight test progranune was lost. " (Martyn & Brown, 1996)1 
Fortunately, for the team at DRA Bedford, the Skyship 600 was already a fully certified aircraft, with a 
proven and successful track-record and a long, well documented, operational history: 
"One mitigating factor was that it was understood that the core Cranfield model had been 
validated against flight test data. " (Martyn & Brown, 1996) 
However, this cannot be the case for the NGVLAs. They have no previous flight history and thus there is 
no validation data available. There are only 'virtual' airships 
- 
and, while some may argue that some 
theoretical work could be some of assistance, the fact remains that accurate data of NGVLA performance 
and of their behaviour in the 'real' world cannot be collected until at least one, real, very large airship 
actually makes (preferably more than one) real test flights. Thus there is a circular argument wherein a 
large airship is needed to make test flights, in order to gather the data, to validate a simulator, to train the 
crew so that they are adequately skilled to fly the first test flight! 
In the meantime, simulation programmes for NGVLAs can only be based on unvalidated and unverifiable 
theories. And relying on theory alone, when building new flying machines, carries significant risks 
- 
as 
was previously noted in the early days of fixed wing aviation: 
"Both men [the pioneer aircraft builders M. Cldment and Wilbur Wright] much prefer what 
-is to what may be, and 
... 
they are deeply imbued with the deceptiveness of theory and the 
foolishness of counting upon anything which has not withstood the test of time and experience. " (G. A. R. 1909) 
[Audiors note: It would be interesting to know how close dieoretical pre-test-flight predictions were to actual performance. ] 
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And in similar vein, the French architect of the then revolutionary design for the long-standing corrugated 
concrete hangars at Orly, Paris, wrote: 
"It is only natural that intuition should be controlled in the light of experience, but when it turns 
out to be in direct opposition to some calculated result 
... 
it is almost always the answer 
determined by calculation that turns out to be wrong. " (Eugene Freyssinet (1879-1962), quoted 
in Dean, 1989: 13) 
This remains true today and some recent prime examples of over-confidence in modem computer-based 
design and calculation methods include: 
0 The Boeing Osprey VTOL aircraft which has recently suffered severely from the unforeseen 
effects of flying into its own wake vortex. 
London's famous "wobbly footbridge" where the most advanced software analysis in the late 
1990's failed to predict a potential performance failure; notwithstanding the fact that the same 
design of bridge had been rejected for the Messina Straits for reasons of dynamic instability in 
197 1. (D. E. J. Walshe via Wootton, 200 1). 
0 The Met. Office weather forecast computer which failed to predict the October 1987 "London 
hurricane" because it could not accept the existence of radically extreme conditions. 
This last example highlights a further problem for simulations in general and with the development of an 
AFS for large airships in particular. 
"Although simulators can replicate normal manoeuvres, they cannot replicate every eventuality 
that might be experienced in real flight. Physical limitations on the movements of a motion 
platform make it impossible to replicate extreme manoeuvres. " (Read, 2001) 
In fact most current simulations are of operations where the mathematical relationships are linear, or can 
be defined by a simple functional relationship. This imposes limits on their use, as has been noted: 
'The use of modem simulators in the current [military] flying training system is somewhat 
limited and where they are used they are generally relatively simple. They provide only a limited 
capability beyond the instruction of basic aircraft systems, basic emergency handling, and 
instrument flying. " (Field, 200 1) 
Thus, simulators for HTA craft are seldom actually operated in highly non-linear modes such as a stalled 
condition for example. However, an airship when it is moored is subject to an airflow (the wind) which 
has a comparatively low speed and which may approach from almost any angle. The hull and the fins are 
thus technically "stalled " for much of the time. Consequently it is only simulations of the highly non- 
linear relationships that are of any real interest. 
Moreover, it must not be forgotten, that in order to simply take-off and land vertically from the hover, the 
NGVLAs will inevitably be using, as normal, operating procedures that are completely different from 
those currently in use by conventional HTA aircraft. Furthermore, while any large airship's behaviour 
during approach to a landing, and climb-out from take-off, would, superficially, appear to be akin to the 
'vertical' methods used by today's helicopters, or by Harrier jump-jets, (and therefore ought to be 
amenable to their similar extant regulations and training programmes) in fact, the NGVLAs will, in 
reality, have very little in common with HTA craft. The difference stems from the airship's inherent 
buoyancy, which means that, for example, an engine failure during take-off would be far from critical. 
Indeed, some of the PGVLAs habitually "took-off' without using their engines at all. 
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"With the controls in neutral Shenandoah " [US Navy's ZR-I] was carefully weighed off, the 
officers noting any rise or fall of the stem. Ballast (water, fuel, or men) was shifted as needed, 
and at 15.00 [on 3 1' May 1924], the ship cast off [for her 24 th fli ght] a trifle light by the bow. 
She was allowed to free-balloon to a safe height above the mast, where, finally, her Packard 
engines barked to life. " (Althoff, 1990: 41) 
Thus there is no doubt that, whatever their eventual chosen preferred procedures turn out to be, any 
NGVLAs will perforce clearly be quite unlike any aircraft currently flying and will consequently operate 
using methods and systems that are similarly unparalleled in modem aviation. Herein lies a further 
acknowledged problem for any attempts to construct computer simulations of them. 
"The aim of the first trial was to assess the simulation subjective [1y] in a known configuration. 
This was done by configuring the simulation as an SlOOO [Sentinel 10002 ] and conducting 
general handling, stability and control testing. This precluded an acknowledged problem with the 
NASA Ames Airship trial 
- 
that the simulation was not configured as a vehicle which the 
subject pilots had flown. " (Martyn & Brown, 1996) 
Even where cockpit configurations are well established there are still severe limitations as to what may be 
achieved in terms of crew training with simulations. 
'The speaker [Air Vice Marshall Corbitt] accepted that the Services were some way behind the 
civil community in the use of simulators 
... 
Research had shown that the anticipated level of 
simulation would still not represent the physical stresses or psychological aspects of military 
flying-, nor would simulators be able to reproduce the unpredictable nature of live flying which 
was essential to the development of sound operational captaincy and airmanship. " (Field, 2001) 
Furthermore, it would seem to be a great mistake to assume that old flying machines were easier to fly 
(and therefore required lesser skills) just because they were less sophisticated and of simpler construction. 
In fact the reverse would seem to be case. 
"Test pilots from Edwards Air Force base flying a simulator fitted with the flying characteristics 
of the original 1903 Wright Flyer were all unable to keep the craft airborne for one second 
without crashing. The pilots practised on a Learjet 24 simulator adapted by the American 
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics. " (RAeS, A. 1., 2001: 13) 
It is thus evident that computer simulations, far from providing a solution to the crew training problems 
for the NGVLAs, are themselves also subject to the very same "Knowledge Gap" that has arisen as a 
result of the inconvenient date-expiry of all experienced personnel. Without either data to validate the 
computer programmes on which they are based, or personnel with experience of very large airships, who 
can comment on the approximation to reality, and give some comparison with the behaviour actually 
observed in the past, it is difficult to see how the results of any immediate present-day attempts to create 
NGVLA simulations can produce anything that is much more than guesswork. 
However, n-dsunderstandings and confusion are widespread in the public mind, as to the problem-solving 
capabilities of computer-controlled simulations 
- 
and indeed, of the absolute necessity of training with 
them. As an example, one serious suggestion, which was made to help solve some of the problems 
foreseen with the training of GH personnel for the gigantic CargoLifter airships, was that a mock-up of 
' ZR-I Shenandoah was 207 m (680 ft) long and had a volume of 60,800 cu m (2,148,000 cu ft) giving a displaced mass of 
approximately 75 tonnes 
2 Ibe Sentinel 1000 (SIOOO) was conceived in 1987 as a half-linear scale, proof of concept for the US Navy's YEZ-2A Operational 
Development Model (ODM) airborne early warning (AEW) airship. Me YEZ-2. A was never built but the prototype S 1000 flew 
many hours of trials until it was destroyed in a hangar fire at Weeksville on 2nd August 1995. The Sentinel 1000 was 65m (213ft) 
long and contained 10,000 m3 of gas giving it a displaced ran s of some 12 tonnes. 
48 
the "Load-Exchange Systea' (LES) could be suspended from the hangar roof and that "computer 
controlled cranes" could then be used to mimic the behaviour of the airsl-ýip. This of course completely 
overlooked the annoying little fact that there is currently no verified data available upon which to base the 
computer programme needed to control the cranes. And, unfortunately: 
"Simulators rely on input from mathematical models based on data provided by aircraft 
manufacturers from flight test programmes. If any of this information is wrong, then pilots could 
be relying on inaccurate information. " (Read, 2001) 
And, what is true for the pilots inside the airship is equally true for those on the ground who are 
endeavouring to take control of the same aircraft when it wants to stop flying. Thus, unless the airship 
behaves accurately in the simulation, then procedures may easily be devised and rehearsed which will 
prove, in reality, to be either unworkable, or perhaps unnecessary, or just plain dangerous. 
This is a serious problem for all prototypes, not just for the NGVLAs. In today's world of computer 
animation, it is extremely easy to get carried away with the technology and to lose sight of exactly what 
the aim is. 
"rhe most seductive tool of all [for management] is computers. Of course, computers are 
important and necessary in many applications 
... 
But they are not 'solutions'. A computer is a 
tool, Eke a hammer, and the only strategy a company needs for it is to use where appropriate. " 
(Caulkin, 2005) 
The danger of falling into this trap has recently been further increased by the dramatic development of the 
computer's abilities to spawn virtual realities, including visual graphic models, which give the appearance 
of coming ever closer to the real world. But, the old saying still holds good 
- 
"appearances can be 
deceptive" 
- 
and without some basis in the real world, (i. e. a reality check), then attempting to rely on un- 
validated computer simulations to train novice personnel to conduct unprecedented GH procedures for the 
untested prototype NGVLAs seems almost certain to cause more problems than it solves. 
2.5 The problem of simulating Ground Handling 
If the foregoing focus on "flight' 'simulation, would seem to have little to do directly with the problems 
associated with the GH of airships, then it should be borne in mind that any Advanced Ground Handling 
Simulators (AGHS), intended to assist with the training of ground crews for the NGVLAs, can only be 
derived from an AFS for a specific airship and not the other way around. The AFS must exist before the 
AGHS because GH does not exist for its own sake. The procedures involved are a response to the actual 
needs of the airship and consequently, the training of its ground crew must depend upon any specific 
airship's real requirements. Until these requirements are clearly defined and the GH procedures agreed, 
then the planning of the training systems to guarantee the competency of the personnel involved, cannot 
seriously begin in detail. 
Furthermore, it must be emphasised that all of the problems so far identified above, with regard to the 
Knowledge Gap, and the problem of scaling-up, and the simulation of prototypes, that were foreseen to be 
problematic for the NGVLA flight crews, are going to be even more difficult to overcome with regard to 
the training of their ground crews. 
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For example, a realistically useful AGHS for any size of airship is going to require far more than just an 
accurate data model of the airship's behaviour in flight. Simply to remove it from its assembly shed in the 
first place, there is the airflow around the complex bluff-body shape of the hangar to consider. Then what 
happens to that airflow when the hangar doors are opened and the airship is manoeuvred through them 
into the open air? There will also be some aerodynamic interaction between the airship hull and the 
ground, which will be in close proximity. Then there are the relative motions of the attached vehicles, or 
whatever is moving the airship, (which machinery incidentally, will also first have to be defined, designed 
and proven fit for purpose, before it too can be mathematically modelled). And finally there are a whole 
range of unquantifiable variables such as the effects of wind, and sun, and rain, and snow and ice; and the 
tension in ropes; and how much they will stretch; and how this will change over a lifetime of abrasion and 
use. So while a flight simulator for the pilots of the NGVLAs might just be possible within a reasonable 
time-frame 
- 
assuming sufficient funds and resources 
- 
there is no hope at all of anything similar for the 
ground crew because GH is far too complex. 
There is also the financial aspect to consider: 
"... full flight simulators have the disadvantage that they are expensive to buy, maintain and 
operate. In some cases, the cost of a simulator is higher than the actual aircraft. " (Read, 2001) 
And this was written concerning currently flying HTA aircraft, which already exist in their thousands, and 
for which there is a vast wealth of knowledge and plenty of operational experience available on which to 
base the programmes. Starting from scratch for the NGVLAs is going to be enormously more expensive 
and it should be noted that comers had to be cut even for the flight simulator of a well-established airship 
such as the Skyship 600: 
"Although initial discussions suggested that an airship cockpit might be developed specially for 
the programme, it was decided that a more cost effective approach would be to adapt the 
generic AFS helicopter cockpit for the airship flight trials 
... 
Details of the layout were achieved 
through interaction with the airship pilots 
... 
" (Martyn & Brown, 1996) [GC emphasis] 
This is not to say that simulators will have no part to play in the development of the NGVLAs, nor that 
crew training, (and even ground crew training) for very large airships will not one day be possible with 
them. Computer based simulations are obviously extremely useful tools and much time and money can be 
saved by the careful use of them. However, establishing a reliable simulator for the first of the NGVLA 
prototypes is clearly going to be an enormous development task in its own right. It will be a large and 
complex research project and initially it will require a great deal of both time and financial investment. 
Fingers have already been burnt in other areas of aviation and these lessons are unlikely to be quickly 
forgotten: 
"Ibe first British Apache pilots, from 656 Squadron 9 Regiment Army Air Corps, are training at 
a new centre at NEddle Wallop, which includes two giant simulators for practising helicopter 
attack rnissions. 
... 
Although the simulators are acknowledged as world-beating training 
facilities, they were the main cause of the delay in the programme. The MoD ordered them late 
and there followed a delay of 18 months because of software problems. " (Evans, 2004) [GC 
emphasis] 
Beating in mind, that any projects to develop the NGVLAs are likely to be faced with tight schedules and 
limited budgets, and that the airships themselves, when complete are intended to be used for tasks that 
will involve currently unprecedented procedures, it is hard to escape the conclusion that there is really 
so 
very little to be gained by embarking on a complex simulation development programme in parallel with 
the real hardware. As was noted nearly a century ago by the German aeronautical pioneer Otto Lillienthal: 
"In flying machines conception is nothing, construction is little, experiment is everything. " 
(Lillienthal, 1909) 
Thus, when forced to choose between spending hard won funds on building and testing a flyable 
prototype or on an, at best unreliable simulation (with a high probability of producing unrealistic results), 
it would seem wise for the future NGVLA project leaders to choose the former empirical route rather than 
the latter theoretical one. Their decision will also undoubtedly be influenced by the fact that the 
certification authorities already acknowledge the risks of relying on unverifiable calculation. This can be 
seen in an excerpt from the British Civil Airworthiness Requirements (BCAR) for Non-rigid Airshýips 
(CAP 471 
- 
Section Q): 
"Sub-section Q3-Structures:... 
Ground loads:... 2 Energy Absorption 
... 2.2 Proof of Compliance. The energy absorption characteristics of the landing gear shall be 
determined by dynamic tests 
... 2.3 DesigLi Velocity of Descent. The design velocity of descent shall be substantiated by data 
from development flying 
... 2.4 Ultimate Velocity of Descent. It shall be demonstrated by test that the shock absorption 
capacity is sufficient to withstand landing... " (CAA: CAP 471,1979: 4 1) [GC emphasis] 
No question of simulation or mathematical analysis being allowed to take the place of testing in these 
cases. However, perhaps, more importantly for the future, the draft regulations that will govern the 
NGVLAs (the Transport Airship Requirements or TAR) tell a similar story: 
"GENERAL 
... TAR 21 Proof of compliance 
Each requirement of these regulations must be met at each appropriate combination of total 
mass, static heaviness and lightness and centre of gravity within the range of loading conditions 
that may occur during the operations for which certification is requested. This must be shown 
by tests upon an airship of the type for which certification is requested, or by calculations 
based on and equal in accuracy to the results of testing or a combination of each. 
(LBA, 2000: 19) [GC emphasis] 
"TAR 307 Proof of structure 
(a) Compliance with the strength and deformation requirements must be shown for each critical 
load condition. Structural analysis may be used only if the structure conforms to those for which 
experience has shown this method to be reliable. In other cases, substantiating load tests must 
be made. " (LBA, 2000: 25) [GC emphasis] 
"TAR 481 Mooring and handling conditions 
... 
(b) 
... 
All static and dynamic loads must be determined considering the wind conditions to be 
expected during mooring and handling. These values must be listed in the Airship Flight 
Manual. The determination by analytical means is only acceptable if a procedure is used 
warranting reliable results. Otherwise appropriate ground tests have to be performed. " 
(LBA, 2000: 29/30) [GC emphasis] 
In other words 
- 
from the regulatory authorities' viewpoint, analysis is optional but testing is mandatory. 
Thus, while there is a strong possibility that computer based simulations may well offer designers and 
structural engineers a shortcut, when it comes to the NGVLA certification process, (provided that proven 
aviation methods and materials are used), it is also clear that this is not going to be the case when it comes 
to the GH operations. Therefore, analytical models (be they virtual realities or whatever), which at the 
outset of the NGVLA programmes can only be derived exclusively from unverified data, are certainly not 
going to be able to plug the "knowledge gap" that lies at the heart of this investigation. 
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"Useful lift can be estimated only as a (relatively) small difference between two large quantities 
when the hull is air-borne it can be measured with certainty. Estimates, it is safe to say, have 
been the curse of airships : so hard to check, when airship flights are as infrequent as solar 
eclipses ; so easily modified to suit the thesis of the moment, whether sanguine or 
condemnatory. " (Southwell, 1929: 4) 
And finally, to conclude this section on the inability of mathematically based models to provide a solution 
to the NGVLA crew training problem, it should perhaps be strongly emphasised, in view of the 
widespread misunderstandings concerning many aspects of airship operations in general, that the term 
"ground handling theory" is in itself something of an oxymoron. By its very nature the science of GH has 
to be based upon practical skills. The sole purpose of GH is to keep the airship from harm and this 
requires action 
- 
and sometimes quick action 
- 
in the real world. For example, the groundcrew of a 
modem blimp cannot just stop loading ballast into an excessively light airship simply because a 
calculated number written on a piece of paper tells them that they should do so. Their job is to stop the 
airship from blowing away. If the airship is "too lighf 'then it needs "more" ballast and the ground crew, 
struggling in the wind and the weather, have no option other than to go on loading weight onboard until 
there is "enough" and the airship is safe. 
Naturally, after the emergency situation is under control, someone will calculate how much extra weight 
was actually put on-board, and the number thus generated will indeed be "useful" (if nothing other than to 
know how much ballast to hold in reserve in case it happens again). It may even be that the calculated 
number is "important" (for instance, indicating that something has fallen off the airship). However, the 
calculation in itself is an afterthought and it cannot be said to be "vital" to the airship's immediate 
survival. It alone cannot protect the airship from imminent danger and neither can it, in this example, say 
what exactly has fallen off, nor where it is. Only physical action in the real world, both to put sufficient 
ballast on-board, and then to go look for any missing component and put it back in place. will save the 
airship from damage and possible destruction. Therefore, although experienced groundcrew may well 
find the calculated number "interesting" or "usefur, they will still be hard to convince that it is really 
"necessary" for them to know in order to carry out their duties. 
Thus, an empirical approach to NGVLA groundcrew training would seem to be the only way forward. 
2.6 The problem of crew training with real equipment 
It would therefore seem that there really is no credible alternative for the GH team of the first NGVLA, 
other than to learn to use their brand new Ground Handling Equipment (GHE) as they go. However, there 
are obviously very big risks in this process and it would also appear that there would be a significant 
advantage if the novice groundcrew were at least to familiarise themselves with the GHE controls, 
preferably by running it through a few test cycles, before the airship was attached to it. If nothing else this 
would minimise the risks posed to the project by mechanical failures. 
"The history of technology indicates that most major engineering enterprises which are 
undertaken in fields where almost all of the factors are unknowns are bound to have some 
failures. " (Higham, 1961: 132) 
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Furthermore, allowing the groundcrew a "shake-dowW'pcriod to test and train with the brand new GHE 
would also get the bugs out it. More importantly it would give the crew themselves some confidence and 
not make the front pages of the world's newspapers if they got things slightly wrong. 
"In every new model of any machine we build "bugs" arise, which must be caught and corrected, 
for progress comes only through experiment, and the long cycle of trial and error. " 
(Litchfield & Allen, 1945/1976: 79) [GC emphasis] 
As head of the Goodyear/Zeppelin Company, and one of the driving forces behind the American Rigid 
Airship Program, Litchfield certainly spoke from experience. But, this "de-bugging" and familiarisation 
process poses a further problem for the prototype NGVLA, for while such a ground crew training period 
would obviously minimise the risk of Kapitan Strasser's aforementioned 1 "slight mistake that leads to 
serious consequences, " it presupposes that the GHE will be completed and ready for use some time in 
advance of the airship. Unfortunately, for the prototype NGVLA, this is unlikely to be the case. 
In order to understand why this will be so, it is necessary to look briefly at the sequence of events likely 
to occur in the initial phases of design and construction of any future large airship development projects. 
However, this needs to be only a very superficial examination in order to reveal that there is a 
fundamental and inescapable conflict within any such schedule, and that, regardless of the size or the type 
of airship, (or even of the GH systems selected for iQ the GHE is almost certain to be unavailable for 
ground crew training. 
In an ideal world, (Figure 2.11 
- 
Generic NGVLA Development Schedules 
- 
Scenario #1) the two 
major component parts 
- 
the airship and the GHE 
- 
could simply be treated as two inter-linked but 
essentially separate projects. Each would then have their own design and construction teams working 
alongside each other. This would seem sensible, as the skills required to build the light-weight aircraft 
look likely to be rather different from those required to build the heavy-weight mobile mooring mast (and 
any associated machinery that will be needed to move the airship about when it is on the ground). 
Thus, regardless of whether the airship and the GHE are actually assembled in the same physical 
building, or merely in close proximity, they could, in this ideal world, both be designed, built and tested 
simultaneously, before being brought together as finished items to begin operations. There would then be 
scope for both flight and ground crews to learn to use their own component parts as the separate 
construction phases came to an end and while the testing and certification phases were in progress. The 
subsequent integration of the two differently complex parts of the system, airship and GHE, would 
therefore be conducted by personnel who were fan-dliar with, and also skilled in the use of their own 
equipment. A further advantage would be that both component parts would also have had many of their 
major bugs removed by the time they came to be joined together. 
However, this 'concurrent scenario' 
- 
i. e. running the two separate projects side by side at the same time 
- 
will only work where the requirements for both the airship and GHE are clear and already well 
established at the outset of the programme. In the real world of today this cannot be the case. 
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Z 
; 3. 
In the real world supcr-largc airships do not exist. The first NGVLA will be a prototype without 
precedent. Thus. at the start of its design, many of its requirements will be unclear and undecidcd. The 
structural confi-uration and the layout ofits cockpit. along with whatever nionitorino and control 
systerns are vitally necessary, (as opposed to merely desirable), will inevitably be the topic 01' Much 
heated debate. Moreover. while it is obvious that the airship design cannot be completed until these issues 
have been resolved, (with trade-offstudics and the like), what is less obvious, but equally true. is that the 
GHE design cannot seriously even Leggin until after some basic decisions have been made as to what 
precisely is going to be built and ho\N exactly it is going to need to be handled. After all the only purpose 
of the GHE is to serve the airship. By definition, it only exists because the airship has need ofit If, this is 
not the case. and the airship could for instance be undocked without any GHE. then why waste money on 
it'! Obviously there is no point in building GHE for its own sake. The whole purpose ofthe proýject is to 
build a new type ofairship. 
Therefore. it follows, that while it is true, from the airship design team*s point ol'\, ie\N,. that: "The 
philosophy adopted for recovery and mooring I i. e. a rnaýjor part of GH I dictates the design concept and 
other aspects are then most likely to be adequately covered. - (Howc. 1999: 302) (GC emphasis) 
- 
it is 
also the case that, it is only after the precise position of suitable anchorage and attachment points have 
been identified on the airship structure, that the GHE design team can seriously begin to determine the 
true dimensions of their own project. It is only when they know exactly where they can take hold of the 
airship structure, that they can start to calculate the forces that their equipment will have to deal with. 
Thus. while some of the general principles for the GH systems may be agreed early on, the actual detailed 
GHE design cannot really proceed until after the airship*s dimensions, at tile very least, have been 
established and agreed. 
Therefore, in a more realistic world. (Figure 2.11 
- 
Scenario #2) it is evident that the integration of the 
two structures (NGVLA and GHE) cannot sensibly start until after the airship*s actual size and shape 
have been finally frozen. Furthermore, this integration. which is in truth the final design ofthe GHE. must 
be an iterative process. It will involve compromises and uncomfortable trade-offs on both sides ofthe 
interface. This is necessarv in order to minimisc the flown weight, while ensuting that the anchorage 
points, and the like. have sufficient strength for all eventualities. Indeed, the defining loads on some parts 
of the airship structure may well be the loads imposed by the intended GH procedures. For example. 
when re-docking, the lower tail fin might be used to pull the airship sideways against the wind and into 
alignment with the hangar axis 
- 
as was done with Akron and Macon. Here again it can be seen that many 
of these decisions are totally dependent upon \N hat the structure ofthe airship actually comprises 
- 
i. e. the 
nature of the component parts and exact location of any strong points that are potentially capable of 
serving as GH attachment points. 
Consequently, while the design integration ofthe two structures has to be an iterative process it cannot be 
led by the GHE design. Neither can the GHE. for reasons ofcost saving, nor for convenience in its own 
construction, dictate any changes to the airship. which will materially alter the shape, nor add any 
significant weight, to the airship. It has to be emphasised that the airship always wins in the end 
- 
and 
rightly so 
- 
its performance and its survival are paramount. 
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Therefore, in the event of a really serious problem at the interface between the two structures it is always 
the GHE that will be modified in order to suit the airship. If changes to the airship requirements arise, 
which call for a drastic alteration of the designed structure halfway through construction, (such as 
inserting an extra section into the hull so as to increase the volume and consequently the amount of lift 
- 
as has happened more than once in the past) then the GHE cannot deny them. Neither can it ignore them. 
It can only follow-on with its own redesign to accommodate the effects of these changes. Thus the GHE 
which started its design later than the airship, is also condemned to follow behind the airship as it passes 
through the construction phase of development. Allowing the GHE construction to get too far ahead of a 
prototype airship could be very costly in the event of any major, late, structural changes. 
To some extent this inherent delay can be expected to be mitigated by the fact that the GHE does not have 
to fly. It can thus be generally more robust and this, in theory at least, should make it easier and quicker to 
build. In addition, the airship will also have to conform to a rigorous and time-consuming quality control 
process in order to aclýiieve certification whereas, that for the GHE is currently less clearly defined. 
However the GHE will obviously have to be tested in some way. It may also have to be certified; if not by 
the aviation authorities then almost certainly under the rules of the airport whereon it is based 
- 
and quite 
possibly by both. This will take time. 
There are already today health and safety regulations, 'that are applicable to all workplaces and these 
include airfields'. The GHE will need to conform to at least some of these regulations, and it is more than 
likely that in the future there may be further constraints imposed by increasingly severe conservation 
and/or environmental protection rules. Worse still, these regulations are likely to be administered and 
enforced by a whole range of government departments (and/or international organisations) none of whom 
will have had any previous experience whatsoever with large airships. Satisfying these bodies and 
complying with all of their edicts, in order to prove that the prototype GHE machinery is safe and "fit for 
purpose" looks certain to have a serious effect on both cost and time budgets. However, in reality there is 
a further twist and the situation is almost certain to be even more complicated by what appears to be a 
fairly obvious simplification: 
6'... operation is simplified if the airship can be moved with the device which is used to moor it. " (Howe, 1999: 301) 
This simple statement has enormous hidden consequences. It is the tip of another iceberg and it goes 
unchallenged simply because there are no large airships in operation today, and there is so little 
knowledge of them within a world that is dominated by HTA practices. However, the fallacy behind this 
apparent simplification becomes clearer if the concept is applied to fixed-wing aircraft. For example, 
following this logic, it would "simplify" the operation of today's jumbo jets if the fuel bowser, and a 
passenger-carrying bus, were to be combined with, and incorporated into, the tug that moves the aircraft 
around. In theory this would save considerable time by allowing an aircraft to be refuelled and 
disembarked while it was being towed along. In practice, everyone with any knowledge at all of HTA 
aircraft systems can immediately see that such "multi-tasking" would cause enormous problems. 
For example ICAO (1987) "Airport Planning Manuar'& ICAO (1999) "Annex 14 
- 
Aerodromesý" 
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Thus, while the simplification statement is undoubtedly, absolutely true for the small blimps, which are 
operating today, (and it may well become so from the perspective of the fully developed NGVL airships 
of tomorrow, ) from the point of view of developing the prototype GHE, then adding or "piggy-backing" 
systems is really going to be a false economy. A problem with any one system willforce majeur hold up 
development of all the others. The more systems that are required to be incorporated into a single 
prototype device, the longer it is going to take to design, and then to build, to test, to certify and, 
subsequently to train the personnel who will operate it. 
Nevertheless, it does seem more than likely that the prototype GHE will be required to carry-out at least 
some multiple tasks. An obvious example being that it will be needed to help complete the construction of 
the first NGVLA (Figure 2.11 
- 
Scenario #3), or, at least it will be found to be the best way to hold the 
airship down securely during the inflation and final assembly process. (Bearing in mind that if the GHE is 
not used for this purpose then further large and expensive equipment will be needed in it's stead. ) But, if 
Us proves to be the case, and the GHE becomes part of the airship assembly process, then some loads 
that will have to be carried by the GHE structure during inflation, may easily be greater than if it were 
only ever to be used to handle the "flight ready" airship. 
For example, if the gondola was not attached to the envelope at the start of the gas fill then the GHE 
would have to cope with the total possible lift load that could be generated by the maximum volume of 
100% pure gas within the unballasted envelope. This would mean a second, separate set of attachment 
points to join the envelope directly to the GHE, and space would have to be provided within the GHE 
structure to allow the gondola to be moved into position for its attachment to, and subsequent removal 
from the envelope. Furthermore, if the GHE becomes a completely integrated part of the airship 
production equipment then it might need additional fixtures to facilitate the removal and exchange of 
other major components for maintenance and repair, such as the fins, the nose cone and the engines. 
On the face of it, these are all straightforward engineering problems and they are most likely to be fairly 
easily solved. Whether they will prove to be cost effective is difficult to say at the start. But the point is 
that either using the GHE to aid airship assembly, or adding complexity to the prototype GHE machinery 
by incorporating Ground Support Systems (GSS) within it, can now be seen to be considerably less 
attractive as ideas, simply because they can only further reduce any flexibility in the NGVLA schedule. 
Moreover, there is an additional disadvantage with the latter scheme because multi-purpose equipment 
will also dramatically increase the risk that a single point failure may hold up or even ruin the whole 
programme. For instance if an untested mobile mooring mast were to de-rail during its first attempt to 
move along its new railway track from hangar to mooring circle then, without the airship attached to it, 
this would probably result in an expensive delay, but with the airship in tow, such an event could easily 
turn into a major, news-worthy and project-wrecking disaster. 
Thus a very rudimentary analysis of a generic NGVLA development programme reveals that because the 
GHE design is completely dependent upon the airship dimensions there is automatically created an initial 
delay, which means that the airship will almost certainly start its construction before the GHE does. 
Furthermore, the GHE, which appears condemned to follow the airship into the design phase of its 
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existence, has to lead the way out of construction 
- 
especially if it is to be incorporated into the production 
process 
- 
for the airship cannot be completed without it. The GHE must logically therefore overtake the 
airship during construction or it will delay the programme. Indeed any delay in the development and 
building of the GHE will seemingly add significant delay to the whole project, and the longer the design 
decisions take to make at the start, the longer the delay in availability is likely to be at the end. 
It should, however, be noted that most of these problems are only applicable to the prototypes, and to a 
certain extant, they will go away after the basic system functions of the two components have been 
successfully proven in the field. The very first NGVLA and the first GHE are almost certain to be subject 
to some drastic alterations, in the early days, before they are considered fit to carry out their 
unprecedented procedures. Keeping the two systems separate initially, will thus allow them to be 
modified independently and in the quickest and most cost-effective manner, each according to its own 
needs and respective regulations. Once each is established and the systems are proven, then the 
integration and amalgamation of some GSS into the GHE may become an attractive option, but if all the 
answers are known at the start of the project then there is no need to build a prototype. 
There is, however, yet another vicious circle at this point, because just as a frozen design of the airship 
was shown to be fundamental to establishing the composition and configuration of GHE, so a frozen 
design of the GHE is now seen to be essential before the training of its operatives can begin. How can 
people be trained when no one knows what the tasks are and what equipment they will be using? And, as 
stated above, computer simulation training devices can do little to assist here simply because they are 
hamstrung by the same lack of dimensional and operational data, which is needed to construct their 
virtual reality models. 
So, just as it has already been established that the ground crew are going to be needed well in advance of 
the flight crew, it can now be seen that if the GHE is used as a part of the assembly process then it too 
will also be needed well in advance of the airship 
- 
possibly many months beforehand. Moreover, this 
will always be so, for, whereas the airship design may have an end date that is tied to the calendar, the 
end date for the GHE cannot be other than "whenever the airship needs it. " Thus, while the end date for 
the airship construction phase of the project might quite reasonably be the first test flight, the end date for 
the GHE must inevitably be earlier 
- 
if nothing else because, in all scenarios, it will be needed to move 
the airship out of hangar prior to its first flight. But, if the GHE becomes an integral part of the inflation 
process, then it must be ready for action earlier still, roughly halfway through the airship build process. 
Either way, there will be tremendous pressure to finish the prototype GHE and then to use it immediately. 
However, the GHE cannot be used for training when it is in use. Plainly the crew cannot drive it around 
and test the brakes and other systems when there is an airship attached to it. Thus there is no room 
whatsoever in this grossly simplified generic NGVLA schedule for the ground crew to practice with it 
prior to its first use. The only possible time in this programme for crew to train with the GHE would be 
during the test phase of the GHE (i. e. immediately following completion of the GHE assembly), but this 
phase too will have to be seriously curtailed if the half-finished airship is already waiting to use it. 
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It must also not be forgotten that there is plenty of scope for damaging the airship in the process of simply 
joining these two enormous structures together for the first time. This is irrespective of whether the GHE 
is used as an integral part of the initial NGVLA inflation and assembly process, or not. Even with fully 
trained crews there is always going to be enormous potential for expensive errors whenever the two 
component parts of the system are separated or re-united again. 
Thus there appears to be no room at all in this simplified generic schedule for the ground crew to gain 
proficiency in using the GHE by initially running it through a few test cycles, nor even to simply 
familiarise themselves with the controls, by driving it around before the airship is attached to it. On the 
contrary it can now be seen that, even from this simplistic and superficial study, time for ground crew 
training with the real equipment is going to be extremely unlikely and it is most probable that the airship 
will be waiting to use the GHE as soon as the latter's construction is complete. 
Obviously the prototype GHE will have to be fully tested somehow, before attempts are made to move 
the new airship around with it. 'ne only question is: "When, in the NGVLA development schedule, is this 
testing going to take place"? And this of course then begs "who is going to do it? " which takes us tight 
back to where we started. So the original GH question (Q2) remains to be answered: "How are the ground 
crew for the first prototype NGVLA going to learn the skills they will need in order to handle it safely 
and prepare it for its first flight? " 
2.7 The problem of hierarchy and responsibility 
There are however, some further problems with personnel which the NGVLA developers will also have 
to address. On the face of it many of these are not directly associated with GH, but the author's 
experience at CL revealed that the lack of experienced personnel at all levels, who were able to make 
reliable decisions, meant that the ground crew inevitably got drawn into these discussions. Yet again, 
assumptions and misunderstandings frequently led everyone back into the wilderness of indecision. 
However, some of these problems are fundamental to everything that the NGVLAs are trying to achieve, 
and they add a whole new dimension to the developers' task because solving them is going to require a 
paradigm shift in thinking among regulators and the aviation authorities 
- 
and possibly even changes to 
international law! A good example of one such problem is the command hierarchy for any future very 
large airships and such questions as who will issue the orders and who will bear the ultimate 
responsibility for each and every operational decision when the airship is on the ground. 
Indeed, the seriousness and intractable nature of these hierarchical "who-has-command7' type of questions 
has already been recognised by several interested parties. These include potential NGVLA operators (The 
UK MOD) and the regulatory authorities (The German Luftfahrt-Bundesamt or LBA): 
"During the visit to Cardington [at the end of the Airship Association's I" International Airship 
Conference at Bedford, England in 1996], a panel of experts was convened in an open forum, at 
the request of UK MOD (PE), to answer questions on airship ground handling and command and 
control. " (Nayler, 1996: 19/20) 
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"TAR AC255 Ground handling characteristics 
The ground handling of airships is a classical problem area that needs to be notified with high 
importance. [sic] 
... 
Further issues, that should be considered, are: Ground crew co-ordination: 
ground crew chief and responsibility sharing / hand-over between ground crew chief and pilot 
and 
... 
on-mast / off-mast responsibility, 
... 
" (LBA, 2000: 25) 
The problem here is that the GH of very large airships is so very different from modem aviation practice 
that the current rule books, whether they be for small blimps, or for HTA craft, cease to have much 
meaning. As shown above (in Section 2.3) the captain of one of today's blimps may be able to sit in the 
pilot seat and hold up his/her fingers to indicate to the ground crew chief how many sand/lead shot ballast 
bags need to be added (or removed) to establish the required take-off weight. However, this is not going 
to work when the two individuals are several hundred metres apart and the ballast is ten tons of water. 
Also, whereas it is logical for the captain of a jumbo jet to be in complete charge of the aircraft whenever 
the engines are running, things become a unclear when a large airship can lift off vertically and start its 
engines in mid-air afterwards 
- 
as was normal in the case of the Shenandoah (see Section 2A) 
Equally there seems little to be gained by the driver of the GHE winches, who is actually controlling the 
movements of a partially captured airship, to await the arrival of orders from an airship captain, who is 
strapped into a seat several hundred meters away, with his engines idling. Or, indeed, from a ground crew 
chief-cum-mooring officer who is standing, perhaps on the ground, or on top of the mooring mast, and 
who is nearly as far away, is equally as powerless to influence events, and in many instances cannot even 
see what is really happening. This will be all the more so, if, as seems likely, the GHE driver and the 
airship pilot are not only equally highly skilled to operate their very different machines, but are also both 
equally qualified and licensed to carry out their respective tasks. ' 
Thus, despite the fact that a well-disciplined, hierarchical structure is universally recognised as being 
absolutely essential for the safe working of the NGVLAs, at many stages of their foreseeable GH 
operations, the answer to the question "who is in commandT' is currently ill-defined. Establishing who 
passes responsibility to whom, exactly when, and in a manner that all are immediately clear about, will be 
no easy matter. Convincing the regulatory authorities, that irrespective of its final form, this chain of 
command is safe enough to allow the NGVLAs to be integrated into today's overcrowded and heavily 
regulated skies, will also clearly be a challenge 
- 
but thankfully it lies beyond the scope of this study. 
It must however be recalled that the previous generation of very large airships (PGVLAs) encountered 
these exact same problems and that their solution was a "Mooring Officer. " It is a moot point where such 
an individual would fit into today's world, where the universally agreed rules of international aviation 
have successfully, and safely, shared the responsibilities, and all decision maldng and monitoring of flight 
preparations for HTA craft, between, the captain (on board the aircraft), the dispatch engineer (on the 
ground outside the aircraft) and the air-traffic controller (at a remote location). 
I Ile need for a licensing system for ground crew was discussed at CargoUfter after early rough estimates suggested that the driver 
of a mobile mooring mast Large enough to handle an airship the size of the CLI60 would be in sole charge of a vehicle that weighed 
at least 600 tons. 
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Here again, those familiar with modem HTA aviation are apt to make sweeping assumptions, and it may 
well be that the answer for the NGVLAs is simply to modify the role of the dispatch engineer. 
Nevertheless actually carrying this out and getting universal agreement at international level for a reliable, 
tried and tested hierarchical structure that governs the transfer of responsibility between the flight and 
ground crews, and putting it into place prior to the first attempted test flights of the first prototype airship, 
is going to present a formidable obstacle which cannot simply be ignored. But, at least this problem has 
begun to be recognised, unlike a hitherto unacknowledged second facet of the hierarchy problem, which, 
in common with the aforementioned problems inherent in ground crew training, will also have to be faced 
by the first prototype NGVLA, and which will be at least as difficult to solve. 
2.7.1 The conflict between pragmatists and theoreticians 
The second facet of the hierarchy problem into which ground handlers are dragged is even more obscure. 
It stems from the fact that quite apart from their personal skills, the effectiveness of the ground handlers, 
in dealing with both the day to day operations of the NGVLAs, and with any crises that may arise, will 
also depend to a very large extent upon the actual physical configuration and properties of the GHE 
machinery they are given to work with 
- 
or more precisely, on the capabilities that are built into it. This in 
turn will be determined and governed by the knowledge of those who design and build it. 
It is an obvious truth that the quality of work that can be done by any machinery, (even in the hands of the 
most highly trained, competent and quick-thinking operator), in terms of the flexibility of its use, and for 
example, of the possibilities of multitasking with it under a variety of perhaps unforeseen conditions, or in 
unpredicted circumstances, and of bypassing functions, or of substituting certain procedures and thereby 
permitting alternative ways of achieving its intended purpose to be employed, is governed by the 
requirements that are originally foreseen and provided for, by the aforesaid designers of that machinery. 
Thus the cost-effectiveness and safety of the NGVLA programmes really hinges on the designers of the 
GHE being fully aware, before they even start to design the prototype GHE, not only of all the GH 
problems liable to arise, but also where the deviations from the norm will most frequently occur. This, of 
course, they currently are not, and neither can they be in the foreseeable future. 
However, in circumstances where the designers of both the NGVLA and its GHE are only too well aware 
of their lack of knowledge, as was the case at CL, one obvious solution is for them to turn for advice to 
those who have at least some experience of how airships behave in the real world 
- 
namely the personnel 
who operate the small blimps which are currently flying. 
There is however, a serious philosophical point which needs to be noted here. It stems from one very 
fundamental difference between the designers and the end users of any piece of equipment. Design is 
inherently a creative process. If something is found not to work because the numbers "do not stack up" 
then a new idea can simply be conjured out of thin air and quickly substituted for the failed, theoretical 
concept without penalty. Moreover, a new device, which is not quite working yet is of far greater interest 
than something old that continues to work perfectly. 
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Operations, on the other hand, are quite different. The ground crew of an airship, for example, (and to a 
large extent also the pilots) have to deal with the real equipment in the real world 
- 
i. e. with those items 
which are actually available at any given instant, no matter whether they are in working order or not. The 
operators are thus forced to be pragmatists. If some component does not work when it is needed to then 
the groundcrew cannot wait around until a new bit of idealised equipment appears out of thin air. If they 
delay taking action when it is necessary, then almost certainly something will break, and someone may 
get hurt, and the airship could be damaged beyond repair or even lost altogether. Reliability is therefore a 
must. Defects and weaknesses in equipment are actively dangerous; as is delay caused by unfamiliarity. 
New devices are consequently treated with some suspicion and operators are generally keen to test new 
things until they break, preferably under controlled circumstances, simply so that they know where the 
failures are likely to occur when things begin to get out of control, (as their enduring experience with the 
perversity of inanimate objects has shown is always eventually going to be the case). Thus old and 
"inefficient" equipment, (even objects which are damaged or broken but which can still be trusted and 
relied upon to do a specific task), are not only looked on with affection, but are regarded as worth far 
more than something new and "more efficient" that is unknown and untested. 
One way to differentiate between the two groups is to observe their very different instinctive reactions 
when confronted with an emergency situation. The operators will take anything that is to hand and try to 
adapt it to their immediate needs whereas the designers reach for their drawing boards and create a new 
tool specifically for the task that has arisen. In other words, there are those whose first reaction is to 
modify the "technique, " and there are those whose instinct is to rely on changing the "technology, " and as 
a result there is a fundamental conflict and a deep mistrust between the two groups. 
Moreover, the conflict between these diametrically opposed world views is exacerbated by a further 
philosophical point that again is often overlooked. The ground handlers are the first real "useW' of any 
newly designed airship. In other words, they start to break it. All design and production up to the time of 
their arrival is creative and constructive, but the very act of taking the airship out of its shed starts to wear 
it out. Indeed, it has the potential to destroy it. Consequently, many prototype airships, which have been 
lovingly built, have never made it out through the shed door. They have stayed safely in the hands of their 
designers, undergoing an unending series of improvements and modifications. There is thus a mental 
barrier that has to be overcome in order to accomplish this first usage of a prototype airship and the 
builders are naturally loath to let "their baby" out into the dangerous world of operations 
- 
especially in 
the hands of the "mad bad7' groundcrew. Conversely, the ground crew need courage, determination and a 
thick skin in order to wrench the prototype away from the perfectionist protection of its creators and to 
start to test it and discover which bits wear out, break or fall off it, when it is first put to work. 
Therefore, from the designers view, the operators are a bunch of bodgers and clumsy, mindless thugs who 
either ruin, or refuse to use, every new thing they are given. Whereas, from the ground crew perspective, 
the designers are a bunch of heartless and dangerous dreamers, who have little grasp of reality. They are 
forever solving non-existent problems with new-fangled gizmos that plainly won't work, while ignoring, 
or wanting to throw away, perfectly useable kit. Thus in general terms designers love problems and 
operators fear them. 
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Neither view is of course wholly correct but both of them do have a point, and of course both the over- 
optimistic theoreticians and the pessimistic pragmatists will have their vital parts to play in the evolution 
of the NGVLAs. However, this uneasy marriage between these two philosophically opposed outlooks is 
further compounded by the fact that, in this instance, there are really two completely separate teams of 
designers to contend with. Those who will produce the prototype Airship, and those responsible for the 
prototype GHE. 
"We are well supplied with designers of airships themselves and this needs to be paralleled by 
designers of robust and economic mooring systems. " (Netherclift, 1993: 7) 
CL did attempt to fulfil this need, and what their efforts to provide both groups with the necessary 
information to design the CL160 eventually revealed, is that the two design groups actually have rather 
different requirements. They also have separate agendas (as shown above in Section 2.6) and they ask 
different questions of those who have real experience of blimp ground handling. More to the point, there 
is no natural hierarchy to govern the interaction of the three groups. On the contrary there is a classic 
three-way split, which creates a vicious and time-wasting circle. This arises because, whereas, the airship 
designers can, and do dictate their wishes to the GHE designers, they can also be wrong-footed by 
"evidence" from the operators. The result is that the designers of the GHE get caught in the middle. They 
are forced to accept the decisions of the airship designers but cannot use this authority to dictate their own 
decisions to the operators, because, if the operators don't like what they are presented with, then they can 
go over the GHE designers heads and take their case back to the airship designers. Being ill-equipped to 
contradict the voice of experience, the airship designers will tend to accede to the operators' wishes 
thereby creating a situation where no-one can ever have the final say. 
At CL people from all three teams were going around this loop in both directions with everyone blaming 
someone else for not giving them the information they needed or for not listening to what was being said. 
Thus the difficulty of establishing a hierarchy, to settle the arguments and differences of opinion which 
naturally arise when these conflicting groups are brought together to attempt the design of the first 
prototype NGVLA, should not be underestimated. Especially when other groups, who have further 
different ways of seeing how things ought to be done in an ideal world, are bound to get involved too. 
For example, there are the accountants, whose natural instinctive tendency is to prefer the cheapest (and 
thus usually the quickest) possible solution to every question. This frequently brings them into conflict 
with the operators (who tend to place quality and performance above cost) and the designers (whose 
creative processes and calculations cannot always be hurried). Then there are the production/construction 
team, whose practical knowledge of assembly methods allies them naturally with the pragmatists, but 
whose specific lack of experience with the construction of very large airships leaves them vulnerable to 
the whims of the theoreticians and the diktats of the accountants. 
All this adds up to a morass of constantly shifting alliances with the different groups circling around the 
unpalatable but historically proven fact that it is perfectly possible to design an object on paper which will 
not work in reality, (1-0 to the pragmatists). Plenty of airships that cannot be either assembled or inflated 
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have been designed in the past. ' This of course has the potential to waste very large amounts of time and 
money. Equally, it is also often overlooked that on occasion, it is quite possible to save a significant 
amount of time and money later on, by using equipment in a way that was never intended, and for a 
purpose never originally envisaged nor even conceived of, by its designer, (2-0 to the pragmatists). 
So, clearly, for the NGVLA development projects, design must come first, but it must be recognised that 
it cannot be successfully completed without feedback from the operators. Furthermore both groups need 
information from each other and obviously will need input from many other groups of specialists. 
However, without a hierarchy in the design authority and someone to call a halt to the design process then 
it becomes prey to a series of interlocked feedback loops, which can continue forever 
- 
or at least until 
the money runs out. 
2.8 The problem of substituting automation for skill 
One final problem centres on the fact that the NGVLAs will be forced to use equipment for which there is 
no precedent. 
"In the early days of airships large teams of ground handlers were relied on to hold the craft 
steady as it was 'walked' into and out of its hangar, or when it took off and landed. Anyone who 
has seen an old film of an airship near the ground will have noticed these often vast teams of 
men swarming around like ants as they handled the lines from the ship, but in the 1990s wages 
are no longer reckoned in shillings per week and 
- 
certainly for a large airship 
- 
such labour 
intensive methods are no longer economic. Mechanised handling will be essential. " (Netherclift, 
1993: 13) 
Here again, we have a perfectly sensible statement, which, on the face of it, few could find reason to 
disagree with. And yet, as with the statement by Howe, (previously quoted in Section 2.5 above), 
concerning the advantages of using the mooring masts to move the airships around, the assumptions and 
implications are far-reaching. For instance, the old saying "the higher the fewee'inverts and comes home 
with a vengeance, because plainly the fewer groundcrew members there are going to be, the higher the 
level of individual competence, and the greater the number of diverse tasks each will need to be capable 
of carrying out. Thus, here is a case where quantity and quality are directly, inversely proportional. 
Furthermore, reducing the numbers of personnel must not only increase their level of necessary skill, but 
it must also involve the use of more, (and of more complex), equipment as well. However, if any piece of 
machinery is increased in size, or in speed, or in the number and variety of simultaneous tasks it can carry 
out, so then the need also increases for the driver/operator of it, not only to have a greater understanding 
of, and capability to, monitor what is actually going on at any one time, but also, to posses the foresight, 
and the abilities, (along with the quick reactions, the communication skills and the manual dexterity), to 
take effective mitigating action whenever operations start to deviate from the norm. 
This means that the driver (or operators) of the NGVLA ground handling equipment (GHE) wiH indeed 
have to be the very highly trained and multitalented individual(s) who were shown to be necessary in 
Section 1.2 above. But it also means that the degree of training they will need in order to become 
proficient, prior to the first operations of the prototypes, must be directly proportional to the 
sophistication and complexity of the machinery they are given. 
I There are numerous examples among the designs registered at the Patent Office. (See Appendix G) 
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Tberefore, the more the GHE is capable of doing, the longer it will take to design, and the more expensive 
it is going to be, both to build it and thereafter to train its operators. It would therefore seem most 
sensible for the NGVLA project managers, who will perforce be dealing with inexperienced personnel at 
all levels of design and operation, when faced with an untested prototype airship, which is totally 
dependent for its survival upon unproven prototype GHE, to keep things as simple as possible to start 
with. Initially they would be well advised to restrict "multitasking" and to utilise instead a diversity of 
specialist expertise in a multitude of separately trained and easily interchangeable people. 
2.8.1 The difference between knowledge and ability 
A second facet of this same problem was also manifest at CL, where there was, in many instances, a 
failure to truly appreciate the vitally important difference between knowledge and ability. Again this may 
appear to be a rather trivial point, but in the author's experience, the fact that entire departments were 
apparently unable to grasp it led to a considerable waste of time and effort. 
Perhaps it is an easy mistake to make? For example compare the apparently subtle distinctions between: 
a) knowing how an airship works in principle, and 
b) knowing how to design, build and operate a specific airship. 
Now consider the rather more obvious differences between: 
c) knowing how to design a proven, tried and tested airship, 
d) having a workforce with the necessary skills to construct a proven, tried and tested airship, and 
e) having trained crew who are licensed to operate a fully-certified, modem small blimp safely and 
reliably in all weathers. 
Then see how in reality the subtle distinctions add up by small steps to a yawning chasm when it comes to 
the difference between an enterprise that is capable of c) and d) and e), and one that: 
f) owns a detailed design 1 for something that although it look may look like an airship, has never 
actually ever been assembled, (let alone flown), and 
g) has a workforce able first to build, and then to operate a gigantic, unproven, prototype airship in 
perfect weather conditions, and 
h) has trained staff who are competent to carry out unprecedented manoeuvres with the largest 
flying object ever built, in a cost effective manner, without endangering the public or interfering 
with other users of airspace 
- 
as is fundamental to the success of the NGVLAs. 
What this emphasises is that knowing how to do something, does not guarantee proficiency at it. Only 
"practice makes perfect. " Similarly, knowing how to use an object, or how it should be used, is a very 
different thing from knowing how to design it, or how to assemble it, and, these are different again from 
having hands-on previous experience of, and of being really adept at, actually doing any of them. This is 
the difference between being virtuoso or a novice. Thus, for the first prototype NGVLA, it has to be borne 
in mind that even if we knew what to do with it, and how things should be done, it still might not be 
possible to actually do them. 
I N. B. This includes old-fashioned two-dimensional blueprints, ultra-modem dime-dimensional CAD drawings, and any future 
possible fully-orchestrated, computer-generated "virtual reality" images. 
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So, although it is true that skill in general is based on knowledge, and knowledge can be increased by the 
acquisition of a skill, it is also important to realise that knowledge can, and frequently does, exist 
independently, without there necessarily being any skill or proficiency at all. Furthermore, this is in 
contrast to the reverse case, where skill without knowledge is an exceedingly rare thing! In addition, it 
should not be overlooked that there is a great deal of difference between ignorance and incompetence- 
even though the results may often be the same. Nevertheless, it is equally possible for an ignorant, 
inexperienced and unseasoned, beginner to be both competent and well-trained, while an acknowledged 
master, or a veteran practitioner, may on occasion be both clumsy and inept, and thus incompetent, 
perhaps by reason of being out of practice and thus "a little rusty. " 
This harks back to the point previously made above (Section 2.7.1) concerning the conflict in outlook 
between the theoreticians and the pragmatists, and the fact that it is perfectly possible to design on paper 
an object which will not work in reality. However, what seems not to be appreciated by many NGVLA 
enthusiasts, and what seemed often to be overlooked at CL, is that it is also perfectly possible for the 
inexperienced NGVLA development teams to inadvertently make this same mistake at every step along 
the way. Thus they may unwittingly: 
i) design an airship that cannot be assembled, or 2 j) assemble an airship that cannot fly (or does not fly very well), or 
k) design, build and fly a thoroughly good airship that cannot carry a worthwhile payload, or 
1) do all the above, and carry a worthwhile payload in perfect safety, only to find they require an 
infrastructure with a capital outlay and GH overheads that are not cost effective. 
All these have been done in the past. Moreover, returning to GH, it is perfectly possible, at the outset of a 
project, for planners and managers who are lacking in large airship experience, to decide, for example, to 
the best of their abilities, the numbers of personnel needed for an idealised (or affordable) NGVLA 
ground-crew, only to find in reality that the members of it will either be totally over-loaded with work, 
and thus physically exhausted, or under-used and bored mischievous, or misplaced at key times. 
The vital difference in all these things is the skill of the personnel doing the work and making the 
decisions. This collective skill can only come from a mixture of the team members' long term, past 
experiences and their recent currency in rehearsing, or in practising, their specific tasks. Thus, whereas 
the NGVLA designers need skill at designing similar equipment, (and a thorough knowledge of NGVLA 
systems, ) in order to create their designs, the operators need knowledge of the precise NGVLA GH 
procedures, in order to become skilled at doing them. Evidently, the two groups are facing in very 
different directions, and proud of it, as exemplified by this: 
"[Barnes] Wallis saw creative engineering as an art and 
... 
and accepted without reservation 
Einstein's observation that 'imagination is more important than knowledge' 
... 
" (Morpurgo, 
1972: xv) 
Tell that to an airship ground crew who are wrestling with a flailing rope on a dark night in a wet and 
windy field. Obviously the knowledge of how, and the ability to quickly tie, without being able to see it, 
a knot that will not slip, and which can be untied again easily on the morrow, is far more important. 
' An exception perhaps being child prodigies and autistic savants 
- 
neither of which groups sadly seem to have produced individuals 
who are able to work reliably as team members within a disciplined workforce. 2 As per the "dig" ship pre-supposed by Lord Ventry (see Sectiou 1.1) 
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Thus the set of problems facing the NGVLA designers is different from that concerning the operators and 
much of the misunderstanding between them, and the failure to distinguish between knowledge and 
ability probably stems from the simple fact that the NGVLA prototype designers are lacking knowledge, 
but the operators are lacking skill. 
A further misunderstanding arises because, contrary to the designers' "technology based" view, the 
"technique-practisine' ground crew are essentially flexible in outlook. They have to be in order to cope 
with such everyday, real-time events as the vagaries of the weather. Consequently, they will quickly 
"adapt, adopt and improve" new procedures, provided three things can be assured: 
a) it is proven to be safe to do so, and 
b) there is adequate and reliable equipment to do the job, and 
c) the personnel are allowed sufficient time to become proficient and confident. 
However, as already stated above (see Section 2.5) "GH does not exist for its own sake. The procedures 
involved are a response to the actual needs of the airship and consequently, the training of its ground crew 
must depend upon any specific airship's real requirements. " Thus it is only after a frozen design exists 
that it is possible to work out exactly where to hold an airship, and how to move it, and what materials, 
(i. e. fluids, gases, consurnables, etc. j need to be delivered, to which locations, in what quantities, and at 
what speed. Furthermore, it is only when these facts have been established that it is possible to work out 
how many people are going to be needed to carry out the GH tasks, and what skills they will require 
individually, in order to guarantee their own safety, and to ensure both the physical and commercial 
survivability of the airship. And finally, it is only after all of this detail is known that it is going to be 
possible to devise a system for training the prototype NGVLA personnel to carry out their tasks, reliably, 
safely and cost-effectively. 
Therefore, it can now be seen that there is also a quite separate "Skill Gap" to add to the "Knowledge 
Gap, " and that both of these must somehow be bridged if the NGVLAs are ever to fulfil their suggested 
roles as solutions to some of the world's most pressing transportation and communications problems. In 
other words, the airship's potential to carry cargo in the future, while utilising minimal amounts of fuel 
and comparatively small areas of land, and thereby allowing the continued expansion of world trade, 
without creating a lot of noise, or significantly adding further damage to the Earth's atmosphere, actually 
hinges upon the urgent need to come up with a reliable, safe and cost-effective answer for both of the 
"Big Questions" (Q1 and Q2) which were identified at the start of this work. 
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2.9 Summary of the problems 
It can now be seen that all future attempts to develop the NGVLAs will be faced with, and put at risk by, 
the same set of inter-woven, intractable, insidious, and frequently ignored problems. Namely: 
" Many of the NGVLAs' normal operating systems are unparalleled in modem aviation practice 
" Some procedures envisioned for the NGVLAs are unprecedented in the history of airships 
" GH accidents have been a very serious threat to all airships in the past 
" The GH of all types and sizes of airship is totally dependent upon highly skilled personnel 
" There are no experienced personnel to pass on the required skills to the NGVLA ground crews 
" GH is a neglected "Cinderella7' profession and the importance of it is commonly underestimated 
" Current procedures for GH small, modem blimps cannot be scaled up because they are inappropriate 
" Simulations cannot solve the NGVLA GH problems because there is no data to base them on 
" The GH of any airship is too complex and unquantifiable to be accurately or usefully simulated 
" The NGVLA prototype GHE will not be available for groundcrew training 
" The hierarchy and the hand over of responsibility between personnel groupings is ill defined 
" Conflicting views of designers and operators confound prototype GHE design decisions 
" Skill cannot simply be replaced by automation and this has a big impact on crew training 
.......... 
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3 THE SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS 
The problems described in detail in the previous section were not clear to the author, nor, indeed, to 
anyone else at CargoLifter, in the early days of the airship development project. The full scope and the 
complexity of them, along with the reality of the threat that they will inevitably pose to any future 
NGVLA projects, were only fully realised after the company collapsed in the summer of 2002. All that 
anyone was aware of at the time was that trying to design the GHE for the prototype CLI60 was 
extremely frustrating because there were innumerable, unanswerable questions (see Section 2), and the 
absence of reliable answers to them kept leading everyone round in circles. 
3.1 CargoLifter and the circular arguments 
From the author's perspective, inside what was most commonly knowni as the "Operational Supporf' 
department, these complex and well-worn circular arguments went something along these lines: 
* The Ground Handling Equipment, (GHE) which will be required for the CL160 is entirely 
dependent upon the actual needs of the airship. 
0 The needs of any airship are themselves dictated by two things 
- 
the type of airship it is (i. e. 
the physical structure) and its purpose (i. e. the job it is built to do). 
0 The CLI60 airship type, has still to be defined, but its intended purpose is known 
- 
it will 
pick-up and transport large and/or heavy weights. 
However, any airship's ability to carry out its intended purpose in a cost effective way is 
also dependent on two things 
- 
the actual equipment with which the airship is fitted, and the 
skill of the personnel who operate that equipment. 
To some extent these two things are mutually exclusive in that the more experienced and 
highly skilled the crew become, the more ingenious and flexible they will be at adapting, 
and making up for, any lack of, or deficiencies in, the equipment they are provided with. 
Thus, perversely, the more highly skilled the crew are, the less sophisticated or specialised 
the airship and its associated equipment needs to be. 
" But, both air and ground-based equipment for the CLI60 have yet to be decided. Therefore 
everything rests on the skills and abilities of the ground crews, and the flight personnel, and 
on their collective capability to operate the technology safely and efficiently. 
" However, the efficiency of any group of individuals can only depend on their level of 
personal experience and/or training. But, the first of the CLI60 crews will inevitably be in- 
experienced at the outset for two reasons. 1. There are no large airships for them to have 
experience of, and 2. There is no one available for them to learn the necessary skills from. 
Thus the individual crew members will have to rely exclusively on their training. 
" All training, however, depends on repeated rehearsals of known procedures, and these in 
turn are composed of an agreed sequence of tasks which have been demonstrated to be 
absolutely necessary. 
During the compan5es existence the name of the department responsible for ground handling the CLI60 changed several times. 
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But the actual tasks that will make up CLI60 GH procedures will depend largely on the 
operational systems that the airship will use and have therefore still to be decided. 
Nevertheless, the operational GH systems for all airships must consist of three items: the 
infrastructure that is available on the ground; plus the equipment on board the airship; and 
personnel with the necessary skills to use them both. 
However, the GH equipment onboard the CL160 is TBD, and both flight and ground crews 
are unskilled, and furthermore they cannot be trained until their tasks are defined. 'Merefore 
everything must rest on deciding and designing the GH infrastructure on the ground. 
But d-ds infrastructure, whatever it is, must be limited by cost, and this can only be kept 
within reasonable limits by providing the minimum amount of basic machinery that is 
absolutely necessary to handle and support the airship. 
This, however, is dependent on the airship's specific requirements, and the CLI60 
requirements will depend on the type of airship it is, and on the tasks it is designed to 
perform, 
... 
and so on, ad nauseum. 
What this, and similar discussions with colleagues, revealed to the author, in numerous vain attempts to 
progress the GHE design of the CL160, is that there are essentially three necessary elements that are 
intrinsic to any GH systems for all airships. There is the hardware, there is the software and there are the 
people (sometimes rather inelegantly, but usefully, termed the "wetware"). 
0 The hardware is the actual machinery, the bits and pieces of GH equipment. This is divided into two 
physically separate component parts, which must meet at a common interface. These are: 
a) the GHE which flies on-board the airship, and 
b) the GHE and infrastructure which remains on the ground. 
The software is the sequence of procedures, which comprise the system, or systems, that use the 
hardware to accommodate the airship's needs 
- 
i. e. whether it makes a horizontal or a vertical 
landing; whether, after landing it is moored to a mast or is "walked7' directly into a hangar-, whether 
entry into that hangar is done by manual or mechanically assisted means. These systems, or 
alternative methods, consist of one, or more, sets of instructions for sequential and concurrent tasks. 
They are largely governed and constrained by the physical limitations, and the designed capabilities, 
of the hardware, but their effectiveness and the efficiency of them are wholly dependent upon the 
third component 
- 
The wetware. These are the highly skilled practitioners who use the hardware to run the software, and 
upon whose individual abilities, and levels of competence, the whole enterprise rests. The important 
point is that differently skilled personnel, given identical hardware and the same instructions, are 
capable of manipulating it differently 
- 
i. e. more or less effectively, efficiently, safely etc., 
- 
in order 
to achieve the same goal. 
The problem for CargoUfter was that they did not have any of these three components. There was no GH 
infrastructure, there was no consensus on a reliable GH system, and neither were there any skilled 
personnel with the necessary knowledge to carry out the CLI60 GH operations safely and cost- 
effectively. Had the company had only one of the three components it would doubtless have been 
possible, using a combination of modem techniques (such as reverse-engineering, programme planning, 
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targeted training, etc), to either, adapt things to fit, or to work out a way to use, or to learn the necessary 
skills with which to reconstruct, the other two. However, without any of them there was (and still is) a 
closed circle, and notwithstanding their aggressive policy of head-hunting some exceedingly talented 
personnel, (plus a more than adequate supply of financial back-up), CargoLifter could find no evident 
way to break through this circle 
- 
despite more than five years of effort. 
During this time, it became clear to the author, that at CL, two groups 
- 
the "hardware" designers and the 
"wetware" operators 
- 
were each blaming the other for not supplying them with the vitally necessary 
"software" information. Both groups needed it but neither they, nor anyone else in the company, 
possessed it, and to the mutual frustration of all, this was ultimately to the detriment of the entire project. 
Furthermore, it is hard to see how any future NGVLA projects are going to avoid this same trap or indeed 
how they can ever hope to succeed ultimately without all three of these elements. 
3.2 The CargoLifter Operational Support Historical Research Project 
Although the full impact of the "Knowledge Gap" and the complexity of the problems that stem from it, 
were not fully appreciated in the early days of the CL project, nevertheless a suggestion was made, in 
1998, that did have the potential to break through the closed circle. This idea was put forward in an 
attempt to speed up the CLI60 development process and it was based on the fact that, although the US 
Navy blimp programme had long been terminated, some airships did actually continue in operation until 
the mid-1960's. Consequently, in 1998, there were still people living in America, who had first hand 
experience of the large Navy blimps. Although by this time they were quite elderly, many of them were 
more than willing, and perfectly capable of passing on some of their tips and tricks to the next generation. 
Thus the availability of the three vital components that had survived from past airship development 
projects, at the start of the CL development project, could have been be summarised in this way: 
Types of Airship Date of operations Hardware Software Wetware 
British WWI blimps 1910-1919 No Yes* No 
PGVLA rigids 1900-1939 No Yes* No 
US Navy VIWII blimps 1940-1965 No Yes* Yes" 
Small modem blimps 1970 
- 
today Yes Yes Yes 
NGVLAs ? No No No 
No 
= 
Non-existent Yes = Extant :*= Information held in archives 
** Hands-on knowledge fading fast 
TABLE 1- AVAILABILITY OF SURVIVING COMPONENTS IN 1998 
While this table did not exist until drawn by the author specifically for this thesis, nevertheless, there was 
at the time an appreciation of the situation by the core group of CL personnel who were charged with 
solving the CL-160 GH problems. The suggestion was therefore made that, instead of embarking on the 
construction of an entirely new, and completely unproven, type of airship (as a proof-of-concept for 
shareholders, and a learning device for the workforcej the company would be better advised to start by 
building a revised, or "updated7' version, of the last, and the largest of the highly successful US Navy 
blimp series 
- 
the ZPG-3W. 
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This idea, which came from one of the company's influx of new employees who did have previous LTA 
experience, was presented to CL management as a study paper, (Hochstetler, 1998). 1 In it Hochstetler 
argued that such an airship, which would have been much bigger than anything currently flying, then or 
now, having approximately one tenth of the disposable lift of the CL-160, could rather conveniently be 
used as a scaleable test airship. This would permit the testing and development of some of the novel 
component parts, and also of the unprecedented procedures intended for utilisation on the CL-160, at far 
less cost and risk than the real thing, with the additional benefit of potentially saving a lot of time in the 
long-term development schedule. 
What Hochstetler did not say, and, what seems subsequently to have been rnissed by those who evaluated 
the idea, was that, if used in conjunction with the co-operation of the US Navy's surviving, blimp- 
experienced personnel, the updating of a proven design of airship would have provided4 not only a short 
cut to the acquisition of real knowledge, which derived from tried and tested "large airship" techniques 
(for both the CL design and assembly teams, ) but would also have allowed the transfer, under personal 
tuition, of operational skills to both the flight and the ground crews. 
Unfortunately, and somewhat naively from the author's perspective, Hochstetler's plan was summarily 
dismissed, even as a subsidiary project, and CL opted instead to continue with their own experimental 
prototype blimp, (the highly innovative, but diminutive, "Joey') and to rely on a combination of modem 
analytical techniques 
- 
in conjunction with a considerable investment in computer simulations. This 
course of action cost a lot of money and, as was foreseen, did little to enhance the company's knowledge 
of the behaviour of very large airships in reality. Nor, indeed, did it add anything much to the skills of the 
personnel and their hands-on experience with the construction, handling and operation of large airships.. 
However, the rejection of the Hochstetler plan was not the end of the matter because the discussions 
within the Operational Support department, that had led up to its submission, had derived from a previous 
report written by the author, and a group of like-minded colleaguesý in which it had been demonstrated 
that a further possible way of progressing the project, and of perhaps attacking the tide of GH related 
unanswerable questions, was to use Historical Research (HR) to investigate how some of these same (or 
certainly very similar, ) problems must already have been solved by the previous generation of very large 
airship (PGVLA) development projects in the 1930s. 
The original intention, in suggesting Hochstetler's plan, had been that it would be run in conjunction with 
a properly funded, professionally handled HR study project. This 'three-pronged attack' of searching out 
written material lying forgotten in PGVLA archives, and combining it with remembered hints and tips 
from the survivors of the US Navy blimp programme, to help build and fly a "modernised7' large blimp of 
a proven design, and thereby to collect reliable first-hand information, would have maxiýnised the 
company's chances of quickly retrieving as much as possible of the aforementioned three vital knowledge 
components (see Table 1) as had survived from previous attempts to develop large airships. 
Hochstetler. 1998: Questions regarding a ZPG-3W rebuild 2 Camplin, Bischet & Watson, 1998 : Preliminary outline for ground handling CLA60 
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Behind the suggestion of an HR project lay the premise that there is every reason to believe that any new 
very large airships will work quite satisfactorily today, (and at any time in the future, ) simply because 
such aircraft are known to have worked perfectly well in the past. In fact, one of the previous generation 
giants [LZ127 "Graf Zeppelin "] flew around the world in the 1929, and clocked up more than a million 
air-rrdlcs in its 590 lifetime flights. So the airships themselves are unlikely to be a problem. The problem 
for the NGVLAs is that there are no GH facilities for Large Airships (LAGH). Indeed the author made the 
point that were the LZ127 to magically reappear in the sky today, it would almost certainly come to grief. 
as there was (and is) no place on earth to which it could be directed, where there were either any facilities, 
nor the expertise, to enable it to land safely. Furthermore, the GH infrastructure that had supported the 
triumphs of the 1930s had been built up incrementally over a 30 year period of experimentation, whereas 
CL would have to develop the GH infrastructure for their CL160 in its entirety, from scratch. 
In support of the argument that HR might offer a possible way of assisting in this formidable task, or at 
least give CL some insight into the GH problems they were facing, the Operational Support team, in their 
report, turned the idea of a time-travelling LZ127 around: 
"If, for example, we actually had a prototype CL160 in flight, where, in history would we choose 
to go with it? Where could we expect to make the safest, quickest, cheapest and most trouble- 
free landing? In other words, who in history has come closest to our currently envisaged plans? 
How many men did they use in the mooring process? Where did they stand? What hand tools did 
they use? What were the limitations of wind speed? What was their emergency fall back 
procedure if a major component broke at a critical moment? How did they really get the airships 
in and out of their hangars? " (Camplin, Bischet & Watson, 1998) 
Here can be seen in embryo some of the difficult questions which were already starting to preoccupy the 
department at the time. Moreover, the preliminary report, for what was to become the Cargol-ifter 
Operational Support Historical Research Project, (CLOSHRP) incorporated a further hope that it might be 
possible, by means of such an investigation, to find ready-made solutions 
- 
at least to some of them: 
"If we could unearth their actual hand books, or better still the orders and instructions that both 
the air and ground crews were working to, at several potential historical "safe havens, " then we 
would have in our possession tried and tested procedures that we know actually worked. Not just 
some best guess theories but the end result of many years of hard learned experience. Men were 
actually killed and injured getting this knowledge. Their rule books would give us at the very 
least a solid basis for compiling our own landing sequence and maybe even provide us with 
ready written complete procedures for problems we have not yet thought of when it comes to 
servicing and ground handling the CL160. The value to us of this information in terms of cost 
and time saved would obviously be enormous. " (Camplin, Bischet & Watson, 1998) 
This latter hope proved to be somewhat over-optimistic, and it later came to be regretted by the author as, 
within the minds of some people, it caused much misunderstanding as to the actual purpose, and potential 
scope, of the HR project (see Section 4.1). Nevertheless, the weight of the argument was sufficient to 
convince some decision-makers within the company that an historical research project was worthy of 
pursuit, and notwithstanding their complete lack of previous experience with, or indeed qualification for, 
conducting such an investigation, the Ground Support team was instructed to continue the collection of 
such historical material on LAGH as could be found. 
In view of the fact that this thesis is based on much of the early work from what came to be called the 
Cargolifter Operational Support Historical Research Project (CLOSHRP) it is deemed appropriate to pay 
brief attention here to some of the problems and processes involved in it. 
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3.3 The feasibility of an Historical Research (HR) project 
In seeking to persuade CargoLifter of the feasibility of an HR study of large airship GH it was necessary 
to establish two things. Firstly, that in general, by such means, there was a precedent for the retrieval of 
lost knowledge (and/or the resurrection of extinct skills) and secondly that there was likely to be a 
sufficient quantity of pertinent information that could be retrieved within a reasonable time-frame. 
3.3.1 Is there a precedent for the retrieval of lost skills? 
It has been argued that the true wealth of the world is the continuing acquisition of know-how: 
"Energy cannot decrease. Know-how can only increase. It is therefore scientifically clear that 
wealth which combines energy and intellect can only increase 
... 
" (Buckminster Fuller, 
1969: 288) 
Furthermore, it has been declared by the same author that such knowledge/wealth is indestructible: 
"The physicists make it very clear that energy can neither be created nor destroyed. You cannot 
exhaust that kind of wealth. 
... 
Even when we only learn that something we thought might work 
won't work, that's learning more! Every time we make an experiment we learn more, we can't 
learn less. " (Buckminster Fuller, 1969: 109) 
But, we can forget 
- 
and collectively, the whole of humanity loses when know-how is forgotten or a rare 
technique is lost. The death of the last surviving practitioner of any "difficultl" "arduous, " "complex7' 
and/or "obscure" discipline, in which proficiency can only be acquired by way of a long-lasting, or 
physically demanding apprenticeship that involves non-intuitive or non-logical processes, has 
consequences for all succeeding enerations! 
However, in terms of the knowledge and skills acquired in the past, for the operation of old or out-dated 
vehicles, nearly all the forms of transport that have ever been devised, are still being operated, somewhere 
in the world today. Furthermore, where a system has been superseded, the old know-how usually 2 
survives because adherents like to "keep their eye in. " Thus coal-fired railway engines still pull trains, 
wooden-hulled "tall shipe' still sail the seas under canvas and wooden airplanes are still flown for fun by 
experienced enthusiasts. There are also numerous events and rallies where horses pull carts, and veteran 
cars and steam traction engines are put through their paces; but all of this is only possible because the 
expert skills to operate these vehicles have survived 
- 
and here again there is a feedback loop. The very 
existence of these machines, in working condition, allows old hands to "have some fun" and keep their 
operational skills alive, while the fact that there are people with these necessary skills means that the 
machines can be kept in working order and thus new personnel can be trained to perpetuate the cycle. 
Nevertheless, keeping in mind the NGVLAs, the task of building a completely "new generatiorf' of 
bigger and better steam trains, or of even taller tall-ships, would not be quite so easy without the experts; 
also because many of the original manufacturing techniques have now died out, or become rather rare. 
Here again, however, the continued existence of the machines themselves, in full working order, would be 
of some considerable assistance to new age designers, and in this respect, all airships, and particularly the 
I 
-rake our 20 best people and virtually overnight we become a mediocre companyý" (Bill Gatesý Microsoft) 2 This is not invariable and notable exceptions include, for example, the Greek and Roman galley-ships rowed by slaves. 
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VLAs, are peculiarly disadvantaged. Their sheer physical size and the unavoidable cost of keeping them 
buoyant 
- 
helium costs a lot more than pumping dry a watertight hull 
- 
makes the use of airships, for fun- 
flying by groups of amateur enthusiasts, all but impossible. If left to their own devices for any length of 
time, airships lose their lifting gas, simply because it either percolates away or loses its purity due to 
pollution from the ingress of air and/or moisture. ' But even if the lift could be guaranteed, the cost of 
keeping such necessarily gigantic and intricate structures in fully-certified, flyable condition would be 
prohibitive. Consequently, with large airships there is a gap; there are none in existence, and the skills to 
operate them have died out. 
It should however be noted, that airships are not unique in this 2 and that other skills in completely 
different areas of human endeavour have previously died out altogether. Moreover, in the recent past, 
some skills have also successfully been re-captured from the edge of extinction. Dry stone walling and the 
thatching of cottage roofs are good examples of revitalised skills that have been brought back from the 
brink. Lost languages are probably an even better-known example, but there are many others, and a brief 
excursion into the realms of archaeology reveals, not only that the vital part played by "know-how" when 
putting knowledge into practice, has now been widely accepted within the discipline, but also that HR has 
previously been used successfully as a method of retrieving lost skills. 
One or two specific examples will illustrate the point while also revealing the magnitude of the 
difficulties encountered, and offering some caveats for future attempts to recover knowledge and skills of 
VLA GH by similar means. Thus: 
In agriculture: 
- 
"The methods used 
... 
to reproduce ancient materials should not exceed 
those presumed to have been within the competence of the contemporary society. This 
presupposes a detailed knowledge of ancient technology 
... 
because sometimes 
... 
experimental work is conducted with 'primitive' tools handled in an inexperienced and 
therefore inefficient way, and this can reduce the value of the work 
... 
Digging with antler 
picks and chopping trees with stone axes are both unaccustomed exercises for modem man 
... 
and the need for practice before recording efficiency tests is clear. " (Coles, 1973: 15/16) 
In cooking: 
- 
"We must conclude that cooking in a skin or paunch is possible, but that it 
requires some experience on the part of the cook, and it is likely that there are several small 
tricks of the trade that are necessary to ensure success. " (Coles, 1973: 52) 
In the playing of musical instruments: 
- 
"These instruments [Mayan ocarinas] 
... 
are 
fortunately limited in their potential range of notes, and through experiment we can say with 
some confidence that the sounds, or some of them, that we hear were heard by ancient man; 
more than this we cannot say. 
... 
The recent recording of a Rumanian peasant playing on 
two barley stalks must surely point to the irretrievable loss of evidence for music that must 
have existed in the Balkans for perhaps 5 or 6 thousand years. " (Coles, 1973: 161) 
And finally, in engineering: 
- 
"Throughout both Old and New Worlds the traces of ancient 
man include evidence of his skill as an engineer 
... 
The statues on Easter Island in the 
Pacific are up to 60 tonnes 
... 
[they were] fashioned from the solid rock-, and man-handled 
into place 
... 
an experiment 
... 
to see how difficult it would be to actually raise the largest 
fallen statue 
... 
occupied 12 men for 18 days 
... 
[and] required very considerable expertise 
andjudgement. " (Coles, 1973: 82-94) 
' Jones, & Tbach, 1995 : The transmission of water vapor through acrostat hull material and the effect on buoyant lift 2 For example 
- 
only a hand-full of pilots still retain the ability to fly aircraft that are powered by rotary engines. 
75 
In this latter enterprise. the Norwegian archaeologisUadventurer Thor Heyerdahl. (who famously wrote 
several best-selling books detailing his attempts to reclaim lost knowledge from ancient civilisations). I 
was greatly assisted by the fact that. at the time of his statue-raising experiment. the necessarý know-how 
lay. just within the range of living nieniorý of the local people. Thus information concerning the 
techniques needed to complete the work could be passed by word of mouth. Hovvever. of greater 
relevance to this thesis. Heyerdahl*s subsequent work on the possibility of prehistoric ocean crossings 
using balsa-wood rafts and reed boats. proved to be the most successful of all his attempts to regain the 
lost skills necessary for the operation of an extinct transportation system. Here is his problem: 
-When a pharaoh wanted a boat built he had no special problern. His skilled boat builders knevv 
everything about papyrus and papyrus boats, after generations of experience. His labour force 
was unlimited and the buildim, 
_ 
materials -rc" in boundless numbers just outside the palace 
gates 
... 
But that was long avo. 
... 
When the papyrus disappeared from the banks ofthe Nile the C, 
__ 
C last Egyptian master ofthc art of building papyrus boats also faded a\\ a\ for ever. " (He\ erdahl. 
1970: 87) 
The results ofHeyerdahl's empirical experiments are well-knovm. His first reed boat. Ra I failed and sank 
in the Atlantic. but Ra II, built with greater knowledge by more experienced reed-boat builders, reached 
the Bahamas. However, the proof that Heyerdahl"s success in these pro. iccts was founded on his prior 
application of a thorough, widc-ranging and in-depth study of the historical records can be found near the 
start of one of his earliest books 
- 
-The Kon Tiki expedition. " 
"Useless as it is to try to interpret the thoughts and actions of a primitive people by reading 
books and visiting museurns. it is. just as useless for an explorer ofour time to try to reach the 
horizons which can be contained in a single bookshelf. Scientific works, journals from the tinic 
of the earliest explorations, and endless collections in museurns in Europe and America offered a 
wealth ofmaterial for use in the puzzle I wanted to try to put to-gether. - (Heverdahl, 1956: 15) 
"In the library I du- out records left by the first Europeans who had reached the Pacific coast of 
South America. There was no lack of sketches and descriptions 
... 
" (Heyerdahl. 1956: 26) 
Therefore. it would seem that there is a successful precedent for the resurrection of extinct knowledge by 
means ofan HR proJect and that skills too may be re-acquired when the information retrieved is used in 
conjunction with empirical trials. Giving further cause for optimism is the fact that Heyerdahl was 
attempting to retrieve knowledge that was lost thousands of years ago whereas the skills that appear most 
useful for the NGVLAs have disappeared in the last 75 years. Furthermore, there is evidence that careful 
study of recent past endeavours in the field ot'LTA has previously borne fruit: 
"... Renard and Krebs had studied all the contributions of their predecessors. and had adopted 
any ideas that seemed to have merit. Theirs was not a vague idea, translated into reality, without 
any reference to previous successes or failures in the same field. Most carefully had they studied 
and planned; and the results showed the value of all this care. 
... 
in La Francc, for the first time 
in history 
... 
a true dirigible balloon followed a fixed course and returned to earth at the point 
from whýich it had departed. " (Hylander. 1931: 112) 
3.3.2 Is there sufficient information for a viable HR project? 
The second thing to consider. prior to embarking on an HR project, was whether sufficient information 
was likely to be available. Obviously. in the specific case of large airships. having too much information 
to sort through, would be as much of a problem as there not being enough. Recourse to one or two books 
revealed that there was unlikely to be a problem with too much information. 
I E. g. -Kon Tiki, " -Aku Aku, " "Ra" and "Tigris. " 
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"I I appears that about 850 pressure airships IhI imps I were bui It bem cc it 1900 and 1970. 
. -The 
figurcs for rigid airships between 1900 and 1940 are prcclictabl\ smallei- and nalm- botel. 
defined 
... 
The total appeaj-, to be 162. " (Nlo\\ forth, 191) 1: 14) 
While, not all sources were in absolute agreement with these numbers. and [or example. Mo\vIorth's total 
number of rigid airships is sornewhat less than those listed by Robinson ( 1973) in his Appendix A. or by 
Brooks & Griffin ( 1973: 50) (who give a "total number of cont-wurations launched = 178") nevert be less, 
regardless ofhow the calculation was done. ' it was apparent that the number ofairships ever to have 
previously existed was not verv great. Something over 1000 would seem to be a reasonable 
approximation and of these, fewer than 180 2 could properly be said to be -large- airship,,, (see Definitions 
in Section 5.3.1). Thus it was decided that there was likely to be sufficient inforniation available fOr StUdy 
without the proJect being either overwhelmed with data or undUIV protracted. However. in both cases, this 
anticipation subsequently proved to be sorne\. vhat ovcr-optimistic. 
3.3.3 Identitying potential sources of historical information 
Having established that Sufficient information probably existed, the next problem was \\ here to begin to 
look for it" Returning to the sanic historical reference books wherein were found the numbers of 
previously extant airships, there were also to be found further staternents a, to their origins: 
"... 27 of these Irigid airships] were built before World War I(I French, the rest German), 115 
during 
-cst German). and the remainder between the Wars (3 US, 8 
, 
that war, (8 British, the i 
British, 7 German) The figures show that almost 90'( ofall rigid airships \vcrc built before 1919, 
and that a similar percentage ofthe total originated in GernianN - mostly as Zeppelins. " 
(Mowforth, 1991: 14) 
From this, and similar reports, it was possible to establish a fairly clear picture of\vhcre the main PGVLA 
pro . ects had been centred, and thus to identify those countries where the greatest experience of GH was 
.1 
most likely to have accrued. Taking firstly the blimps and then the rigids the following pictures crnerued. 
Number of Blimps built Others 
between 1880-1970 Germany 2% 
Russia 11 Others 
- 
15 7% 
ElGeffnany 
- 
49 France 
9% 
" Russia 
- 
62 S 
41 
" France 
- 
82 Italy 
11* 
El Italy 
- 
98 
Britain 
0 Britain 
- 
230 25*o 
0 USA 
- 
395 
Figure 3.1 
- 
Countries that built blimps 
I Part of the problem centres on such complications as to whether airships that were cut in hall' 
, 
and lengthened. are to be counted as 
one or two separate aircraft. and whether putting a new gas hag onto an old gondola makes foi a conipletelý new blinlpý 
2 For this in vestigation a rnOTe conserv at ive estimate of 160 %%i II he used 
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Clearly the bulk ofthe knomdedgc. as far as the operation of blimps is concerned. was likelý to be found 
in the USA, with Britain looking like a promising alternative second source. and it would appear there 
was little advantage to be gained front spreading the search for GH information on this type of airship 
anywhere IIILICII further afield. However for rigid airships the picture was verý different: 
Figure 3.2 
- 
Countries that built rigid airships 
Here there could be no doubt that any surviving records concerning the GH procedures for the rigid 
PGVLAs were going to be concentrated in the German archives, with Britain once again in second place 
- 
albeit seemingly rather a long way behind. 
In view ofthe fact that. at the inception of the CLOSHRP. the author was unable to read document,, 
written in the German language, and that there was a high probability that follo\ving the two World Wars. 
much German archival material would have been copied by the Allies. and subsequently transferred to 
their own archives for translation into English, it was decided that the team would divide their efforts 
according to their country of origin. Thus, German-speaking team members would look for GH 
information in Germany, while the author would commence his search in the British archives. Visits to 
American archives, although extremely desirable, would be held in reserve until later in the project. 
Adding weight to this decision was the fact that at the time, CL had plans to establish an American office. 
thereby offering the possibility for a future USA based "in-house historical research project" which could 
collect rnatefials directly from the US archives. 
3.4 Methodology of HR project 
Hindsight reveals that the HR project was actually composed of four separate phases, and from the 
diagram (See Figure 3.3 overleaf) it can be seen that the investigation which the author and the GH team 
had been tasked with, was essentially that contained within Phases Three and Four of the project, as it had 
been originally conceived. 
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THE CARGOLIFTER OPERATIONAL SUPPORT 
HISTORICAL RESEARCH PROJECT (CLOSHRII) 
PHASE ONE 1 1.1 IDENTIFYSOURCES OF INFORMATION 
COLLECT RAVVMATERIAL 
F12 DEFINF INFORMATION To BE COLLECTFI) 
1 1.3, COLLECT INFORMATION FROM SOURCES 
PHASE TWO 2.1 ESTABLISH FILING SYSTEM /DATABASE 
FILE AND SORT FOR STORAGE AND RETRIEVAL OF RAW 
COLLECTED MATERIAL MATERIAL 
2.2INSERT COLLECTED INFORMATION AND 
COMPILE DATABASE 
PHASE THREE 
-1.1 
SELECT INFORMATION FROM DATABASE 
ANALYSE SELECTED FOR ANALYSIS 
MATERIAL 
1- 3.2 PROCESS SELECTED INFORMATION 
3.3 COMPARE HISTORICAL ANALYSIS WITH 
OTHER SELECTED INFORMATION 
PHASE FOUR 4.1 USE HISTORICAL ANALYSIS TO SHOW 
PRESENT RESULTS AREAS OF GREATEST RISK FOR NGVLA 
DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS 
4.2 USE COMPARISON OF HISTORICAL 
ANALYSIS AND OTHER SELECTED 
INFORMATION To SUGGEST COST- 
EYFECTIVE WAYFORWARD 
4.3 PRODUCE GUIDELINES FOR 
DEVELOPMENT OF NGVLA GH SYSTEMS 
BASED ON RESULTS OF ANALYSIS 
4.4 WRITETHESIS To EVALUATE 
HISTORICAL RESEARCH PROJECT 
Figure 3.3 
- 
Methodology of the Cargol, ifter Operational Support Historical Research Project 
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However, the fact that the newly emergent CargoLifter company, in 1999, had no library of historical 
information, meant that the team was effectively forced to back-track, and to conduct Phases One and 
Two, prior to commencing on the GH analysis work. This added enormously to the length and complexity 
of the project and embedded a whole range of new and unforeseen problems. 
Some of these problems arose simply because of the author's lack of previous experience in running such 
an historical research project. Others were similar to those which would be common to any such 
investigation. These, therefore need no special mention. However, some of the problems encountered 
during the three-year course of the information gathering phase of the CLOSHRP, were convoluted, and 
far-reaching in their consequences, and because these problems are specific to the study of airship history, 
(even though the relationship of some of them to it are not immediately obvious, ) in the interests of 
providing assistance to future investigations, it is deemed appropriate to pay brief attention to them here. 
3.4.1 Phase One 
- 
collecting the source material 
Although it had been agreed, in principle, that the author's search for historical information should begin 
in the British archives, nevertheless, the first problem was where exactly among them to start looking. A 
little research soon revealed that, while there were no public archives, in Britain, that were concerned 
exclusively with LTA flight, there were several diverse libraries and privately-held collections that did 
contain information from the PGVLAs, and most of them were in, or near London. Visits to these source 
libraries commenced shortly after the CLOSHRP was given the go-ahead, in 1998, and continued until it 
was curtailed by financial cutbacks at the end of 2001. 
The main sources of historical information from which PGVLA information was collected were: 
The Public Record Office, Kew 
The RAF Museum Library, Hendon 
The Royal Aeronautical Society Library, London 
The Imperial War Museum Library, London 
The Patent Office Library, London 
The Airship Heritage Trust Library, Cardington 
The British Balloon Museum and Library, Cranfield 
However, it was almost immediately discovered that while several of these source libraries did contain 
significant amounts of PGVLA information, in none of them was any of the airship related material either 
catalogued or indexed. This made the task of finding, and collecting information specific to GH of the 
PGVLAs far from easy, and it led, in turn, to the realisation that the HR project had several other 
intractable subsidiary problems buried within it which needed to be dealt with before even Phase One 
- 
the collection of material 
- 
could properly begin. In fact, it quickly became apparent hat both Phases One 
and Two 
- 
the collection and the processing of suitable GH material from within the chosen archives 
- 
were dependent upon a chain of requirements each of which needed to be fulfilled before the next phase 
could proceed. 
Viewed with hindsight, the chain of "prerequisite requirements" looked like this: 
Before conclusions regarding NGVLA GH could be reached, historical material containing 
the PGVLA information had to be analysed 
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" Before such analysis could begin, information specific to the PGVLA GH had to be held 
somewhere and filed accessibly so that it could be retrieved to order for study 
" Before the information could be filed, it had to be sorted, categorised and indexed 
" Before the information could be sorted, it had to be collected 
" Before it could be collected, it had to be copied 
" Before it could be copied, it had to be discovered 
" Before it could be discovered, it had to be searched for 
" Before a search could begin, potentially suitable archives where information relevant to the 
GH of large airships was likely to be held, had to be located and visited 
" But, before likely archives were visited, the precise information required for collection had 
to be defined 
" And definition of the information that was potentially of interest and thus needed to be 
collected required a list of keywords, or of search terms, 
" This, in turn, dictated the further need for an understanding of the, sometimes obscure and 
often out-dated, terms and terminologies that were used in the documents held in the 
PGVLA archives and collections. 
The author's lack of prior experience with such a project meant that many of these problems only became 
apparent with hindsight 
- 
and sometimes only after they had become acute. Much of the work to rectify 
these deficiencies in the CargoLifter project was thus done in a piecemeal fashion and retrospectively, 
which again added significantly to the duration of the project. 
3.4.2 Pitfalls and caveats of collecting uncatalogued information 
Having decided where to look for information, the next problem was to decide precisely what to look for. 
3.4.2.1 What to look for? 
From the list of prerequisites it can be seen that fundamental to all four phases was the need for a clear 
and concise definition of what exactly was meant by the term "Ground Handling. " Without this it was not 
possible: 
" in Phase One to know what to search for, or 
" in Phase Two to structure a filing system or repository for the collected information, or 
" in Phase Three to divide, rule and analyse the complex and intertwined GH problems so that 
the separate facets of particular topics could be isolated and investigated, or 
" in Phase Four to establish a framework in which to present the results so that the various CL 
Development teams, and other departments within the rapidly expanding company, could 
understand the lessons learnt and appreciate the full effects that these would have upon the 
requirements of the GHE for a VLA and of its innumerable interactions with other systems. 
However, in view of the fact that this topic is one of several of the links in the prerequisite chain which 
were subsequently found also to be either necessary, or useful, for the completion of this thesis, it will be 
dealt with separately and is thus to be found included among others which are examined in detail, in 
Section 5- Prerequisites. Chief amongst them are these: 
" The need to define a "Large Airship"? 
" The need to define "Ground Handling"? 
" The need to understand the terminology 
3A. 2.2 What to Collect? 
The original aim had been to collect as wide a range of GH related material as possible and it was 
anticipated that useful information concerning the PGVLA GH would most likely be found in two forms: 
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a) In large, concentrated volumes 
- 
where GH specific documents, such as manuals, log books, etc., 
were unearthed, and 
b) Piecemeal 
- 
when gleaned from writings about topics other than GH which mentioned it in 
passing. 
Furthermore, it was recognised in advance that the material found could be expected to have very 
different levels of usefulness, e. g. 
Actual descriptions in detail of relevant procedures, or of GHE and infrastructure. 
Material that gives some insight into specific GH procedures or how they were conducted. 
Material that leads to other potential reservoirs or repositories of knowledge 
Material that poses questions or opens further avenues of research. 
All this proved to be so, however the reality also proved to be far more complex, largely because: 
"Ubraries have conventionally been concerned with books, but 'the collection* in most libraries 
goes beyond the book. Very few libraries would not also collect conference proceedings, reports, 
microfilms, serials and maps. Small collections of videos, slides, film strips and computer 
software are held by many libraries, whilst others, often described as resource centres, actually 
specialize in such media. Organizations also keep extensive collections of documents in the form 
of records or files which may contain letters, invoices, leaflets, personnel documents and a host 
of other items. " (Rowley, 1992: 4/5). 
Thus, whereas the original intention had been to seek out from the PGVLA archives, documentation that 
contained first hand accounts of matters relating to GH, it actually transpired that there was a huge 
reservoir of exceedingly useful information to be found elsewhere. The list of possible sources therefore 
had to be extended to include these, and anyone considering similar research should also bear these in 
mind. Other sources of potentially valuable airship GH information (in alphabetical order) include: 
" Archive documents 
" Books and booklets 
" Conference Proceedings 
" Films and videos 
" Internet web-pages and chat rooms 
" Journals containing peer-reviewed Technical Papers 
" Magazine features 
" Manuals 
" Newspaper articles 
" Official enquiries and reports (most frequently into accidents and incidents) 
" Patents 
" Photographs (a lot can be learned with careful use of a magnifying glass) 
" Rules and regulations 
However, all this diversity only increases the need for a clearly defined set of search terms, or keywords, 
at the start of the collection process. As stated, the author's analysis of this part of the problem, and his 
attempt at a solution to it, can be found below under "Definition of Ground Handling" in Section S. The 
problem of what to do with the information after it has been collected still remains to be dealt with. 
3A. 2.3 Unknown quantity of material 
During the course of the CLOSHRP the author was constantly asked how much the historical research 
project was going to cost and how long it would take to complete. Both of these are virtually impossible 
to answer because without an index of keywords, searching can only be random, and unless there is a 
catalogue there is no way of knowing how much useful information there is to collect from any one 
repository. Thus there is no way of knowing what lies buried in the archives or when it will come to light. 
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Consequently, there is no way of estimating the length of time it will take to collect. Furthermore, in the 
context of acquiring lost knowledge, even if there is a catalogue of the documents, then how much is 
enough? How will a researcher know when there is no more useful information to be found? 
Thus a budget cannot be determined with any accuracy at the start, or even part way through, such a 
project. Therefore, it would seem that until the English language PGVLA records are catalogued and 
indexed, it would be best to treat future historical research within them very much as an archaeological 
dig and to finance research accordingly. For instance one way to deal with the problem would be to copy 
the "Time-team" method (as demonstrated to good effect on television, ) and to designate a length of time 
and sufficient funds for a pilot research and collection project, and then, at the end of it, evaluate the 
material gathered and either stop, or do it again. 
3.4.2.4 Missing archives 
It must also be kept in mind that many arcl-ýives have been destroyed in the past, by bombing, (in London) 
and looting, (in Germany) so there is a high probability that much which was once recorded has now been 
lost, damaged or misplaced. Also it is evident that an unquantiflable amount of material has simply been 
thrown away or deliberately destroyed, due, either to competition for storage space and the cost of 
preservation, or to a plain lack of either interest or foresight. For example: 
"Footnote 
... 
the material contained in the Handbook [on RigidAirship N6.11 is probably the 
only complete and reliable account extant. The Air Ministry Archives unfortunately had 
destroyed the contracts and correspondence just before I arrived, and the other papers including 
the Court of Inquiry Report have been lost. " (Higham, 1961: 4 1) 
Furthermore, in the course of his own research, the author frequently came across references to 
potentially interesting documents of which no trace could be found throughout the duration of the 
CLOSHRP. For example: 
" "In March 1930 the Royal Airship Works produced designs for an 8,300,000-c. f. ship with 
gaseous-fuel engines. R-102 would have been of 226 tons gross lift and 88 tons disposable 
(Higham, 1961: 320) [GC emphasis] 
" "... plans were drawn at the time for an R102 
... 
R 102 remained a paper scheme of course 
(Robinson, 1973: 318) [GC emphasis] 
" "In March 1930 the Royal Airship Works at Cardington had produced designs for an 8,300,000 
cubic feet airship to be called R-102, but no further action was taken. " (Williams, 1974: 162) [GC 
emphasis] 
" "Early in August [1930] 
... 
two important decisions were made: first that design work should 
be started immediately on two stretched versions of RIO] 
... 
to be designated R102 and R103 
... 
" (Johnston, 1994: 136) [GC emphasis] 
Notwithstanding that following CL's demise, subsequent reading by the author did reveal a probable 
location for the example given, ' it still reinforces the point first made in this section, as to the difficulty of 
estimating the cost of research and its likely financial return. On any given day (or within any allotted 
time period) a researcher may find many items that will yield big savings or nothing at all of value. 
I 
-ney left behind in two neat files* [Footnote: * Public Records Office (AIM) Files: AIR 5/987/3069 and AIR 5/988/3069] 
... 
the 
desips and estimates for F-102 and& 103. new airships to embody all they knew; all they had learned. " (Masefield, 1982: 4) 
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3.4.2.5 Multiple copies 
A further complication is that one may find identical copies of the same document in different archives, 
or even, many slightly different versions, or variants, of the same document in several different places 
within one, or more archives. For instance, one may find an author's hand-written notes for a technical 
paper, and then, one or more drafts of the typewritten versions of it, which were perhaps circulated to his 
or her colleagues, and some of these copies may have exceedingly valuable or insightful comments on 
them 
- 
perhaps penned directly by eminent, or knowledgeable, or even anonymous, people. Then there 
may be a printed draft or a proof copy of the same work, perhaps with the author's notes and corrections, 
and then a copy of the actual finished paper as it appeared in some conference proceedings, or in a 
publication. And finally there may be further edited, or abridged, versions of the firdshed work that may 
have been printed elsewhere, such as in technical journals devoted to other related fields, or even to 
totally unrelated, topics. 
In addition, the same author may later re-vamp and expand an already published paper, and use what is 
essentially the same text, or at least the same ideas, or perhaps one specific section of it, to form the basis 
of a later, larger and more detailed worL All these various versions may have different dates on them 
- 
or 
none at all. Some may have the author's name on them, and others may not, in which case the authorship 
may only become apparent after the document has been collected and processed and the similarities 
noted. Sometimes authors meet and collaborate, and a name is added 
- 
sometimes they dispute, or fall 
out, and a name is dropped. The title may change and may very well be different on different versions, 
and early versions may have no title at all. The first line or the first page or even whole sections may be 
missing in some versions. 
While the opportunity of watching a particular author's ideas develop may be useful for biographers, for 
the general researcher, collecting multiple copies of exactly the same (or almost identical) documents is a 
waste of time and money. Although, collecting different versions, may have benefits, especially if they 
show how an author's ideas changed in the face of input from, or exposure to, other fields of knowledge, 
or, more importantly following the realisation of a concept and the results of some empirical experiments. 
However this duplicate copy problem is really only part of a greater one that is generally acknowledged to 
be inherent in all research projects, and when deciding which pieces of information to collect for any 
library, it is just as true as in the context given here: 
"The researcher begins by taking notes of everything that he thinks might be useful; some will 
prove to be, quite simply, not as useful or relevant as was first thought likely-, some will have to be pruned, or excised, in the interests of space. Waste is inseparable from research. " (Berry, 1966: 24) [GC emphasis) 
Try telling that to the bean counters! 
3.4.2.6 False witnesses with "axes to grind" 
One further problem to be borne in mind when searching for information in the PGVLA archives, or 
when attempting to analyse it, is that some of the material may not be true. Among the reasons for this: 
"Most writers have a "thesis" 
-a point of view which they seek to advance. Put more bluntly, 
they have an axe to grind. " (Berry, 1966: 20) 
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This is especially so when it comes to the history of airships and indeed, many books 1 and biographies 
have been written revealing the way in which the various conflicting personalities drove their own 
agendas and influenced the development of the PGVLAs. To quote but one historian on this problem: 
"... the airship business in particular was full of petty jealousies and the survivors still hold 
strong opinions. The task of the historian has been made no easier by the dearth of vital materials 
in certain areas and the plethora of remembrances offered to fill these gaps. " (Higham, 
1961: XX) 
Thus there may be contradictory reports of some events that are due simply to the writers' own particular 
prejudices, or perhaps because of their need to justify decisions taken at the time of writing, or even in 
order to attract financial support for their future plans. A prime example of this latter, where the 
capabilities of the American mechanised GH system are shown to have been falsely over-stated, appears 
in a revealing Memorandum from The University of Akron Archives, that turned up in the CargoLifter 
library. Dated 13th June 1930 and signed by W. T. van Orman, the Memo concludes that "Unquestionably 
the present Lakehurst mechanical handling gear represents a tremendous stepforward. " However, prior 
to this, it clearly accuses the officer i/c Lakehurst, (the highly regarded and influential Commander 
Charles Rosendahl), of massaging the numbers to prove his case: 
"As set forth by Commander Rosendahl, the 'Los Angeles' has been docked and undocked in 
cross hangar winds of 17 to 20 rnp. h., and further that gusts momentarily increased this to 25 
m. p. h. Existing aerological records show the maximum cross hangar velocities for docking and 
undocking with present equipment to be 10 knots for the 'Los Angeles'. " (Van Orman, 1930) 
Similarly in Britain, it is well-known, and frequently repeated, that there was considerable friction 
between the two developmental teams of the "private-enterprise" R100 and the "state-owned7R101. 
For example statements by witnesses describing the first ever connection of R. 100 to the "opposition's" 
High Mast at The Royal Airship Works, Cardington were clearly coloured by the respective positions of 
the writers. Thus the view expressed by an experienced ground handler, who had narrowly missed being 
appointed as Mooring Officer at Cardington, is somewhat rueful and focussed in his criticism: 
"R-100 made her first flight on 10h December 1929 and after trials in the vicinity of Howden 
flew to Cardington to join R-101. There was great disappointment here, apparently due to the 
lack of experience of the landing officer. Three circuits had to be made before a connection with 
the ship's mooring wire was made 
... 
" (Williams, 1974: 156) 
Whereas, Nevil Shute Norway, a leading light within R100's design team, when commenting on the same 
event, uses it to pour scorn more generally on his competitors and on their abilities: 
"We had assumed that there would be little difficulty in landing the ship on the Air Ministry 
mooring mast; so much had been written about this method of handling airships that it came as 
rather a surprise to us to find that the experts on this matter were inexpert in the use of their 
rather complicated apparatus. On this first flight it took three hours to land R100 to the mast, no 
less than three attempts being made to establish connection between the ship's rope and the mast 
rope. " (Norway, 1933) 
However, only 8 flights later, for the first ever connection of R100 to an identical high mast at St Hubert, 
near Montreal in Canada, Norway seems to have acquired a slightly less jaundiced view of the system: 
"... we came up to the mast just as dawn was breaking, and made connection at the first shot; 
the ship was moored without incident. " (Norway, 1933) 
1 E. g. Johnston. 1994; Meyer, 199 1; Dick & Robinson, 1985; Masefield, 1982; Knausel, 198 1; Cochran, 1980. Morpurgo, 1972; 
Ifigham, 1961; Eckener, 1958; Spanner, 1929; Lehmann & Mingos, 1927; 
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This brings him more into line with Wing Commander R. S. Booth, (Captain of R100) who seems to have 
had a more balanced, less partisan view of that first mooring at Cardington, as demonstrated by this latter- 
day exchange: 
"... he [Nevil Shute Norway] says [in his memoir "Slide Rule"] "It came to us as a surprise to 
find that the experts 
... 
were inexpert in the use of their 
... 
apparatus", as though to castigate by 
implication the rival gang. It looks to me [E. A. Johnston, son of the navigator of R1011 rather 
more like inexpert handling of the new ship by its own crew. [Wing Commander R. S. Booth 
answers] Agree entirely. Scott did this landing and quite rightly took his time about it, The ship 
had never landed before on that tower and the crew had been trained using a kite balloon! We 
went through the motions by approaching three times, and who is to say that he [Scott] was 
unduly cautions? At our best we never got much below one hour, though we were working out 
simpler methods. " (Johnston, 2001: 24) 
So, it is important when researching into the history of past airships to know, not only who an author was, 
- 
in terms of his (and almost never her) standing, or rank, within the various competing development 
teams, 
- 
but also, when the item was written 
- 
not only with regard to the maturity of the individual's 
personal career, but also of the context, (politically, financially and historically, ) within which the 
particular project or event is being spoken of. 
3A. 2.7 Secrecy 
And finally, it must be kept in mind when digging into the historical records that many, if not most, past 
airship development programmes were run by the n-dhtary in times of war. Thus much information was 
classified as secret. In general, as few copies as was possible, were made of 'sensitive' reports, with 
access to all severely restricted on a "need to know" basis. Espionage was seen as a serious threat during 
the Second World War and in many areas even the taking photographs was forbidden on pain of death. It 
is therefore to be expected that unofficial pictures will be hard to find, and in some cases information that 
was originally scarce may have been destroyed simply in order to keep it secret. 
"Precisely what happened [to HMA No. "Mayfly"] may never be known, for evidence that might 
settle the point is not available. Winston Churchill, First Sea Lord of the Admiralty when the 
causes of the accident were investigated, refused to allow the minutes and proceedings of the Court of Inquiry to be published, and the report was afterwards described as 'lost'. " (Andrews, 
1969, cited in Collier, 1974: 65/67) 
Some documents may also not exist today because when de-classified they were judged to be of very little 
interest and were destroyed irrunediately 
- 
again to save archive space. Conversely, it is also possible that 
some very secret material may still be classified as sensitive, or potentially of future value, and may still 
be lying, safely hidden in the archives awaiting public release at such time as its usefulness will have been 
deemed to have expired. It is not inconceivable that some material was adjudged so valuable and useful 
that it was sealed away for one hundred years. Whatever the case, the need for secrecy means that there is 
a high probability that for today's researchers there will be some unquantifiable holes in the picture. 
A further problem is that 'disinformation' was sometimes actively spread in wartime to confuse enemies. 
The German Army, for example, deliberately chose a confusing numbering system for their First World 
War Zeppelins. By adding a number 'T' to the front of the manufacturer's production number they 
increased the perceived size of the Army's fleet, literally at a stroke. It is not clear if, at the time, this did 
deceive their opponents, but it certainly has potential to confuse historians and researchers in the future. 
Thus "Caveat Lector" is a good thing to keep in mind when searching archives. 
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3.4.3 Phase Two 
- 
filing and sorting collected material 
Soon after the author started to collect information from the British archives, in Phase One of the 
CLOSHRP, it became evident that Phase Two, establishing a repository for the discovered documents and 
organising a system for finding material within it, was going to be an enormous task. Yet again the 
author's lack of previous experience exacerbated the problem, as the pursuit of this goal led him into the 
deep waters of Information Science. While much of this work has no relevance to this investigation, some 
does, and because, again lessons were learnt, and some useful pointers discovered that may be of - 
assistance to any future attempts to establish an archive dedicated to the history of LTA flight, it is thus 
thought appropriate to include here some of the most serious difficulties that were encountered. 
3.4.3.1 Inherent complexity of the subject 
First and foremost, as stated above (in previous section) it was found that a fundamental prerequisite for 
all four Phases of the CLOSHRP, and subsequently for this thesis, was the need to establish some system 
of dividing up into recognisable and useful categories the material held in the airship archives. The 
difficulties in doing this had been previously noted and one suggested solution had also been made: 
"The innumerable facets of an airship's peculiarities arc interlink-ed to an extent that defeats 
categorisation but for convenience a survey may at least begin under the separate headings: 
" the mechanics of the airship 
" the airship in the air 
" the airship on the ground" (Mowforth, 1991: 16) 
At the outset of the project the author's intention was to concentrate solely on the last of these divisions, 
however, as time passed, more and more interest was shown by other CL departments in learning how the 
PGVLAs had dealt with a whole range of diverse problems, in many spheres, and in disciplines other than 
GH. This further complicated and extended both the time and costs of Phase One 
- 
not least because the 
lack of a coherent collection policy frequently meant the author returning to collect previously noted 
items, on subsequent visits, instead of continuing the search for new material. Anyone contemplating a 
future investigation along the same lines would be well advised to clarify this and define the scope of 
their search prior to starting their project. The use of experienced researchers is also highly recommended. 
However, there is evidence that the difficulty of organising the information concerning fully-immersed, 
buoyant vehicles may be endemic in the type; submarine experts have had the same problem: 
"We encountered some difficulty in structuring the contents of the book ["Concepts in 
Submarine Design"] 
... 
because each aspect is so closely interrelated to the others that it is 
difficult to treat any one in isolation. " (Burcher & Rydill, 1994: xii) 
3.4.3.2 How to categorise the rindings? 
A further dimension of complexity is added to an already difficult problem by the previously identified, 
plethora of different types of potential source material that is held in the PGVLA archives. This is 
because they combine with the interrelated nature of the material to make it virtually impossible, in this 
case, to use what is commonly regarded as a normal basis for a straightforward classification system of 
historical archives. "Historians especially like to distinguish between Primary and Secondary sources. " 
(Berry, 1966: 48). However, accepting the definition of these two terms, as given by the same author, thus: 
"Primary materials are first hand accounts, reflections and statements. They are not based on 
other written works. They are in the original form, without having been arranged or interpreted 
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by anyone else.... Secondary sources 
- 
by far the larger group 
- 
discuss primary sources. Iley 
consist of works which select, edit, and interpret this raw material. " (Berry, 1966: 14) 
... 
this author found that, in the airship archives, it was often extremely difficult to decide which is which. 
This was partly because there are seemingly examples of both categories in nearly all sections of the list 
of potential information sources identified above. But mostly it was because, in the document collections, 
(where the PGVLA primary sources were predominant, ) actually sorting them into categories which 
would allow a third person to search them, by reference to any normal means, was rendered virtually 
impossible by the fact that many exceedingly interesting papers were either, untitled, or undated, or 
unsigned 
- 
and on occasion, all three. 
In trying to sort these, it was often considerably easier to subdivide the research findings loosely into 
three rather different parts 
- 
contemporary accounts, retrospective memoirs and modem reviews 
- 
but it 
was frequently the "Provenance" or the context in which particular papers were found that actually gave 
the information contained within them its value. For example, undated and unsigned memos, or hand- 
written notes, that were discovered amongst the official papers taken from the offices of the Royal 
Airship Works at Cardington, had obviously been adjudged of some interest, to those unfortunate 
individuals who had lost their lives in the crash of the R101. Obviously the thoughts, writings and 
intentions, of these exceedingly experienced men can reveal a great deal of interest, and whatever was left 
on the desks to which they intended to return, represents a snapshot of their immediate concerns, prior to 
the unexpectedly abrupt, and tragic ending of their project. As a consequence, these Eragments are again 
more like the findings from an archaeological dig where the context in which items are found is vital to an 
understanding of their importance. Thus, in trying to organise, and to categorise, the results of an airship 
based historical research project this would seem to be a very useful suggestion: 
"Ancient archives were almost never catalogued alphabetically because so many authors were 
unknown. Titles didn't work either because many historical documents were untitled letters or 
parchment fragments. Most cataloguing was done chronologically: ' (Brown, 2000: 223) 
However, the value of this nugget is perhaps questionable, if for no other reason than that the quote 
actually comes from a work of fiction. Nevertheless, this author also found that there was seemingly 
equally useful advice hidden away elsewhere in popular literature: 
"A complex assembly is best described first in terms of its substances: its subassemblies and 
parts. Then, next, it is described in terms of its methods: its functions as they occur in sequence. 
If you confuse physical and functional description, substance and method, you get all tangled up 
and so does the reader. " (Pirsig, 1979: 332) 
Regardless of the fictional source of such wisdom, it is nevertheless apparent that trying to untangle and 
define the requirements for the physical "hardware" of the NGVLA GH systems, and of then specifying 
exactly what a particular prototype will actually need, in terms of its GHE, and of then further defining 
and describing not only the method, (i. e. the "software" or how this equipment will be used, ) but also its 
functions, (i. e. what skills the "wetware" who are going to use it will need to be trained in so as to operate 
it cost effectively and safely, ) is a forn-ddable set of tasks. Providing a reference library to encompass all 
that looks likely to be required in order to facilitate this process, and which allows inexperienced 
personnel to complete the work before the prototype airship has been built, appears even more daunting. 
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Yet, despite the complex nature of the subject it is useful to remind ourselves that in this we are not 
entirely pioneering new ground. To some extent today's researchers are merely retracing the almost 
obliterated tracks of the previous generation of airship authors who were faced with finding solutions to 
these very same problems. They also had to solve the problem of how to categorise and how to present 
this interwoven complex of information. It is therefore pertinent to ask how these problems were solved 
in the past? How for example did the authors of airship manuals for the PGVLAs break down the 
complex subject? How have others previously dealt with the interdependent nature of the GH processes? 
It would be instructive to compare the layout of PGVLA operations manuals and perhaps to use their 
contents lists as the basis for a classification system? However, this lies beyond the scope of this present 
investigation. 
3.4.3.3 Retrieving stored information 
To a large extent the structure of any reference library of historical information that is focussed on LAGH 
will depend on what is found from other archives to put into it, and what, from the diverse sources 
mentioned above, is also deemed worthy of inclusion. However, there are other considerations. The 
purpose of any and all information storage is essentially to facilitate its subsequent retrieval on demand. 
This is confirmed in specialist literature devoted to the subject of information processing. For example: 
"The organization of knowledge is a process that has been recognized as necessary for thousands 
of years. As the quantity of knowledge expands, the need to organize it becomes more pressing. 
... 
the organization of knowledge is an essential preliminary to the effective exploitation of that 
information. " (Rowley, 1992: 3) 
"Any attempt to organize knowledge must, in order to justify the effort involved, have an 
objective. 
... 
In general terms, the objective 
... 
is to permit that information or knowledge to be 
found again on a later occasion. Thus the organization of knowledge and 
... 
information 
retrieval, are very much part of the same process. Poor organization makes it difficult to find 
something later... " (Rowley, 1992: 3) 
Furthermore, there may still be problems even when things are perfectly well "organised7': 
"If someone else puts your things away but is unfamiliar with your usual system, then the objects 
may be organized, but that does not mean that you can find things. 
... 
Organization in itself has 
limited value. The organization must be sensible, according to some criterion, and preferably 
familiar to, or at least expected by, the user. Thus 
... 
it is not possible to divorce the organization 
of knowledge from information retrieval. " (Rowley, 1992: 3) 
Here is confirmation that the three facets of this problem 
- 
what to collect, where to keep it and how to 
make it easily accessible 
- 
are united by the common need for a universally agreed categorisation system. 
Moreover, in the situation, which it seems will inevitably face the NGVLA developers, where the 
majority of their incumbent personnel 
- 
i. e. those who will be most in need of a reference library 
- 
will 
have little or no experience of the vagaries of airships, and/or of LTA matters, then the requirement for 
speed and clarity in an information retrieval system should perhaps take precedence. The requirements for 
such an accessible filing and information storage system would seem to be twofold: 
a) that it affords easy and quick categorisation to facilitate insertion of new material, 
b) that it is easy for the uninitiated to find filed information that is contained within the system. 
The key to this would appear to this author to be the founding of a database, or a databank of sorted 
source material; one that is easy to understand, and regardless of the fact that it will almost certainly be 
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computer-based, one that is based on the simple indexing, and cross referencing principles of an old- 
fashioned card index would seem to be a good place to start: 
"Essentially, each card contains three items of information: a descriptive label, or some 
identifying phrase ; the main body of the note itself ; and the reference to the source. " (Berry, 
1966: 25) 
In view of the complex nature of this problem, and of its fundamental importance, it is the author's belief 
that a very considerable investment of time and money, along with specialist advice from the world of 
Information Science, will be required to solve it. Nevertheless, in attempting to establish a reference 
library of historical information specific to the construction and operation of large, or very large, airships 
for CL the author did attempt his own inexpert, preliminary analysis of some of the advantages and 
disadvantages of different information storage systems. This is given overleaf in Table 2. 
A further possible starting point for anyone contemplating taking on this categorisation problem would be 
to base it upon the Air Transport Association (ATA) classification system, ' as is commonly used in the 
HTA world. This would however have to be extensively modified to allow for such additional airship 
parts as ballonets and other LTA peculiarities, including, for example, disposable ballast for discharge 
during flight. The author is aware that CL did at least start to carry out this exercise but the abrupt closure 
of the company in 2002 has left the fate of this, and many other potentially useful documents, uncertain. 
A modified ATA system would however only categorise the aircraft itself and further additions to the 
system would be required to cater for the GHE 
- 
masts, dollies, rail tracks, etc. Much further work on this 
topic remains to be done. 
3.4.3.4 Presentation of results 
A final difficulty in conducting this investigation has been the three-dimensional nature of the subject. If, 
for arguments sake, there are 100 different airships, and each has a life of ten years, and there are a dozen 
different GH procedures that each airship is subject to, and moreover, each of these procedures evolves 
into a definably separate variant every year, then, in order to contain this information, a matrix is required 
that will contain 100 x 12 x 10 = 12,000 fields. However, the fact that the procedures interact with each 
other as they evolve, and can be passed through the matrix in both time and space directions, (i. e. 
reappearing later in the same airship's lifetime, or transferring to a different airship of the same ageJ 
means that this is a "Rubic Cube" of mammoth proportions. Furthermore, in order to produce a written 
report that traces the evolution of these procedures through time it is thus necessary to attempt to trace a 
linear narrative through a three-dimensional space. 
In reality, of course, there are far fewer fields and the shape is far from being a cube, simply because the 
lifetimes of the world's airships ranged from a few days to a decade, and many procedures found to be 
effective, continued in use until a problem occurred or a new idea supplanted them. Nevertheless, the 
problem of how to present the information collected during the CLOSHRP is one that occupied a great 
deal of the author's time and NGVLA developers would be well advised to consider carefully how they 
will deal with this three-dimensional problem. 
I ATA Spec 100 contains format and content guidelines for technical manuals written by aviation manufacturers and suppliers and is used by airlines and other segments of the industry in the maintenance of their respective products. This document provides the industry-wide standard for aircraft systems numbering, often referred to as ATA system or chapter numbers. 90 
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4 ORIGINS AND AIMS OF THE THESIS 
4.1 The origins of the thesis 
This investigation stems from the unpublished internal CL Technical Report, ' (previously mentioned in 
Section 3.2) that was submitted to the company by the author and his colleagues in September 1998. This 
report outlined the preliminary findings of a brief search through archives in Britain and Germany for 
historical material concerning the PGVLAs, and it indicated that continued research along these lines 
would be of large potential benefit to the company. As a consequence of this report the author was tasked 
with collecting further historical material from British archives and this led in the following year 
- 
1999 
- 
to the founding of The CargoLifter Operational Support Historical Research Project (CLOSHRP). 
In addition, in this same year, a 'ýrisk" was registered by the author on CargoLifter's newly established 
Risk Management Database. It voiced the concern that unless the company were to conduct a thorough 
study of the PGVLA GH there was a high probability that designers would inadvertently "re-invent the 
wheel" and waste both time and effort devising GH systems already proven in the past to be ineffective 
for large airships. This would have potentially serious financial consequences for the company. 
Shortly after submission, the original report was re-formatted, and incorporated into the embryonic CL 
document database as "ref. DE 0100001. " This document then served throughout 1999 as the basis for a 
majority of the formative decisions regarding the early evolutions of the CL160 GH systems. The seminal 
nature and importance of the CLOSHRP was thus recogrdsed internally, by many within the company. In 
the year 2000, on the basis that HR and analysis could be seen as having a wider application externally, 
with potential benefits to other organisations within the LTA community, (which would thereby enhance 
CargoUfter's imageJ the author was encouraged to expand and promulgate the work. Initially this was 
done by embarking upon an academic qualification (this thesis in 2001) and latterly by the presentation of 
a conference paper given by the author at the Airship Association's 4th Conference, held in Cambridge in 
2002. Both of these projects were initially funded by CL, however, the delivery of the paper, 2 (hereinafter 
"the Cambridge paper") which was intended merely as a step in the evolution of the thesis, also unhappily 
coincided with the financial collapse of the entire company, which threw everyone's plans awry. 
Originally, as can be seen from Figure 3.3, this thesis was foreseen as an end product of Phase Four of 
the CLOSHRP, but, the premature termination of CL in July 2002 meant that, although Phases One and 
Two (Historical Research 
- 
HR) were under way, work on Phases Three and Four (Analysis of Historical 
Airship Activities 
- 
AHAA) had barely begun. The company's demise thus left all four phases incomplete 
with the thesis in limbo. In response to appeals, encouragement and some financial support, from within 
the LTA community, the author determined to complete the work independently, and to tum the focus 
away from the specifics of heavy-lift airships towards the GH of very large airships in general. 
I Camplin, Bischet & Watson, 1998: Preliminary outlinefor ground handling CL-160 2 Cwnplin & Schaefer, 2002: Learning from the past 
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Central to the reasoning behind the whole idea of an historical research project had been what appeared to 
be a very great danger for the emergent large airship industry in the 21" century. It was one that had been 
noted some ten years prior to the start of the CLOSHRP, and it was quoted by the author in his conclusion 
to the Cambridge Paper in 2002: 
"More than one modem designer, intoxicated by the perceived omnipotence of today's 
technology, has turned his back on history and marched upon the airship with the confident 
intention of programming the concept into instant and final submission. The subsequent process 
of rediscovering the problems, and reinventing the solutions, already well documented in the 
archives can become terminally expensive. Computers don't read history. " (Mowforth, 1991: 16) 
With hindsight, this can perhaps be seen as something of a timely warning. What was certainly true at CL 
was that not all departments were cognisant of the finer points and possibilities of an historical research 
project and, particularly in the later stages of the company's rapid expansion, when a large influx of 
"LTA novices" were enlisted, there was in some cases, (as mentioned in Section 3.3) considerable 
misunderstanding as to the investigation's true nature and purpose. Moreover, as the current dormant state 
of the LTA industry (particularly in Britain) would seem to make it unavoidable that most of the 
personnel joining any future NGVLA development projects will perforce also be comparative newcomers 
to the subject, and thus prey to similar misunderstandings, it is deemed appropriate here to explain briefly 
some of the less obvious aspects and advantages of conducting such an investigation, before laying out 
the aims of the thesis itself. 
Firstly, in recognition of the reality of the "perceived omnipotence of today's technology, " the point was 
put to the author on occasion that modem airship designers have available to them today, infinitely better 
calculation methods, greatly improved materials, and a whole range of processes that were not available 
to those who built the PGVLAs. These include computer simulations, systems monitoring, cost 
estimating, finite element modelling, and project management, to name but a few. Consequently things 
today are plainly very different from the way they were in the 1930s. Thus, it was argued, that the 
experiences of the PGVLA teams, along with the problems they encountered, were simply not relevant 
for the contemporary NGVLA designers and "digging up old stuff' was really just a waste of time. 
However, what this argument overlooks is that, while today's designers and engineers undoubtedly do 
have access to much more, and better, technology than existed in the 1930s, it is also true that the 
fundamentals of the physical world have not changed at all since that time. Furthermore, despite Global 
Warming, there are some things that will never ever be made worse nor improved, nor altered in any way, 
by human technological "progress. " For example, although our knowledge of both hydrogen and helium 
is now much improved, neither actually provides any more lift today than it did in the 1930s. The passing 
years have not increased the density of the atmosphere nor weakened the force of gravity, and the power 
of the wind is similarly undiminished. And the same is true for other meteorological phenomena, such as 
the build up and discharge of static electricity, the viscosity of the air, and the effect of temperature on the 
expansion and contraction of gases. All these are still exactly the same as they were 
- 
as indeed, are 
human beings. We have not changed in our basic requirements; or our physical strengths and endurance; 
or inherent fragility and general vulnerability when working alongside machinery. Thus the environment 
in which any future NGVLA will have to operate is identical to that of its forebears in the 1930s. 
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Consequently, the physical problems, and the challenges presented by nature that face today's designers, 
who have no practical experience of VLAs, are the same as those faced by the PGVLA designers, who 
had a great deal of practical first-hand experience with VLAs. And thus careful study of their chosen 
solutions to these same challenges 
- 
i. e. the big rigid ships of the 1930s -will allow a deeper 
understanding of what they, the designers, initially perceived, and later subsequently found by experience, 
to be the real problems associated with the operation of real very large airships in the real world. 
Therefore, the thinking behind the CLOSHRP, and its true purpose, was not as many believed to dig up 
and catalogue some of the old solutions and offer them to the CL design team as ready made answers, or 
even as shortcuts, for direct implementation today. Rather, it was to use old ideas, designs and systems to 
try to understand the questions that the PGVLA designers and operators were trying to answer, and 
thereby to identify the underlying problems they were trying to solve. The hope was that then it would be 
possible to examine these problems and see how well each of the 1930s solutions had achieved, or had 
succeeded in approaching, its aim. Only thereafter would it be decided whether to actually propose the 
use of any 1930s solution as was, or whether to upgrade and modemise it, or whether perhaps to abandon 
the old idea altogether and start again with a modem solution for a now more clearly defined and better 
understood, real, quantifiable problem. The omnipotence of modem technology is thus something of a 
side issue and the true purpose of the HR project was primarily to acquire knowledge and understanding. 
Moreover, the existence of better, or more sophisticated, technology today and tomorrow, is only going to 
be of significant advantage to future VLA designers if the reason that the PGVLAs failed, and that they 
are thus not around today, doing the jobs for which they are seemingly so perfectly well suited, was 
because of a lack, or a failure of the technology available in the 1930s. However, as was shown in 
Section 2.7.1. there is a second and often overlooked aspect to this, namely the part played in operations 
by "technique: ' and if the real weakness in the PGVLA systems were due in large part to operational 
difficulties then no amount of technological improvement, either now or in the future, is going to help. 
A further common assumption, which was certainly widespread and deeply rooted in the early days at 
CL, and which added weight to the apparent inappropriateness of studying the PGVLAs, was that the 
NGVLAs would not be of a rigid construction. The argument was that the weight penalty is too great and 
our modem materials are strong enough, and our stress calculations clever enough, to make the single- 
chamber giant blimp into a viable proposition. However, interestingly, many of those who decried the old 
"outdated7' ideas of the 1930s were quick to suggest he application of the equally old fashioned rigid 
airship GH methods whenever serious ground handling problems arose. For instance. the use of a 
mechanical "dolly" or "stem bcanf' to control the tail, as when seeking to align the airship with its shed, 
was commonly accepted without question. This conveniently overlooked the fact that the tail structures of 
the rigid airships were reinforced intemally to withstand these ground handling loads, and adoption of this 
system, for a giant non-rigid blimp, would have necessitated the incorporation into it, of what was 
effectively a rigid airship tail, thereby adding considerable weight to the finished article and great deal of 
complexity to its inflation and assembly processes. 
94 
This cherry-picking of partially understood concepts from the past, reveals once again the old truth that a 
little knowledge is a dangerous thing, and thus, the misunderstanding of PGVLA systems and procedures, 
or the appearance at a critical decision-making moment in an NGVLA project, of an apparently "proveW' 
idea from the past as the "solution"to a serious problem, can lead to the embedding and reinforcement of 
erroneous beliefs and an entirely false sense of progress. Such historical cherries can also create a biased 
assessment and a distorted view of a truly new idea and thereby actually lead to the stifling of innovation. 
Therefore, to be of value, detailed information resulting from an HR project must be critically assessed, 
the more so because not all that has been recorded is relevant, nor indeed necessarily factually truthful. 
And here, regardless of how the PGVLA solutions were described in their time, (or even sometime 
afterwards, ) by those involved in the devising, operating or witnessing of them, it is very important to 
keep in mind, that some of the claims made for them may not have been genuine. In addition, it is equally 
necessary to recognise that, regardless of its source, information on its own has no intrinsic value. In 
order to be of value, information has to be understood and, just as a piece of text, when taken from 
another language, must be skilfully interpreted after it has been translated, so too, the results of HR on the 
GH of airships also requires expert analysis to enable its proper comprehension. As history shows: 
"T'he mere acquisition of German airships and material failed entirely to reveal to their new 
owners [the British and French military authorities] the secrets of their construction and 
operation. It would appear that in their almost frenzied efforts to reap airship benefits, they had 
quite forgotten the extensive German background; they certainly appear to have been unwilling 
to acquire operating and construction knowledge gradually and by the historical and basic 
method of the sweat of the brow and the usual pioneering grief. " (Rosendahl, 1938: 361) 
Caution is thus required. 
"It is an axiom that the entire forty years history of the giant rigid airship is one whole saga in its 
own right, and the many attempts made by historians to dissect and dismember its numerous 
parts have seldom met with satisfaction. Logically it makes sense to open up for detailed 
examination the specific area or sector of interest for special attention, but only when it is 
viewed in the perspective of contemporary activity can the discoveries made be properly 
assessed. " (Chamberlain, 1984: xv) 
Such assessment, however, requires a great deal of expert knowledge 
- 
which in this case, thanks to the 
Knowledge Gap, can only come from a study of airship history. 
Furthermore, when contemplating the broader picture and the "whole saga" of the PGVLAs, there are 
self-evidently also some wider issues to consider. Many of these lie beyond the scope of this particular 
investigation, as for example the popularly held beliefs that the apparent failure, and the subsequent 
disaster-studded isappearance, of the PGVLAs was largely due to a combination of technical problems, 
political decisions and plain bad luck. ' However, there are other theories that do involve GH, not least the 
growing suspicion, (evinced by the several authors quoted in Section 2.1j that the "GH problems" of the 
large airships were never actually properly solved at all, and that inadequacies within the 1930s GH 
systems played a significant, if unrecognised, part in the denlise of the PGVLAs. 
This theory, however, is of fairly recent origin, and contemporary authors frequently held a very different 
view of the effectiveness of the GH systems with which they were familiar. 2 
I Meyer, 1991 : Airshiptnen, businessmen and politics 1890 
- 
1940 
2 There were of course also those who had serious doubts about large airships in general 
- 
e. g. most notably, Spanner. 1929 
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"rhe dirigible was little thought of, up to recent years, because of its bulL The very volume that 
made it safe in the air 
... 
made it liable to destruction by the winds, especially when on the 
ground. Added to this was the difficulty of landing and mooring the huge airship. 'Mese 
disadvantages have been overcome, if we can judge by the performance of the Los Angeles and 
the Graf Zeppelin, both in the air and on the ground. " (Hylander, 193 I: xiv/xv) 
So, it would appear that either the 'old guys' were wrong to claim that GH problems had been solved, or, 
possibly they did find satisfactory solutions which have subsequently been forgotten If the latter is true 
then maybe these solutions can be redisc6vered by careful and focussed HR? However, if the former is 
the case, then this is extremely serious for any future NGVLAs because it means that despite statements 
to the contrary, there has never been a solution to some of these fundamental problems! And if the highly 
skilled and enormously experienced experts of the past were defeated by them after years of empirical 
experiment, then wholly inexperienced modem-day novices should be extremely careful, otherwise the 
NGVLA developers may simply make the same mistakes as their forebears and think- that they also have 
solved these complex problems when they have not. Making such assumptions could be disastrous both 
physically and financially for the NGVLAs. 
Thus, unless the NGVLA developers properly appreciate what were the specific questions that their 
predecessors were trying to answer, then they cannot truly and objectively judge how well they 
succeeded, and nor can they understand the reasons behind the choice of the technological solutions. It is 
thus the author's conviction that the development of the NGVLAs must start from a detailed study of the 
history of similar aircraft. The nearest thing to them are the extinct Zeppelins of the 1930s, and it is 
essential that these should be thoroughly investigated, along with their operational GH systems and the 
incidents that befell them, in order to avoid the risk of repeating past mistakes, reinventing the wheel and 
of falling into the same trap. A key objective of this thesis is thus to reduce the risk that what is being 
proposed for the NGVLA GH will not be cost-effective, and on the other side, also to minimise the 
chances that some valuable GH past-concepts will be overlooked or missed. Finally, extracting as much 
information as possible, concerning the GH of the PGVLAs, from their surviving written records will 
allow some suggestions and guidelines to be drawn up for the NGVLA developers that are based on the 
discoveries of the CargoUfter historical research project. 
4.2 Aims 
The overall objective of this thesis is to demonstrate that Historical Research (HR) is of vital importance 
for any future NGVLA development projects, because it offers an effective way of understanding the 
many obscure and intractable problems that stem from the combined effects of the "Knowledge Gap" and 
the "Skill Gap" as identified above. Furthermore, the Analysis of Historical Airship Activities, (AHAA) 
permits identification of those GH problems actually encountered by the PGVILAs that remain as a 
serious but unrecognised threat to the NGVLAs, and it offers ways of circumventing. or at least 
minimising the impact of those, which all future NGVLA designers will somehow have to address. In 
particular, detailed study of written records associated with the GH of the PGVLAs, makes it possible: 
- 
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Aim 1- To isolate, and define, the fundamental GH problems generic to all airships, and to identify some 
of the unresolved GH issues that remain relevant, or which appear to be major risks to future NGVLA 
development projects. 
Aim 2- To expose and correct some of the misunderstandings that have arisen since the end of the large 
rigid airship era, concerning the capabilities of, and the procedures actually used by, the PGVLAs; also to 
find answers to some of the difficult and/or misleading GH questions encountered during the CargoLifter 
project, which have the potential to cause NGVLA designers to waste their time and effort, and which 
will thereby inevitably impede any further NGVLA projects. 
Aim 3- To unearth methods, suggestions, plans, interesting ideas, and/or potentially viable concepts etc., 
put forward or conceived by experienced engineers and acknowledged PGVLA experts, for GH systems 
that were untried, unproven, or insufficiently tested, perhaps because they were ahead of their time, but 
which are now possibly achievable with today's more advanced technology, and which might help to 
improve or facilitate the development of NGVLAs and their GH. 
Aim 4- To suggest a strategy and establish guidelines for future NGVLA GH development. 
The method by which these aims are to be accomplished is as follows: 
Aim 1 Method 
- 
The method chosen to reveal the generic GH problems fundamental to all types of 
airship, regardless of their size or intended purpose, and to identify unresolved PGVLA GH issues and 
risks still relevant to the NGVLAs was to: 
a) break down large airship ground handling (LAGH) into a list of specific tasks 
b) use the task list as a basis for collection of unresolved issues from the PGVLA GH systems 
c) trace the evolution of airship GH systems throughout history 
d) extract data on ground-based accidents and ground related incidents such as unassisted 
and/or forced landings 
e) analyse, the findings to identify the fundamental generic GH problems 
Aim 2 Method 
- 
The method chosen to reduce the damaging effects of the "Knowledge Gap" by 
correcting misunderstandings concerning the PGVLAs and finding answers to some of the difficult 
CargoLifter GH questions was to: 
a) collect apparently contradictory or incompatible statements from the history of airships 
b) investigate some of the apparent contradictions and establish which facts are false 
C) confirm the correct version from within the written records 
d) select some of the difficult GH questions that bedevilled the CargoLifter project 
C) find pertinent references in the evolution of PGVLA GH systems 
Aim 3 Method 
- 
The method chosen to find potentially viable untried GH concepts was to: 
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a) compile a list of experienced, knowledgeable PGVLA designers and engineers 
b) collect LAGH ideas from sources such as excerpts from books, historical references, 
patents, papers from conferences, articles from journals, periodicals, magazines & etc., 
C) select some of the most potentially useful untried ideas put forward by PGVLA experienced 
personnel 
Aim 4 Method 
- 
The method chosen to suggest a strategy for future NGVLA GH development was to; 
a) summarise the findings of the HR project with conclusions and recommendations 
b) lay down suggested guidelines for NGVLA projects to help minimise GH risks, costs and 
development time, while they also maximise safety, reliability and the chances of success. 
4.3 Requirements 
In order to achieve the stated aims it was first necessary to collect relevant historical material and to use it 
to compile lists, databases and tables of information on which to base the study. These compilations, 
some of which were begun as part of the CLOSHRP, included: 
9 list of large and very large airships 
list of PGVLA airship bases and GH facilities 
list of GH accidents and incidents 
list of unassisted or forced landings 
list of GH related patents 
From these "first ordee' lists, 1 and other historical sources, it was then possible, by fairly simple analysis, 
to work out, and then to assemble, further "second ordee, lists. These were a vital part of the study. 
interestingly, (and perhaps revealingly in view of the general lack of interest in GH identified among the 
problems in Section 2.1), although the work involved in making these compilations was more time- 
consuming than difficult, and their potential value to the NGVLA designers is self-evident, the author 
could find no evidence that such compilations and listings had ever previously been attempted. These 
novel, "second-ordee, lists, which are specific to Large Airship Ground Handling (LAGH), included: 
list of generic GH tasks 
list of unresolved LAGH issues 
list of myths or erroneous beliefs 
list of difficult or unanswerable questions 
list of untested but potentially viable LAGH ideas and useful future concepts 
Some of the above mentioned first and second order lists can be seen to be common requirements for the 
realisation of more than one of the stated aims of this thesis. However, there are also one or two points 
that require initial clarification because they are fundamental prerequisites to the whole research project. 
I The first order lists are included as Appendices to this worL Many are extensive, and where they proved to be excessively long, 
then only sample pages of them are given as examples. The second order lists are less clearly defined and are either referred to or 
have been included in the text as appropriate. 
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5 THE PREREQUISITES 
In order, both to collect information of potential relevance to the GH of the NGVLAs from the PGVLA 
archives, as mentioned above, (Section 3), and also to extract meaningful conclusions from such collected 
material in the preparation of this analytical investigation, it was necessary firstly to establish a novel and 
purely ground-based perspective of airship operations. The author could find no evidence that any such 
revealing and different, change of viewpoint had previously been devised or drawn-up. 
Secondly, when attempting to assemble and analyse the collected archival material, it was soon apparent, 
that there was also a need for a clear definition of some common but carelessly used phrases which were 
intrinsic to the investigation. These terms were "Large Airship" and "Ground Handling. " 
Thirdly, when studying documents from the PGVLA era, there was also an obvious need to understand 
precisely what was being written about, from which arose the requirement for a "Glossary of Terms" in 
order to define the meaning of many arcane, out-dated and/or foreign words. 
Fourthly, there was need to review the previous work on the GH of large airships. 
Finally, there was need for an overview of the history of airships, in which to set the context of their 
development, and from which could be derived by investigation, an outline of the way in which GH 
systems had co-evolved to support them. In view of the volume of material, this overview/investigation of 
airship and GH history will be dealt with in its own section. 
5.1 The need to establish a GH perspective 
The fact that there are no large airships in existence today means that there is a natural tendency for 
everything to do with the development of the NGVLAs to be seen from the point of view of those who 
are trying to create them 
- 
namely the designers. 
From a designers' creative perspective, it seems perfectly logical, when contemplating the development 
of any brand new machine, (including a gigantic airship) to start with it operating under some 
theoretically benign set of "normal" conditions. It is then a simple matter to make things progressively 
more difficult for it by changing its circumstances, and developing the operating procedures to bring it 
ever closer to the conditions it will encounter in reality. Thus the author found that it was common 
practice among the designers and would-be developers at CargoLifter to start all discussions on the 
CL160 GH procedures from the assumption that the airship was already in flight. 
From here, the debate then centred on how the CLI60 was going to first, pick up, and then subsequently 
to put down again, its payload. This was not unreasonable, considering that these two unprecedented 
procedures were fundamental to the success of the company, and that financial backing had been raised 
on the assurance that viable systems for conducting these complex manoeuvres could be found. 
99 
However, leaving aside, these hugely important, but (still to this day) entirely theoretical ideas, then the 
next operational question that appears is, how will the airship make a landing? Thus, from the "designers' 
view" the perceived sequence of required GH Procedures looks rather like this: 
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FROM A CONVENTIONAL PERSPECTWE 
FLIGHT 
---- 
00, CARGO 
---0, FLIGHT 
CARGO 10 FLIGHT PICKUP DROP 
LANDING 0 MOORED REPLENISH TAKE-OFF 
----*-FLIGHT 
DOCKING MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR 
Figure 5.1 
-The Conventional Sequence Of Procedures 
The disadvantage of using this sequence, from an operational point of view, is that it makes the enormous 
presumption that the airship has been successfully launched to start with 
- 
i. e. any problems associated 
with taking-off have already been solved. The historical records show that this is a very dangerous 
assumption to make; and even moving out of the hangar carries large risks 
- 
as Eckener proved in 1911.1 
But there are further difficulties with seeing things from this conventional viewpoint. For instance it 
means that anyone attempting to design or develop GH systems for a large airship, who adheres to this 
sequence of events, is constantly presented with situations that require equipment that appears out of 
nowhere. For instance, going from "Flighf' to "Mooring" brings a mooring mast suddenly into the 
picture, (with all its connections and support systems fully-functional), while moving from "Mooring" to 
"Docking" presupposes that there is a complete hangar for the airship to "Enter" into. Furthermore, when 
using such a sequence in order to design these enormous, and complex structures, it seems perfectly 
obvious, and sensible, for the mast and hangar, to be reverse engineered from the airship's dimensions. So 
from the designers perspective the GH equipment and ground-based infrastructure can simply be built to 
fit onto, or around, the machine they will be required to service. 
The problem is that, once again, this process makes sweeping assumptions, and, for example, it skips over 
the need to have initially inflated the airship inside the hangar in the first place. Tlus vitally important, 
and necessary, equipment (such as cranes in the hangar roof, and anchor points in the floor, for example) 
I See Chapter 1, Section 1.2 
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tend to be overlooked and having been initially left out of the calculations they are then inserted into the 
plans as an afterthought. Inevitably this means they are designed as add-on attachments to a building that 
is probably already drawn and dimensioned, and for which the stresses and strains have been already 
calculated, and which may even be partially built. ' This then leads to GH systems that are far from 
optimal, and, in the case of roof-cranes, in all probability their lifting capacity will be severely restricted 
by the loads that the already-designed hangar roof can additionally bear. In addition, the add-on crane 
structure itself is more than likely to intrude into the already-calculated hangar free space, where at best it 
will be a hindrance to the airship's movements, and at worst it may even reduce the available working 
space sufficiently to restrict, or even diminish, the size of the airship that can actually be built inside the 
hangar. This is neither helpful nor cost-effective, and consequently, some other view point is required. 
In the conventional, design-led view, the GH procedures start in mid air and end up with a moored airship 
that needs to be moved inside a hangar. In reality, this cannot happen: the airship must first come out of 
its hangar before it can get airborne. But, it cannot come out of its hangar until it has been inflated, and it 
cannot be inflated until it has been assembled. Therefore, it is the author's conclusion, based on his 
previous hands-on experience in pioneering the development of prototype LTA systems 
- 
albeit for very 
small airships, 2 and the mooring systems for a range of even smaller tethered (kite) balloons, 3_ that, when 
considering the GH for the NGVLAs, and particularly when attempting to design their GHE and devise 
its operating procedures, a far better way to approach things is to view events chronologically from start 
to finish. 
Such a GH based viewpoint, would then take any new airship from its design on the drawing board, 
through its construction phase, via its inflation, and hangar exit, and on to its first flight. Only then would 
such an operationally biased sequence fall into line with the conventional or designers view, and follow 
the airship back from flight operations, via the landing to the safety of a secure mooring system and 
ultimately back into the hangar again. 
The first GH task in this chronological sequence therefore becomes to fill the airship with gas and, only 
once this is done, to think about trying to move it outside. Thus, starting with a newly-built, but as yet un- 
inflated, blimp airship 
- 
for example, a US Navy K-ship 
- 
and referring to the procedures 4 approved for 
it, (See Appendix D) the requirement is almost immediately revealed for some sort of crane to help 
inflate it. This leads naturally to such ideas as retractable cranes that are integrated into the hangar roof 
structure, which can then be purpose built to take the extra internally suspended loads, while maxinfising 
the enclosed available working space. Thus, rather than a building for housing the airship (as it is most 
commonly perceived) the hangar can now been seen to be in truth a huge specialised jig for assembling 
the airship; one that is clad simply to keep out the weather. In all cases this change of viewpoint starts 
everyone thinking along rather different, far more realistic lines than is the case when either a "load-pick- 
up" or a "landing" is seen as the first manoeuvre to be accomplished. 
I This is what happened at Cargollfter vAth their hangar at Brand. 
2 G-ATDK "WASF'(1966); G-AVSL "Chitty Chitty Bang Bang"(1967) and G-BAWL "Santos Dumont" (197315) 
3 Flying Pictures "Topshoe'camera-blimp series (1987/90), NOFO'ýOil on Water" (1993) and MRU Cardington (1995) 4 
"Sequence of events for Inflation and Assembly of U. S. Navy K-Type Airships" extracted by the author from GAC, (1944) 
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Thus, in the author's opinion, to avoid repetition of effort and constantly back-tracking, it would be far 
more logical for the whole NGVLA design process to follow a sequence more like this: 
NEW AIRS14P 
"00' USHATE "0' REPLENISH 
W46, 
ooý UNDOCKING 
DEFLATE 
TAKE OFF 
MA 
t 
ENANCE 
REPLENISH I 
FLIGHT 
MOORED 
CARGO PICKUP 
LANDING 
Aeoolo 
'14-11. 
FUGHT 10- CARGO DROP 
,,, 
o FLIGHT 
Figure 5.2 
- 
The CargoLifter Procedural Sequence from a GH Perspective 
The big advantage of this approach is that it focuses on the need for each step to be successfully 
completed before a further one commences and it allows a sequential -storyboard7' of events, and 
associated procedures, to be drawn up. This in turn, reveals the need for any and all GHE in the order in 
which it will be required and thus automatically ensures that nothing gets missed out. 
However, in setting out to draw such a story board, another subtle but important difference between the 
designers and operators immediately rears its head. When drawing an airship (or any other aircraft, or 
vessel for that matter, ) it is accepted practice, in the process of design, to have it "flying" from right to left 
on the page 
- 
i. e. with its nose to the left and its port-side facing the onlooker. Thus the orientation of the 
object and of its x, y, and z axes are once again taken as set in stone, at the start of any discussion, without 
any thought really being given to it. Yet, neither of these conventions are particularly useful when 
planning procedures from the GH perspective, and in fact, when planning a "comic strip" of sequential 
events, viewing things in this way is confusing for the eye. Thus: 
AIRSHPLEAM3SHED CROSSESARFý NIMIDMAST 
C=> ACD 
Figure 5.3 
- 
Conventional story board of undocking 
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Consequently, when considering the planning of a GH sequence it is far more logical to turn the airship 
around so that it faces the other, unconventional way, and to draw it from its starboard, or right-hand side, 
if for no other reason than that English is read from left to right, so captions and directions flow with the 
movement and it is easier to envisage the airship moving through time in the same direction. Thus: 
AUNPlEAVSSIID I CROMARdIRD I N=TDMAST 
__: 
IIII: E=D 
Figure 5A 
-More logical story board of undocking 
It is the author's opinion that anything which increases the clarity and understanding of the GH topic and 
of its complex and multifarious component parts is to be encouraged. This is especially so for the words 
that are used to describe it. 
5.2 Understanding the terminoIogy 
The much heralded arrival, and the subsequent disappearance, of a succession of airship development 
programmes, conducted separately, by both civilian and military organisations, in several different 
countries, each with its own languages and oral traditions, over a period of roughly one hundred years, 
has left bel-ýind a legacy of half-understood, misused, abused and transmogrified words, that can, and do, 
lead to a great deal of confusion and wasted time. This is a fact that has frequently been commented on in 
the past by many authors, historians and airship engineers: 
"The science of aeronautics being a very recent development, its terminology is not yet exactly 
defined so that confusion is likely to arise from the various interpretations of every term. " 
(Bleistein, 1925) 
"Though our English language can be rich and beautiful, it is notorious for its lack of 
consistency. Some terms used in the airship field are affected by this, which makes for 
confusion and inconvenience. " (Cochran, 1980: 2.9) 
"AEROSTATICS FOR AIRSHIPS 
... 
Much confusion has arisen by there being no standard 
definitions of weight terms. " (Lewitt, 1925: 41) 
"There has been some confusion over the definitions of the various weight configurations of an 
airship. These should be related to the tenns used for heavier-than-air aircraft, wherever 
possible, despite some inconsistency. " (Craig, 1999b: 235) 
"... in its heyday, the rigid dirigible airship was often called a "zeppelin, " or "zepp" for short. 
However, using that term to denote rigid airships in general is confusing when it is also 
necessary to refer to vessels produced by the Zeppelin works, to those produced by other makers, 
to the revered Count [Ferdinand von Zeppelin] himself, and to the [two] airship[s] "Graf 
Zeppelin" named after him. " (Cochran, 1980: 2.11) 
The potential for this "rerminology Problem" to generate time consuming confusion and 
misunderstandings for the NGVLA developers of the future, (and therefore also to waste their money, ) is 
evidenced by this example from an internal CL memo: 
- 
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"... in a meeting last week it was found that the expression "trim" was used in different manners. 
That is a reason to put it into the glossary. Before doing this, I would like to have a basic 
agreement about the definition. My proposal is the following: 
" Trim 
- 
activity taken to move either the centre of gravity or the centre of aerodynamic forces 
(or both) in any direction. 
" Pitch Trim 
- 
activity where the c. g. or centre of aerodynamic forces is moved in longitudinal 
direction resulting in a changed attitude of the ship. 
" Roll Trim 
- 
activity where the c. g. or centre of aerodynamic forces is moved in lateral 
direction resulting in a changed bank angle of the ship. 
" Ballast (verb) 
- 
activity where the total mass of the ship is changed. This could also cause 
c. g. shift, but that is then trim. 
Notes: This definition means that trim is restricted to attitude/ roll influence but does not include 
weight changes, which is covered by the verb "ballast. " Trim in general does include also 
movement in vertical direction. This makes sense to me as it win result in a different state of 
equilibrium, too 
... 
" 
However, the problem of "tria' is not restricted to airships. Their close cousins the submarines have also 
had similar difficulties with this same small word: 
"We should point out that this special usage of the word 'trim' is confusing 
... 
Ile only advice 
we can give is: judge from the context which meaning applies. " (Burcher & Rydill 1994: 43) 
Such advice may be helpful in the specific case of reading a book, but it does not solve the problem in 
general. For historians, and for other researchers in the field, when attempting to collect material 
concerning the PGVLAs from archives and libraries, confusing words remain a serious problem that can 
easily lead to the waste of much research effort. And it isn't only single words that are a problem: 
"An accurate comparison of the airships built in different countries can be a challenge. Different 
countries use different units of measure, different lifting gases, different standards for the lift 
imparted by the same gas, different definitions and categories of elements of their airship 
structures. The published figures never seem to be gathered with direct comparison in mind. " (Hall, 2000: 8) 
So a researcher into airship history, endeavouring to make comparisons, really needs to know all of these 
"different" words, and their multifarious usages 
- 
and even then can still be left wondering. 
"... many of the records (particularly of the World War II airships) include such words as 
"wrecked", "destroyed" and "lost" when what was actually meant was "deflated"... These 
mishaps [i. e. deflations] were readily corrected with new envelopes 
... 
" (Shock, 1994: xi) 
Thus the unwary newcomer can easily be perplexed to find a US Navy blimp apparently rising from the 
dead and taking part in an operation, perhaps only days after it had been reported as being subject to an 
event, which elsewhere in the aviation world would have terminated its career and probably killed all its 
occupants. 
Then there is jargon: 
"Where the mooring operation demands Us speed [dead-slow], it is obtained by attaching a 
four-fold manila purchase to the main wire where it leaves the base of the mast and leading the 
purchase to the niggerhead of the winch. " (USN A. F. Notes, (undated): Method IV. Part D. 46. 
Or this from the memoir of a US Navy blimp pilot: 
"Normally, in moderate to light winds, the lugs holding the nose cone are pulled and the pelican 
hook is backed off a tad for the trim check. The pilot then almost backs the ship off the mast as 
it's [sic] tripped loose and the mast pulled away. " (Moore, 2004: 144) 
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It should be remembered here that there is a considerable difference between the meanings of the words 
"pilot" and "captafif ' when used in context at sea, or in the air, and that most of the large airships of the 
past were developed by navy personnel whose traditions and usages are very different from those now 
prevalent in modem aviation. Moreover, jargon can also cause confusion simply because procedures have 
fallen from use and appreciation of their meaning has thus been lost: 
"A good normal landing is a smooth trail-rope landing rather than a handling-line landing as the 
latter is really too much of a stunt with the present and future immense airships. " (US Navy, 
1927: IX-45) 
However, confusion and a diversity of terms are not only limited to the aircraft. Significantly for this 
investigation they also affect the GH and the ground support infrastructure: 
"On the matter of terminology, a mention should be made of the origin of the word "hangar. "
This is from the French, hangar, which in its initial usage means a shed or shippon. It is of 
course, in common usage in international aviation circles. However, the word for an airship 
building in English terminology is traditionally "shed"... The German word Halle would 
perhaps be more appropriate for general usage as it gives a much stronger impression of the 
vastness of such structures. " (Dean, 1989: 6) 
Here a n-dxture of foreign and unfamiliar words are shown to be part of the problem, but fan-dhar words 
may also be so over-used that they too can become equally bewildering. Take "docking" for example: 
"rbe fixed docking systems also demand precise control of the airship. 
... 
The craft is lined up 
by the engagement of a docking probe and secured by a mooring latch. The docking assembly is 
free to rotate to follow wind conditions. " (Howe, 1999: 316) 
"The development of mooring circles and railroad masts [at Lakehurst] reduced the need for 
very large ground crews and made docking operations possible in relatively strong crosswinds. " (Althoff, 1990: 68/9) 
"... the 'Macon, ' used a large and substantial mast. The mooring line was attached prior to 
docking to enable it to be winched onto the mast. " (Howe, 1999: 307) 
"The virtue of a mast was the operational flexibility it afforded in terms of independence from a 
hangar. A returning airship could postpone docking, for example, if conditions on the field were 
unfavorable for this delicate maneuver. " (Althoff, 1990: 32) 
"... the ship [Graf Zeppelin], moored to the travelling stub mast, was walked out of the hangar, 
made fast to trolleys fore and aft which ran on the docking rails. When clear of the hangar and 
mast, the ship was released from the trolleys and held on the ground by the ground crew. " (Dick 
& Robinson, 1985: 48) 
"The restraining sandbags are being removed from the [Graf Zeppelin] gondola's docking rails. 
... 
Another shrill blast on the whistle. "Schiff hochl" comes the command. "Up ship! " The group 
of handlers holding the control car by its docking rails literally throw the giant ship into the air. " 
(Botting, 2001: 9) 
"Mechanical assistance [at the Lakehurst hangar] was augmented further by three docking rails 
or trolley slots; bow and stem handling lines would be made fast by tackles to mobile trolleys 
during the docking evolution. " (Althoff, 1990: 12) 
Thus, "docking rails" are either part of a railway track that is fixed to the ground, or they are strong-points 
fitted to an airship gondola for the ground crew to hold onto. Whereas "docking" on its own, may mean, 
in the nautical sense, either the whole process, or the specific act, of taking the Air-"ship" into its Air- 
"dock7' (or "hangar", or "she&', or "Halle") or, alternatively, it may be used, as in NASA's "space age" 
jargon, for the whole process, or for the specific act, of merely attaching an airship's nose cone onto a 
mooring mast. 
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Consequently, the corresponding opposite term, "UN-docking" is equally ambiguous and many of the 
modem small blimp operators now prefer to use "masting" and "un-masting" to cover the latter case. 
However, in view of the fact that the very large airsl-ýips of the past often needed a "mast" of such gigantic 
physical proportions that it was commonly referred to as a "mooring tower" it will be interesting to see 
whether the NGVLA operators of the future will choose to follow this pattern of usage, and bring 
"towering" and "untowering" into common parlance. 
For the record, the author's suggested solution for this particular term would be to adopt the common 
working practice of today, and hold to the old navy ways at the same time, by the universal acceptance of 
the appropriate prefixes. Thus the whole process of connecting/disconnecting, to and from the mast, i. e. 
the "Masting" process, would consist of "RE-masting7' and "UN-masting" while the process of 
enteringlexiting the dock, i. e. "Docking" (or "Shedding"? ) would encompass the "RE-docking" and the 
"UN-docking" procedures respectively. 
Unsurprisingly, there have previously been some serious attempts to sort some of these linguistic 
problems out. In Britain they range from publicly available articles for enquiring young minds 
- 
e. g. "rhe 
language of the aie" 
- 
to official government documents such as "Standardisation of data for airship 
,, 
2 
calculations, which, latter was only intended for use by experienced airship engineers and designers. 
"Standard definitions have recently been drawn up by the Air Ministry, but up to the present they 
are only used in official circles. " (Lewitt, 1925: 41) 
In the USA the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) produced in 1926 
- 
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"Nomenclature for Aeronautics" which runs to 35 pages. Furthermore, many books on the history of LTA 
aviation in general and many published works on the history of airships, do also contain their own 
"Glossary of Terms. " 
Unfortunately, many of these attempts to clarify and explain some of the terminologies have, with time, 
served only to add further layers to the confusion, and this in turn confirms, that the whole subject of 
determining the meaning of words is, in reality a vast area of specialist study. Indeed, in attempting to 
understand the nuances of historical material concerning the GH of the PGVLAs, the author found that 
here again, he had unwittingly swum into some very deep waters. For example, an entire book has been 
written solely on the origins of the three words "Airship, Aeroplane, and Aircraft. 99 3 
Nevertheless, shortly after the initiation of the CargoUfter Operational Support Historical Research 
Project, (CLOSHRP), it was found necessary to commence the compilation of a Glossary in order to 
define the more unfamiliar, and old-fashioned words, for no other reason than that the company was 
German based, and that many of the young designers, who were joining the CL Development team, and 
starting to request information from the PGVLA era, did not have English as their first language. 
I Nfiddleton, c. 1920 : 258 
2 Wyn-Evans, 1921 
3 Stubelius, 1958 
106 
In addition, it was hoped that the existence of an historically based Glossary would also help to highlight 
some other areas of confusion and thereby to: 
a) Show where different words are used to describe the same thing 
b) Show where the same word is used for different things, or has different meanings 
C) Show how the meaning of words has mutated with time 
d) Show how misunderstandings of terminology can become the source of myths 
e) Show how many useful LTA words have been stolen by other industries and disciplines 
f) And finally, to perhaps discover terms that might help NGVLA development in the future. 
An example of this latter idea was recognition that the old orders as used by the PGVLA officers, may 
well become of use again. The reason being that instructions must be clearly understood in order to avoid 
confusion. Any misunderstandings between officers, and the crew-members on a watch, can have 
disastrous consequences, and the NGVLAs are intending to develop unprecedented manoeuvres for which 
orders and instructions will have to be evolved from scratch. But, there is already a large working lexicon 
of words and phrases that would go a long way to solving part of this problem, and which has already 
been tried and tested both onboard, and on the ground around, very large airships during their normal 
flying and ground handling operations. This previously proven lexicon has now fallen into disuse and 
been overlaid by HTA usage and practices. However, it seems foolish to start with a completely blank 
sheet of paper, and to releam all the PGVLA lessons the hard way, when it is possible to take a shortcut 
and to use the old terminologies 
- 
at least as a basis for these new procedures. After all, as has been noted 
with some irony: "Two months in the laboratory can easily save two hours in the library. " (Dick, 2002) 
In practice, the scale of this undertaking, in compiling and defining such a universal Glossary, due to the 
large number of terms involved, and the complexities caused by the way in which many words have 
either changed their meaning, or been adopted and adapted to cover different circumstances, meant that 
the volume of work involved soon proved to be beyond the means of the author working on his own. It 
was therefore decided that a quicker way to arrive at a workable lexicon for the CLOSHRP would be to 
simply collect and collate the most comprehensive Glossaries from previously published works on airship 
history, and to use this "Glossary of Other People's Terms" as a basis for the investigation. Unfortunately, 
even the fusion and integration of this previously published material into a single document proved to be 
a formidable task in itself; one that was far from complete at the time of CargoLifter's collapse in 2002. 
In the end, even a greatly reduced, and incomplete version of this compilation of other people's glossaries 
proved to be too large in its entirety (more than 50 pages), to sensibly include as an Appendix to this 
thesis. Thus, only a sample of alphabetical sections are appended for readers' interest as Appendix E. 
Prior to the closure of the CLOSHRP, the further possibility of expanding and updating the HR LTA 
terminology collection, was also considered. This "Complete VLA GH Glossary" would have 
incorporated words from other areas of activity, which while not normally associated with airships, nor 
even with any form of aviation, were considered likely to involve processes similar to those procedures 
envisaged for NGVLA GH in the future. The intention was thus to search for potentially relevant words 
and phrases in such diverse sources as these: 
* Glossaries from literature for leisure pursuits, (e. g. Sailing, Climbing, Mountaineering etc., ); 
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* Rule Books governing modem-day industries, (e. g. Freight Transportation, Cargo-Handling, Oil 
and Gas Exploration, Submarine Survey, Mining, Construction, Maritime, etc.. ); and 
Health and Safety Regulations concerning employees in other disciplines, (such as Ropes & 
Rigging; Cranes & Hoists; Man-riding equipment, and the Mooring of VLCCs and other ships). 
It is to be hoped that such a Complete VLA GH Glossary may one day be compiled. 
53 Definitions 
It is normal for the definitions section of a thesis to contain some fairly straightforward explanations of 
the various terms that are to be found in the text. However, in the case of this investigation, two of the 
commonly used word combinations referred to in the title, are ill-defined, and both have been somewhat 
carelessly used in all previous works on the subject. These terms are "Large Airships" and "Ground 
Handling. " Because these terms are fundamental to the whole HR project, it was necessary before digging 
into the archives to attempt a clearer definition of them. 
5.3.1 What is a "Large Airship"? 
In view of the fact that, as shown in previous sections above, approximately 1,000 airships have been 
built and flown in the past, and that a great proportion of them used GH procedures that are clearly going 
to be either inappropriate or rather difficult to adapt for use with any future very large airships, it was 
apparent that some way of focussing the research, and of limiting the numbers of airships adjudged 
worthy of detailed study by the CLOSHRP, needed to be devised before the investigation could proceed. 
Such a filtering system is similarly a basic requirement for this thesis. 
The most obvious way to reduce the numbers involved would be to extract only "large" airships from the 
records; but the author could find no agreed definition of what a "large airship" actually was. 
Conventionally, airships are categorised by the type of structure within which their lifting gas is 
2 
contained. Thus, in most, if not all, published histories of LTA flight, the PGVLAs are categorised as 
being either "rigid, " "semi-rigid7' or "non-rigid. " While this classification method does seem to offer an 
immediate and straightforward way of sorting large from small, owing to the fact that all the rigid airships 
were effectively 'large' and all the non-rigid ships have been considerably 'smaller, ' (with the "semi- 
rigids" lying somewhere in the middle), it was recognised that adoption of this simple definition would 
close-off certain areas of investigation, and this could potentially exclude much that was of great value to 
future NGVLA projects. Furthermore, virtually from the company*s beginnings in 1996, and prior to the 
author's enlistment, CL had determined that a rigid construction method was uneconomic for their 
purposes. They had therefore declared their intention of building a gigantic non-rigid airship. 
Consequently, focussing the CLOSHRP research solely on "rigid airshipe' would threaten to reinforce the 
misunderstandings of those within the company who were unable to see the relevance of an HR project to 
their 21' century problems. 
1 Subsequent to the closure of the CargoLIfter projem the author was made aware that there is also a British Standards institute 
ýublication entitled "BS 185-7: 1969 Glossary of aeronautical and astronautical temis. lighter-than-air aircraft (aerostatsY' 
e. g. RoI4 1966; Robinson, 1973; Cochran, 1980; Dick & Robinson. 1985; Althoff, 1990; Mowforth, 199 1; 
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Moreover, for this thesis, rather than assisting future NGVLA projects with their decision of which type 
of airship to build, it would introduce a similar bias and invite dismissal of the GH topic, or at least 
perpetuate the denial of its importance at an early stage. It was also recognised that whereas, the "heavy 
operations, " as used by the US Navy blimps through to the 1960's, were not in themselves appropriate for 
the NGVLAs, there was, nevertheless, every reason to suppose that much of the work that had been 
carried out at the time, in establishing these modem blimp GH procedures, might well be of some worth. 
Certainly, it would be unwise to completely ignore this work, or to exclude the records of the Goodyear 
and US Navy experiments, if for no other reason than that they were part of the world's most recent large- 
scale airship development programme, and thus are the most technologically similar to the present day. 
Therefore, it was evident that what was required was a more subtle and inclusive definition of the term 
"large airship" 
- 
one which would limit the area of interest to be researched while also yielding the 
maximum in terms of GH system diversity and of lessons learnt. Thus further ways of categorising the 
PGVLAs were investigated and a refinement of the conventional classification system was sought. 
A first step was to view the conventional classifications from the Ground Handling Perspective outlined 
in Section 5.1. This revealed, perhaps unsurprisingly, that when it comes to GH, all three airship types 
have little to choose between them 
- 
although, plainly there are some significant differences. Most 
notably, the non-rigid airship's absolute reliance upon its internal pressure for the maintenance of 
structural integrity, means, that the blimps, in general, require much closer, and therefore more costly, 
monitoring, than do their rigid counterparts. In addition the blimps also afford fewer, and less accessible, 
strong points, for the attachment of restraining ropes &c., and generally lack integral structure to facilitate 
ease of access for inspection and maintenance. From the point of view of handling, or keeping control of 
any particular airship when it is on the ground, however, it's structural composition, and the associated 
problems caused by it, are actually of far less significance than its sheer size. 
"One of the greatest dangers an airship faces, is its vulnerability when being handled on the 
ground in strong winds. This is a particularly hazardous procedure when entering a shed. Wind 
eddies over the building can make an airship, which is lighter-than-air, leap around alarmingly. 
The larger the airship, the greater the problem. " (Mowthorpe, 1999: 64) 
'7heir smaller size [the L-10 and L-20 class Zeppelins], compared with the larger ships which 
came later, was always remembered as a good point, easing the handling on the ground that was 
always the biggest problem with any airship. " (Brooks, 1992: 93) 
Thus, the "largeness" of airships is acknowledged to be of fundamental importance when it comes to the 
ground handling of them, although the term itself remains ill-defined. 
Initially, the idea of relating largeness directly to airship length was discounted on the grounds that, as 
previously stated (in Section 2.3, ) "the length of an airship gives no real idea of the inertial forces that its 
pilot has to deal with. " And moreover, because the same holds true for the GH team, as also stated, "A far 
better guide to this can be gained from a comparison of the internal volumes 
... 
" For example: 
"The R-101 [as first flown] was seen to be a short, plump craft, with the length-to-breadth ratio 
of 5.5 to 1. Thus, though it was 43 feet shorter than the famous Graf Zeppelin, its greater 
diameter (by 30 feet) gave it actually twice the volume of hydrogen 
... 
approximately 5,000,000 
cubic feet. " (Hylander, 1931: 203) 
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It was therefore suggested that another obvious way to categorise the PGVLAs according to their size 
would be to ignore their length and simply to use the "volume" of gas each contained. However, when 
reviewing the historical records, this term proved to be equally problematical simply because in many 
instances it is not at all clear what exactly is meant by an airship's "volume. " There is certainly no 
universally agreed definition of it. On the contrary: 
"Most published data on airships are unreliable and often contradictory.... [and] there are 
usually wide discrepancies in recorded figures for gas capacities. This is because of confusion 
with 'nominal capacity' (usually 95 per cent of full) and with the air volume of the hull. There 
are also frequent errors of conversion to and from metric units. " (Brooks & Griffin 1973: 55) 
Furthermore, with non-rigid, pressurised airships, calculating the volume of lifting gas within them is 
complicated by the fact that, even when moored in a hangar, the contents of a blimp airship's multiple 
inner chambers can, and do, vary constantly in accordance with fluctuations in the ambient 
meteorological conditions. Specifically diis means that although the 'gross* volume of the entire envelope 
stays constant, the percentage taken up within it, by the 'net' volume(s) of the air-filled ballonet(s), is 
forever changing as the interactions of temperature and barometric pressure result in compensatory 
pumping and venting of the chambers in order to maintain the correct hull pressure. Therefore, to simplify 
diings, the maximum total 'gross' theoretical volume of all the gases enclosed within the entire fabric 
envelope, (i. e. as it would be at "pressure-height: ' full of gas, with empty ballonets), is frequently given 
in preference to the actual or normal volume of the lifting gas. However, even here there is a problem 
because non-rigid envelopes are also susceptible to volumetric change for another reason 
- 
they stretch: 
"The best known of these [earlier types] was the World War II Navy K Ship or ZPK, of which 
133 had been built. It was a medium sized machine, 251 feet long with a volume of 425,000 
cubic feet (435,000 with stretch, or dimensional relaxation, as the contractor liked to call it). " 
(IýUlls, 2004: 127) 
"Envelope design volume for the cotton [ZPG-3M envelope was 1,465,000 cubic feet and was 
expected to increase to 1,516,000 1 cubic feet due to stretch of 3V2 %. " (Shock, 1994: 111-26) 
This dimensional slippage is less of a problem for rigid airships, where the gas cell membranes are 
usually restrained within a system of nets and/or cables. Nevertheless, obtaining any universal agreement 
as to an accurate method of recording the lifting gas capacity within rigid airships is still all but 
impossible, and the calculation of it is similarly beset with many of the same problems. For example, the 
combined total of the volumes of lifting gas contained within the multiple gas cells (or bags) of any 
particular airship, when it is ready for operation, or in flying trim, is different from the volume that could 
be theoretically contained within those same gas cells, when they are filled to their absolute capacity (i. e. 
at that airship's "pressure heighf'). Moreover, this number (be it in cubic metres or cubic feet) is different 
again from the total combined volumes of all the gas cells, plus all the air enclosed in the spaces between 
them, and that within the enveloping outer sIdn of the hull surface cover. But, there are further 
complications, derived as always, from one or two exceptional cases: 
'The length of this air cruiser is 770 feet, with a diameter of 100 feet. The seventeen lifting-gas 
cells can use 2,295,000 cubic feet of hydrogen; they occupy only three-fifths of the volume of 
the hull. The lower two-fifths contains twelve fuel gas cells with a capacity of 1,482,000 cubic 
feet; so that the total volume of the Graf Zeppelin is about 3,700,000 cubic feet. " (Hylander, 
1931: 260) 
I 
-rhe demonstrated volumes (based on actual weigh-offs) of the four [ZPG-3M airships were 1.545,000,1,542.000 and 1,544,000 
cubic feet for the cotton envelopes. Ile demonstrated Dacron envelope volume was 1,509,000. " (Shock. IW4: IH-27) 
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Another possibility suggested for the CLOSHRP was to devise a classification formula based on the 
length to diameter (L to D) ratios of the PGVLAs. The thinking behind this was that it is commonly 
accepted as a fact that the rigid structure has generally led to craft of this type being longer and thinner 
than the non-rigid varieties. However, the idea was abandoned as being too complicated and because it 
produced no clear division between large and small in the spectrum of classes it generated. A further 
system based on sub-dividing the PGVLAs according to their behavioural characteristics, and on their 
ability, for instance, to swivel their engines, (and thus to hover or non-hover) was similarly dismissed as it 
resulted in a grossly unequal division and some strange bedfellows. 
Finally, it was determined that, while it was not ideal, and there were anomalies, the overall length was 
actually the simplest way to categorise the PGVLAs and that careful positioning of the dividing line not 
only allowed inclusion of the GH systems devised for the largest and latest of the US Navy's blimps, but 
also results in a clear division between "large" and "small" airships with an easily memorable "rule. " 
To achieve the desired reduction in the number of airships of interest, while maximising the diversity of 
GH systems available within the "large" category, it was first necessary to compile a table of all the major 
types, or different classes, ' of airship that have existed in the past, and to put them in order of their 
increasing length (See Figure 5.5). If, a line is then drawn at the exact half-length point (246 in being the 
defining maximum) then, some 77 classes of airship are reduced at a stroke to 44. Conveniently, also the 
last and largest of the US Navy blimps, the ZPG-3W, is actually on the dividing line, 2 and there are few 
exceptions stranded on the wrong side of the line. Only Nobile's semi-rigid "Roma" (128 in 420 ft) and 
the final extended version of the German Army's blimp "Gross Bassenach M-X(c)" (127 in 416 ft) 
- 
were longer than 123 inetres, whereas only one airship with a conventional 3 rigid structure of less than 
123 metres in length appears ever to have been built. This was Eckencr's "Bodensee" (LZ120), which was 
under 400 ft long when first built but which was subsequently stretched to 426 ft (129.8 in) in its final 
incarnation. 
Thus, if "Large" is defined as 
- 
greater than 123 metres (403 feet) in length, and "Small" as 
- 
less than 
123 metres in length, then this conveniently also divides the PGVLAs quite cleanly into their 
conventional "rigid" and "non-rigid" categories and also results in the easily memorable "123 metre 
length rule" to use as a filter for the historical material. Interestingly. although the division between large 
rigids and small non-rigids has previously been commented upon, it does not seem to have been precisely 
delineated nor seriously employed for the categorisation of airships prior to this study. 
Therefore for the purposes of this investigation, a "Large Airship" is an airship that is more than 123 
meters (or 403 feet) in length. 
I See Appendix IF 
- 
Comparison of airship classes by length 
2 ZPG-3W overall length = 403.4 feet (Shock. 1994: IH-26) 3 Assun-dng one discounts the three small and unconventional "Metalclads" ('Schwarz, ' 'City of Glendale' and 'ZMC-2') 
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Airship types in order of length to show 123 metre (403.5 feet) divide 
NB 
- 
For clarity only alternate airship name/classes are shown here. 
The full list of classes is given as Appendix F 
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5.3.2 What is "Ground Handling"? 
When attempting to define the term "Ground Handling, " for the purposes of this investigation, it quickly 
became clear that conventional definitions were somewhat lacking. For example, here is a seemingly 
straight-forward and simple description of the ground crews' tasks, which can be found in the Ground 
Handling manual of a small modem blimp: 1 
"rhe ground crew have two main roles: the launch and recovery of the GA42, (and) to ensure 
the airship remains secure when moored. " (Flying Pictures (Airships) Ltd., c. 1988: 3) 
However this definition excludes some vitally important and problematical processes in which both GH 
personnel and the GHE would appear inevitably destined to play a major role for the NGVLAs. These 
additional tasks are revealed, and listed here, as "problems" under item (b). 
"The ground problems of airships, outside of mooring, involve in general terms: 
(a) the landing of ships from flight and 
(b) the moving or handling of the ships over the ground and in and out of hangars. "
(Rosendahl, 1927) 
Thus, the problems the ground crew of an airship have to solve, according to Rosendahl's description, 
(and despite his listing them as being only two in number), are really four-fold. 
1. The landing; 
2. Movement over the ground; 
3. Movement in and out of buildings, and 
4. Mooring. 
Quite why Rosendahl should have pushed "mooring" to the "outside" of his list can only be conjectured 
at but perhaps he felt it to be of a lesser magnitude than the other problems? Or maybe he perceived that 
in his day it was a problem that had been more nearly solved? Whatever the reason it serves to illustrate 
the fact that different operators at different times have each viewed the subject of GH rather differently 
and consequently have expected rather different things from their "ground crews" (see next Section 
- 
5.4 
Previous Work on Topic). This makes defining the term somewhat problematical and it maybe the 
reason that there seem to have been so few previous attempts to do so (See Section 2.1 The Problem of 
the Cinderella Profession). Indeed, among all the books referenced at the end of this thesis the author 
could find only one definition of the actual term "Ground Handling. " It is this: 
"GROUND HANDLING 
- 
The processes involved in the loading, unloading, servicing and 
movement of an aircraft on the ground or at a mooring facility. " (Mowforth, 1991: 102) 
This seems on the face of it to be a perfectly good and workable definition and, indeed, it was used as the 
basis of a paper on this topic, 2 given by the author, at the time of the closure of the CargoLifter Project, to 
the Airship Association Conference in Cambridge in 2002 ("rhe Cambridge Paper"). 
However, this definition introduces a further dimension to the debate by adding "loading, unloading and 
servicing" (presumably replenishment and supply of vital substances and consurnables? ) to the 'moving' 
and 'mooring' tasks already identified. It is also in close accordance with GH as it is understood and 
accepted within modem HTA practice. 
I 
-Ibe GA42 Airship Ground Handling and Mooring Manuar, 
2 Camplin & Schaefer, 2002 
- 
see Section 4.1 
- 
Origins of the Thesis 
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This might be seen to be a good thing 
- 
except that it omits entirely two procedures, previously mentioned 
above as being of primary importance, by both of those with extensive hands-on GH experience of small 
(Flying Pictures) and large (Rosendahl) airships 
- 
namely the launch and the recovery (or landing). Here CI 
is further confirmation of the point previously made that there is a very great, but largely unrecognised4 
difference between what is accepted as the norm in modem HTA practice and the opinions expressed by 
those whose experience and expertise lies exclusively within the arcane world of LTA flight. 
In order to obtain a more detailed and all-inclusive definition of the term "Ground Handling" it would 
perhaps be rewarding to delve further back into the airship's LTA roots and see if the world of ballooning 
can offer a clearer understanding of what are the irrefutably necessary "processee' that lie behind the 
term. However, here again, as far as the basic modem hot air balloons are concerned, there is not a lot on 
offer. This is one of the only definitions related to the GH topic that the author could find: 
"Ground Crew 
- 
Persons who assist in the assembly, inflation, chase, and recovery of a balloon. " (FAA, 2001: G-4) 
The important distinction here, in comparison with the foregoing, is that the balloon crew's job is seen as 
being to assist with every process involved in the operation of the aircraft, all the way from its initial 
assembly right through to the final recovery of it after it has landed and been deflated. In airship terms 
this would equate to a ground crew that would help to: 
a) transport and collect its constituent parts; 
b) construct the airship; 
C) fill it with gas; 
d) load it; 
e) launch it; 
f) provide logistical support during flight operations; 
g) capture it; 
h) unload it; 
i) deflate it, and 
j) pack the components for transportation by road. 
In short, the ground crew would do everything that the pilot doesn*t, and it is apparent, from study of the 
history books, that in the long slow evolution of the airship from its origins as a 'motorised-balloon, ' the 
ground-based personnel have at times been asked, and indeed expected, to do all of these tasks. What all 
this reveals is that there is today no universally agreed point at which the GH for an airship 
- 
particularly 
a very large airship 
- 
really begins, nor what it consists of, and nor where it should end. This needs to be 
addressed. 
5.3.2.1 Derining the GH tasks 
By means of reference to the previously mentioned "ground based perspective" (see Section 5.1 The 
Need to Establish a GH Perspective) it is possible to identify a list of ground based actions or tasks, 
every one of which, in the course of building and operating any new airship, (and regardless of its size or 
function, ) will have to be addressed by someone, and which the "ground crew personner' are almost 
certain at least to be involved with, if not entirely responsible for. 
In The Cambridge Paper the authors identified 21 such tasks: 
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Fiq. 2 The Generic Ground Handlinq Tasks 
1. Inflation 
- 
fill the airship with its lifting medium 
2. Weigh-off 
- 
measure and adjust the static buoyancy 
3. Undocking 
- 
move airship out of a hangar 
4. Mooring 
- 
keep control of airship when not in flight and protect it from damage 
5. Replenishment 
- 
re-supply consumables necessary for normal operation 
6. Systems testing 
- 
prove fit for purpose and/or of certifiable standard 
7. Flight preparation 
- 
make ready for specific mission in foreseeable weather 
8. Launch (take-off) 
- 
initiate controlled transition from mooring to flight 
9. In-flight monitoring 
- 
track mission progress, stand-by to give assistance 
10. Load exchange 
- 
load and unload payloads 
11. Capture (landing) 
- 
control transition from flight to mooring 
12. Maintenance 
- 
routine inspections, cleaning, etc. of airship and GH equipment 
13. Repair 
- 
mend or replace damaged or time expired parts 
14. Expeditionary site set-up 
- 
establish and service temporary operational bases 
15. Gas management 
- 
maintain lifting medium within designated parameters 
16. Storm mooring 
- 
keep control of the airship in normal windy weather 
17. Enduring extreme weather 
- 
protect the airship against abnormal weather 
18. Breakaway and emergency touchdown 
- 
logistical support for unplanned nabnormal" 
flight to an unknown destination 
19. Retrieval from remote landing site 
- 
logistical support for planned "abnormal" return flight 
OR wreckage retrieval 
20. Docking 
- 
move the airship into a hangar 
21. Deflation 
- 
remove lifting agent without damaging airship structure 
However, subsequent research and analysis by this author has led to the conclusion that these 21 tasks are 
something of an underestimate. To some extent this number is merely a matter of classification and 
doubtless it can be argued that many of these divisions are arbitrary, nevertheless, a start has to be made 
somewhere and if the tasks are defined, or sub-divided by the range of skills, or areas of specialist 
knowledge that whomsoever carries out the task will have to be proficient in, then it becomes apparent 
that there are at least 40 actions which can be, and have been in the past, lumped together and/or loosely 
described as "Ground Handling. " 
Continuing with the practice established in The Cambridge Paper, these actions can be termed "The 
Generic Ground Handling Tasks" and taking them roughly in the order in which any, and every, newly- 
built airship might expect to encounter them in its lifetime, they can be listed and defined thus: 
001 Preparation of the Ground Handling Infrastructure 
- 
design, build and test GHE 
(shed, mast, rails, &c. ) 
002 Preparation of the Ground Support Infrastructure 
- 
design, build and test GSE 
(tanks, pumps, pipes &c. ) 
003 Protect infrastructure ( Groundside Security) 
- 
protect the infrastructure from 
unauthorised interference 
004 Protect airship (Airside Security) 
- 
protect the airship from unauthorised interference 
005 Assemble airship structure 
- 
connect, lay-out, erect or suspend component parts 
006 Inflation 
- 
fill the airship with its lifting medium 
007 Buoyancy management 
- 
keep the airship close to neutral buoyancy by on and off 
loading ballast weight 
008 Gas management 
- 
keep the lifting medium within designated parameters of pressure 
and purity 
009 Systems testing (for certification? ) 
- 
prove airship is fit for purpose (includes initial lift 
and trim test) 
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010 Preparation of Airship 
- 
obtain permissions from airfield authorities etc., and connect 
airship to GHE 
011 Undocking 
- 
move airship out of shed with the GHE 
0 12 Taxiing or transit 
- 
move the airship on the ground with the GHE 
013 Mooring 
- 
keep control of the airship when it is not in flight 
0 14 Endure extreme weather 
- 
protect the airship from hail, ice, snow, dust and other 
weather conditions 
015 Storm mooring 
- 
protect the airship from strong wind 
016 Replenishment 
- 
re-supply consumable items necessary for normal operation 
017 Load payloads (LEP) and/or people 
0 18 Preparation for flight 
- 
weigh-off etc., for specific mission in foreseeable weather 
conditions 
019 Launch (take-off, lift-off or release) 
- 
controlled transition from mooring to flight 
020 In-flight monitoring 
- 
keep track of mission progress, stand-by to give assistance 
021 Capture (landing or touchdown) 
- 
controlled transition from flight to mooring 
022 Unload payloads and/or people 
023 Maintenance (airship) 
- 
routine inspection, cleaning and checking of airship systems 
024 Maintenance (GHE and GSE) 
- 
routine inspection, cleaning and checking of GH 
systems 
025 Repair (airship) 
- 
mending or replacing damaged or time expired airship parts 
026 Repair (GHE and GSE) 
- 
mending or replacing damaged or time expired GH parts 
027 Emergency break-away pursuit 
- 
logistical support for unplanned abnormal flight to an 
unknown destination 
028 Emergency situation 
- 
crash (includes forced landing at both home base or a remote 
location) 
029 Emergency situation 
- 
fire on board airship or associated with GHE 
030 Emergency situation 
- 
structural failure or damage 
031 Emergency situation 
- 
loss of lift (e. g. resulting from stuck valve) 
032 Emergency situation 
- 
injured/sick personnel on board airship or associated with GHE 
033 Set-up temporary ops: base 
- 
move GHE from home base and establish a temporary or 
"expeditionary" base for mooring airship at remote site 
034 Service airship at remote mooring site 
- 
capture and moor airship at remote site and 
supply consurnables and precisely measured quantities of fuel, ballast and lifting gas 
035 Retrieval from a remote landing site 
- 
launch airship at remote site and monitor 
planned abnormal return flight (i. e. may be with damaged airship) 
036 Retrieval of wreckage 
- 
supervise uncontrolled removal of lift and salvage components 
037 Remove or "strike' temporary ops base 
- 
dismantle and transport GHE and GSE from 
remote site 
038 Re-docking 
- 
move airship into shed 
039 Deflation (includes dismantling) 
- 
controlled removal of the lifting agent without 
damaging airship components and disassemble structure 
040 Weather monitoring 
Clearly, this is an even more "formidable" list than the 21 identified in the Cambridge Paper. However, it 
seems inevitable that all these tasks will at least have to be considered by the developers of any future 
NGVLAs, even if they are not precisely defined, allocated or assigned to any particular group of people at 
the start of any project. Equally clearly, for the purposes of this investigation, 40 complex, interwoven 
and imprecisely defined procedures are far too many to be properly investigated. Some way will have to 
be found 
- 
as with the numbers of the airships themselves 
- 
to reduce the number to more manageable, 
and ideally more memorable, proportions. 
One obvious way, commonly believed to be the most convenient way, to reduce the number of tasks at a 
stroke, is to take the task list and simply "fold it in half"by combining as a single topic all those events 
that appear to be most closely allied. There are, for example, some tasks which might logically be 
expected to involve the use of the same equipment, and thus, on the face of it, these could quite 
legitimately be paired up and treated as one. For example: 
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Inflation (assembly) and Deflation (dismantling) 
Undocking (move out of shed) and Re-dockina., (move into shed), 
Launch (release from moorings and take-off) and Capture (land and re-connect to moorings), 
Loading and unloading, 
Set up (establish) and take-down (remove and clear up) remote operational bases 
However, the problem with doing this is that it presupposes that these pairings are a mirror-image of their 
opposite number, and it engenders the belief that they are composed of procedures which can be run in 
reverse order. In many instances this is not the case. Take for example the procedure for connecting a 
large airship to its mooring mast, as it was commonly done in the 1930's. 
"To make the usual "flying moor" 
... 
the airship would fly slowly towards the mast and drop 
three wires 
-a mooring wire and two yaw guys - from the nose. All three would be connected [by ground crew members standing on the ground] to lines leading to winches at the mast 
... 
The 
airship would now drop ballast and rise vertically under the control of the winches, lateral drift 
being prevented by the yaw guys 
... 
the main winch would now draw the nose down until this 
[mooring] cone [suspended on a vertical axis from the extreme nose] engaged the corresponding 
cup on top of the mast and was locked into it by spring latches. Flying off from the mast used 
essentially the same procedure in reverse. " (Mowforth, 1991: 35) [GC emphasis] 
This would seem to suggest that, when leaving the mast, the airship would reverse away dragging the 
three wires 
-a mooring wire and two yaw guys - with it. It would then move forward, to slacken and 
lower the wires to the ground so that the ground crew could "disconnect' 'them, finally allowing the 
airship to climb away, reeling in its halves of the three wires as it did so. But this is not what was actually 
done. 
"Even when the [newly moored] ship's bow cone was secured in the mast cup, much work 
remained to be done, for "the ship is never safe until in all respects ready to take the air 
instantly. ' " The ship's main mooring wire and the yaw lines had to be hauled back into the ship, 
and water ballast and fuel loaded, while the cells would be topped up with helium as necessary. 
At the mast a skeleton crew 
... 
was on board at all times 
... 
to fly the ship if she were forced to 
slip from the mast in an emergency. " (Robinson & Keller, 1982: 75) 
"The top portion of the mast to which the vessel is attached is designed to rotate 
... 
It should be 
noted that mooring and release are entirely mechanical, requiring the services of but a few men; 
... 
and 
- 
what is an important point 
- 
that the release of a ship is a matter of seconds only 
(Pratt, 1920) 
"He [the captain of R100] gives the order 'Flying stations' and we go to our various allotted 
posts. The supply services such as gas, water, petrol, electric fight and telephone are 
disconnected and the gangway hauled up. 
... 
On the winch platform [in the airship's nose] we 
receive the order 'Prepare to slip. ' This is passed to 
... 
[the officer in charge of the tower] 
... 
who gives the order 'Take strain on the wire' 
-a mast hand inside the tower then screws down 
his wheel and draws the mooring pendant taut. Then, 'Out stops', and the spring stops holding 
the ship's cone in the mast's cup are withdrawn, and the airship is left riding solely by its 
mooring-pendant 
-a short length of wire with an eye at the mast end and a stopper in the ship's 
cone. A report is made to the control car as to the state of the airship as shown by a device in the 
bows 
... 
water is dropped 
... 
until the indicator shows a quarter of a ton either side of zero. A 
message then comes from the control car 
... 
to the Mooring Tower Officer who gives the order 
'Ease up on the wire. ' The wheel holding the pendant will be slackened off. 
... 
The Captain will 
order 
... 
'Stand by to slip, ' quickly followed by 'Slip, ' all this being repeated to the Tower 
Officer, who finally orders 'Slip, ' and the bar, holding the hinged hook fast in the eye of the 
pendant, is lifted. The bow lifts slowly, drawing the cone out of the cup, the mooring-pendant 
with it, and the ship is free. To make sure that she will lift clear the top of the tower, another half 
ton of water is let go as she lifts clear. As soon as the ship is well clear of the tower the engines 
are rung up to the required rpm and away we go, gradually gathering speed and height while the 
tower recedes 
... 
" (Meager, 1970: 160/1) 
1 US Navy Rigid Airship ManuaL 1927: IX-97 
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Thus there is no necessity for the airship to pull the wires with it and then to wait around, dangerously 
near to the mast, while the ground crew do the disconnecting. T'herefore, it is evident that the procedures 
for an airship leaving its mooring tower are not simply the reverse of the attachment procedures, and nor 
is the procedure for taking an airship out of its shed the reverse of that for putting it back in again 
- 
although, this too is commonly believed to be the case. However, here too it is necessary to go into some 
little detail to understand the reasons. 
Consider an airship inside a shed that is aligned with the prevailing wind. If the nose of the airship is 
attached to a "mobile mast"which is capable of driving itself forward by means of an in-built 
"locomotive, " or an attached "tractor, " and the airship's tail is held by a separate mobile, but unpowered, 
anchoring device (commonly a "beam" in US Navy parlancej then it is a simple matter for the mast to 
tow the airship out of the shed dragging the beam along with it. However, this relies on the pull from the 
mast being transmitted to the wheels of the beam through the generally fairly fragile airship structure 
- 
unless this has been foreseen to be a problem, and: 
"... a system of interconnecting tension and compression members has been designed and built 
which rigidly holds the [stem handling] beam a fixed distance from the [mobile] mast and is 
stronger than the full tractive effort of the mast locomotive. On one occasion while the ship [ZR3 
- 
Los Angeles] was being walked out of the hangar, the beam fouled on a protruding part of the 
hangar floor and was definitely stopped against further motion. Using the interconnecting 
spreader-bar system of towing, this merely resulted in stopping the mast and airship, the 
locomotive spinning its wheels but doing no damage to any part of the ship or handling 
apparatus. " (Bolster, 1932: 119) 
So far so good, but now consider what happens when trying to return the airship to the shed. Either the 
beam must now tow the mast to put the airship back in tail-first as it was, or, the airship must enter the 
shed mast-first and end up facing in the opposite direction. Of course, neither of these is a serious 
problem in itself, assuming the engineers have done their work properly and provided, either a "tractoe, 
to pull the beam, or doors at both ends of the shed. However, the latter solution has the big disadvantage 
that, (assuming the same weather conditions, ) in order to align the airship with the shed axis, the tail must 
initially be turned into the prevailing wind and, subsequently on its second removal from the shed, via the 
other set of doors, the airship will emerge down wind of the building and have its tail facing into wind. 
Whatever the decision, it is plain that the GH procedures for entering the shed are going to differ 
significantly from those for leaving it, and that, as with the mast connections, lumping these two 
procedures together in the mistaken belief that they mirror each other, is quite wrong and disguises the 
true nature and complexities of them. Thus it is deemed wise, certainly at the start of this investigation, to 
keep all these 40 identified procedures as separate entities unto themselves, and consequently another way 
is needed of reducing their number and of bringing the field of study into more manageable proportions. 
Looking again at the list of tasks it can be seen that some are fairly obviously subsets of others. They 
consist of selected procedures from within a larger, more thorough, and more complex, sequence. For 
example, the initial lift and trim tests, including the very first experimental "weigh-off' of a brand new 
airship, immediately following its construction-assernbly-inflation process, will inevitably be much more 
detailed, and involve far more cross-checking, than a check "weigh-off' after a gas top-up or re- 
purification when that same airship has been in operation for some time. Moreover, this lesser procedure 
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will in turn almost certainly encompass and exceed all that takes place within the regular (perhaps) daily 
(or weekly? ) pre-flight "weigh-off' that must precede that airsWp*s every mission. 
There are also some events that can be classed as exceptional, and some which will involve abnormal 
procedures. These include both planned events 
- 
such as inflations and deflations 
- 
and unplanned events 
- 
such as extreme weather; serious but not critical in-flight equipment failures; retrieval from forced 
landing at remote site; fires; floods; and other occasions when the flight crew reach the limits of their own 
resources and need external assistance or rescue. Furthermore, all the tasks will have a preferred, or a 
required location, and thus one possible way to sort and shorten the list would be to decide where the 
tasks are most likely to be, (or will unavoidably have to be, ) done, and whether they are hkely to be rare 
or every day occurTences. A simple table will help to sort the tasks by their location and frequency: 
Location 
List of Tasks 
Inside 
shed 
Outside 
at base 
Remote 
Site 
Every 
day 
Rare 
event 
001 Preparation of GH Infrastructure x x x 
002 Preparation of G Support Infrastructure x x x x 
003 Protect GH &S infrastructure (Security) x x x x 
004 Protect airship from interference x x x x 
005 Assemble airship structure x x 
006 Inflation x x 
007 Buoyancy management x x x x 
008 Gas management x x x x 
009 Systems testing (for certification? ) x x x 
010 Preparation of Airship (lift test) x x 
0 11 Undocking x x x 
012Taxiingortra sit x x 
013 Mooring x x x x 
014 Protect Endure extreme weather x x x 
015 Storm mooring x x x 
016 Replenishment x x x 
0 17 Load exchange payloads and/or people x x x x 
0 18 Preparation Flight & Weigh-off x x x x 
0 19 Take-off, lift-off, launch or release x x x 
020 In-flight monitoring x x x 
021 Landing, touchdown or capture x x x 
022 Unload payloads and/or people x x x x 
023 Maintenance (airship) x x x x 
024 Maintenance (GHE and GSE) x x x x 
025 Repair (airship) x x x x 
026 Repair (GHE and GSE) x x x 
027 Emergency 
- 
break-away pursuit x x x 
028 Emergency 
- 
crash x x x 
029 Emergency 
- 
fire on board x x x x 
030 Emergency 
- 
structural failure x x x x 
031 Emergency 
- 
loss of lift x x x x 
032 Emergency 
- 
injured personnel x x x x 
033 Set-up temporary ops base x x 
034 Service airship at remote mooring site x x 
035 Retrieval from a remote landing site x x 
036 Retrieval of wreckage x x x 
037 Remove or strike temporary ops base x x 
038 Re-docking x x 
039 Deflation (dismantling) x x x 
040 Weather monitoring and forecast x x x x 
Table 3- The GH Tasks Bv Location And Freauenev 
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There is however, a danger in making such a table, in that each of the 40 procedures can now be seen to 
have three different facets, each of which is quite likely to require its own modified set of procedures and 
thus could claim to become a task in its own right. For instance Gas Management inside the Shed could 
easily involve different equipment (and thus also crew skills/training) from that used in the same process 
outside on the Home Base Field, or, indeed from that transported by road to a Remote Location. The 
result is that the list of 40 Generic GH Procedures has now grown to encompass some 120 potential 
separate actions, or events, all of which would seem to involve some participation of the "ground crew. " 
Notwithstanding that not every box in the table has a cross in it, and, for instance it is obvious that the 
Setting Up of a Remote Base is never going to take place Inside the Shed, just as the Assembly and 
Inflation of a VLA is unlikely ever to take place in an unprepared open field, it is still clear that the size 
and complexity of "Ground Handling7 is increasing rather than being reduced as was the intention. 
Furthermore, if, for example, one were to exclude from the area of study, all those events which are 
categorised as 'rare' in this table, and which take place exclusively 'inside the shed, ' then the list of tasks 
is only actually reduced by three items 
- 
005 Assemble airship structure; 006 Inflation and 0 10 
Preparation of Airship. Plainly this "inclusive" method of sorting the GH tasks is the wrong way to go. 
It should be kept in mind that the impetus behind this definition of the term'ýGround Handling, " is not 
only to limit the list of tasks for the purposes of making things more immediately amenable for this thesis. 
It is also hoped to be of assistance to any future VLA project developers. Thus, given the length of the 
list, and the diversity of topics it encompasses, along with the range of skills which are going to be 
required in order to accomplish all these various tasks, it would seem that a better way to provide a useful 
service to the NGVLAs would be to establish who, within any future project, might be best suited to carry 
them out. Moreover, it seems virtually certain that the personnel who will be involved in making these 
decisions and in carrying out the actions, for any NGVLA projects, will have come from a background of 
HTA operations and, consequently, bringing the ground operations as closely into line with modem 
aviation practice would perhaps also be advantageous. 
It would therefore seem sensible to draw another table, one that is "excluding" in that it seeks to hand- 
over responsibility for as many of the 40 tasks as possible, from the ground crew, to other departments 
who are perhaps necessarily already involved in them, or who have in interest in them, and who might 
reasonably be expected to contain personnel with the requisite skills and qualifications to carry them out. 
Rather than maximising the complexity of GH and of multiplying the tasks on the list, and thereby 
empowering the ground crew, this would aim to exclude them or minimise their involvement, and to limit 
the number of actions that will need their participation. The adoption of this method will allow, it is 
hoped, a greatly reduced area of study for this thesis to be identified while. at the same time incidentally 
offering a possible way of making considerable savings of both cost and manpower for the NGVLAs. 
However, redefining GH by excluding all those procedures which are, or conceivably could be, shared by 
another department within the organisation, in order to leave a residue of "pure GH7' procedures that the 
ground crew can claim to be entirely their own, requires the identification of the other departments and/or 
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interested parties. There need not be many of these, and some of them are obvious 
- 
as for example, the 
Flight Crew. Plainly they will be involved in much that the ground crew do, that is related to the airship's 
flight operations. Equally it seems a natural divide to take all those processes that happen inside the shed 
and pass responsibility for them over to some sort of assembly/construction or Production Team, while 
events out on the field at the home base, along with such problems as "security" will almost certainly fall 
within the jurisdiction of an Airfield Authority. Finally, in accordance with HTA practice, it would seem 
logical for all those procedures that require the supply of consumable materials (fuel, helium and the 
like, ) along with many of the routine maintenance and repair tasks, to be passed over to a loose network 
of Specialist Sub-Contractors, and/or agencies of licensed operatives and Ground Support experts. 
Department responsible 
List of Tasks \ 
Product 
team 
Flight 
crew 
Airfield 
authority 
Specialist 
contractor 
Ground 
support 
001 Preparatio of GH Infrastructure x x x 
002 Preparation of G Support Infrastructure x x x 
003 Protect GH &S infrastructure (Security) x x 
004 Protect airship from interference x x x 
005 Assemble airship structure x x 
006 Inflation x x x 
007 Buoyancy management x x x 
008 Gas management x x x x 
009 Systems testing (for certification? ) x x 
010 Preparation of Airship (lift test) x x x 
0 11 Undocking x x x 
0 12 Taxiing or transit x x 
013 Mooring x 
014 Protect Endure extreme weather x x 
015 Storm mooring x x 
016 Replenishment x x x x 
017 Load exchange payloads and/or people x x 
018 Preparation Flight & Weigh-off x 
019 Take-off, lift-off, launch or release x 
020 In-flight monitoring x x x 
021 Landing, touchdown or capture x x 
022 Unload payloads and/or people x x 
023 Maintenance (airship) x x x x 
024 Maintenance (GHE and GSE) x x x x 
025 Repair (airship) x x x x 
026 Repair (GHE and GSE) x x x x 
027 Emergency break-away pursuit x x 
028 Emergency situation 
- 
crash x 
029 Emergency situation 
- 
fire on board x x 
030 Emergency situation 
- 
structural failure x x 
031 Emergency situation 
- 
loss of lift x x 
032 Emergency situation 
- 
injured personnel x 
033 Set-up temporary cps base x 
034 Service airship at remote mooring site x x 
035 Retrieval from a remote landing site x x 
036 Retrieval of wreckage x 
037 Remove or strike temporary cps base x 
038 Re-docking x x 
039 Deflation (dismantling) x x x 
040 Weather monitoring and forecast x x x 
Table 4- The GH Tasks Distributed to Other Departments 
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The interesting thing about compiling this second table is that it now becomes apparent that GH per se 
has disappeared completely. All the other departments seem quite able to take over the various tasks and 
incorporate them into their own spheres of expertise without much difficulty. There are no gaps in the list, 
indeed there are plenty of places where there are several possible candidates who appear qualified and 
able to take on the GH tasks 
- 
albeit that some of these will be dependent upon the specific type of airship 
that is being used or the role that it is intended to undertake. Tlius, rather than reducing the GH to a more 
manageable number of categories, and helping to define the term, this analysis seemingly fulfils the 
commonly expressed wish of getting rid of the (expensive and problematical) ground handlers altogether. 
That is the problem with GH 
- 
it is either all or it is nothing. As soon as there is admission of the need for 
it, it takes over everything and becomes hugely complicated, riddled with intractable questions and 
impossible to pin down, but as soon as there is an attempt to minimise it, or to question the justification 
for it, then it promptly reveals a slippery tendency to disappear entirely. There seems to be nowhere to 
draw a sensible line, and this begs some questions that lead right back to the roots of this investigation. 
Why do the modem blimps, like the Skyships (of the 1980s) and the Lightships (of the 1990s) have 
dedicated ground handlers, if other departments within their organisations can apparently do the job just 
as cost effectively? Moreover, why did the equally cost-conscious US Navy not do away with them in the 
1940s? And more to the point why does the most recently produced Zeppelin NT which famously claims 
to operate with a minimal groundcrew bother to have any at all? 
The answer is simply because they cannot do without them. The why of this is perhaps easier to envisage 
if the life of the airship is seen in terms of the sequence of the events it will encounter in chronological 
order, along the lines of those given above in Figure 5.2 
- 
The CargoLifter Procedural Sequence from 
a GH Perspective. Some of the labels in this diagram should be recognised as -statee'in which there is 
continuity and stability, whereas some of the others are actually transitional "phasee' that involve sudden 
or vigorous activity and where events are much more unpredictable. The airship is at its most vulnerable 
when it is passing through a transition phase, as for example when it moves from a "docked7 state to a 
G'moored" state via the transitional "undocking" phase. Or, when depletion of its consumables dictates a 
need for it to depart from the relatively stable and predictable state of "flying" and return to the greater 
safety of a "moored" state but can only get there by taking its chances through a transitional "capture" 
phase. It is the job of the ground crew to handle the airship during these brief periods of uncertainty and 
to make these transitions as quick and safe as possible. Thus the ground crew fill in the gaps between the 
other departments and provide back-up where it is needed. Therefore "Ground Handling7 is essentially 
the glue that binds the enterprise together, and if there are any tasks which might be claimed as belonging 
wholly to the ground handlers then they are those where the other teams have the least overlap 
- 
as for 
example when the airship is operating at a temporary location or from a remote "expeditionary" site. 
Nevertheless. a manageable and memorable Est of specific GH categories is still required for this 
investigation, and armed with the foregoing understanding, it is now possible to return to the list of 
potentially responsible departments and, (without specifying all that each might reasonably, or in 
extremis, be asked to undertake, ) to leave with each, those tasks that clearly fall generically within their 
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sphere of expertise, and to reclaim those where they are weakest and regroup these under the heading of 
"Ground Handling. " 
Consequently, all events that happen within the shed will be largely left to the Production Team-, all 
provision of the services and infrastructure connected with the operations that take place out on the field 
will generally be considered to be under the aegis of the Airport Authority; all supply and replenishment 
of consurnables, along with maintenance and repair will be carried out by Ground Support in conjunction 
with Specialist Contractors, Consultants and Suppliers; and the Pilots and Flight Crew will retain control 
of all events leading up to flight and those that occur during it, while the airship has no physical 
connection to the ground. This leaves the Ground Crew as intermediaries between these other groups, 
backing them up where necessary and taking responsibility for the transitional phases that the airship will 
pass through during operations 
- 
especially where this concerns operations away from the home base at an 
Expeditionary Site or any Remote and Temporary Location. 
Thus, for the purposes of this investigation: 
0 Production is defined as consisting of all procedures that are necessary in order: 
to assemble and/or construct the airship 
to inflate the airship 
to monitor and maintain the airship's structure while it is inside the shed 
to monitor and maintain the airship's buoyancy while it is inside the shed 
to repair or replace any damaged parts of the airship while it is inside the shed 
0 Airfield Authority is defined as ownership of all procedures that are necessary in order: 
to provide security for the airship, the infrastructure and equipment inside and outside the shed 
to inspect and maintain all GHE and GSE infrastructure and equipment outside the shed 
to obtain all necessary permissions for ground and flight operations at the home base 
to enforce and comply with environmental rules and health and safety regulations 
to provide emergency services to deal with fire, deflation, and injury to personnel 
to inspect and maintain all storage facilities for consumables on the airfield 
to provide a weather monitoring and forecasting service for airship and ground crews 
0 Ground Support is defined as all procedures that are necessary in order: 
to provide and maintain facilities for communication between all parties 
to ensure quality and replenish the consurnables (fuel, gas, ballast, lubricants, food, drink &c) 
to inspect and maintain the airship's structure, systems and equipment in working order 
to repair or replace any damaged parts of the airship while it is outside the shed 
0 And thus, in conclusion, the term "Ground Handling" is defined as all those remaining procedures 
that are necessary in order: 
to prepare the airship and the GHE for operation outside the shed 
to monitor and control airship buoyancy while it is outside the shed 
to move the airship out of and back into the shed 
to move the airship over the operational area 
to keep the airship safe and secure when it is moored (at home base and elsewhere) 
to assist the airship in withstanding changes and effects of the weather 
to load and unload the airship payload (ballast, cargo, sensors or passengers) 
to assist the airship flight crew with preparation for flight (weigh-off and trim) 
to launch the airship 
to capture the airship 
to establish and remove temporary operational bases at remote locations, and 
to carry out all of the above tasks at any temporary, remotely based sites. 
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Furthermore, this somewhat unwieldy list of tasks can be rendered more easily memorable if the job of 
the ground crew (i. e. the "ground handling") is simply summarised as this: Use of the GHE in order to: 
1. Protect; 
2. Prepare; 
3. Move-, 
4. Moor-, 
5. Load; 
6. Launch; 
7. Capture, and 
8. Camp-out with airship. 
Perhaps therefore, in conclusion, the "ground crew" (if defined as comprised of both "ground handlers" 
and "ground supporters") could best be summarised as: "those who carry out all necessary duties in order 
to preserve and maintain an airship while it is in the "moored" state and who facilitate all the transitional 
phases that allow the airship to safely arrive at and depart from this state. " 
5.4 Previous work on topic 
In the course of the CLOSHRP a certain amount of literature and documentation that either was, or at 
least purported to be, concerned exclusively with the detail of the PGVLA GH systems, and of the 
procedures that were evolved for use with them, was brought to light. The author unearthed some of this 
material himself, on his visits to the London archives (Patent Office, British Library, etc., ) on behalf of 
CL, but he was unaware of the origin of many of the other documents and photocopies, which appeared in 
the company library, especially those from America. However, in the preparation of this thesis, which 
was initially financed by the company in accordance with their policy of promoting the academic 
improvement of their employees, the author was given unlimited licence and access to study relevant 
sections from all the collected materials. 
The abrupt termination of the CL project in 2002 brought an end to the collection process and thus, the 
body of work relating to GH within the CL Library cannot by any means be said to be exhaustive. 
Nevertheless, in view of the fact that no such investigation, or assemblage of documentation, seems to 
have been previously attempted, and given that there was sufficient material for the author to form an 
opinion as to the potential value of the different types of material collected, a summary of the GH 
literature which was unearthed is deemed appropriate here. In the interests of maximising the usefulness 
of this study for those conducting any similar future investigation, the following compilation includes 
material from the author's own personal collection, which was amassed prior to his involvement with CL 
and, also subsequent to the closure of the company, on privately arranged return visits to some archives. 
5A. 1 Published and unpublished sources 
There are a few commercially available books that deal exclusively with the GH facilities devised for the 
PGVLAs. 1 Among the most notable of them are these: 
Many of these titles are now out of print but mst are available via specialist dealers 
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" Airships 
- 
Cardington: A history of Cardington airship station by Chamberlain, G. (1984) 
- 
gives details of GH systems developed at one British base. 
" Pulharn pigs: the history of an airship station by Kinsey, G. (1988) 
- 
gives details of GH 
systems developed at one British base. 
" Housing the airship by Dean, C. (1989) 
- 
is the definitive work on almost all the airship sheds 
ever built but makes no mention of the mooring systems, or the mooring masts, and scant 
reference of the methods used to move the airships in and out of the buildings. 
American airship bases andfacilities by Shock, J. R. (1996) 
- 
gives an overview of airship GH 
infrastructure in America, from the American perspective. 
Airship sheds in Friedrichshafen by Bauer, M. (2001) 
- 
gives details of GH systems developed 
at one German base. 
Although these publications are exceedingly valuable sources, and much useful information can be 
gleaned from them, from the point of view of developing GH systems for the NGVLAs, they do have 
some shortcomings. Primarily, all these works have a tendency to deal with the evolution of the PGVLA 
GH infrastructure (i. e. the hardware) rather than the specifics of the systems that were used, and the way 
in which the actual GH procedures (i. e. the software) developed. This is perhaps excusable considering 
the fact that all of this material was written by historians, with hindsight, long after the equipment was 
actually constructed and used. 
"... hindsight is the bane of history. It is corrupting and distorting and pays no respect to the way 
life is really lived 
- 
forwards, generally blindly, full of accidents, fortunes and misfortunes, 
patternless and often adrift. 
... 
Hindsight is the easy way to mop up the mess which we call 
history; it is too often the refuge of the tidy-minded, making neat patterns when the dust has 
settled. As often as not, when the dust was flying, no one at the time knew what the outcome 
might be. " (Bragg, 2003: 39/40) 
The fact that all the PGVLA development programmes ended abruptly, either due to financial 
curtailment, (as at the end of a war, ) or following one of their infamous disasters, which thereby removed 
many, if not all knowledgeable personnel, 1 and left a climate of opinion where no one was interested to 
know the minutiae of GH, meant that there was no incentive to write anything on the topic for posterity. 
Moreover, when each airship programme was actually in process, it was anticipated to be the start of an 
industry, or a system which was going to solve the world's transport problems and it was hoped, would 
lead on to the imminent construction of dozens, if not hundreds, of similar airships. Consequently, there 
was no reason to write down the early experiments, particularly when ground handling the prototypes, 
and certainly there was no thought to pass this mass of detailed information on to future generations. 
Thus, it appears that there is, today, no publicly available material on the evolution of the GH techniques, 
simply because little or nothing was published by practitioners at the time for public consumption, and 
there were no contemporary books written on the subject of GH per se. 
However, some of those who were of an age to have had experience with the PGVLAs did subsequently 
write their memoirs, and there is quite a lot of very detailed description of the GH systems, and of the 
problems encountered, and of the empirical trials which were conducted, hidden in such books as these: 
" My airshipflights 1915-1930 by Meager, G. (1970); and 
" Airship pilot no. 28 by Williams, T. B. (1974); both of which deal with the British programmes, 
and 
" GrafZeppelin & Hindenburg : the golden age of the great passenger airships by Dick, H. G. & 
Robinson, D. H. (1985) 
- 
which deals with both the German and American systems. 
See below under 5.4.2. 
- 
list of key personal and experts killed in crashes and disasters 
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This latter source is quoted extensively later in this study as an example of the quality of information that 
is available by means of historical research. 
There is also one thoroughly excellent, privately printed, recent study, mostly of the American systems, 
which gives insight into some further possible reasons for a general lack of similar material: 
*A research of rigid airship ground handling by Shock, J. R. (1998) 
"rhere are several excellent sources that thoroughly cover the airships, however, the support 
equipment and process assumed a secondary role, since it was complicated, not as interesting 
and required lengthy explanation. " (Shock, 1998: 3) 
There are, however, many unpublished written records, which have survived and, with regard to the 
British airship development programmes, these chiefly consist of government and other official files; 
notes, memos & etc., from such places as the Royal Airship Works at Cardington, as well as personal 
letters and memoirs that are to be found in such collections and repositories as the Imperial War Museum; 
the RAF Museum; the Royal Aeronautical Society Library and the Public Record Office. There are also 
large collections of similar material in both Germany and America. Unfortunately this material is, for the 
most part, ' uncatalogued and unsorted, and thus, although the author and others on behalf of Cl, had 
begun to mine this resource, the true quantity and quality of the GH information that still lies waiting to 
be discovered, within these repositories, is impossible to estimate. 
5.4.2 Airship GH manuals 
Because most of the large airships of the past generation were, almost without exception, prototypes, it 
seems that in many cases no one was tasked to write the GH manuals for them. Everything was changing 
so fast that nothing became well enough established to be written down, and more often than not, the 
project then ended abruptly following one of the infamous disasters 
- 
many of which also resulted in the 
deaths of those who were, or who would have been, writing the manuals in due course. The list of those 
key people caught up in disastrous crashes who took invaluable and irreplaceable knowledge to their 
graves at critical moments in the history of airship development is surprisingly long, and if the loss of 
their lives was a personal tragedy, then the loss of their knowledge and expertise was a devastating blow 
to everyone who will ever share enthusiasm for their treasured cause of LTA flight. 
List of some kev mrsonnel and exverts killed in crashes and disasters 2 
Ll and L2 (1913) 
- 
"experienced German naval personnel" 
AP-1 blimplairplane hybrid (1916) 
- 
Usborne 
R38 (1924) 
- 
Maitland, Campbell, Maxfield 
Shenandoah (1925) 
- 
Lansdowne 
Akron (1933) 
-Moffett 
RIO] (1930) 
- 
Richmond, Scott, Irwin, Johnston, Rope, Huntý Atherstone, Colmore, Giblett 
LZ129 (1937) 
- 
Lehmann 
"Practically all the experienced [German] naval airship personnel were lost in the LI and L2 disasters. " (Robinson, 1994: 46) 
Although some progress is being made, most notably at such collections as the Rosendahl papers at the University of Texas. which has got as far as an index of the file boxes that can be viewed via the internet. 2 See also Appendix G Who was who 
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"... unfortunately, the wreck of the R-101 wiped out almost everybody in England who knew 
anything about airships, leaving only two or three, and it was almost impossible for them to start 
again because of lack of trained personnel, either in engineering, design, or operation 
... 
" (US 
Congress, 1933 
- 
Harpham: 445/6) 
Nevertheless, during the course of the CL research project, a number of Flight and Operations Manuals, ' 
for various airships from previous generations, were discovered and placed in the CargoLifter company 
library. It should be kept in mind that these fisted documents are only those which were brought to the 
author's attention, and there is every likelihood that there are many other manuals in existence, lurking in 
forgotten comers of archives. Although some of the manuals which turned up at CL do have sections 
dealing with GH, there are few that are specifically GH Manuals, and because the focus of this 
investigation is exclusively on material that is likely to assist with the GH of 'large' (or super-large) 
airships, the search results can legitimately be divided into two groups: 
Those concerning small blimp airships, and 
Those written for large rigid airships 
Of the first group, the overwhelming majority concern the "heavy" operational systems (already shown to 
be inappropriate or too problematical for the NGVLAs) and are thus of lesser interest for this study 
- 
with 
perhaps the exception of the US Navy Blimp manuals, for the largest of the post Second World War 
types, from which were derived the GH procedures used by the 'large' ZPG-3Ws. 
There is also a second group of 'small' blimp manuals which, although not strictly 'Historical, ' are 
nevertheless of some interest. These are the manuals for modem blimps that are currently certified and 
flying, and which have thus been successfully integrated into the modem world of HTA regulations. As 
this integration process is a further barrier that the NGVLAs will have to cross if they are to succeed, a 
list of some modem blimp manuals are included for reference. 
However, it is the third group containing those manuals for the PGVLAs with details of the vertical 
mooring methods, and information on other GH systems and procedures used by the rigid airships 
between the two world wars, which appear to be most suitable as a starting point for the NGVLAs, and 
consequently that are the most potentially interesting for this study. 
Taking these three groups in the order of their increasing interest, the most notable manuals which came 
to the author's attention were: 
5.4.2.1 Manuals for Modern Small Blimp Airships 
Skyship 600 series 
- 
AIRSHIP OPERATIONS INC. (1998) Operations Manual Part 4- Ground 
Handling Manual (USA: Airship Operations Inc. ) 
GA-42 
- 
FLYING PICTURES (Airships) Ltd., (c. 1988) The GA-42 airship : Ground handling and 
mooring manual. (Unpublished draft) 
Aeros 40B Skydragon 
- 
WORLDWIDE AEROS CORP. (200 1) Ground Handling Manual 
- 
FAA 
approved for Aeros 40B "Sky Dragon"(California, USA: Worldwide Aeros Corp) 
I Or in most cases photocopies of them 
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5.4.2.2 Manuals for US Navy blimps 
US NAVY, (1920) Notes on the operation of non-rigid airships (Washington D. C. USA: Government 
Printing Office) 
US NAVY, (1957) Ground handling of airships, evaluation of equipments and development of 
techniques (Final report). NAS Lakehurst Report serial No. 3-57, Project TED LAK AC 7038 
(Lakehurst NJ, USA: Airship Test and Development Department, US NAS Lakehurst) 
US NAVY, (1958) Handbook 
- 
airship ground handling instructions (rough draft). NAS Lak-ehurst 
Report serial No. 1-58, NAVAER 01-IF-501, Project TED LAK AC 7063.1 (Washington D. C. USA 
: US Bureau of Aeronautics) 
GAC/NASA (198 1) Study of ground handling characteristics of a maritime patrol airship. Final 
Report. Prepared by Goodyear under contract No. NAS2-10448 (Akron, OH, USA: Goodyear 
Aerospace Corporation) 
5.4.2.3 Manuals for Large Rigid Airships 
* British Rigid 23 Class 
- 
ADMIRALTY, (1918) Handbook on Rigid 23 Class Airships! 
This Handbook, which was published by The Admiralty in 1918, seems to have been as close as the 
British ever got to writing an operations manual for their large rigid airships. Only four airships of this 
class were ever built; R-23, R-24, and R-25, (all of which made their first flights in autumn 1917) and R- 
26, (which first flew in spring 1918); and because these were effectively a series of prototypes, with very 
short operational lives, it is apparent that the GH procedures for them were sirnilarly in a process of rapid 
evolution. Consequently, this manual makes only one passing reference to the duties to be performed 
specifically by ground based personnel. It is to be found under "Stations and Duties of Crew 
- 
General 
Orders" and it reads in full: 
"Duty Crew 
- 
To consist of a crew made of No. 9 crew and crews under training. They will sleep 
in the shed, and will gas ship, when this is to be done, before 8 am. This crew is to remain on 
board after working hours and is to be in the shed by 10 p. m. and relieve at 8 am. daily. " (Admiralty, 1918: 7 1) 
Apart from underlining the importance of round-the clock vigilance, this is of little value in the search to 
an understanding of the techniques that were practised and the knowledge which was accumulated by the 
ground crews of the time. This handbook, however, does contain much detailed information on the testing 
and flying of the British 23-class rigid airships but 'The contents of chapters" makes no actual mention of 
either "ground crew" nor of "handling. " There are some references in the text to what is clearly GHE (e. g. 
"hauling down ropes") but instruction is limited to the flight crews' perspective with regard to on-board 
stowage etc. There is no mention of any procedures for "Undocking, " nor for "Mooring, " nor -rake-off, " 
nor "Landing. " In short, this volume seems to have been a work in progress which was never completed. 
LZ 120 "Bodensee" 
- 
Eckener, (1919) Introduction to "Bodensee" flight manual: Brief instructions 
and practical hints for piloting Zeppelin airships for the flight personnel of the "DELAG" ("Revised 
extract from the "Practical Instructions" written by order of the former leader of Naval airshipe) 
(published as an Annex in Robinson, 1964) 
This is an extremely valuable document which, as the introduction states: 
"... reveals the secrets of Dr Eckener's consistent success where many others have failed 
- 
careful, conservative and prudent airship handling, together with a profound knowledge of the 
Reprinted and published in 2005, jointly by The Naval and Military Press in association with bnperW war Museum 
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physical laws and weather conditions governing the operations of the monster gas bags filled 
with hydrogen. His homely aphorisms and sage advice 
... 
appear on every page of the this 
45-year-old manual. " 
The problem, from the GH perspective is that this is a "Flight Manual" and as such is clearly written from 
a pilots perspective for pilots to learn from. This is shown by the fact that of the 17 pages of small font 
text, only 5 are concerned with topics involving ground based personnel. Nevertheless the sections on 
'Take-off against the wind, ' 'Landing in various conditions' and 'Lying out in a storm and at anchor' 
represent a wealth of detailed information that is of unparalleled importance 
- 
coming as it does, from the 
authoritative voice of prolonged personal empirical experience. This text should be made compulsory 
reading for all would be NGVLA developers, and also the regulators, although whether the latter, 
schooled under the modem HTA regime, will be open minded enough to allow gigantic airships in the 
future to perform the previously common place procedure of a down-wind take-off, ('The take-off before 
the wind') whereby "... the ship, on the command "Up Ship! " is thrown up aft 
... 
" by several hundred 
personnel, is somewhat doubtful. 
ZRS-I "Shenandoah" and LZ-1261ZRS-3 USS "Los Angeles" 
-US NAVY, (1927) Rigid airship 
manual (Washington D. C. USA : US Bureau of Aeronautics 
- 
Navy Department) 
Tfiýis extremely detailed volume is essentially an expanded and updated version of the previous one. Its 
origins in Dr Eckener's work are unmistakable: 
"It is hardly possible to lay down hard and fast rules for making landings under various 
conditions, for the number of factors to consider is great and the possible combinations are 
almost unforeseeable. Every landing turns out differently 
... 
" (Eckener, 1919: Vl) 
"It is hardly possible to lay down definite rules for landing an airship under all the various 
situations as the variety of possible combinations and complications is practically endless. Each 
landing is different in some respect from all others 
... 
" (US Navy, 1927: IX-45) 
Indeed, there is no pretence that this is anything other than an American rendering of the German state of 
the art: 
'The following notes represent the best German practice as well as our own. " (US Navy, 
1927: IX-8) 
However, there are some major and significant differences, chief of which is the superimposition of the 
problems that occur when the rare and expensive, non-flammable helium is substituted for the cheap and 
plentiful, but all too combustible hydrogen. Secondly, there are now several sections which do deal, quite 
comprehensively, with GH and plainly these are based on the American experiences with their own 
home-built "Shenandoah" and their German imported "Los Angeles. " The extent to which Eckener 
himself was involved in writing this document is not clear, but his influence is overwhelming, and it is 
more than likely that the purchase of the German airship did involve also supply of an operations manual 
to accompany it. Either way, this is a good example of the knowledge transfer process in action, which 
will be dealt with in Section 6.1.1. below. 
The big problem with this manual, from the point of view of those who wish to provide safe and reliable 
GH facilities, and procedures, for the NGVLAs, is that it was written at a time when labour was cheap, 
and before the necessity of mechanisation had been fully realised. Thus nearly all of the procedures 
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described are either too dangerous or too expensive to even contemplate for current or future use. 
However, where this 'Airshippers' Bible' does have great value, is that careful reading of the processes 
involved, allows the underlying problems to be revealed. As stated previously in this work, conducting a 
study of the GH procedures used by the PGVLAs does not imply that there is necessarily any intention of 
actually using them 
- 
but a clear understanding of the problems that the hugely experienced designers and 
engineers of the 1920s and 1930s thought they were trying to solve, does allow for the selection and 
application of the most appropriate and most cost effective modem solutions to those fundamental, 
intrinsic difficulties which the NGVLAs will unavoidably have to face. 
ZRS-5 USS "Macon". US NAVY, (1934) Operation manual 
-ZRS-5 USS Macon. Serial No. 13 (photocopy of typewritten extract received by Inspector of Naval Aircraft, Akron, Ohio on Feb I- 
1934) (Akron, Ohio USA: Goodyear-Zeppelin Corp. ) 
While this is the most recently produced 'large' airship manual that has come to light, and thus potentially 
should be the most useful, in reality it contains little of value simply because it is written from the airship 
manufacturer's point of view. Presumably, the authors of it 
- 
Goodyear 
- 
as manufacturers of the airship, 
had no reason, nor remit, to write down details of the US Navy*s own GH procedures. Tlere is thus 
hardly any information concerning the GHE itself. For example: 
"BOW CABLE ARRANGEMENT 
- 
It is understood that on each side of the ship a trolley is 
used, standing on docking rails 80 to 100 feet distant from the axis of the ship. It is further 
understood that the cable from station 213 is loaded twice as much as that to main frame 170. " (US Navy, 1934) 
There is no information on what this 'trolley' is, or how it is 'used', or how the cables are fixed to it, or 
how many men are needed to operate it. Even the distance from the 'docking rails' is an approximate 
value. Furthermore: 
"The lower vertical fin structure is designed for a permissible vertical reaction to the ground (ground reaction) by a cradle or other means, of 4000 pounds. 
... 
Ile control car structure and 
main frame 170 are designed for a permissible ground reaction by a cradle car or other means 
of 1100 pounds. Both ground supports, at the lower fin and at the control car, are assumed to be 
of such construction that they will permit the ship to roll freely 
... 
" (US Navy, 1934) [GC 
emphasis] 
Plainly this is written from the point of view of the airship and the intention was to supply general 
information which would allow the Macon to be used with a variety of different GH systems. Thus the 
specifics of how to use, or in what manner any of this equipment was fashioned, are omitted, and are 
perhaps recorded elsewhere 
- 
hopefully in the US Navy archives? However, here is confirmation of the 
point raised at the end of Section 2.2 that many so-called 'GH manuals' were actually written as an 
adjunct to the airship's certification process and as such, merely help to obscure the fact that there is, in 
reality, a distinct lack of information concerning the GHE and the procedures used by the PGVLAs. 
Commentary on US GH systems 
-ROLAND, (1978) Handling Rigid Airships on the Ground (photocopy of typewritten "... short essay on the subject 
... 
prepared largely from memory by the 
author who, at this late date in life, recalls and records events of the past which might otherwise be lost to postexity. " Registration No. TXU 13-060 (Library of Congress 
- 
Oct 25 1979) 
This unofficial memoir contains much useful information, and on occasion even some illustrations, of the 
techniques and procedures mentioned in the foregoing "Macon" Manual. When read in conjunction with 
130 
it, these 40 pages give some valuable insight into the reasons for, and reasoning behind, the evolution of 
the US GH systems, and, in the introduction, it also emphasiscs the scarcity of similar information. Thus, 
"To the best of my knowledge and belief, these papers constitute the only record of its kind ever 
compiled to cover exclusively a phase of rigid airship operation extending over a period of five 
years. " (Roland, 1978) 
The external forces on an airship structure with special reference to the requirements of rigid 
airship design: R. 38 prize paper 1928. In Joumal of Royal Aeronautical Society XXXIII (225): 
726-811 (Roxbee Cox, 1929) 
This prize-winning paper was the only serious scientific study discovered, in the course of this 
investigation, that dealt specifically with a large airship when it was in a "Moored" state. Although the 
Ground Handling section forms a relatively minor part of this work, it nevertheless represents the 
pinnacle of achievement in terms of quantifiable data and scientific method from the PGVLA era. This 
work is thus highly recommended as a starting point for anyone intent on furthering the science that will 
be necessary to underpin any NGVLA development projects in the future. 
5.43 Summary of previous work on topic 
There is really only one manual for large airships that is of any real value when it comes to the GH for the 
NGVLAs, and it is that which was written by the US Navy for their rigid airship programme in 1927. 
This work is based largely upon Hugo Eckener's experiences with the LZ126 Los Angeles and the earlier 
and smaller LZ120 Bodensee. 
"Our manual handling and landing methods are to a large extent based on those passed down to 
us from German practice where abundance of manpower was always available. " (Rosendahl, 
1927) 
However the original text was written for rigid airships that were filled with hydrogen gas and operated 
by ground crews that consisted of hundreds of subservient and disciplined military personnel. 
Considering that neither hydrogen nor large numbers of people look likely to be available for the first 
NGVLAs, and bearing in mind Netherclift's assertion (as quoted above in Section 2.8) that: "... in the 
1990s wages are no longer reckoned in shillings per week and 
- 
certainlyfor a large airship 
- 
such 
labour intensive methods are no longer economic. Mechanised handling will be essential. " (Netherclift, 
1993: 13) 
... 
it is evident that what is required is an updated version of this "Airshippers' Bible, " a version 
which incorporates the lessons learned by all three of the major large-airship-building nations, in their 
attempts to mechanise the GH processes for the helium-filled giants that were built and flown after 1927, 
and one which properly looks at the processes and problems from a ground based perspective. 
SAA Patents 
A separate area of interest is GH related Patents, and the original intention, at the start of the CLOSHRP 
was to use the abstracts from the British Patent archive as a source of potentially useful GH ideas that had 
perhaps been forgotten or overlooked. However, as the study progressed it was recognised that the full 
text of the patent applications themselves generally contain a great deal of extremely detailed information 
on how equipment was intended to be used, and from this, the actual problem as foreseen or understood 
by the inventor, could sometimes be deduced, and furthermore, other closely related problems were often 
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mentioned in passing. Thus some patents proved to be, not only a source of potentially useful ideas, but 
also on occasion to reveal what did, and, equally importantly, what did not work. 
The only problem was that there is no discrimination within the patent process itself, and the existence of 
an application, or indeed the grant of a full patent, is no guide as to whether the idea was, or was not, a 
realistic or practical proposition. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that even if an idea were to be a 
practical proposition there is no guarantee, if and when it was ever realised, or taken into the field, that 
any particular patented device was actually used in the way its inventor intended. Also, some ideas just 
did not work. This drawback with Patents had also been previously noted in the USA: 
"Patent Office files contain many patents on airship handling equipment. A perusal of these and 
other literature leads to the conviction that there is very little new in regard to airships. However, 
most of the devices that have been proposed are either conceived without regard to the practical 
side of airship handling or are themselves so complicated as to be impractical. 
... 
There is no 
substitute for actual experience in designing and actually trying out various equipment. " (Fulton, 
1929: 55) 
Nevertheless, here, side by side in the British collection there are some extremely good ideas from 
PGVLA experts that are juxtaposed with what amounts to rubbish. Thus the ideas of experts that were felt 
to be so good, or so commercially valuable that they needed protection from competitors, are filed 
alongside, and mixed up with completely unrealistic and unworkable dreams, that have come from 
crackpot inventors, who in many instances seem to have little, if any, idea of how any sort of airship 
works, or who determinedly solve non-existent problems and try on occasion to defy the Laws of Physics. 
Therefore the researcher eally needs to know who was who in the world of airship development, and it is 
only when armed with the names of those who really knew the problems of the PGVLAs, that it is 
possible to see whether a patent is likely to hold information of real value. Moreover, much also depends 
on when, in a particular career, the patent was taken out, and those recorded early in a career, before the 
serious lessons had been learned, will probably be of less value than those that were applied for later on. 
One example of how the detailed information from Patents, when combined with knowing who was who, 
and how the PGVLA development projects were inter-related, can be used to reveal the growth of 
successful ideas, and the eclipse of others, was quoted by the author in the Cambridge Paper in 2002.1 In 
this it was shown that George Herbert Scott, having flown as Captain of the R34 and witnessed at 
firsthand the problems of the, then state-of-the-art, "three-wire mooring systerrf'went on to invent and 
patent a vertical mooring system for large airships using a retractable mast-head (British Patent No. 
178,568). This worked so well, that he was approached by the Americans, who licensed the idea from 
Scott, and installed it on several of their own mooring masts. 
Meanwhile, the eminent Dr Barnes Wallis of Vickers, (later to become designer of the RIOO for 
Commander Denistoun Burney's Airship Guarantee Company) who had far less operational experience 
than Scott, had previously patented a horizontal method of mooring large ships onto masts (British Patent 
No. 131,072). This idea, not only seems to have disappeared shortly after it was patented, but its failure 
I Camplin & Schaefff. 2002 
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was later mentioned in an official memo 
- 
albeit probably one written by one of Wallis's competitors on 
the opposing R101 development team: 
"It will be noted that except for one or two very early patents relating to the original 
unsuccessful Vickers' mooring mast, the dates of Commander Burney's patents are all later than 
those given in the above list. " (Air Ministry (undated): Appendix E) [GC emphasis] 
This illustrates that it is necessary to know not only the names and the career progression dates of the 
individual patent applicants and/or holders, but also something of their employers, and of the political 
situation at the time a patent was claimed, as well as the idea's place in the sequence of events during the 
evolution of the PGVLAs. In this we are fortunate that the number of people who had actual knowledge 
of large airships and who really understood the problems associated with the GH of them is not very 
great. 
'There is but a comparative handful of people in the world today who have first-hand knowledge 
of them [airships]. " (Rosendahl, 1938: 361) 
This means that the task of collecting and compiling a list of knowledgeable persons in whose names 
potentially serious, and thus useful, ideas were Patented is not too demanding. A project to collect all the 
GH Patents held at the British Library for the period from 1900 until 1940 was thus started, by the author, 
as a forerunner of the CLOSHRP. And shortly thereafter, a collection of names was also started, as they 
came to light, with the intention of compiling brief biographies of the 'major players' within the PGVLA 
development projects of Britain, Germany and America. Sadly, both of these projects were left unfinished 
when CL closed in 2002. However, the incomplete lists, such as they are, are included as Appendices to 
this work. (See Appendix G- List of GH Patents and Appendix H- Who was Who) The collection of 
further Patents from other countries where large airship development was known to have taken place, 
such as, Italy, France, Japan and Russia, was also envisaged but never started. 
.............. 
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6 AN OVERVIEWOF AIRSHIP HISTORY AND THE EVOLUTION OF GH 
6.1 The airships and the transfer of technology 
There are man\ bool,,., vhich deal with the history ot airships, A number of them are listed among. the 
References and in the Bibliography at the end of this studv. Thev include: 
" General LTA histories : Delacombe. 1910-, Hylander, 1911. Rolt. 1966.. Hood. 1968-. 
Jackson, R. 197 1 
-. 
Oppel. 1987-. Brooks. 1992, Owen. 1999-. 
" General airship histories : Sprigg. 1932-. Robinson, 1973. Meyer, 1980. Botting. 198 1 
Ventrý & Kolesnik. 1982: Giitschovv. 1985 ý Griehl & Dressel. 1990: Meyer. 1991 
Nlo%N forth. 1991 
-. 
Mowthorpc. 1999: Topping & Brothers. 2001 : 
" Histories of specific airship programmes : Santos-Dumont. 1904. Higharn. 190 1, Masefield. 
1982-. Robinson & Keller, 1982: Chamberlain. 1984-, Morrow, 1987-. Abbott. 1989-. Althoff. 
1990. Shock. 1994-. Robinson. 1994. Mowthorpe. 1995-. Treadwell & Wood. 1999: 
" Histories of individual airship achievements and disasters : Toland 1957b.. Vaeth. 1959*. 
Nobile. 1961 
-. 
McKinty 1972-. Abbott 1973-. Deighton & Schwartzman 1978-. Countryman. 
1982-. Jamison, 1994-, Duggan. 1999-. Botting. 2001 ý 
Memoirs and Biographies Of those with firq hand experience oflarge airships : Pratt. 1920'. 
Lehmann & Nlin2os, 1927, von Buttlar Brandentels. 1931 -. Shute. 1954. Eckener. 1958. 
Meager. I 970ý Niorpurgo. 1972: Williams, 1974ý Dick & Robinson, 1985-. Bentele, 1992-. 
Johnston. 1994. Tittel & Schmidt. 1995-, Meyer, 1998-. 
From these, and other published sources, the author was able to compile a comprehensi \e (but not 
exhaustive) list ofthe dates on which most of the xorld's airships made their first and last flights. (See 
Appendix 1) 
This work enabled a Picture of world-wide airship development to be built up. and charts were then 
produced to show the countries, and the time frarnes xithin \vhich, the main development of the previous 
oenerations of both small and large airships had occurred. For bre\ it\, scmi-ri gids are classed as blimps. 
Rigid airships 
France 1 ship 
U) America 4 ships 
0 
L) Britain 17 ships 
Germany 139 ships 
1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 
Dates of rigid airship operations 
Figure 6.1 
- 
The development of rigid airships 
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Non-rigid "pressure" airships (blimps) 
I 
Others 15 ships 
1 
Germany 9 ships 
 1 
U) Russia 62 ships 
2 
C France 82 ships 
:3 
0 
Italy 98 ships 
Britain 230 ships 
America 395 ships 
1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 
Dates of blimp airship operations 
Figure 6.2 
- 
The development of blinip airships 
These chart,., revealed that in general terms the blimps and the rigid airships had evolved intermittently, in 
most instances separately, and that they were built and operated largely in response to military deniands 
in time ofwar 
- 
note the British First War Blinip programme. The episodic nature ofthe development 
programmes, the proliferation ofairships in time,, of war and the attempts at their -subsequent utilisation 
can be seen from the following two charts. These were produced by simply counting Lip the number of' 
airships reported as being extant at any time \vithin any given year, regardless oftheir true operational 
status. The first chart show- how the US Navy blimps blossomed during the Second World War: 
NUMBER OF US NAVY BLIMPS IN EXISTENCE 
180 
0 160 
a 
!E 140----- 
W A: 120 
100 
0 80 
60 
E 40 
3 
Z 20 
0 
1930 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 
Date 
Figure 6.3 
- 
The number of US Navy blimps in existence 
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While the second chart shows the equally drarnatic numerical increase and the oýerarching dominance of 
the German 'Zeppehns' during the First World War: 
RIGID AIRSHIPS IN EXISTENCE 
100 
90 
80 
70 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
Year 
Figure 6.4 
- 
The number of rigid airships in existence 
However. it is important to keep in mind that this simplistic analytical method does give an artificially 
high impression of the numbers ofairships which were actuallN operational at an\ one time. and that. for 
example. although the German Na% ý did indeed operate 72 airships throughout the course of the 
hostilities in the First World War. the truth is that: 
"The navy had never possessed more than nineteen airships in commission at any one time 
- 
and 
that number only for brief periods in 1916 and 1917. The ý ear that America entered the NN ar saxk' 
a total of 39 airships commissioned. but losses and the constant development which rendered 
many ships obsolete, thereby forcing their retirement from ser\ ice. Kept the naval airship 
strength reduced numerically. - (Lehmann & Mingos. 1927: 300) 
Furthermore. it should also be noted that the numbers of airships -operated" by the various countries can 
never be given precisely due to the fact that airships were on occasion exchanged. or transferred. either 
with the owners' consent. (by means of trade), or without. (as when captured. ) or in payment for war 
reparations. This resulted from. and was also inspired by. the sporadic transference back and forth 
between the development programmes of their 'hardware. ' 'software' and 'wetware. ' (See Section 3.2) 
This information exchange process really began with the success of the Germans and their pre-First War 
blimps, which inevitably led to other governments of the time purchasing. or making arrangements to 
purchase, fully operational airships from Germany. These transactions eventually included both large 
rigid and small non-rigid ships and frequently the ground handling was exported a,, part of the deal. 
Although a fair proportion of these arrangements did not reach fruition. being overtaken bN events, (such 
as declarations of war between former partners), nevertheless in many instances, bases were still 
prepared. and personnel were trained, even though the airship itself never arrived. In addition, the need 
for large numbers of low-skilled ground crew personnel also encouraged the use of local. cheap labour for 
'menial* tasks, which often left behind a reservoir of exploitable knowledge when circumstances changed. 
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0) ::: ý2 ýE, ,- 0) - c-, 'r -- c- co N c) 0000-C, . ,,, ('J 0) C. ) 0) 0, 
DAMERICAN 0 BRITISH 13 GERMAN 
Thus there is a list of counnies that either imported the WCIIIIOIO, "ý' V0111111,161N, 0 - WhCI-C the COMILICI-ing 
German military set tip bases and imposed their GH techniques. and then retreated lem ing, the kno\\ 
-lio\\' 
behind. These third-party countries include 
- 
Denmark, Poland, Russia. BUhIaI-ia, and Belgium, and a 
few later ones from the passenger can-ying era ofthe DELAG such as 
- 
Brazil, Spain. and Japan. Also, the Zý C7 
Americans had bases in the West Indies and Morocco, as did the British in Greece. A few other countries 
also made their own \vay and created their own independent networks ofcontacts and dcpcndcncies: 
*'In the years between 190-5 until 1911 were in Italy 98 airships built and a further 20 were either 
sold or with Italian know-how erected. " (Translated from GUIschow, 1985) 
The Japanese N a\ y, for example. had a total of9 airships. the last of which Nvas dcleted in 1932, and 
several of these were purchased from Italy. The Russians also took great interest in the Italian senii-ri-id 
desi n and imported several airships, along with knowledgeable personnel. including. most fatuously. 9 
General Umberto Nobile. who retreated to the Soviet Union after his public humiliation in Italy following 
the "Italia" tragedy of 1928. 
However, it was in tirne of war that most ofthe technological information Nvas transferred 
- 
sometimes 
when airships were shot down or captured intact. sometimes when they were taken in payment ofwar 
reparations. and occasionally by straightforward theft: 
"It was during this same nionth [April 19131 that a German Army airship ZIV(LZ1o) 
... 
on a 
factory test flight was forced down on a French Army drillfield [at Lune\ illel. The German 
aviators were most hospitably entertained by the gallant soldiers 
... 
But, ofcoursc. Gallic 
sympathy NA'as not without reason. Whilst the Krauts were being, entertained, French experts 
graphed and made drawings ot'as much ofthe equipment, ctc., photo rapidly 4- aboard the ship as 
they could 
... 
how much ofthe material gathered was passed into English liands is uncertain, 
though Bfitish officers were invited to inspect her. - (Higham. 1961: 09/70) 
The French, not only generously shared their ill-gotten information with the British but also passed it oil 
to the Americans, thereby doing much to excite the US military's interest in acquiring, their own airships. 
This led eventually to probably the most famous ofall technology transfers when the formation ofaJoilit- 
venture between the American Goodyear and the German Zeppelin companies resulted in the wholesale 
haernorrhage of knowledge to the USA in the forin ofDr Arnstein and "the twelve apostles" who, in 
1925, were persuaded to transfer their allegiances from Germany and move with their families from (lie 
shores of Lake Konstanz near Friedrichshafen. to the shores ofLake Wind'oot near Akron, Ohio. 
Thus. as was stated in the aforemenlioned report to CargoLifter 
- 
Preliminarv outlinefivground handling 
CL-160 1 (hereinafter the CIL Preliminary Report): 
"Although the evolution of airships. and the advances made. can be viewed more or less as a 
linear. chronological progression. with one leading onto the next, it is more accurate to say that 
the different types co-e\ol\, ed 
- 
with virtually every conceivable hybridisation between thcm 
under-going trial in the various countries concerned. at one (mic or anodier. " 
And there was considerable exchange ofideas : 
"One particular aspect stands out with clarity and significance-, so intense and so constant \vas 
the cross-fertilisation of ideas. in some cases by legitimate and legal exchange and in others by 
espionage, that no part of airship history can be studied in isolation with in adequatc 
comprehension. " (Chamberlain. 1984: xv) 
Caniplin, Bischet & Watson, 1998. 
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The complexity, and the import, of this web of knowledge and intrigue, and the way in which such events 
as war, and the mergers of companies, has affected the evolution of the world's airships, can be better 
understood if the era of their major development is viewed in diagrammatic form. Thus: 
I DATE I Germany I Britain I America I France I Spain I Italy I Russia I Japan 7] 
1900 
1902 
1904 
1906 
1908 
1910 
1912 
1914 
1916 
1918 
1920 
1922 
1924 
1926 
1928 
1930 
1932 
1934 
These transactions (black arrows), involved exchange of information and personnel as well as the airships 
themselves, and, in the process some of these latter came to be owned and operated by more than one 
country in their lifetimes. Whereas a few of the transferred ships had long and eventful careers, flying 
under the flags of their new owners, others were never flown at all. Some were used instead for ground 
crew training, others were dismantled so that details of their construction could be studied and copied, 
while some were just left to decay or broken for scrap. Deciding which country to allocate some of these 
airships to, and their exact dates of operation, is consequently something of a problem. 
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Figure 6.5 
- 
The Transfer of Airship Technology 
Nevertheless, the diagram clearly shows: a) the way that early French enthusiasm later evaporated; b) the 
overarching dominance of Germany as a net exporter of knowledge; c) the late awakening, but seemingly 
insatiable acquisitiveness of America, and d) the pivotal part played by Britain in acting as a go-between. 
However, the focus of this investigation is not with the airships themselves but rather with their GH 
infrastructure and the systems that were used to handle them when they were on the ground. Therefore it 
is necessary to examine briefly the way in which these GH facilities, and the procedures used along with 
them, were first established, and also to understand how they evolved over time. 
6.2 The evolution of GH systems 
As has been shown, GH is an extremely complex subject, and tracing its multifarious facets back to their 
origins is further complicated, not only by the above mentioned interchange and interplay occasioned by 
the transfer of technology between the various countries, but also by the timing of world events. Some 
development programmes arose in time of war and were cloaked in an atmosphere of military secrecy, 
while others flourished openly under civilian regulations in times of peace. Some were run, quite literally, 
in deadly serious competition, whereas others enjoyed a free flow of information, and benefited from a 
spirit of friendly co-operation. Many, were run concurrently, whereas others evolved consecutively with 
one following on from the ruins of another, and while some were founded on purloined reparations 
granted by protocols and treaties, a further few were kick-started by corporate deals, trade agreements and 
goodwill gestures. Consequently, establishing who knew what, and when, and which events triggered 
which innovations in each country, is far from simple, and the drawing of a similar GH version of the 
diagram for the Transfer of Airship Technology 
- 
shown above as Figure 6.5 
- 
is all but impossible. 
Moreover, there is a further problem here, in simply presenting the GH information in a readily 
understandable manner. It is caused to some extent by the quantity of material available, but in large part 
by the three-dimensional nature of the subject. There are, or were, (as shown above in Section SAL) 
some 70+ types of airship, 46 of which may be classed as "large airships" and they evolved in several 
different countries over a period of more than 40 years. It is thus relatively straightforward to trace the 
history of these through time. However, for each and every individual airship there are arguably, (as 
shown in Section 5.3.2, ) some 40 or so, different procedures that may be classed as GH, and even if these 
are reduced to eight categories, as is suggested, there is still (as explained in Section 3.4.3.4. ) an 
information matrix that contains several thousand fields. Conducting a linear narrative to follow each 
procedure as it evolved through time, revealing how it was modified and improved by experience, (or 
adapted to suit each class or airship type, ) and how it was then changed by the events that occurred to 
every individual airship to which it was applied, is clearly impossible within the confines of this study. 
Nevertheless, in a work of this nature, where previous studies of the subject are by implication charged 
with neglect of detail, a thorough and detailed explanation is plainly necessary. Thus, as with the 
definitions given above in Section 5, some way of focussing the investigation has to be found, that will 
reduce the quantity of data to be processed without reducing the quality of the end product. This will be 
examined in a discussion in Section 7. 
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The problem of how to present the GH information (hereinaftererbe Matrix Problenf') was first 
encountered by the author, and his colleagues at CargoLifter, in the autumn of 1998, when, during the 
writing of the CL Preliminary Report, the full scale of the complexity and interwoven nature of the 
subject became apparent. The solution adopted then, was to separate, (in so far as it is possible to 
disentangle them, ) the systems developed by the three major countries involved in the PGVLA 
development 
- 
Germany, Britain and America 
- 
and to deal with these in sequence. In view of the 
success of this method, and for want of any alternative, a similar division and structure will thus also be 
adopted generally throughout this investigation. 
The reasoning behind this decision is that from the collected First and Last Flights (Appendix Ij it can be 
seen that the history of the world's airship development programmes, may fairly conveniently be divided 
into three distinct chronological eras according to the predoniinance of different types of airship. 71bus: 
a) the pre-rigid or "proto-airship" era: 
- 
wherein un-powered free-flying balloons, and a 
succession of small, poorly-propelled, blimp-type craft (closely related to balloons, and most 
of which were civilian-built "one-offs") made what were generally single down-wind flights, 
between 1783 and about 1900; 
b) the rigid airship era (or "golden age" of the airship): 
- 
wherein the large rigid airships co- 
existed, and evolved alongside, a "first wave" of military blimps, (dominated in numerical 
terms, by the intense British First World War programme) and culminated in the impressive 
achievements of the Italian semi-rigids, from 1900 through to 1939; and 
c) the post rigid (or "modem") era 
- 
wherein a "second wave" of military blimps (dominated in 
numbers by the US Navy blimps of the Second World War, ) developed techniques such as 
the "heavy operatione' which were taken up by the modem, and largely civilian owned, 
airships that continue in operation up to the present day, and thus spans from 1940 to 2000+. 
However, from a GH perspective, the golden age really needs to be further divided into two parts, in 
accordance with the predominance of the GH systems that the different types of airship would have used, 
and thus, for the purposes of this investigation these four eras can be identified as : 
1. 
-the proto-airships -small blimps operating as balloons (1783-1899) 
2. 
-the first wave blimps and semi-rigids -pioneering horizontal GH methods (1899-1939) 
3. 
-the rigid airships- developing the vertical GH methods (1899-1939). and 
4. 
-the second wave blimps -perfecting horizontal "heavy operations" (1940-2000+) 
Furthermore, in view of the fact that this study is concerned with the re-discovery of GH systems for 
Iarge" or "very large airships, " and that the methods that were devised for small airships are extremely 
unlikely to be of use to the NGVLA developers, as has been previously shown, ' it is possible to reduce 
the area of interest still further and to concentrate only on those sections within the eras where "large" 
airships were predominant. Thus, application of the "123 metre rule" 
- 
as defined in Section 5.3.1 
- 
reveals that there are really only two areas of serious interest to this study: 
3. 
- 
the rigid airships 
- 
developing the vertical GH methods (1899-1939), and 
4. 
- 
the second wave blimps 
- 
perfecting horizontal "heavy operations" (1940-2000+) 
1 
see Section 2.3 
- 
Scaling up eidsting procedures 
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Moreover, the era of the "large" rigid airships (era 3) can itself be fairly easily further broken down into 
three quite clearly defined separate subdivisions according to the development programmes that took 
place in each of the three major countries concerned: 
3a. 
- 
The Gennan rigid airships (1899-1939) 
3b. 
- 
The British rigid airships (1910-1930) 
3c. 
- 
The American rigid airships (1920-1935) 
In addition to which, it is really only the latter part of the 4h era 
- 
the second wave American Blimp 
programme 
- 
that contains airships large enough to qualify for inclusion in this study; namely that part 
specifically dealing with the non-rigid ZPG-3 W programme. Although this can be said to run roughly 
from 1955 through to 1965, it should be recognised that many of the GH procedures used by the biggest 
blimps were actually established earlier on, in the 1940s, and honed to reliability by small blimp wartime 
operations. This 4h era was ornitted from the original CL Preliminary Report, nevertheless there is much 
of relevance in this work and text from it, with some additions, forms the basis of the next section. 
6.2.1 Analysis of the three major rigid airship GH systems 
In the CL Preliminary Report it was stated that 
- 
"Although our historical research project is not yet complete it has already revealed that the 
inherent complexity of the subject can be reduced in essence to three key mooring methods and 
for simplicity we have chosen to refer to them by their country of origin. They are thus: 
- 
The German System 
- 
whereby the airship descends into the hands of several hundred men 
who simply hold on it for the duration of the landing, or manhandle it onto a low mooring 
mast, or if weather conditions allow, walk it directly into its hangar. 
The British Syste 
- 
whereby the airship is attached by its nose to the top of a tower or high 
mast and is serviced via its nose attachment point while it is allowed to weathervane with the 
wind, and is only taken into its hangar for major overhaul or in extremis. 
The American System 
- 
whereby the airship is captured by motorised "mules" and hauled 
down close to the ground to rest upon a wheeled "dolly" which allows it either to 
weathervane around a fixed "stub" mast, or with tail fin clamped to a "stem handling beam7' 
to be pulled by winches, or driven directly into its hangar, by a self-propelled "Iron Horse" 
running on rails or caterpillar tracks. " 
Having concluded that "the three systems are by no means mutually exclusive, " the report then embarked 
upon a brief tabulated analysis of the major advantages and disadvantages of the three systems. Although 
this analysis does not cover all the aspects of GH subsequently identified by the author, it does help to 
encapsulate many of them and to reveal the difficulty of comparing the numerous ways in which the GH 
tasks have been organised and tackled in the past. Therefore, an amended, updated and expanded version 
of the preliminary analysis is given here. 
6.2.1.1 The German System 1- 
whereby the airship descends into the hands of several hundred men who simply hold on to it by 
means of ropes, cables, lines, handles and/or purpose-built hand-rails, for the duration of the landing. 
Or, who, if weather conditions allow, manhandle it with assistance of rudimentary GHE (i. e. "lauf- 
katzen" or "running-cate') and walk it directly into its "Halle. " Take-off is, in this case, literally the 
reverse of this procedure. The airship is walked out of the shed and thrown into the air. As here: 
Also virtually indistinguishable from the early British and American systems 
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"ThursdaN. 15 August 19229 
... 
The ship [Graf Zcppelin] is readN 
... 
The Hinuncisti-cppe is taken 
away and the passenger door shut 
... 
The restraining sandbags are being removed frorn the 
rails. The great ship 
... 
ho,, ers just aboý. e the han-ar floor. %%eighed off fore gondola's docking tr 
and aft with meticulous exactness 
... 
A little water ballast is spouted out 
... 
to Correct the trim 
one last time, and then the order is given: "Remove supports" The Ground Officer b1oN%. s a sharp 
blast on his %Nhistle. Another order is barked throuý! h a megaphone: '7eppchn. marsch'" It is 
4.25 a. m. The army of ground handlers. two hundred strong. begins to haul the le\ iathan out of 
its hangar. walking the ship forward with quick. rhythmic steps and a stead\. highk co-ordinated 
pull on the handling lines 
... 
Soon the Graf is gliding smoothlý out into the open. onto the take- 
off field 
... 
and then another order is given "Tluc los- 
- 
-ut 2o linesl" The handlins! lines are 
let go, the ship hangs in the air at the height of a man's shoulders. onl\ restrained bý the men 
clinging onto the gondola's rails. 
... 
Another shrill blast on the whistle. hoch'" comes the 
command. "Up ship"' The group of handlers holding the control car b% its docking rails literally 
throw the jiant ship into the air. " (Botting. 2001 : 9) 
ADVANTAGES OF GERMAN SYSTEM Figure 6.7 : LZ 127 prepares for launch 
Minimal infrastructure required on field 
No mast to impact with airship or obstruct other aircraft 
Airfield surface has low maintenancc cost (grass mowing) 
Flexible and adaptable to weather conditions including low level wind shift 
Fewer crew in calm weather cuts costs but requires accurate forecast of'. % ind', 
Airship can be walked over low obstacles and wet ground 
Quick turnaround possible in calm weather 
Minimum strong points required on hull 
- 
saves weight and affects design 
Heavy take-off assisted by crew pushing 
Compatible with all types of visiting airships that carry suitable handling ropes 
Easy access from ground 
DISADVANTAGES OF GERMAN SYSTEM 
Need trained crew pre-assembled on site, rea& and able to work throughout both landing and launch 
Dangerous 
- 
men can and do frequently get injured 
High cost of wages and injury insurance 
Airship does not weathervane of its own accord 
Cannot land in rough weather 
Cannot enter or leave shed in cross wind 
Ground crew can become exhausted if prolonged bad weather pre%ents shed entrý Cannot use with mast system because hull structure not strong enough in the nose 
Difficult to weather a storm 
Ground contact can damage structure during rough weather 
Communication between crew is difficult in bad weather or at night 
Low level Temp inversion can cause problems during landing 
Airship subject to ground turbulence 
Gas and water ballast top-up difficult 
Landing requires valving off gas 
Cargo has to be hand loaded (maybe not today? ) 
Major engine maintenance or structural repair difficult 
Snatch loads on handling line connections (due to gusts) are very difficult to predetermine 
........... 
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Figure 6.6: Undocking with Laufk-atzen 
6.2.1.2 The British System 
hereby the airship is winclied by its nose to the top ol'a tower or high mast and set-\ iced from the 
masa head while it is allowed to \veatlier\ane with the wind. It is onlý taken into a shed f01 major 
o\ erhaul or repair. Take-offfrom the niast is a back\\ ard down wind climb. The svstem \\ as initiall\ 
developed for small blinips in 1917 and later adapted for (he larlger rigid ships that Followed. 
Viz.: 
"... Extended trials under service conditions with S. S. Airships moored to one ofthese masts 
were made at Pulliam Airship Station. The Sý'Steln P1-OVCd to be 
. 
111 UlIqUalificd success. Airships 
have since been moored out in all kinds ol'sumnicr and winter vAcathcr. includim, \\inds Lip to 55 
miles per hour and heavy snow and thunderstorms. 
... 
Following on the Successful results I with 
blimps] 
... 
the Vickers patent landing and mooring gear was designed to enable Ia rigid 
airship to land and remain moored in the open air for extended periods in aný state oftlic 
weather without the use of sheds and large handling parties 
... 
mooring and release are entirely 
mechanical, requiring the services ofbut a few men 
... 
1110VeMC11tS 0 1111LI frOul the 111001-CLI 
are made entirely under cover [via tower elevator and covered walk-way I and 
... 
release ofa 
ship is a matter of seconds only, as compared with the niuch longer process ol'bringing a ship 
out of a shed. " (Pratt. 1920) 
EI. n, toout L St), 
ADVANTAGES OF BRITISH SYSTEM 
No ground contact 
Minimal number of groundcre%A, needed (e. g. 12) 
Airship accessible from mast even in worst weathcr 
Fewer ropes and handling lines 
Airship can be captured in strong wind 
Airship can fly away in strong wind 
Airship maybe above level oflowest temperature inversions 
Air-hip free to sle%k, sideways or rotate fast 
Minimal airfield maintenance (grass niowinu) 
Minimal stress on airship hull (loads are primarily longitudinal tension) 
Re-fuelling and ballasting can be quick via masthead pumps 
Easy to monitor weight of people and equipment on board 
Security assisted by restricted access 
Moored airship can withstand gale force winds (e. g. RIO] survived 83 niph gust) Cý 
- 
DISADVANTAGES OF BRITISH SYSTEM 
Restricted access via nose cone walkway' limits quick turn around 
Major engine maintenance difficult from outside 
Airship inmt be flown at all times (i. e. qualified aircrew on board 24 lirs a dav) 
Airship needs constant ad ustment ol'ballast to counter evcr-chariging ambient weather condifions J I- Drag weights endanger groundcrew 
Mooring difficult in unstable air and airship niaý "kite" (i. e. Los Angeles headstand manoeUvre) 
Tower infrastructure and construction expensive 
Tower cannot readily be moved from site to site (unless mounted on a ship at sea) 
Snow or hail or heavy rain can ground the tail 
Tower is an obstacle to other aircraft even when not in use 
Shed entry/exit still depends on manpower 
Mast connection requires compatibility with visiting airships 
........... 
Restricted access niaý now haýe become a positive advantage in a world threatened b\ tenotists intent on planfing hombs 
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Figure 6.9 : Nlechanics of Mast Head 
(Masefield, 19821: 344) 
Figure 6.8 : The High Mast at Cardington 
6.2.1.3 The American S-., stem 
ý\ hereby the airship is captured and held close to the around bý mechanised mean,,. such as 
motmised "mules. " then coupled to a "stub" mast and a xN heeled -dollý - or -stern-beam. - These then 
allow the "low-moored" airship to either ýýeathervane around the mast with its tail held b\ the rail- 
mounted bearn or, to be moved directlý into its shed. by a self-propelled Iron Horse" (niobile mast) 
running on rails. or caterpillar tracks. Take-off is vertical and requires either positi,. e buoý, anc%. or 
vectored thrust. Note that mechanisation creates a lexicon of new terms. and the use of machinerý 
increases complexitý ot'procedures: 
"The problem of holding and moving the huge but relatively fragile ship [Akron I in strong 
crosswinds. dictated a system which travelled on rails. Consequentl\ the old docking rails and 
trolley slots were replaced by tracks for a 
... 
mobile mast \kith a rectangular base riding on four 
railroad trucks. 
... 
In the new system, Akron's lower fin rested on an eiEhtý 
-fi,, e-ton stem beam 
or -Bolster beam, " 
... 
Attached by a bridle arrangement to reinforced points on the Akron. the 
beam resembled a very long flatcar which travelled broadside with the ship 
... 
The rail mast and 
beam undocked Akron to a -hauling up circle" 
... 
[and] when the mast reached its center the 
beam was transferred from the hangar's tracks to those of the circle. A small locomotive then 
towed the beam around until Akroii was parallel to the wind. The beam \ý as removed and the 
airship (usually) pulled by the mast to the centre of a "mooring out circle- farther out for take- 
off. a taxi wheel substituting for the bumper on the lower fin. The scheme 
... 
eliminated the 
small army formerlý required on the ground, and it provided securitý against se\ere side loads in 
high winds. " (Althoff, 1990 : 92) 
Figure 6.10: Macon on mobile mooring mast 
ADVANTAGES OF AMERICAN SYSTEM 
Reduced number of ground crew 
Airship easily accessible at all times 
Major engine maintenance simple 
Can enter and exit hangar in strong wind and cross-winds 
Quick turnaround easy in good weather 
Re-fuelling via pumps 
Gas and water top-up easý, 
No need for drag weights 
Mobile GHE mean,, no obstruction to other aircraft when not in use 
DISADVANTAGES OF AMERICAN SYSTEM 
Puts a lot of stress into airship hull and fins (i. e. adds weight to basic structure) 
When landing airship is vulnerable to ground impact until stem beam is attached 
Communication with vehicle drivers difficult (not so true todav) 
High initial cost of rail and track laying. also specialised vehicles 
- 
Iron Horse, mules. winches, etc 
High cost of maintenance (GHE and airfield/trackway) 
Noise from GHE engines makes verbal communication no longer possible 
Capture and take-off difficult in strong wind 
Temperature inversions and low level wind-shifts can cause serious problems 
Dependent on closely co-ordinated or synchronised movements of large and heavý vehicles 
Light take-off requirement diminishes operational capability by reducing initial payload 
Multiple access complicates monitoring of people and equipment weight on board 
Increased risk of stowaways and sabotage 
Mechanical breakdown of small components can have catastrophic effects 
Subject to all railway type failures such as de-railed wheels. icing. loss of traction and frozen points 
Large vehicles and machinery can cause injuries to crew 
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Figure 6.11 : The Lakehurst hauling-up circle 
6.2.1.4 Summary of the Three CH Systems 
In their sunimino Lip of the original version ofthis sonieMiat simplistic analysis of large rigid airship GH 
and mooring svstenis, in the CIL Preliminary Report, the author and his colleagues concluded that: 
"As can be seen the result is not at all clear cut. There I,., no universally accepted Nva), of' jiloorilqg 
very large airships that can be guaranteed to work in all wcathers. FLI1111CI-11101-C 0111- research haS 
shown that the svstenis in all three countries were undergoing a process of' almost franticall\ 
rapid evolution when they were sonicMiat abruptly terminated by the tragic in(] much publicised 
crashes of their respective prototype.,,. (British "RIO]" in 1930ý American "Macem" in 1933-, 
German "Hindenbur " in 1937. ) Thei " questions remaining, g -c are therefore many tantalising 
which have been left hanain- unanswered in the air since the demise oftlic rigid airships. - 
(Camplin, Bischet & Watson, 1998) 
Moreover, the problem facing the NGVLAs. especially for those whose declared purpose is to offer the 
facilitv of carrving cargo, or heavyweight freight commercially, and ofcompctins-, cost 
-effecti N, cl\ in the 
hi. ghly competitive. financially constrained and environmentally sensitive world ofmodern transport. is 
that thev will require to use as the very basis of their operations. a system that is significantly different 
front, and more advanced than. any of the three outlined above. This can be seen ifthe three systems are 
reduced to their fundamentals and the component procedures are placed in sequence. and these are then 
compared \vith the sort of system foreseen as necessary for ail inter-continental CargoLifler-type VLA. 
Comparison of the four GH Systems 
The "old" German Halle based sequence 
Load 
- 
replenish 
-undock - launch - capture - redock- - unload - replenish - reload - &c. 
The newer British high mast sequence 
Undock 
- 
walk across airfield 
- 
capture/transfer to mast 
- 
moor 
Load 
- 
replenish 
- 
launch 
- 
capture 
- 
moor 
- 
unload 
- 
load 
- 
replenish 
- 
launch 
- 
&c. 
Moor 
- 
launch to groundcrew for walking across airfield 
- 
Redock 
The final American low-mast system 
Moor in shed 
- 
undock 
- 
moor on field 
Load 
- 
replenish 
- 
launch 
- 
capture 
- 
moor on field 
- 
unload 
- 
load 
- 
replenish 
- 
launch 
- 
&c. 
Moor on field 
- 
redock 
- 
moor in shed 
Future theoretical system predicated by Cargol-ifter 
Moor in shed 
- 
undock 
- 
moor on field 
Load 
- 
replenish 
- 
launch 
Mid-air replenish 
- 
mid-air unload 
- 
mid-air reload 
- 
mid-air replenish 
- 
mid-air unload 
- 
&c. 
Capture 
- 
moor on field 
- 
redock 
- 
moor in shed 
The differences are perhaps clearer and more easily understood when viewed in diagrammatic form 
(overleaf). However. while this division of the subject into the three identifiabiv different systems as Iried 
and tested by the PGVLAs does much to help encapsulate the extent ofthe GH problem, and to force 
sorne order onto its complexity, it must be cmphasised that the foregoing represents only it snap-shot of 
these systerns, moreover, it is one that is taken at the end oftheir respective sub-divided era, as identified 
at the start ofthis section. Consequently it does nothing to reveal the beginnings ofthese systerns, not- tile 
subsequent evolution of their respective infrastructures and the actual GH procedures that were developed 
for the PGVLAs. and indeed for all the other types and sizes of airships in the other eras. 
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63 The origins of airship GH procedures 
In general, the earliest balloons, both gas and hot air, were inflated, flown and cleared away after they had 
landed, all within a 24 hour period. The same was true for the earliest airships and things stayed pretty 
much like this for the next hundred years, with only the preparation and assembly of the various devices 
taking ever longer, as the complexity of their structures increased. In general terms too, the ground crews 
of these early flying machines, both balloons and airships, were really comprised of two differently 
skilled groups 
- 
specialists in inflation and a chase crew. Although there was little to distinguish either of 
them from those who handled any of the free flying LTA craft throughout this period, in an unexpected 
branch of the science, there was official recognition of the "profession" surprisingly early on. 
From the very beginning there had been a tendency with many gas balloons, due to the unreliability of the 
gas production methods, towards inflation on one day and flight on the next. Also, on occasion, when the 
weather was fine, and the landing was gentle, the flights of these early balloons might be continued into a 
second or even a third day, (and this was particularly so after more than a century of development and 
experience, )' but generally balloons in the first era of LTA flight were not kept inflated for protracted 
periods. 
There was however, one exception 
-a group of people who had the incentive, and thus the desire, to 
increase the longevity of their balloons and, as was pre-requisite for all airships, to keep them inflated for 
several days or preferably weeks. These were the military, who pioneered the use of observation balloons 
in time of war. The first of these on record was built by Jean Marie-Joseph Coutelle for the French Armed 
Forces of the Revolution, barely ten years after the very first Montgolfiere ascent: 
"... the balloon 
... 
was called the "Entreprenant' '... The bag was made of silk 
... 
impregnated 
with varnish said to be so impermeable that after two month's inflation the balloon would retain 
most of its lifting power... " (Stehling & Beller, 1962: 36) 
It was handled by the world's first "professional" ground crew. Their composition already showing early 
signs of the breadth of talents and skills that would be required by those who, in later years, would choose 
to follow in their footsteps and devote themselves to the care and preparation of buoyant aircraft. 
"On April 2,1794, the first air corps in the history of the world was formed. It was known as the 
PremWe Compagnie dAirostiers 
... 
There were twenty-five men in the corps, each being 
selected because he was experienced in some form of artisanry useful to the aerial mission. 
There were masons for laying furnace brick, carpenters for making and keeping the basket in 
repair, and chemists to regulate the gas-generating system and to test the varnishes used on the 
bag. To help with the riggings, two fishermen were recruited 
... 
" (Stehling & Beller, 1962: 37) 
Although many of these particular and peculiar talents have now fallen into disuse among modem ground 
crews, they serve to demonstrate the point made previously that a large part of ground crew training is 
specific to the actual aircraft the crew will handle. (As in all things associated with airship GH 
- 
the devil 
is in the detail. ) However, other of these very early methods were, and still are, universally applicable and 
some have scarcely changed at all in the intervening centuries. For example the rope-grabbing ground 
crews of today's modem blimps will have much affinity with this description: 
An excellent first-hand account of such an overnight stop with a free-fl*g gas balloon appears in Hardy, 1986: 62-66. 
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"Sixteen ropes hung from the "Entreprenant 'I the ends in the hands of the Airostiers. The men 
leaned ladders against the stone wall, cli; 
ý; d them, and jumped down and waded through the 
ditch onto the outer bark Wet from the high humidity of the summer night, slimy from their dip 
in the water, plagued by the mosquitoes spawned in the stagnant liquid, they towed their 
machine across the field. " (Stehling & Beller, 1962: 46) 
And not a lot had changed 67 years later, in the American Civil War, when John Wise undertook to 
provide a similar observation balloon to assist the Union Army with its advance into Virginia in 1861: 
"A detail of twenty men and their officer emerged at two o*clock Sunday morning from the 
Columbian Armoury, where the balloon had been inflatedL Overhead, the aerostat danced in the 
light breeze. The men jockeyed the mooring ropes to coax the huge machine past telegraph poles 
and wires lining Pennsylvania Avenue. A bright moon outlined the detail*s way through 
Georgetown and across the Aqueduct Bridge, which spanned the Potomac River. When they 
reached the Virginia Shore, the men began following the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal. Their path 
was narrow, heavily arched by overgrown shrubs and tree branches. Soldiers hacked the way 
clear so that the balloon could move on. Occasionally, the growth became too thick 
... 
Then the 
men took to the water, sometimes wading, sometimes swimming. with the ends of the mooring 
ropes tied to their waists. " (Stehling & Beller, 1962: 71/2) 
Furthermore, some 55 years later again, in the middle of the First War, almost identical procedures were 
still acceptable, in extremis, for a large German rigid airship - even with an entirely ad hoc ground crew: 
"So our forced landing [of the L6 in a wood at night] had turned out fairly successfully after all 
... 
I tried to find out what would be our best way on foot back to the landing ground [at 
Nordholz]. 
... 
I wanted 
... 
some opening between the village and the wood through which I 
could pass with my ship in tow. 
... 
all the crowd that had gathered together 
- 
Men, women and 
above all the schoolchildren 
... 
were distributed over the various handling lines, and each group 
was taken charge of by one of my crew. And thus we set off in the direction of the airship base, 
which was about a mile and a half away. When we had gone half-way we saw innumerable little 
lights approaching us through the wood. 'Mey were the ground staff from the landing ground 
... 
coming to meet us 
... 
They took over the transport of the airship 
... 
[and when] we came across 
the first obstacles to our progress along the road 
... 
a coil of handling guys was drawn up into 
the ship, dropped down from the bows on the farther side of the telegraph wires, and seized by 
the men, whereupon the same process was repeated at the stem. 
... 
As soon as we were out of 
the wood the wind began to blow very much harder 
... 
So we decided to send a party on ahead, 
who 
... 
sawed down the telegraph posts and laid the wires on the ground 
... 
Our main concern 
was to get the ship back into the shed. By 1.30 a. m. this had been accomplished (Von 
Buttlar Brandenfels, 1931: 83/5) 
From this it can be seen that, in LTA GH, if a simple procedure works adequately then there is really 
nothing to force a change to it, or in other words, as the saying goes -if it ain't broke don't fix it. " 
Consequently, and interestingly, the corollary to this, is that GH procedures, which supersede those that 
are intuitive, or plain common sense, (such as pulling LTA craft around with ropesj are only going to be 
devised in direct response to occasions when things have gone seriously wrong 
- 
i. e. after there has been 
an accident. 
So, in contrast to the largely performance-driven development, and incremental improvements of the 
airsl-ýips themselves, the evolution of their GH, has in the past been driven, almost exclusively, by 
accidents and disasters. This is of profound importance to this investigation because it provides an 
opportunity for some of the PGVLA GH procedures to be studied in detail. 
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63.1 Accidents and incidents 
In the normal course of events, it is true to say that nothing gets written down if it is considered "normal" 
or simply common knowledge. Thus, a mediaeval scholar, plucked from his time and placed in a modem 
dwelling, would be hard put to find any literature within it explaining in simple terms, how he could 
activate any means of illuminating the room. Everyone today knows what a light-switch looks like and 
where one is likely to be found. Who needs written instructions? 
Similarly with the historical records concerning the PGVLAs, and particularly with their GH procedures. 
Nobody wrote down what was known to everyone around them as common knowledge, because there 
was simply no point. However, there were two exceptions - handbooks (i. e. instruction manuals 
specifically intended to pass on knowledge to future generations of students) and, records of exceptional 
events wherein the norm was departed from, and where there were perhaps lessons to be learned that 
could save either time, or money, or peoples lives and limbs (i. e. accidents). Thus, both of these would 
seem to be vitally useful for this investigation, and would indeed be so, apart from the fact, (as explained 
above in Section 5A. 2 
-Airship GH manuals, ) that there is not a great deal of GH information available 
in the surviving manuals simply because so many of the experts who should have written them were 
killed before they could complete the task. As a consequence, reports of extreme and unusual events (i. e. 
accidents and incidents) wherein the common GH knowledge was invariably written down, assume a 
great significance as a potential resource for this study. 
Indeed, careful reading of the records stemming from the subsequent accident investigations, official 
inquiries, and the like, that were produced in response to the many unplanned events that befell previous 
generations of airships, makes it possible to glean much of the day to day procedures that were in use, as 
they were applied or employed at the time to deal with these events. They also detail something of the 
manner by which these methods were confronted, and perhaps confounded by the incidents that arose, 
and therefore reveal the driving force or reasoning beliind any GH "improvements" that resulted from 
them. However, before searching out specific reports for the CLOSHRP, the author found that it was 
necessary to know where, and more importantly when, the major accidents with which such writings were 
likely to be associated, had actually occurred. By reference to the same history books listed above as 
sources for Appendix 1, it was possible to compile a further comprehensive list of the major accidents 
and minor incidents that befell the airships of the past. (See Appendix J- Accidents and incidents) 
This list was by no means exhaustive, but as can be seen, it is extensive because there were a great many 
accidents. However, classification of these is again something of a problem largely because perception of 
what constitutes an 'accident' has changed considerably over the years. Events which would undoubtedly 
cause chaos today were taken as commonplace and quite acceptable in the past. For example, if Von 
Buttlar were to start chopping down telegraph poles today, in order to get his ship back to it's shed, it is 
extremely improbable that he could do so without attracting the attention of the local 'accident and 
emergency services. ' 
Just how such an event would be recorded today, and passed on to future researchers by the media and 
statisticians alike, is debatable. Suffice it to say that this incident, recorded as an anecdote in Von 
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Buttlar's memoir, was not classed as an 'accident' in his time. Nevertheless, he did write it down in some 
detail, and without this record future generations could easily believe, wrongly, that despite its obvious 
simplicity, such an inherently dangerous procedure could not succeed and was thus never done. Therefore 
there was a requirement for unusual GH events and relatively minor incidents of a similar nature that 
were recorded to be collected, and an example of these is given in Appendix K- Unassisted landings. 
Furthermore, information concerning the bases themselves was also collected and this is given in 
Appendix L- The airship bases. From this, and the compilations in Appendices I&J, a list of events 
can be extracted that with hindsight, seem to have been influential in the evolution of GH, and from this 
an overview of the way in which the GH infrastructure developed by the PGVLAs can be derived. 
6.4 The evolution of GH infrastructure 
[NB 
- 
The amount of computer memory required by the large number of illustrations in Section 6.4, has 
necessitated their removal to 
- 
Appendix M: GH infrastructure illustrations] 
In the conventional view of airship history, it is usual to dismiss as largely irrelevant, all the early 
pioneering attempts at dirigible flight 
- 
i. e. "Era I" prior to the appearance of Santos Dumont in the late 
1890s 
- 
on the grounds that there was insufficient propulsive thrust available to make the concept viable. 
However, from a ground based perspective things are rather different, and there are a number of 
important events which occurred within this "proto-airship" era that are deserving of note and inspection. 
It is true, that virtually all of the very early small blimps that took to the air between 1783 and 1899 were 
little more than one-day wonders, and in GH terms they were handled much as the free-flying balloons of 
their day 
- 
i. e. they were inflated in the open air, and dismantled when, and wherever, they landed. It is 
also true that a majority of these contraptions, never flew a second time. and in this they followed a 
tradition begun by the Montgolfier Brothers, whose fragile "smoke" balloons were usually damaged 
beyond repair by the impact of their first landing. 
"Heretofore [189911 had emptied the balloon of all its gas at the end of each trip, as one is bound 
to do with spherical balloons. Now I saw very different possibilities for dirigibles. 
... 
my 'No. 3' 
had lost so little gas (or, perhaps none at all) at the end of its first long trip that I could well have 
housed it overnight and gone out again in it the next day. " (Santos-Dumont, 1904: 126) 
However, closer examination of the method devised in 1783 for inflating the world's very first man- 
carrying balloon, reveals that it bears a remarkable degree of similarity to that used for the last and largest 
of the big rigid airships in 1938; 1 and even to that used by today's modem bhmps. 2 Therefore, although 
'inflation' was adjudged, in Section 5.3.2, to be one of the tasks that might safely be excluded from those 
allotted to the overburdened ground crew, in this instance, in order to find the origins of airship GH, and 
to understand how the infrastructure for it developed, it is necessary to take a brief excursion into the 
early history of ballooning and to look at how the very first of their kind were inflated. 
I LZI30 Graf Zeppelin 11 
2 Far detailed breakdown of these procedures see Appendix D- US Navy K type blimps 
- 
inflation sequence 
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6.4.1 Evolution of the airship shed 
The first balloons, built by Joseph Montgolfier at Annonay, in France, in the summer of 1782, were 
simply paper bags. These were held upside down over a fire, until they filled with smoke, whereupon they 
were released. However, the succession of the ever larger "Montgolfieres" that Joseph and his brother 
Etienne went on to build throughout the following year, (culminating in the first, manned, free-flight from 
Paris by de Rozier & dArlandes, on 21"' November 1783) were much more complicated devices. They 
were still constructed of paper, but now in sheets stuck onto canvas, and these strengthened panels were 
then buttoned onto a gigantic framework of bamboo poles. Thus, the first problem that the brothers faced 
was how to keep the highly combustible balloon away from the heat of the fire while persuading the 
inherently unrestrainable and freely ascending lift agent 
- 
heat, or as they believed at the time, smoke 
- 
to 
enter into the chamber prepared for it. 
Their solution, to what was essentially the world*s first GH problem, was to hold the balloon above, and 
away from, the fire by building it (the balloon) on top of a raised dais. This solution, of raising the body 
of the balloon higher than the supply point of its lifting agent, was universally adopted by the succeeding 
generations of would-be LTA flyers, and it appeared to be the only viable solution at least until the advent 
of pressurised gas in portable cylinders a hundred years later on. 
However, while the Montgolfier Brothers' raised platform did protect the balloon from the fire 
- 
safely 
down on the ground below 
- 
and conveniently acted as a wind shield that helped to stop the smoke from 
blowing sideways, unfortunately, thus elevating the balloon also created and exacerbated a second GH 
problem. This was how to stop the enormous, fragile and progressively more buoyant structure from itself 
being blown sideways by the wind before the inflation was complete. 
The Montgolfier Brothers' solution to this second problem was to anchor the top (or "crown") of their 
balloon by means of a rope strung like a washing line between two upright poles. These can be seen on 
either side of the raised dais, beneath the ascending balloon in Figure 6.13 (See Appendix M). This 
system too became an accepted norm for the inflation of balloons in general and was soon to be seen in 
use by other pioneer aeronauts at subsequent smoke balloon ascents elsewhere 
- 
see Figure 6.14. 
So, from the very dawn of LTA flight, there were found to be three fundamental GH requirements. 
0 Firstly, a means to counteract or negate the effects of the wind. 
0 Secondly, a suspension system to support, or even take the entire weight of, the "empty" 
structure, prior to and during its assemblylinflation. 
And, thirdly, some means of gaining access to the underside of the structure to enable 
control of the incoming lift agent and attachment of the payload impedimenta 
- 
gondola &c. 
Of even greater import for the history of GH, within days of the first manned free-flight, by a smoke. 
filled Montgolfiere, the generic nature of these three fundamental requirements was reinforced by the first 
free flight of a gas-filled balloon. Although this device was of an entirely different construction, and 
operated on a completely different lift principle, its GH requirements soon proved to be identical to those 
of its predecessor. 
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On the V of December 1783 Professor Jacques Charles took off from the Tuileries in the world's first 
hydrogen-filled gas balloon. In contrast to the paper Montgolfiere, the "Charliere" gasbag was made of 
silk panels that were sewn together and made gas-tight with a coat of lacquer. This "envelope" was 
encased in a net of knotted cord and from this was suspended a wickerwork "gondoW' that carried the 
pilots and their ballast bags full of sand. These latter, used in conjunction with a simple cord-pull valve at 
the top of the balloon, were the means by which the device was operated, and allowed the pilots, by 
venting gas (lift) or ejecting sand (weight), to establish, and then to precisely balance a state of 
"equilibrium" between the quantity of lift agent and the payload weight suspended from it. This was in 
contrast to the Montgolfieres, wherein, the pilot, by increase or decrease of beat, could directly, albeit 
crudely, adjust the density of the lift agent itself, leaving the payload weight unchanged - save for the 
coincidentally beneficial diminution-by-consumption of the onboard fuel. 
The superior nature of the gas balloon, both in flight and in its GH, was apparent almost from the start 
and sandbags with a net, were soon to take over the role of anchoring and controlling the inflation of gas 
balloons the world over. Indeed they remained as a vital part of all gas balloon ascents for the next 200 
years and are still used in modem blimp inflations. However, initially the washing line method as 
described here was preferred (see Figure 6.15). 
"In order to facilitate the entrance of the gas into the balloon two long poles are erected. These 
are furnished with pulleys, through which a rope, attached also to a ring at the top of the balloon, 
passes. By means of this contrivance the balloon can be at once lightly raised from the ground. 
and the gas tubes easily joined to it. When it is half full it is no longer necessary to suspend the 
balloon; on the contrary, it has to be secured, lest it should fly off. " (Marion, 1870: 26) 
On the P of December 1783, just two days after Professor Charles' very first gas balloon ascent, a 
distinguished French engineer (Lieutenant Jean Baptiste Marie Meusnier) presented a paper to the 
Acad6mie des Sciences in Paris. His Memorie sur 1'equilibre des Machines Aerostatiques suggested the 
idea of using an air-filled 'ballonet' to control the pressure of the gas within the balloon envelope, and six 
months later, the world's very first airship was fitted with one and made its debut. 
"At his [Meusnier's] suggestion a ballonet was used in the first elongated balloon ever to take 
the air. This venture was promoted by the Duc de Chartres in 1784 and the balloon, 52 ft long, 
32 ft deep and 30,000 cubic ft capacity was built by [Prof. Jacques] Charles and the brothers 
Robert. It was intended to be dirigible (i. e. steerable), 
... 
but the method of propulsion was so 
completelZ ineffective that it scarcely merits the term. 
... 
This machine took off from St Cloud 
on the 15 July 
... 
[and landed]... near the Chalais Meudon: ' (Rolt, 1966) 
The method by which this first airship was inflated is not known but it seems likely to have been similar 
to that used for the spherical balloons of its day, especially as the upright poles are still clearly in 
evidence later on, at gas balloon ascents that were made elsewhere as the novelty of aerial-ascending 
devices spread to other countries (see Figure 6.16). Indeed, as time passed, so it appears that the system 
was refined and that at least in England in 1785, the number of poles was actually increased for a short 
while, as evidenced by Figure 6.17 
- 
Mr Arnold's ascent. 
While little is known of the GH procedures involved in the inflation of Mr Arnold's gas balloon, much 
can be gleaned from an exceedingly detailed sketch that was made of the arrangements for the ascent of 
his immediate predecessor, Vincent Lunardi, whose second balloon had been inflated and prepared at the 
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exact same site in London, a few months previously. Close study of this drawing 1 (Figure 6.18) reveals 
evidence of equipment that was designed to deal with all three of the basic GH requirements. Taking 
them in order, firstly, it can be seen that there are three vertical poles or "masts" on either side and behind 
the balloon, and that these have fabric "sails" strung between them. These sails are billowing in the wind 
and this reveals that, whatever their true function, they must have acted to some extent as a wind screen 
for the envelope during inflation, and thereby fulfilled the first of the three fundamental GH requirements. 
With regard to the second requirement, the balloon appears to be full, and the top of the picture is 
cropped. This unfortunately makes it impossible to see if the empty envelope had been initially suspended 
in some way. But, at the top of the picture, there is the suggestion of angled beams that are pointing 
upwards, and not only could these easily meet in the middle to form some sort "sheerlegs" or elevated 
anchor point, but there seems little reason for their existence otherwise. Moreover, it is undoubtedly clear 
that during the gassing-up process, the balloon, in switching from needing support to needing restraint, 
has been inflated within a large mesh net, and that this is now anchored down with the numerous weights 
that are to be seen standing atop the raised platform. 
Thirdly, the fact that Lunardi's balloon has been inflated on a raised platform reinforces the point that he 
had foreseen a requirement for space beneath the gasbag to allow access for its connection to the gas 
production equipment (the large wooden casks). In addition to which it is evident that a second reason for 
raising the gas balloon has now also been found. The platform is set at such a height that when the 
balloon is fully inflated, the ornate passenger-carrying ondola, seen situated off to the left-hand side, can 
be easily carried in underneath and attached to the net in preparation for the ascent. 
But, there is evidence that a fourth fundamental requirement has also been identified. There appears to be 
a high fence surrounding the whole site. The function of this, presumably, is to protect both the balloon, 
and those "ground crew" conducting the inflation of it, from the crowds of excited spectators whom, it 
can be safely assumed were massing outside. Hoards of people are a feature at nearly all early balloon 
ascents, and they dominate many depictions of them, as in Figure 6.17, when Mr Arnold flew from the 
same site in the same year. Indeed, it should be noted that many of the very early attempted balloon 
inflations became the scenes of some very serious riots when large crowds of onlookers, many of whom 
had paid to witness the spectacle, were frustrated by the failure of the balloon to ascend as promised. 2 
Crowd control was thus established as an essential part of GH from the outset and Lunardi's fence reveals 
that by mid-1785, the need for protection from curious onlookers had been identified as such a serious 
GH problem that was worthy of a considerable financial investment in infrastructure. 
Furthermore, there is also to be seen, in the right-hand foreground of the Lunardi picture, the base of a 
fourth upright pole that appears to have been tipped backwards away from the balloon and out of the 
picture 
- 
perhaps to make way for the gondola connection? Whatever the reason, it is apparent that what 
had actually been erected, prior to the balloon inflation, was a four-sided, combinadon-wind-and-people- 
screen, that both protected the gasbag from the weather and prevented the hoi polloi from seeing 
I Rolt, 1966: 97 "Inflation of Lunardi' second balloon in St George's Fields, 1785" 
2 Prior to Lunardi's ascent both Tyder in Edinburgh, and Chevalier de Moret in London. had caused riots and others had come close. 
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prematurely what others perhaps had paid to see. Taken in conjunction with the fence, this screen 
structure can be seen as a rudimentary, and temporary hangar, and as shown in Figure 6.12, this was 
indeed the next step in the evolution of LTA GH infrastructure. However, with equipment designed to 
address all four elements of the fundamental GH requirements, Lunardi's system may lay claim to be the 
progenitor of all subsequent airship inflation systems 
- 
up to and including the largest of the PGVLAs- 
The truth of this can be traced pictorially (Appendix M), and the same four fundamental systems: 
a) a roof and screens (or hangar walls) to provide protection from the weather, 
b) secure perimeter walls and doors for protection from people, 
C) suspension systems (or roof cranes) to assist with assembly/preparation by support of 
the empty or partially buoyant gas chamber, and 
d) a raised platform to allow access to the underside of the vessel and facilitate attachment 
and control of gas and ballast, 
can all be seen in use, unchanged in their essentials, in photographs of airships that were taken more than 
one hundred years after the preparations for Lunardi's balloon flight were sketched, (Figures 6.28; 6.31; 
6.34). Indeed, these same solutions to the fundamental requirements can be seen throughout the PGVLA 
era and derivatives of them are still in use by modem balloons and blimps (Figures 6.21; 6.30; 6.36). 
Part of the reason for the seminal nature of Lunardi's system, as it was sketched4 lies with the fact that 
this, his third gas balloon inflation, was early enough in the infancy of LTA flight for the major problems 
to have been identified, but too soon for divergent solutions, or separate mitigation strategies to have 
taken effect. He is thus effectively using a smoke-balloon inflation technique to inflate a gas balloon, and 
here it should be recognised, that in terms of their GH, the rigid airships 
- 
have much more in common 
with the Montgolfiere smoke-balloons than they do with either blimps or gas balloons. T7his stems from 
the previously unremarked fact that while "airshipe' are conventionally categorised by their structural 
type 
- 
i. e. "rigid, " "semi-rigid7' or "non-ngiV 
- 
"balloone' are defined, either according to their lifting- 
medium 
- 
i. e. "hot air, " "gas" or "Roziere"l 
- 
or by their purpose 
- 
i. e. "free-flyingl" "tethered, " and 
"passenger-carrying: ' &c. Interestingly, the application of the airship categories onto balloons reveals a 
very simple reason for this; all the balloons built since the demise of the Montgolfieres have been of only 
one structural type 
- 
i. e. "non-rigid. " The concept of a rigid free-flying balloon died with the 
Montgolfieres and the overarching supremacy of their non-rigid gas-filled rivals thereafter, not only 
eclipsed their achievements but also removed any need for differentiation by structural description. 
The significance of this one-sided dominance is that the complete absence from history of any rigid aerial 
vehicles, for a period roughly from 1789 to 1899, meant that while techniques for inflating, moving and 
mooring the non-rigid gas balloons were tried, tested and honed to perfection, (most frequently in time of 
war, ) (see Figures 6.13; 6.15; 6.16; 6.18; 6.20), the parallel procedures for the rigid craft were in large 
part abandoned and ignored. They remained so until the arrival of the airship as a viable proposition. 
Notwithstanding, the advances made in "mooring-out" and "bedding-down, " (Figure 6.19) 
- 
helped in no 
small part by the British military's invention of portable pressurised cylinders for the transportation of 
Named after Pilatre de Rozier who was fu-st to fly in a "combination balloon" with compartments containing both hot air and gas 
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compressed hydrogen, which allowed for quick deployment of observation balloons in remote places, 
(and which idea was quickly taken up by armies elsewhere, Figure 6.17) 
- 
there was one piece of 
infrastructure from the early days that never went away entirely. Although the gas balloons evolved 
techniques for operating out in the open they did retain the occasional use of "Balloon sheds. " These, 
however, were expensive to build and maintain and were thus reserved almost exclusively for 
construction purposes. They were places where gas cells could be made, mended and given test inflations 
without having to depend on good weather. (Figures 6.22: 6.25) The facilities for fulfilling the basic gas 
cell needs were consequently developed in association with these various military Balloon establishments. 
Thus, when, at the end of the 19th century, the airship re-emerged from theory into practicality, the shed 
with its accoutrements was already developed as a concept. All it needed was modification to suit specific 
needs and both Santos Dumont with his French blimps, and Count Zeppelin with his German rigids, were 
able to pick up where the early pioneers had left off, and to take what they needed from the gas balloon 
systems. The British military also turned their gas balloon lessons toward the development of airships. 
"By the year 1903 it had become imperative that Britain should build an airship for her Army. 
An airship, however, could not be built until there was an airship shed in which to erect and 
house it. There was no room for such a shed in the existing Balloon Factory [at Aldershot] 
... Therefore it was proposed to erect an airship shed locally 
... 
" (Walker, 1971: 54) (Figure 6.24) 
I needed a building for the housing of my air-ship between trips. 
... 
I should need my own 
workshop, my own balloon house, hydrogen plant, and connection with the illuminating gas 
mains. The Aero Club had just acquired some land... and I concluded to build on it a great shed, 
long and high enough to house my air-ship with its balloon fully inflated, and furnished with all 
the facilities mentioned. " (Santos-Dumont, 1904: 126/9) (Figure 6.26) 
This was not, as Dumont claimed in the picture caption on page 271 of his book "the first of the world's 
airship stations" 
- 
Renard and Krebs at Chalais Meudon (Figure 6.23) beat him by many years, although 
the idea can be traced right back to the genius of Meusnier in 1784 (Figure 6.14). Neither did Santos 
Dumont significantly add to the science of LTA GH infrastructure. Count Zeppelin, on the other hand, at 
virtually the same time, was making a quantum leap with his famous floating shed at Manzell on Lake 
Konstanz. (Figure 6.27) The reason being his perhaps unconscious advance in what is now known as 
functional integration. 
Here it should be remembered that, as stated in Section 5.1, the rigid airship shed was really an assembly 
jig that was clad to keep out the weather. So while its first function is "protection, " for the airship and 
shelter for the people who are building or servicing it, the shed also serves to assist with "preparation" 
- 
by provision of such ancillary equipment as suspension and anchoring systems, along with access for 
connection of gas supply and the attachment of fins, gondola, &c. 
"For docking the airship in a shed there is a choice of supporting her from above by slings; from 
below by shores; by a combination of slings and shores; or by keeping the airship "light" and 
holding her down by lines forward and aft. " (Fulton, 1929: 6 1) (Figures 6.33; 6.34; 6.35) 
However, with his floating shed, which weathervaned passively according to the wind, Count Zeppelin 
actually integrated a third function; going one step further along the chain of the necessarily sequential 
GH events, identified in Section 5.1, as being those that every airship must inevitably pass through. 
iss 
By automatically aligning itself with the wind, the Zeppelin floating shed(s)l went beyond "preparation7' 
and also assisted with the next phase 
- 
that of "moving" the airship out and in a ain. It was thus the first 0 
major component of GH infrastructure specifically designed to facilitate airshipflight operations. Sadly, it 
proved to be a little too far ahead of its time. 
"Apart from the floating sheds at Lake Constance, which were abandoned after one of them sank- 
in a storm, the German solution was the revolving shedL Otto Krell, who designed the 1911 
Siemens-Schuckert ship, had built her in a single revolving shed at Biesdorf. T'his was later 
copied in enlarged form at Nordholz, the more famous of these expensive solutions to the 
ground-handling problem. " (Higham, 1961 : 41/42) (Figures 6AS; 6A6) 
However, such buildings were really early attempts to solve a different set of problems; those that lie 
beyond Protection and Preparation of the airship, and for them a different GH infrastructure comprised of 
further specialised equipment was found to be necessary. 
6AI Evolution of mooring masts and loading system 
It is important at this point to emphasise something about "airship basee' that is yet again commonly 
overlooked 
- 
there are several different sorts of them. Moreover, the airship's needs, and consequently the 
GH infrastructure required, at each of these different sorts of base, are themselves very different. This is 
an important distinction to make, and it also applies to HTA craft. For example, Boeing build at Everett, 
but there is no commercial air traffic, and the same can be said for Long Beach, Filton and Warton, and 
even Toulouse has limited commercial flying. The obvious conclusion is that test flying and commercial 
operations don't mix well. 
The same was true for the PGVLAs and, although many bases were not specifically labelled as such, it is 
possible to identify in the historical records, at least six different sorts of base that were found to be of use 
and upon which very different GH facilities and infrastructures for the moving, mooring, loading and 
launching of large airships were establishedL These different categories of airship base include: 
Construction and assembly 
Operational or terminal/hub 
Training and experimental 
Planned temporary operations or "expeditionary" base (full facilities at remote location) 
Unplanned temporary or "emergency" base resulting from forced landing 
Anchorage or resting place (only for refuelling and/or crew/load exchange) 
It is also important to note that whereas a shed has a universality of purpose, in that it can provide 
protection for any airship that will fit inside 
- 
and, in most cases also contains equipment that can then 
accommodate a degree of preparation, or repair, (i. e. ladders, hoists and tie down points) 
- 
the same 
cannot be said for the mooring equipment out on the field. This, by its very nature, is far more airship 
specific, and indeed, many of the competing PGVLA mooring systems were incompatible with the 
airships from other nations, or even with succeeding generations of their own. Most frequently, latterly, 
this was because the mast height did not fit with the airship's diameter, as shown for example with the 
American "Wellmarf'telescoping mast, (Figure 6.10) which was made extendible in height in order to 
accommodate a range of differently sized airships that were planned for the future but were never built. 
7bere were in fact two built on the same site, one after the other. 
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However, there were other reasons for incompatibility, such as a lack of suitably reinforced strong-points 
at the correct location on the hull, or, as with rail-mounted, tail-holding devices, simply because the new 
airship was longer than its predecessor and the radius of the rail-track circle was too small. 
All this is indicative of the fact that so many of the PGVLAs were actually still in the prototype stage. 
There were one or two exceptions 
- 
most notably the German Navy Zeppelins of the First World War 
- 
but in general most projects never really got far enough along the development line to establish any 
national, let alone international, standard. The author and his colleagues at CargoLifter commented on a 
further aspect of this in their preliminary report: 
"Comparison between the methods is also compounded by the comparatively small number of 
cycles of use that some of these systems were subjected to. And it is difficult today to put a value 
on a mooring system that had barely been tested before it was demolished. For example the high 
mast at Cardington successfully held the RIOI safely moored through a week of 60-mph gales 
that culminated in a peak gust of 83 mph. 
... 
This feat is impressive and such a performance 
should obviously not be dismissed lightly. Yet the R101 only made 12 flights in its lifetime, 
while its sister ship the RIOO, popularly believed to be the more successful of the two, only made 
10 flights, of which 3 were the voyage to Canada. This begs the question of how many times the 
Cardington high mast was actually used? 
Compare this with the lifetime total of-. 
- 
590 recorded flights for LZ127 Graf Zeppelin; 
- 
338 for LZ126 Los Angeles; 
- 
73 for ZR4 Akron; 
-58 for ZR1 Shenandoah; and 
- 
54 for ZR5 Macon. " 
(Camplin, Bischet & Watson, 1998) 
Of these, the cream of the PGVLAs, only the twins R100 and R101 in Britain, and ZR4 and ZR5 in the 
USA, were truly compatible with their siblings 
- 
although not with the other pair 
- 
and whereas LZ126 did 
share its mooring facilities with some of the others, and LZ127 was on occasion wrestled into the 
Lakehurst Shed for repair, (and further damaged in the process, ) in truth, all these airships were 
differently equipped for their own unique blend of mooring systems. Some of these are shown above in 
Section 6.2 on pages 143/5 as Figures 6.6 to 6.11. Consequently, there are a very great number of more- 
or-less, one-off, GH and mooring devices, comprising a wide array of subtly different masts, towers, 
trucks, dollies, trolleys, mules, cars, cradles, beams, tugs, towing-vehicles, railway-tracks and purpose 
built locomotives, most of which have been described in detail by historians in the past. For this reason, it 
is not deemed necessary to investigate the vagaries of their various careers, nor their disparate 
contributions to the science of GH, and nor to provide illustrations to more than a few of those felt by this 
author to be the most interesting or significant. See Appendix M- Figures 6.38 to 6.50. 
Suffice it to say that the situation for the VLAs was very different than it was for the blimps, which were 
produced in large numbers, in both World Wars, and which could all use the same, or at least very similar 
mooring systems. In large part this commonality stemmed from the process of hardening in the field that 
the gas balloon had undergone in the hands of the military. It began originally with the need to move, 
moor and preserve the gas of, the Entreprenant (Figure 6.13) and it continued seriously with tethered 
observation balloons during both the American Civil War (wherein Count Zeppelin first encountered 
LTA flight) and the Boer War. Specifically the real advances came from the aforementioned "bedding- 
dowif' and "mooring-out" techniques that were devised. These consisted of simply removing the 
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suspended impedimenta from beneath the gas bag and then pulling it down until it was squeezed between 
it's retaining net and the ground. (Figure 6.19) This was done either manually by hooldng sandbags onto 
the net or by mechanical means with ropes and winches attached to ground anchors or "screw-pickets. " 
It was found that these simple means were perfectly workable in all sorts of terrain and weather 
conditions, and that this was a quick, cheap and flexible method of creating sufficient pressure in a non- 
rigid gas bag for it to withstand the force of the wind 
- 
even up to gale force. More importantly, there was 
no need for any form of external pressurisation to be supplied, and this technique, combined with the 
invention by Col. Capper and the Royal Engineer's, of portable gas-cylinders, (Figure 6.17) freed the gas 
balloon from its reliance on, and need for a protective shed. This allowed Boer War observation balloons 
to be inflated, and kept for days on end out in the open air, and even inflated on river-boats, (Figure 6.40) 
thus making them of some practical military use and bequeathing to future generations of airship-makers 
a reliable and cost-effective method of inflating virtually all and any type of gas cell, regardless of shape 
or size. Gas bags restrained by nets can be seen inside the large rigid First War Zeppelins (Figure 6.32) 
and in use with the RNAS blimps of the same date (Figure 6.29). Furthermore, these methods of inflation 
with sandbags and of mooring under tensioned nets still remain in use today. (Figures 6.21 and 6.30) 
However, whereas spherical balloons are equally affected by the wind from whichever direction it blows, 
the same is not true of an elongated airship gas bag. Thus, a balloon can be put back into service as soon 
as the wind's strength decreases, but a blimp must wait until the wind also blows towards it's nose. 
Realigning the squeezed-down envelope to meet a changed wind-direction is impossible as even a slight 
cross-wind will make re-fitting of control-car and fins exceedingly difficult 
- 
not to say dangerous 
- 
for 
the groundcrew doing the work. Moreover, the bigger the airship the worse the problem becomes, and this 
was a serious limitation with regard to their usefulness in general prior to the First World War. 
The French in particular, had some initial success when they attached a large downward-pointing spike to 
the bottom of their control cars, thereby allowing some of their early non-rigids, to pivot into wind as 
gusts came and went, but the idea was abandoned after Le Patrie was literally torn from the hands of her 
numerous ground crew and blown out to sea. Thereafter the problem was tackled by the British military 
who solved it for their First War blimp's in two ways. Firstly by seeking shelter. 
"Mooring of the small non-rigids was carried out on the ground in quarries or bays cut into 
woods away from their bases which greatly assisted the value of their operations. " (Williams, 
1974: 15 1) (Figure 6.37) 
Secondly, by the development of the nose mooring mast. Initially, work on this was done by Vickers at 
Barrow with small blimps, (using the double-headed Masterman Mast, ) and latterly it was taken up and 
perfected at the dedicated experimental base near Pulham, where large rigid ships, such as R28 and R33, 
tested the famous high mooring mast. The culmination of this work, some ten years after the Armistice, 
was the erection of a Mooring Tower at Cardington (Figure 6.8) and of others in Canada, Egypt and 
India. However, the success of these early trials led the Americans in 1922 to build their own high mast at 
their new Naval Air Station at Lakehurst, and, then to licence Major Scott's patented4 tower-top 
connection system for use with their own home built ZRS-1 ShenandoalL The subsequent break-up of 
this airship in mid-air; the Americans prolonged experimentation thereafter with their German-built 
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LZ1261ZRS-3 Los Angeles, along with their eventual disenchantment with the high mast and development 
of the low- or stub-mast, are all well-known and well documented elsewhere. (These latter, and the 
associated GH procedures, are also examined in detail in Section 9.3.1). 
Less well-known, but far more potentially interesting from the GH perspective, are the American trials of 
the Ford mast at Dearborn, (Figure 6.38) with its "vertical railway" for lowering an airship to the ground 
- 
two airships did use the mast but the railway was never tested 
- 
and the fitting of a mooring mast onto a 
sea-going ship, (Figure 6.42) which was a proven success. 
"Ilirough the night, and during the following day, the Shenandoah was on the mast with no 
trouble, experiencing fresh breezes to calm, and swung in a complete circle around the Patoka's 
masthead, safely clearing all top hamper. The duty watch found that even with daytime 
superheating, it was much easier to keep the airship trimmed and ballasted than when on the 
mast at Lakehurst, with convection currents rising from the hot sand. " (Robinson & Keller, 
1982: 88) 
In later years, both ZRS-3 (Figure 6.41) and ZRS4 had a similar experiences on this same system. 
Moreover, the method of capturing the airship's mooring lines at sea, forced a reduction of ground crew 
numbers, to more or less those who could fit into a small boat 
- 
and it also explored the potential for yaw- 
guy booms 
- 
an idea that was proposed in a British patent (GB 252,517) by Barnes Wallis in 1926. 
In terms of simply mooring out with very large airships, these various systems really represent the state of 
the art, and it is important to keep in mind that the large rigid airship has yet to pass through a similar 
hardening process to that experienced by both the gas balloons and the blimps. Indeed, in reality, there 
have really been very few attempts at operational hardening of VLAs to allow prolonged survival outside 
of a their sheds. Chief among them are Graf Zeppelin's regular visits to Brazil and Spain, (Figure 6.39) 
Shenandoah's 19 day circuit of the USA, and a handful of brief exercises wherein ZRS-3 Los Angeles and 
ZRS4 Akron used expeditionary masts at Camp Kearney and on board Patoka in the West Indies. 
As to which is the best, or most cost-effective, mooring system for VLAs, there is unanimity that for plain 
and simple mooring, holding them by the nose is the winner, but opinion is sharply divided on all else 
- 
particularly with regard to mobility and handling on the ground. 
"The high mast cannot be used for docking and handling purposes and requires an added 
'Vansportee' mast, if a mobile mast is to be used as the nucleus of a mechanical docking system. 
The stub mast can easily be made a mobile unit at a reasonable cost, thereby performing an 
additional very important function. Transition of an airship from a high mast to a "transporter" 
mast for docking is an added operation and may be a hazardous one. No such added features are 
involved in the use of the mobile stub mast. " (Rosendahl, 193 1 a) 
6.4.3 Evolution of mobile and mechanical mooring 
As with mooring, the moving, loading, unloading, launch and capture procedures that were devised for, 
and practised by, the PGVLAs involved the tests and trials of a great many diverse, one-off, highly 
specialised and often purpose-built machines. Here again, all of them have previously been depicted and 
described elsewhere and thus tracing the adventures, fortunes and misfortunes of these innumerable, and 
in many cases complicated, devices, lies beyond the scope of this present investigation. Consequently in 
this section, too, the illustrations are limited to those where it is apparent to the author that significant 
progress in the science of GH was made. (Figures 6.45 to 6.52) 
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In terms of infrastructure evolution, there was very little progress made, with regard to the loading and 
moving of airships on the ground, until Dr Eckener had his accident con-drig out of the shed at DOsseldorf 
in 1911 with LZ8 (see Figure 1.1). His immediate installation thereafter, of rail-mounted trolleys 
("laufkatzeif') to hold the airship's mooring lines, and to keep it central during its passage through the 
shed doors, (see Figures 6.6 and 6.7) marked a turning point and was the forerunner of a succession of 
rail-mounted and other mechanical devices that were used to move airships on the ground. Curiously, 
having initiated the process, the Germans then lost interest in pursuing the idea and all further 
development was left to the other countries 
- 
although the British also made little serious effort at the 
mechanisation of moving their ships on the ground despite some early success: "Towing trials of rigid R- 
26 by a tank at Pulharn showed some promise. " (Williams, 1974: 15 1) (Figure 6.47) 
However, thereafter they too seemed happy to revert to the old proven method of men pulling on ropes. 
Meanwhile, in America, the famous "Iron Horse" (Figure 6A8) was succeeded by many subtle variations 
on the same theme 
- 
some were self propelled and others were tractor-towed; some were telescopic, 
others were of a fixed height; and while some incorporated devices for holding the airship tail, (Figure 
6.50) others let it float free and weathervane. The final significant breakthrough came with the invention 
of the "hauling-up" circle, and the much vaunted "Bolster Beam: ' which allowed for the automated 
alignment of the VLAs with either the axis of their shed or with the wind. This system was installed on 
both East and West coasts of America, (Figures 6.11 and 6A9) at the home bases of both the US Navy's 
last and largest rigids ZRS4 and ZRS-5. 
In terms of loading, little was ever done to improve the original German steps (Himmelstreppe) into the 
crew/passenger accommodation and passing items in through the doorway. (Figure 6A3) Or of simply 
hoisting objects up into the ship's belly while it was safely secured inside its shed. This was partly 
because no PGVLAs were ever purpose-built to be solely freight-carriers. Nevertheless, everything from 
bombs to passenger's baggage 
- 
including on one occasion an automobile (Figure 6.44) 
- 
was loaded and 
carried by these means. "A conspicuousfeature of thefreight-carrying space [on LZ1291 is the huge 
hammock and slingfor cumbrous articles such as motor cars. " (Coke, c 1937: 91/2). The only significant 
variant was that used by the British, who loaded all passengers into their Imperial Airship Scheme 
prototypes 
- 
RIO0 and RIO] 
- 
via a lift (elevator) in the high mast, with a "gang-way" then leading from 
the mast head to the airship's interior. (Figure 6.9) 
The American contribution to this was to perfect the system, tried and then neglected by the others, of 
loading and unloading aircraft onto their flying aircraft carriers 
- 
ZRS4 and ZRS-5 
- 
while they were in 
n-dd-flight. This allowed a significant extra quantity of fuel to be lifted at launch and greatly improved the 
"mother" sl-dp's operational endurance. The reliability of the system, and it's potential for crew-exchange, 
were demonstrated by ZRS4 in the course of one single flight during which 300 "hook-ons" and "drop- 
offs" were made. Some years later, after the Second World War, another in-flight crew-exchange method 
was also demonstrated by a US Navy blimp using a winch-suspended"basket. " (Figure 6.52) 
And finally, and perhaps most surprisingly, it seems that the most neglected of all the GH procedures that 
were devised and used by the PGVLAs, in terms of their refinement and improvement, were those dealing 
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with the launch to, and capture from, flight. Where one might have expected there to have been trials of 
some sort of "Launch-catapult" or a "Landing-arrester-hook-and-wire" there appears to have been none. 
Even through the last season's flying of the last passenger-carrying PGVLA 
- 
LZ129 
- 
which was 
unquestionably the most sophisticated of them, and which by 1936, stood to benefit from all the lessons 
and preceding experience amassed in both Germany and America, the ground handlers are seen in 
photographs to be using the most primitive manual GH equipment for launch and capture (Figure 6.51). 
6AA Summary of GH evolution 
To sum up, broadly speaking, the history of airship development, which began in France, moved, over a 
period of some 200 hundred years, via Germany to Britain, and then finally on to America. The common 
thread in all four countries is that the driving factor behind the airship's evolution was war and that the 
GH was modified largely as a result of, and in response to, serious or damaging accidents. Moreover, in 
all three of the major countries, Germany, Britain and America, there seems to have been a pattern in their 
parallel processes whereby, speaking in very general terms, the Army initially perceived the potential 
usefulness of airships and commenced trials. After a short, and usually expensive, test period they 
discovered that there were limitations for their purposes and transferred their working sliýps and crews to 
the Navy, who then took on the project, and by application of maritime practices made it work; but at a 
huge physical and financial cost. This was borne in time of war, but could not be supported when peace 
ensued and civilian safety regulations were enforced. Thereafter, the amount of financial investment 
necessary for continuation, involved both the government (civil service) and the private sector, who 
alternated, erratically, between over-enthusiastic investment and panic-stricken withdrawal of funds until 
the projects finally collapsed. The exception was in Italy where, curiously, the Army managed to develop 
their own brand of semi-rigid airship and to develop it with considerable success until the project was 
eventually brought down by political intrigue and a media-led witch-hunt against General Nobile. 
In terms of the actual GH infrastructure and equipment, this inconsistency of financial support, and lack 
of experienced or informed management at the highest level, resulted in a bewildering array of 
incomplete systems, partially tested hardware and deeply-ingrained, false assumptions. While the largest 
of the airships were generally the losers in all this, the blimps benefited hugely, not least in the freely- 
gifted inheritance of rigid airship sheds. These were gigantically proportioned for the smaller ships' needs 
but allowed them a freedom in experimentation with construction and operational techniques that would 
otherwise have been impossible. The result was that whereas rigid airships were fitted tightly into the 
sheds they bought and paid for, the blimps got space enough to turn around in and could run from bad 
weather into man-made harbours that in other circumstances would have been far beyond their means. 
In evaluating the overall successes and failures, the strengths and weaknesses, of the various projects of 
the previous generation, it cannot be ignored that the largest of these "ships of the aie' began their 
development on water; (in Count Zeppelin's floating sheds, ) were operated most reliably in three separate 
countries by Navy personnel; achieved many of their most famously successful flights over water (R34, 
R100, LZ127); and that among the most efficient GH systems ever tested, in terms of small ground crew 
numbers, was a mooring mast mounted onboard a sea-going ship (Patoka). 
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DISCUSSION 
7.1 Defining the area of investigation 
As stated at the outset of this investigation, and confirmed in the preceding historical overview, ground 
handling is a very large and complex topic. Although poorly defined, it can be said at least to extend over 
a period of 200 years and to encompass a huge number of events in three or more separate countries. 
Even when such events are listed as single line entries and reduced to a small font, (as has been shown at 
the end of this investigation, with the sample pages from Appendix I- Chronological list of events and 
Appendix J- Accidents and incidents) there is still an enormous amount of data to manage. ' 
Furthermore, as explained in Sections 3.4.3A. and 6.2, the topic is also three-dimensional in nature and 
can be perhaps best presented in the form of a three-axis graph or Matrix, which will contain many 
thousands of fields. Consequently some way of reducing the amount of data has to be established. 
In Section 6.2 it was shown that some reduction was possible by: 
a) Elimination of the small blimp GH methods that are extremely unlikely to be of use 
to the NGVLA developers, and 
b) focussing on GH systems for "large' or "very large airships" as defined by 
application of the "123 metre rule" that was explained in Section 5.3.1 
By these means it was shown that although the history of airships may be conveniently divided into four 
"Eras" of development, that there were really only two of serious interest to this study, with the result that 
approximately 1000 airships are summarily reduced to some 300. The two eras of interest are: 
3. 
- 
the rigid era 
- 
developing the vertical GH methods (1899-1939), and 
4. 
- 
the second wave blimps 
- 
perfecting horizontal "heavy operations" (1940-2000+) 
Moreover, it was also shown that Era 3, the era of the "large' rigid airships, can itself be fairly easily 
further broken down into the three quite clearly defined subdivisions, according to the development 
programmes that took place in each of the three major countries concerned: 
3a. 
- 
The Gerrnan rigid airships (1899-1939) 
3b. 
- 
The British rigid airships (1910-1930) 
3c. 
-Me American rigid airships (1920-1935) 
In addition to which, the latter part of the 4h era 
- 
the American Blimp programme 
- 
was also identified as 
being of some interest. This is that section which contains the last and largest of the US Navy's non-tigid 
blimps, some of which (specifically the ZPG-3Ws ) were as large dimensionally as the smallest rigid 
airships, and all of which used the most advanced US Navy GH techniques. 
However, having taken an overview of the GH systems evolution and it's infrastructure developmem it is 
now possible to see that a further reduction in the area of interest can be made by applying this same 
principle to all three of the sub-eras and concentrating only upon the latter part of each. Obviously, for the 
I Appendix I in fulL runs to 14 pages, and Appendix J to 9 
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NGVLA developers, knowing what did not work, in the past, can be of great value, however, as a starting 
point for their new airships, those GH systems and PGVLA machinery that were of proven worth would 
seem to offer the most likely short-cut to success and to minimise their risk of "re-inventing the wheel. " 
Furthermore, by declaring this intent, it is possible to identify a precise number of individual airships that 
were firstly, "very large" and secondly, that were operational at the end of their respective development 
programmes, and thus, for which the GH was either of proven reliability, or was in the process of testing 
perhaps the most advanced ideas that were promoted and endorsed by the most experienced personnel. 
Therefore, this investigation is primarily interested in the GH of those airships that are included in the 
following "classes" of airships 
- 
as they were developed in each of the three major countries. 
7.1.1 The selected large airships 
GERMAN OPERATED AIRSHIPS 
-4 classes containing 8 individual aircraft 
" Zeppelin 'x' class 
-3 airships 
LZ112 (German Navy L70); First flew 7/1918 
-, shot down 8/1918 
LZI13 (German Navy L71), F/f 7/18 ; dismantled 1923 
LZI 14 (German Navy L72) (later French Dixtruide); F/f 7/20 ; exploded mid air 12/23 
" Zeppelin 'y' class 
-2 airships 
LZ 120 (Bodensee) (later Italian Esperia); F/f 8/19 ; dismantled 7/28 
LZ 121 (Nordstem) (later French Wditerranýe); F/f 6/21 ; dismantled 9/26 
" Zeppelin Graf Zeppelin class 
-I airship 
LZ 127 (Graf Zeppelin); F/f 9/28 ; dismantled 1940 
" Zeppelin Hindenburg class 
-2 airships 
LZ 129 (Hindenburg); F/f 3/36 ; burned 5/37 
LZ 130 (Graf Zeppelin II); F/f 9/38 ; dismantled 1940 
BRITISH OPERATED AIRSHIPS 
-5 classes containing 7 individual aircraft 
" The 33 class 
-2 airships 
R33 (G-FAAG), First flew 3/1919 ; dismantled 1928 
R34, F/f 3/19 ; wrecked 1/21 
" R36 (G-FAAF); F/f 4/21 ; dismantled 1926 
" R38 (ZR-2); F/f 6/21 ; broke in mid air 8/21 
" R80; F/f 7/20 ; dismantled 1925 
" The Imperial Airship Programme class 
-2 airships 
R100 (G-FAA V); F/f 12/29 ; dismantled 1931 
R101 (G-FAAW); F/f 10/29; crashed 10/30 
AMERICAN OPERATED AIRSHIPS 
-4 classes containing 8 individual aircraft 
" US Navy ZR-1 (USS Shenandoah), First flew 9/1923 ; broke in mid air 9/1925 
" US Navy ZR-3 (USS Los Angeles) (formerly LZ126); F/f 8/24; dismantled 12/39 
" US Navy Akron class 
-2 airships 
US Navy ZR4 (USS Akron); F/f 9/31 ; crashed 4/33 
US Navy ZR-5 (USS Macon); F/f 4/33 ; broke in mid air 2/35 
" US Navy ZPG-3 W class 
-4 non-rigid blimp airships 
ZPG-3W (1) serial number 144242; F/f 7/58 crashed in sea 7/60 
ZPG-3W (2) serial number 144243; F/f 9/58 deflated 1962 
ZPG-3W (3) serial number 146296, F/f 10/59 ; deflated 1962 
ZPG-3W (4) serial number 146297; F/f 3/60 ; deflated 1962 
There are thus 23 individual airships which can be defined as "large" enough, and for which the GH 
procedures can be expected to be sufficiently well developed to be of potential use to the NGVLAs. 
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However, this is only half the story because the GH of these selected airships was entirely dependent 
upon the facilities, the infrastructure and the ground-based hardware that was available to them at their 
various bases. As noted in Section 6A. 2 there were several different types of PGVLA base and the story 
of their development, although less well documented than the airships themselves, is just as long and 
complicated. Therefore, it is equally necessary to reduce the number of bases and to eliminate from the 
study all those, for instance, that were devoted solely to small blimps, or at which, little or no contribution 
was made to advancing the science of GH. By reference to the information collected in Appendix L it is 
possible to identify, and to select a manageable number of bases, upon which the above listed large 
airships spent most of their time, or where there is either evidence, or good reason to presume, that 
potentially interesting GH infrastructure was developed and/or used. 
7.1.2 The selected large airship bases 
Unfortunately, unlike the airships, there is no obvious way to categorise and sort the bases other than by 
the aforementioned description of their main activity (i. e. Operations, Construction, etc. see Section 
6.4.2. ) however, this is complicated by the fact that many bases served several purposes in their lifetimes. 
Some were the scene of intense activity during one particular programme and were then abandoned, while 
others were constantly updated and re-used, or re-equipped for another purpose after a period of 
inactivity. Therefore, for convenience, six bases have been selected from each of the three countries, that 
were owned or operated by them and which seem to have been either the most active in each country or 
sites where the most innovative large airship GH was carried out. 
GERMAN AIRSHIP BASES 
" Friedrichshafen, (Construction, Experimental development) 
- 
longest manufacture 
" Berlin, Biesdorf 
- 
(Operations) 
- 
rotatable shed 
" Frankfurt (Operations) 
- 
most recent passenger hub 
" Nordholz 
- 
(Operations) 
- 
most airships 
" Ahlhorn 
- 
(Operations) 
- 
most Halle 
" Recife, Brazil 
- 
(Expeditionary) 
- 
remote regular destination 
BRITISH AIRSHIP BASES 
* Barrow-in-Furness (Construction) 
- 
manufacture and experiment 
- 
water mooring 
" Howden (Construction) 
- 
big sheds and accidents 
" Cardington (Construction, Operations) 
- 
biggest airships, mooring to tower 
" Pulliam (Experimental development) 
- 
high mast invented 
" Croydon 
- 
(Expeditionary) 
- 
wooden mast 
" St Hubert, Canada 
- 
(Expeditionary) 
- 
remote destination 
AMERICAN AIRSHIP BASES 
Lakehurst (Experimental development, Operations) 
- 
largest and longest in service, Iron Horse 
Akron 
- 
(Construction) 
- 
the Airdock 
Sunnyvale (Operations) 
- 
latest GH, Bolster Beam 
Camp Kearney (Expeditionary) 
- 
reinvigorated and enlarged 
" Dearborn (Expeditionary) 
- 
railway mast 
" The "Patoka" 
- 
(Expeditionary) 
- 
floating mooring mast 
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7.2 The risk from GH accidents 
This investigation has uncovered several areas of concern, commonly grouped under the heading of GH, 
that clearly have great potential to impact on the NGVLA projects. Not least is the risk posed by GH 
accidents, which, as shown in the charts that compare those of LTA and HTA (Section 2.2) are not only a 
considerably greater threat for airships but also somewhat anomalous. For instance, the US Navy blimps, 
which were smaller in size, and later in time than the rigid airships, can be seen to have suffered a 
significantly higher proportion of ground-based accidents. It is therefore evident that the dangers from 
GH apparently got worse as time passed and experience was gained. Considering that many individuals 
within the ground crews who handled the blimps were able to build on their personal experiences with the 
rigids, that weather forecast accuracy was greatly improved between 1925 and 1945, and that the blimps 
were filled with supposedly "safer" helium, this finding is strange to say the least. Perhaps all the more so 
in view of the tremendous amount of ingenious problem-solving contributed during the Second World 
War 
- 
plus the almost frenzied technological advances made in the subsequent "Cold War" that were 
assisted by the enormous military budgets of the 1950s "Arms Race. "
Bearing in mind also, the point previously made, that the blimps were in many cases using sheds inherited 
from their much larger forebears, and that consequently, for a lot of their operational time they had 
enormous sheltered spaces to manoeuvre in, with disproportionately large doors - which luxuries were 
denied the rigids 
- 
it is also strange that the blimps then suffered so many accidents coming out of these 
shelters. It would be logical to expect the opposite, when the crews were more likely to be tired and 
struggling to get back inside the shed in deteriorating weather with failing light. Why they performed so 
badly when, in theory the men were physically fresher, and within limits, they could choose their moment 
of exit with ships that were in "mission-ready" condition, is something of a mystery. 
What this means for the NGVLAs, which will obviously have access to even more accurate weather 
forecasts, and are certain to use helium, and as this study has revealed, willforce majeure have 
inexperienced ground crews, is unclear. However, it is possible that the fault lies with the statistics and 
the paucity of data available for large airship accidents. This, in turn, is founded on the rarity of the 
aircraft themselves, and compounded by the fact that direct comparisons of historical data for the 
different types of airship are hard to make. The various airship operators not only defined their accidents 
and incidents differently, thus leading them to record different events, but they also tended to change their 
definitions as time passed. The picture is also distorted by losses due to enemy action. 
It is thus instructive to compare the chart for PGVL rigid airship accidents (previously given as Figure 
2.3) with both the records of US Navy post war losses that include their largest blimps (Figure 2.4) and 
with data not previously given, from reports of US Navy blimp accidents during the Second World War 
(US Navy, 1946). 1 This latter report covers the period of their most intensive operations: 
"... with 119 non-rigids operational in March 1944, gradually reducing to 10 in 1961 
... 
This 
huge fleet 
... 
was only able to operate so efficiently because of the handling experience which 
stemmed from the early rigid programme. " (Mowthorpe, 1999: 138) 
NOTE: The nine US Navy K-type blimps lost in the one fire at the NAS 
- 
Richmond hangars have been included in this chart. 
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Comparison of accidents in different programmes 
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Figure 7.1 
- 
Comparison of rigid and blimp accident statistics 
On the face of it these charts. with their ill-matched categories, are not a very close fit 
- 
apart from the 
obvious fact that ground based accidents are predominant in all. However, in the last case, and in the 
same source document complied on behalf of the US Coastguard. there is further analysis of the same US 
166 
fire in shed 
22% 
Navy post-war blimp accident reports. In addition to the -phasc ot'llighi" in which these incidents 
occurred. there is also a re-classificatioll of then) accordill" to tile actual -Causc 01, tile accidClit. - It' tile 
last pie chart in the foregoing Figure is thLIS I-CCII-aWn LISill" the alternati\c breakdown of' nunihers then [he 
match is somewhat closer 
- 
in particular with regard to the "I'light- percenia-c ofrigid airship accidenis. 
US Navy blimp accidents 
- 
1946 / 1961 (Tripp, c. 1 961) 
equipment 
17% 
pilot 
weather 
20% 
personnel 
23% 
Figure 7.2 
- 
Causes of US Navy post-war blimp accidents 
The difficulty oftnaking accurate data comparisons from past airship programmes that are necessarily 
based on relatively small numerical samples (where a single event can have great effect on the statistical 
results), means that it would be unwise to conclude with absolute certainty that all future airship 
programmes will always, and inevitably, be similarly prone to accidents on the ground. It must be 
remembered that a very large proportion ofall the airships in the past projects were actually prototypes 
and that their ground crews were thus learning as they went. This alone would be expected to have 
markedly increased the frequency of all types ofaccidents. However the fact that the rigid airship L- 
programmes. (which were developed over a forty year period. by three separate countries, for both 
commercial and military purposes, through times ofboth financial least and famine and many of\vhich 
used large and unskilled ground-crews. ) produced a pattern ofaccidents that is \, cry similar to that ofthe 
largest and most sophisticated pressure airships that have ever been built, i. e. the US Navy post-\ýar 
blimps, (which were developed some thirty years later. were generally less than lialfthe size ofthe rigids. 
were used exclusively for military purposes, suffered no real shortage-, offunding Or unexpected U-turns 
of policy, and were operated by America's most experienced and professional crews 
- 
who worked in 
small, highly-trained and disciplined teams, and who also had the benefit ol'previous experience with file 
rigid ships. ) does tend to point to such a conclusion. 
If nothing else confirms the importance ofGH, these similarities betwccii the accident patterns of(liverse 
and differently targeted past projects does suggest that the developers ofany future super-large airships 
should be exceedingly cautious in their plans for manoeuvring their creations on or near the ground. 
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7.3 The generic physical GH problems 
By reference to the foregoing compilations of airship information 
- 
as given in Appendices 1, J, K and L 
- 
and by study of the historical material collected from archives and libraries, it is possible to establish 
where the biggest and most common problems were encountered by the PGVLAs. Moreover, by 
comparing the evolutionary process of VLA GH, as it occurred in the three major countries, it is possible 
to distil these problems into generic fundamental problems that are applicable to all sorts, types, classes 
and sizes of airship. 
As a start point, all airships are constrained by the laws of physics: 
"As an aircraft the principles directly affecting the airship are the 'laws' concerning the pressure, 
velocity, and density of gases and fluids, and as a structure the stability, stress, and strength of 
solids. These are limitations which decree, in general form, the sort of vehicle the airship must 
be. " (Sprigg, c. 1932: 13) 
These laws and limitations also create some significant problems for ground handlers and notwithstanding 
the complex interactions of these laws, and the properties of matter that result from them, (as outlined 
briefly in Appendices A and B, ) the GH problems that arise can be reduced in essence to six 
fundamentals that are common to all airships regardless of size or type. These can be grouped as three 
"physical" problems and three "operational" problems. Taking them in the likely order in which the 
ground crew for a newly built prototype airship will encounter them, they are: 
The Generic Physical GH Problems: 
1. The Fragile Shell 
2. The Variable Buoyancy 
3. The Wind and Weather 
The Generic Operational GH Problems: 
4. Access 
5. Launch 
6. Capture 
73.1 The fragile shell 
If it is assumed that a generic airship (of any size imaginable) has been designed and assembled and is 
ready for use, waiting in its shed, then irrespective of whether it is a rigid structure, or a blimp that 
requires constant pressure for its structural integrity, the first task for the ground crew is to move it 
outside. It should be borne in mind that such a move may be done without anyone actually being on board 
the airship, and that the airship structure does not even have to be complete. For instance, it is conceivable 
that the certification process might call for a newly built airship to be attached to its newly built mooring 
mast for a period of mooring-out trials, but for this there is no absolute necessity for its propulsive 
engines to have been installed. In which case, reducing the manoeuvring of an airship to it's simplest 
form, it is simply a bubble of gas that needs to be held and moved. Furthermore, it does not matter what 
moves the airship, whether it is teams of people pulling on ropes or mechanical devices, provided they 
keep control of it 
- 
and it at this point that the fragile shell becomes a problem. 
In order to move the airship it must first be released from its anchor points and then manoeuvred by 
attachments of some sort. The number and positioning of these, necessarily strong and thus heavy, points 
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is critical because Lighter-than-air flight dictates use of the lightest possible construction materials and 
the displacement of a large volume of air. 
"The importance of good weight estimation and control during all phases of the design of an 
airship, especially in the early stages, cannot be over-emphasiscd. " (Craig, 1999b: 235) 
Consequently all airships are by definition exceedingly delicate structures that have an enormous inertial 
mass. This inescapable combination of a large momentum and fragile, ethereal architecture means that the 
slightest impact between any airship and a solid or fixed object is almost certain to result in a 
disproportionate amount of structural damage to the airship. Moreover, 
"Symmetry of cross-section represents the triumph of theory over reality. A theory of stress 
calculation simplification vs. the realities of gravity, load distribution and the resultant built-in 
tendency to structural "hogging. " A rigid airship with longitudinals and bracing divided about 
the cross-section of the hull in perfect symmetry seems theoretically capable of equal resistance 
to a given aerodynamic stress applied across any plane of the cross-section of the hull: 
horizontal, vertical or diagonal. The reality seems to be that, either such a hull is adequate to 
deal with a given aerodynamic stress in the vertical plane where it compounds the "hogging" 
stress and thus the ship is overbuilt to deal with anticipated aerodynamic stress in every other 
plane, or the design is adequately strong to deal with stress in all planes save vertical, and no 
more than marginally adequate in the vertical plane. " (Hall, 2000: 5) 
What is true for the aerodynamic loads is equally true for the GH loads, and some idea of the magnitude 
of the problem for the ground crew, and of the extraordinary achievements of the PGVLA designers, can 
be drawn from the fact that were a hull of one of the latest and largest of their ships to be cut in half 
vertically, (as was actually done to lengthen the RIOI) then the cross section of bare metal exposed would 
amount to not much more than an eight inch square 
- 
for an unsupported girder that is 700+ feet in length. 
Thus, the fragile shell, which it should not be forgotten in the case of the non-rigid "pressure" blimps is 
merely a multi-layered fabric bag, inevitably has to have a limited number of attachment points and/or 
handles, and these can only take so much load and may be very restricted in their permissible pull angles. 
"For the Los Angeles the mechanical-handling gear at the stem of the ship is towed by cables to 
the ship itself, 
... 
Differences in airship construction make themselves felt in this handling 
problem at this point. In a ship not designed for mechanical handling, it was necessary to apply 
the loads at carefully selected points and always in proper directions relative to the structure. 
Although satisfactory means were found, nevertheless this feature complicated the design of the 
mechanical handling equipment for the Los Angeles. " (Rosendahl, 193 1 a) 
Moreover, tension and compression must be kept within strict limits and in contrast to the maritime world 
where super-tankers and VLCCs can be pushed sideways by a couple of tug boats pressing on 
strategically placed bulkheads, no such luxury is possible for the ground handlers of VLAs. In general 
terms, airships do not bounce; they crumple, and any contact of an airship hull with a fixed, or heavy 
solid object, risks a potential disaster. Consequently point loads such as those unavoidably generated by a 
ground impact protection device (or an under-carriage) are a real problem and they will be all the more so 
for designers and ground handlers of the NGVLAs, because the larger an airship gets, the more inertia it 
has and the worse the problem becomes. 
So the first generic GH problem is how to hold onto the hull and manoeuvre the airship without damage 
to its fragile shell. 
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7.3.2 Variable buoyancy 
The second problem is that the buoyancy ofan airship is constantly changing. As shown in Appendix A 
this sterns from the interacting laws ol'physics and is very much affected by changes of temperature. 
However, cvcn inside a shed, with climate control and air-conditionim,, the lift of anN, -as-filled aerostat tý 
. 
Cý 
Will fluctuate. day by day and even minute by minute as ambient external barometric pressure changes. 
This is nothing to do with whether the craft itselfis pressurised or not. Buoyancy will constantly vary for 
all gas-fillcd airships, regardless of type or structure, and the risk of damage to the fragile shell means that 
the finely balanced equilibrium between lift and weight must always be kept within strict limits. Of 
Course these limits may be very different for different types of aerostat, and for example a rigid 
framework with liall'cnipty gas cells may still be able to be moved, provided the GH equipment supports 
it in the right places, whereas this would be impossible with a pressurised airship. Nevertheless. loss of 
buoyancy is a problem foi- all airships and if left unchecked it can easily cause structural damage. 
Conversely, an unchecked increase in buoyancy may overstrain the hold-down points or make moving the 
airship dangerous For the ground crew. So. buoyancy control is essential from the moment an airship is 
first inflated, and it must be maintained without interruption until the ship is finally deflated 
- 
and the 
method by which it is done must be guaranteed and reliable. 
This brings to light the absolute need for the buoyancy to be constantIv monitored. somethinLz that in itself 
is not as simple as it at first appears 
- 
particularly where the airship is large, with perhaps multiple gas 
cells or compartment.,, that may heat and cool independently. and where there are several access points via 
which weight may be added and removed. Here. yet again, the devil is in the detail, for regardless of how 
the buoyancy is actually monitored, (i. e. what the sensors are, and where they are located. ) and by what 
means the accuracy ofthc measurement is guaranteed, the information generated has ultimately to be 
displayed at some specific location where action can be taken to maintain the correct "EQ. " The control 
car/gondola is naturally a first choice, but monitoring of the buoyancy must begin as soon as the gas is put 
into the gas cell(s). and with a large and complex prototype it may be many days into the assembly 
process befOrc the two components 
- 
gas bags and gondola 
- 
are united. A second, back-up monitoring 
station, perhaps incorporated into the mooring machinery. is thus an attractive option - to all except those 
who have to pay for it. Whatever the method, the fact remains that the ground crew must have a reliable 
way ofknowing the airship's state of buoyancy both before. and throughout the duration of, any attempt 
to move the airship Out ofits shed. Moreover, this information is vital for the operation of large airships: 
-During the night, in a closed hangar, the temperature drop lags behind that of the outside air-, by 
rushing the ship out and taking the air at once before temperature equalization takes place. it is 
practicable to get offwith fair superheat. By taking off with superheat and landing after the sun's 
heat begin,, to Nvane, the ship can land without having any excess buoyancy to overcome by 
releasing helium. " (Rosendahl, 1927) 
So the second problem fundamental to all airship GH is provision of some reliable and accurate means for 
the constant monitoring, control and physical adjustment of an airship's ever-changing buoyancy. 
I NB 
- 
Naturally fluctuations of buoyancy are not a problem for devices that derive their lift from hot air, but due to the present 
raritv of such craft, and the fact that to date. no one is proposing to apply this principle to the NG%'LAs, the GH of them is excluded. 
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7.3.3 Wind and weather 
The third problern i,. the weather. As soon as aný airship lei\c,, it',, shed it will Icel the influclicc ol (lie 
weather and particularly ofthe wind. The fragile shell means that the airship must he allo\\cd to 
weathervanc and to turn it's nose into xvind in order to present the least resistance to it. Aný attempts to 
hold the airship across the Nvind risk damage to the IILIII structure. So the transit out ofthc shcd and across 
the airfield to the mooring place, must either be quick, or allow the airship, while it is being moved to its 
new location, to swin- into ali, 2nment with whatever wind is blowim-,. 
-While the principles of handling airships are much the same as those for handlin- surface 
vessels. in airships we have a third dimension. We also have to deal with Nvind, gusts, eddies 
which may have an almost instantaneous effect on ail airship and which make it necessary to 
keep the airship constantly under control and to anticipate ifpossiblc the changes that are likely 
to occur. The analogy of'bringing a sailing vessel to her dock with canvas spread is a crude one 4- Zý Zý 
- but conveys some idea of the what airship handling may involve. - (Fulton, 1929: 55) 
Indeed, the strength of the airship hull may be the defining factor for some manoeUNTCS: 
"it may be interesting to know that it was the vertical strength of the Los Angeles* structure aft 
that determined the maxiML1111 wind velocity in which that ship could be handled in and out of 
the shed. " (Rosendahl, 193 1 a) 
Furthermore, rain and sun may also alter the buoyancy while the airship is in transit. Thus an accurately 
forecast weathcr-window. that is foreseen sufficiently far in advance and is ot'sufficient duration for 
whatever translocation or nianoeuvre of the airship is intended, is vital. and as with the buoyancy, there 
must also be constant monitoring and awareness ofthe weather throughout the procedure. 
At the end of an initial transit manoeuvre from its assembly shed, when an airship arrives at its launch or 
mooring site, there are three options. These are: 
1. Turn around/reverse and go back inside, or 
2. Let go so the airship flies (preferably under control. ) or 
3. Hold on 
- 
i. e. moor the airship securely. 
Assuming for the sake of argument that the airship is launched to flight then the next problem for the 
ground crew will be to catch it again. And here the wind and weather create c\ en more difficult problems. 
The reason being that all aircraft are affected by the wind to some extent, but airships are peculiarly 
disadvantaged. Their gigantic proportions make them slow to respond to the lichu and their Lilly tail fins 
deny them the ability to weathervane autornatically like other aircraft. When hit by side gusts. airships in 
flight naturally turn away from them thereby exaggerating the diverting effect until a Counteracting force 
is applied to push them back on course. Because ofthis, airship pilots must constantly steel- to correct 
their craft's unpredictable movements in three dimensions and ground handlers must be prepared for all 
airship that can be moved suddenly by the wind, cither forwards or backwards, LIP or down. or to either 
side. It may also yaw freely and even rotate completely about its vertical axis. It may pitch more thall 45 
degrees above or below the horizontal axis and also roll a little. Furthermore, in very gusty or turbulent 
conditions, an airship may combine several ofthese movements simultaneously so that I gentle, 
controlled touchdown at a prearranged spot is virtually impossible. 
Assuming further that the airship is recaptured satisfactorily without damage, then it will have to be 
moored and here again, quite apart from the wind, there are also several other formidable meteorological 
phenomena that the ground crew ofany moored airship will, on occasion, have to Contend with. 
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These include 
- 
Solar radiation and ultra-violet light : Snow and ice : Dust and fog : Heavy rain and hail 
Lightening and the build up of static electrical charge : and Storms. 
So the third inescapable generic GH problem is the wind and weather. 
7.3.4 Mooring and access 
The fourth fundamental problem is of a different order to that of the preceding three 
- 
but it is no less 
important nor easy to solve. In many ways it can be seen as a resultant of the immutable physical 
constraints outlined thus far. It stems from the inescapable requirement that, when an airship is on the 
ground, and out in the open air, it must somehow be held securely so that the combined effects of its 
positive buoyancy and the wind cannot carry it away. As an airship is moved from it's shed, across an 
airfield and on to a mooring site, changes to its buoyancy may be caused by fluctuations in sunshine, or 
ambient barometric pressure, or air temperature variations, or leakage of gas, or accumulations of 
rainwater, or wind-chill, or combinations thereof. All of these must be constantly monitored and 
compensated for as failure to do so can result in loss of the airship. And yet, even while the airship is in 
transit, there must be guaranteed access for personnel to the airship's life-support systems at all times. 
The wind and weather may change. The forecast may be entirely wrong, but whatever happens, the 
airship must be held secure and regardless of the time of day (or night, ) the season of the year, or the state 
of the airship's buoyancy, people and things have to be constantly got on and off it. Needless to say this 
addition or removal of weight will itself also affect the buoyancy. Nevertheless, provision must be made 
for passengers to embark and disembark, for luggage and cargo to be on- and off-loaded, for engineers to 
carry out routine inspections and maintenance, and for crew members to generally service, clean, refuel 
and replenish consurnables, in preparation for the first, or the next flight. 
Thus whatever the airship is moored to, must both allow access to its interior and enable it to ride out 
whatever extremes of weather may eventuate 
- 
including perpetual changes of wind direction and even 
storm force winds that may last for several days 
- 
without the airship sustaining any structural damage. 
The scarcity of anchor points on an airship's surface adds to the difficulty, however, the fragile shell does 
also mean that there are likely to be only a limited number of possible access points, which makes the 
balancing act that is buoyancy control a little easier to monitor and adjust. 
One of the major lessons learned during the prolonged period of GH experimentation conducted by the 
PGVLAs is that by far the best way that has been discovered to date, of achieving a secure mooring that 
will also allow guaranteed all-weather access, is by means of a mooring mast: 
"The report by Captain Thomas on the conclusion of the trials of R-33 at Pulham up to 21' July 
1921 read: It was definitely proved by the foregoing experiments that the system of mooring to a 
mast, and leaving and landing thereto, is entirely sound; that a ship would successfully ride out 
all types of weather ; that she could leave the mast in any weather she could fly in; and (notably 
the hauling-in and yaw-guy winches) she would be able to land in winds of over 30 mph. The 
ship did not show excessive deterioration excepting the gas bags which is probably caused by the 
adhesive used between the sldns and the fabric. Ordinary routine work can be carried out on the 
ship at the mast and work such as changing an engine or a gas bag performedL " (Williams, 
1974: 151) 
Thus the fourth generic problem is mooring and access. 
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7.3.5 The launch / release (or take-off) 
The fifth problem is how to let go of the airship controllably. The launch must be carried out without 
damage to the airship or injury to crew members. Weather monitoring and forecasting is obviously vital. 
Changes of wind speed or direction and temperature inversions may cause the launch to be aborted. 
Systems failure may also cause launch abort and the ground crew must be ready to react or the ship will 
be lost. However, the fragile shell means that the ground crew can only offer limited hands-on assistance. 
Prior to launch the buoyancy has to be adjusted to suit the pilot's requirements for the intended mission. 
The major problems for launch are thus: How to establish precisely, before the airship is released, how 
buoyant it is. Then, how to weigh it off, by adjustment of ballast in an unpredictable wind, and lastly bow 
to avoid it hitting the mooring mast when it is let go? The winds that blow very close to the ground are 
locally extremely sensitive and forecasts of them are not very accurate. Temperature (and hun-ddity) 
prediction is worse and the measurement and accurate prediction of air density (which is really what an 
airship needs) is non-existent because no other human activity needs it or is perturbed by changes to it. 
Although some minor structural damage on take-off might not be as catastrophic for an LTA craft as it 
would be for its HTA counterpart it is nevertheless true to say that: 
"Unless the airship leaves the hangar and the ground safely, it cannot be considered airworthy 
for the accomplishment of its mission. " (Rosendahl, 1938) 
7.3.6 The capture / touch-down (or landing) 
The sixth fundamental GH problem is how to capture an airship at the completion of its flight. The 
difficulty stems from the craft's ability to fly in two completely different ways at the same time. Although 
classed as aerostats and capable of being flown like balloons, modem small blimps are nearly always 
operated like aerodynes, and the PGVLAs also flew a lot of the time in similar fashion. However, unlike 
all other aerodynes, which use aerodynamic lift to keep themselves up, airships sometimes do the reverse 
and adopt a nose down attitude to counteract excessive buoyancy. This usually occurs at the end of a long 
flight when they have used up most of their fuel and may be short of ballast weight. If they slow down or 
stop in this positively buoyant state, they will float upwards and like any other gas balloon, will continue 
to ascend until they reach their "pressure height' '- possibly several thousand feet above the ground. 
This capacity to change from aerodyne to aerostat makes landing an airship far from simple and gives the 
pilot five possible ways of changing and controlling altitude. These are: 
" To vector the thrust from propellers and push directly up or down. 
" To use engines to increase or decrease airspeed. 
" To alter the angle of attack: 
aerodynamically with elevators, or 
statically, by movement of ballonet air, or redistribution of ballast weight. 
" To alter buoyancy by 
ejecting ballast to make the craft lighter, or 
releasing gas to make it heavier. 
Lastly, to and change the airship's density by use of meteorological conditions to 
"superheat" or "super cool" the lifting gas. 
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All this results in a bewildering variety of possible trim states in which an airship may make its approach 
to a landing. So, as stated above, an airship arriving for capture can be light or heavy, nose-down or nose 
up, and be in the process of translating quickly or slowly from one to another. Depending on the weather 
conditions, specifically on the speed and direction of the wind, an airship can also be travelling at a wide 
range of ground speeds, with consequent different inertias, and it can approach from any direction. 
It is thus important to realise that all airships are free-floating in three dimensional space and thus have 6 
degrees of freedom. These are: roll, pitch, yaw, surge (or thrustj heave and sway (or side slip). An airship 
pilot's top priority when landing is therefore to bring the craft down very gently and to aim for as little 
vertical speed as possible at the moment of touchdown. This is no easy task- 
"The use of the ship's rudders and elevators to counteract the effect of lateral and vertical gusts 
while mooring is generally of little value. The use of these moveable surfaces during the 
mooring operation in gusty conditions is generally sluggish and tardy, and on the whole 
unprofitable. Human instinct is not able to detect or interpret gusts sufficiently in advance to 
prevent their effects; it is difficult also to know when to shift the controls to counteract for the 
opposite gusts. " (Rosendahl, 1931a) 
On their part, ground handlers must ensure that an incoming airship always decelerates slowly and never 
encounters anything solid before it comes to rest, for a glancing blow from a relatively small but firmly 
fixed object can cause catastrophic hull damage. The task is complicated by the fact that airships have no 
brakes, and inechanisation of the capture process is hampered by the fact that there are a strictly limited 
number of precisely positioned attachment points available on the fragile hull, as stated in the first 
fundamental GH problem. 
"Deflations were the most common accident [for the US Navy blimps], but they were often due 
to events not directly related to flight problems, i. e. striking hangars, masts, or other ground 
handling problems. " (Shock, 1994: xi) 
7.3.7 The generic requirements for an effective GH system 
So, to sum up, a universally effective GH system for all airships must: 
protect an airship's fragile shell from damage yet hold it securely for prolonged periods in 
all weather conditions, 
" be able to accept and counteract he effects of both negative and positive buoyancy, 
" provide easy and safe access for personnel in all weathers, 
" provide full facilities for service and repair in normal operating conditions and for 
emergency systems support in all weathers, 
" facilitate a quick, safe, reliable and cost-effective turnaround. 
" allow an airship to be correctly weighed-off and trimmed for its anticipated mission, 
" ensure an unobstructed take-off, in all weathers, 
" allow an airship to land and/or take-off both aerodynamically and aerostatically, 
" cater for an airship approaching to land from any direction, over a wide range of ground 
speeds with a touchdown at any angle of attack, 
" be able to deal with an airship landing forwards, backwards, sideways or vertically, and 
" in all cases result in a soft, slow impact, 
" cope with unpredictable gusts of wind during a landing and while an airship is moored. 
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8 UNRESOLVED GH ISSUES 
The foremost aim of this investigation has two parts and whereas the preceding section has established 
that there are essentially six generic GH problems for airships of all sizes and types, the purpose of this 
section is now to fulfil the second part, and identify some of the GH issues from the PGVLA era that 
remain as a potential threat to the NGVLAs. In so doing, it is first necessary to re-emphasise that GH is 
an enormously complex topic, that it covers a whole range of loosely interconnected and often poorly 
defined disciplines and that, in all matters concerning GH, the devil is in the detail. Many of the 
procedures involved require extremely specialised skills that are specific to a particular type, or class, of 
airship, and consequently there are an enormous number of wide-ranging subjects and of individual 
actions, that are commonly classed as GH. The potential for unresolved issues to be found amongst all 
this is thus very great indeed. 
Moreover, the seriousness of some of these unresolved GH issues for the NGVLAs should not be 
underestimated, for, as has been shown, while the size of an airship makes little, or no, difference to its 
vulnerability, the larger an airship is, the greater will be the media attention focussed upon it and the 
higher the financial pefialty becomes for what may be, initially, a minor error of judgement. Furthermore, 
the historical records reveal that, when handling airships on the ground, even the simplest of actions, or 
even a non-action by a single individual, can create chains of interacting events that may lead on to an 
exponential number of possibly damaging consequences, some of which may even be catastrophic. Thus, 
failure to recognise and resolve some of the problems encountered by the PGVLAs does offer a really 
serious risk to the future success of the NGVLAs. 
The aim of this section is therefore to illustrate, by means of quotes from the historical records, some of 
the most important of those unresolved, or only partially solved issues from the past, and to identify, with 
occasional reference to quotes from recent, aviation related, and other relevant material, some of those 
which in the author's opinion remain a genuinely serious threat to the VLAs of the ftiture. These are the 
issues that will be dealt with in this section: 
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8.1 General GH issues 
- 
including some old ones perceived to be new! 
There are a number of important general issues related to the GH of VI-As where HR might be expected 
to reveal useful information. These include several old chestnuts that are popularly perceived to be "new" 
issues. Some of these topics are simply too large or ill-defined to be dealt with adequately in this small 
study. For example: 
"The main problems involved in providing adequate airship terminals (exclusive of repair 
facilities) may be classed under three headings: 
(1) Landing the airship from flight by mechanical means (2) Servicing the sl-ýp and mooring it out in the open (3) Housing and unhousing the ship when necessary, by mechanical means that will 
reduce the danger and increase the utility of operation; this includes moving the 
ship between the mooring location and the dock: ' (Rosendahl, 1931 a) 
Nevertheless, there are some specific subjects that do need to be drawn to NGVLA developers' attention: 
8.1.1.1 Ropes and rigging 
Ropes and cordage no longer play a significant part in modem HTA aviation and there is little use for 
them today either in aircraft construction or in operational practices. The days of the old "string-bage' are 
long gone and the regulatory authorities have little need for expertise on the subject. However, the same is 
not true for LTA, and. this lack of knowledge will cause some problems for the NGVLAs, as was pointed 
out in a communication by the author to the LBA/TAR study group in 2003. 
"... It should be remembered that there are a whole range of very different usesfor ropes that can be 
foreseen on large airships and that the safety requirementsfor each will consequently also be very 
different. Considerfor example the properties required by thefollowing: 
Control cables 
- 
to constantly move the rudders and elevators in flight 
Valve lines 
- 
to occasionally control gas valves and ballast water tank valves 
Catenery curtain 
-permanently loaded cables that attach the gondola to the envelope 
Fin rigging 
- 
to hold the tailfins steady and transmit side loads to the envelope 
Handling lines 
- 
to hold the airship during construction and when in transit 
Mooring lines 
- 
that are used briefly to steady the airship during capturefianding 
Tag lines 
- 
to draw the airship's lines through the mast head and onto anchor winches 
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Nose connection line 
- 
to pull the airship onto the mast during capturel7anding 
Yaw guys 
- 
to prevent the airship hitting the mast during capturefianding 
Handrails and crew safety lines 
- 
to allow access to all parts of the shipfor inspection 
Liflingl7owering lines 
- 
for inboard winches or cranes to move such items as engines 
In addition we should notforget that the large rigid airships of the past also carried two long and heavy 
"trail" ropes. Yheir use may not be required in thefuture but we would be unwise to dismiss them as 
totally unnecessary until after thefirst of the next generation of very large airships has made testflights. 
The decisions on the type of rope to be used in each situation 
- 
whether man-madefibre, or wire, or a 
combination of both (e. g. for electrical conductivity! ) 
- 
arejarfrom simple, and the care and maintenance 
of the various rope types 
- 
multiple twisted strands, plaited, woven, encased or single strand 
- 
also needs 
to be addressed Add to this the potentialfor the different types of terminations and connections 
- 
kwots, 
splices, whipped eyes, thimbles, swaged sleeves, bonded 'pultrusions' etc., - coupled with the wide range 
of differentpossible materialsfrom which each of these might also be made, (to say nothing of the 
interaction between them e. g. electrolytic action of dissimilar metals! ) and the uses and abuses to be 
expected during year-round, all-weather, operation (e. g. loss of strength due to abrasion, orfatigue from 
constant knottinglunknotting) and the complexity of the topic becomes clear. 
There is also the point that it wasjound in the past that the airships could be lightened considerably if 
much of the GH equipment stayed on the ground Thus the winches that pull the ropes, which are vitalfor 
the safe connection of the airship to its mooring mast, orfor aligning the airship with the shed, are most 
likely to be classed as ground equipment. However as Martin Penn has pointed out in his comment on a 
previous paragraph, if a mooring line breaks at a critical moment then the "whiplash " or "snapback" 
effect as the tension is suddenly released can be very dangerous to people and structures. Thus it seems 
inevitable that the TAR should be very clear about winches and who is responsiblefor their design, 
operation and maintenance. 
... 
it is apparent that there are a wide variety ofproblems that are unfamiliar and somewhat alien to the 
modem world of aviation. It is however a well researched and well regulated topic in other industries 
where peoples lives are similarly at risk, e. g. Ships, Cranes, Elevators and lifts, and Rock climbing. 
With Martin's point about ropes breaking in mind, I recentlyfound this [following quote] I therefore 
suggest that the TAR study group initiate some research into the whole topic of ropes and their uses, and 
especially into other codes ofpractice that have evolved in industries other than aviation, before making 
any decisions on this topic that may later be regretted. " (Camplin, 2003) 
The following is the excerpt referred to. It comes from a mooring manual written for the maritime oil 
tanker industry by The Oil Companies International Marine Forum in 1989. 
"SNAPBACK 
- 
The most serious danger from synthetic ropes is "snapback" which is the 
sudden release of the energy stored in the stretched synthetic line when it breaks. 
... 
Synthetic 
lines normally break suddenly and without warning. Unlike wires, they do not give audible signs 
of pending failure and they may not exhibit any broken elements before completely parting. 
When a line is loaded it stretches. Energy is stored in the line in proportion to the load and the 
stretch. When the line breaks, this energy is suddenly released. The ends of the line snap back 
striking anything in their path with tremendous force. 
... 
A broken line will snap back beyond 
the point at which it is secured, possibly to a distance almost as far as its own length. If the line 
passes around a fair-lead, then its snap back path may not follow the original path of the line. 
... It is not possible to predict all the potential danger zones from snapback... " (OCIMF, 1989: 34) 
The current HTA practice is far less aware of, or concerned to regulate, such things: 
"We shackled the cables to the tow points on the main gear [of the bogged-down Lockheed 
Electra] and stretched out a lot of very cranky steel cable. Only those who have worked with 
heavy steel cable know what I mean. Loose strands cut through gloves like hypodermic needles. 
It kinks and twists given the slightest chance. You do not want to stand near it when it is under 
strain. " (Vasko, 2001: 19) 
However, the very real danger to a large airship from a single broken rope is shown here: 
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'The landing in Rio, [LZ129 Hindenburg first S. Atlantic crossing; Marcb/April, 1936] was not 
so uneventful. 
... 
A ground crew of two hundred and forty men was on hand but 
... 
The entire 
field was under about six inches of water from heavy rains. Because of the difficulty in handling 
the ship in these conditions, it was decided to keep the stem in the air until the ship could be put 
on the mast. This resulted in getting the nose cone below the cup on the mast and shearing off 
the mooring cable, making it impossible to use the mast. The ship was then walked 
... 
into 
the hangar. 
... 
" (Dick & Robinson, 1985: 114/117) [GC emphasis] 
In other words, the airship only survived because it was in the hands of 240 experienced men, and the 
weather was such that the airship could be walked into a shed. Moreover, this shed was not only 
conveniently situated nearby, but was both large enough to hold the airship in question and not occupied 
by another airship at the time. Had any one of these factors been absent or different, then the happy 
ending to the story would have been so too. 
Other airships came close to disaster for similar reasons, as these three accounts of the same event attend: 
"In addition, when landing [R100 first time in Montreal] they did in the sl-iip's main rope as on 
the second flight, but they have a spare out here. " (Shute, 1954: 122) 
"Also replaced [prior to the R100 return flight to England] was the ship's main [mooring] wire 
which had been pulled in two after coupling to the mooring arm. Lieutenant Commander 
Pressey, in charge of the mast, concluded that the wire must have been kinked because there 
could not have been more than a 15-ton pull on it. " (Countryman, 1982: 97) 
"After [RIOO] landing it was found that the main wire had been damaged badly due to 
disconnecting it while under tension. During, or rather just after, the landing the main mooring- 
wire had become so badly kinked that it had to be scrapped. The cause of the kinking was that 
during the hauling down of the airship the wire is put under great strain which tends to stretch it 
and unlay the strands. This can be seen on any crane for lifting heavy loads 
... 
The reason our 
wire kinked itself was that as soon as the strain was taken off the stretched or unlayed strands 
suddenly tried to lay themselves up again so fast that some of them ballooned and twisted 
themselves into a kink. This is a serious difficulty, as the cost of a new wire is no bagatelle 
... We tried various remedies, but I am not sure to this day if we did finally overcome it definitely. " (Meager, 1970: 163) 
In the author's experience at CargoLifter, the full danger to the NGVLAs from rope failure was not 
appreciated. For example, it was on occasion suggested, most frequently by experienced HTA pilots, that 
if the partly moored airship "got into difficulties" then the CLI60 pilot should have the capability to cut 
his mooring ropes and initiate a go-around. However, anyone who thinks this is going to be a useful 
option simply has not thought of the consequences, and here again, the devil is in the detail. 
If for example an NGVLA were to follow the tried and tested mooring method used by the large rigids 
- 
as was indeed proposed for the CargoLifter prototype 
- 
and to be halfway into the process, connected to 
the mooring mast by one or more mooring lines, and the pilot, or a ground crew member were then to cut 
these connections for whatever reason. It is necessary to consider these points. Firstly, does the snap-back 
of the cut ends cause a) damage to airship; or b) damage to the GH equipment; or c) injury to personnel? 
Any of these may render a second attempted landing impossible. 
Secondly, what happens to the cut ends? Where do they end up? Do they fray into a "horses-tair'? This 
then begs the crunch questions : How long does it take for both air and ground crews to restore the 
severed ropes to their correct lengths again, or more specifically, how will each cut end be turned back 
into something that is compatible with its counterpart and allows them to be re-connected? Do the crew 
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simply tie a knot or do they replace the broken cable with a new one? If the latter, then the airship will 
have to carry a permanent weight-penalty of "x" number of spare cables, plus the means of exchanging 
them, and allow access to both the new, stored cables and to the connection points whereon the old cables 
are still in situ. Even if these connection points are undamaged by the snap-back they may still be out of 
conunission. For instance, there maybe cable that has jumped out of fair-leads or pulleys and piled up 
loose on the floor, or on winch-drums, and this will need to be rewound before it can be used again. Also, 
if the cable ends unlay then they may jam in their fair-leads and the actual cut part may therefore be 
physically out of reach. Both ground and air crews will have their own separate problems here. 
Bearing in mind also that if a rope can simply have a new end/connector efashioned onto it's now 
shortened length, then the question arises as to why this rope was so long to begin with? All the airship 
systems are required to be the lightest possible configuration that can carry out their designated task 
- 
i. e. 
to contain the least superfluous material. If the airship can now be landed, in the emergency conditions, 
with a much shorter rope than that which was being used for the first attempt, then it must by definition 
be normally carrying "excess" weight. There is nothing wrong with an airship carrying spares, it just 
means that the design philosophy and the allocated weight budget will have to be amended. Furthermore, 
if the airship can be landed without using the cut ropes at all, then why have them in the first place? 
Consequently, if ropes are present, they must be necessary, and if they are necessary, they must work, and 
thus, because their failure threatens the airship's survival, it follows that if these ropes are cut, then they 
do not work and the airship is in a critical condition. So, a safe landing cannot be made until full 
functionality is restored and the idea that a pilot, or his ground crew, would willingly cut the mooring 
ropes is thus nonsensical. 
And then there are knots. These require great precision 
- 
one wrong crossover creates a completely 
different knot with different properties. If the NGVLAs are to use mooring ropes then such detail matters. 
"... some knots are more prone to jamming than others, that is 
... 
they become particularly 
difficult to untie. This tendency to jam is important in selecting knots that are expected to endure 
heavy loads yet require frequent tying and untying. It seems that no one has solved the problem 
of how to test that property reproducibly and objectively 
... 
" (Warner, 1996: 201) 
And knots have caused serious problems for large airships in the past: 
"... there was a stiff land breeze that made it difficult to manage the long hull of the dirigible 
[Count Zeppelin's LZ-2]. The wind drove the airship ahead of the tug, making it necessary to 
drop the tow-line. But even so small an accident as a knot in this rope spelled disaster; the 
airship could not be freed from the tug until its bow with its steering apparatus had been pulled 
into the water. This broke the steering gear. " (Hylander, 1931: 150) 
It is thus evident that the ground crews for any future VLAs will need to be at least as skilled in the use of 
ropes, and as knowledgeable of the lore concerning them, as are today's sailors. The NGVLA designers 
will also have to understand all matters concerning rope, including the reasons behind its various types 
and usages. This information is freely available in the world of modern sailing: 
"If a constant load is applied to a rope, such as by suspending a fixed weight, the rope continues 
to stretch slowly and, if the load is a substantial fraction of the breaking strength of the rope 
... the rope will eventually break. 
... 
Some extrapolated figures suggest hat, even with a load of 
20% of the breaking strength (listed as the safe working load for many industrial applications) 
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the rope would break through creep within a few years 
... 
in practice, of course, weathering 
would have weakened the rope sufficiently to cause a break before that. " (Warner, 1996: 194/5) 
The regulatory authorities, who in seeking to establish a basis for safe working practices for the NGVLA 
ground crews, will also need to know the advantages and limitations of different fibres as well as 
something of the history and evolution of rope, along with the state of rope-making technology today. In 0 
so doing they will also need to come to terms with, and perhaps incorporate into modem aeronautical 
manuals some old nautical knowledge and tem-ýinologies. For example: 
"... strengths may vary somewhat with the lengths of the fibres from which the ropes are made: 
the longer the fibre the stronger the rope. The fibres are first twisted into yams, the yams are 
twisted (or laid) into strands, the strands are twisted (or laid) into ropes. Ordinarily, the yam is 
twisted in one direction, the lay of the strand is opposite to that of the yam, and the lay of the 
rope is opposite to that of the strand. When, however, we want a flexible and unkinkable rope, 
the strand is laid in the same direction as the yam, and the rope is then known as a "reverse laid7' 
rope. " (Jutsum, 1941: 83) 
"All ropes are measured by their circumference, and they reeve through a common wood block 
whose length is three times their size, and through a clump block twice their size. Calling the 
size of the rope, in inches 'C'we can find its strength as follows: 
Breaking strength =C squared over 3 tons. 
Proof strength =C squared over 4 tons. 
Safe working load for occasional lift =C squared over 7 tons. 
Safe working load for continuous working =C squared over 18 tons. 
When a purchase is put on to the fall of another purchase, as with a luff upon luff, the resultant 
purchase obtained is equal to the power of the first purchase multiplied by the power of the 
second purchase. We have to make an allowance for friction (an addition of 10 per cent of the 
weight for each moving sheave). " (Jutsum, 1941: 84) 
'The life of Wire Rope depends principally upon the diameter of drums, sheaves, and pulleys; 
and too much importance cannot be given to the size of the latter. Wherever possible the size of 
the pulleys should be not less than 700 times the diameter of the largest wire in the rope, and 
never less than 300 times. The diameters of drums, sheaves, and pulleys should increase with the 
working load when the factor of safety is less that 5 to L'Me load should not be lifted with a jerk, as the strain may equal three or four times the proper load, and a sound rope may easily be 
broken. 
... 
Examine ropes frequently. A new rope is cheaper than the risk of killing or 
maiming employees. " (Jutsum, 1941: 72174) (GC emphasis) 
8.1.1.2 Crew training and skills 
The preceding issue further underlines the absolute need for all those involved with the GH of the 
NGVLAs to know what they are doing and to be skilled in carrying it out. This comes back to training, 
and even though the seriousness of this has been recognised in the HTA world, it is difficult to see how 
such a scheme as that following can be applied to the first prototype NGVLA: 
"[Aeropass] adoption on a national basis will raise standards in both the practical and acaden-dc 
fields of all those who operate in an airport's ground environment, an environment that has been 
described by the UK Health & Safety Executive as one of the most dangerous to work in. Only 
by operating to the highest levels of competency and safety 
... 
will it start to claw back those 
huge sums of money lost each year to accidents and damage. " (Mason, 2000: 47) 
However, the risks of using large airships without expert crews are well documented: 
"The war would not wait for training. And I am sure it will not be taken as any personal 
reflection on those brave men when I say that the majority of the accidents which destroyed 
Zeppelins resulted from sheer inexperience: ' (Lehmann & Mingos, 1927: 110) 
It would seem that perhaps the answer lies yet again in a closer alliance with the sea and that future 
airship crews should initially be sought among the ranks of trained sailors. After all there is a strong bond 
between airships and their sea-going Counterparts. 
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"Clambering about in and on top of an airship flying at 40-50 mph, 1,500 ft above the waves is 
very reminiscent of sailors working in the rigging of a tall ship, shortening sail in a squall. " 
(Mowthorpe, 1999: xv) 
"As with surface vessels, some officers will develop into better "airship handlers" than others. " 
(Fulton, 1929: 58) 
I think that any officer who has handled a surface ship and then qualified for a command of a 
rigid airship is better able to command that ship. The question of seamanship is closely allied 
with so-called "airmanship", and in my opinion the handling of a surface ship has many points in 
common with handling an airship. " (US Congress, 1933 : Dresel : 135) 
And there is a wealth of experience to learn from at all levels: 
"... [the practical seaman of short experience when learning to tie knots] must remember that 
proficiency in what is really skilled workmanship, amounting almost to an art, can only be 
gained by much practice and perseverance, and should gladly avail himself of any advice or help 
he may be able to obtain from his more experienced ship-mates. " (Jutsum, 1941 : Introduction) 
8.1.1.3 Conununications 
- 
visual or audio? 
There are also some problems that are not of a physical nature but which are nonetheless related to GH 
and which offer a threat to the NGVLA development programmes. One such is the common presumption 
that communication between ground staff for large airships will be best done by means of "modern" radio 
links such as those used in the HTA world today. These, however, are not infallible: 
"... during the night they towed a B-720 into a hangar door. 
... 
With only a few mechanics on 
duty they had enlisted a rampie to "watch the left wingtip as we tow the big Boeing in. " He did 
exactly that and watched it run into the door and crumple. He was a very good watcher, but poor 
at communicating. " (Vasko, 2001: 19) 
"A large tow tractor [at Frankfurt Airport in October 2000] had just had its towbar uncoupled 
... The ramp agent 
... 
was hit by the reversing tow tractor. 
... 
The driver was alerted to the collision 
only through calls from ramp personnel nearby. 
... 
This is a tragic accident and a reminder of 
how dangerous the ramp is as a workplace when communication and visual contact are lost 
among ground staff. " (Lamprecht, 2000/2001: 46) 
The important point here is that "visual contact was losf' and it is often overlooked by advocates of 
modem systems that the "old-fashioned" visual signals, as practised by the PGVLAs are not actually 
inferior to an audio-based system but are actually an alternative, independent system that in many ways is 
safer. For example, the sound of a short verbal response may easily be missed in a noisy environment, 
moreover, it is a transitory event that requires active repetition on the part of the sender, (who is perhaps 
busy with other things, ) whereas a visual signal, continues to work, and may be constantly and repeatedly 
checked by the receiver, until it is cancelled. With the adoption of mechanical GH systems in the future, 
and the use of unavoidably large and noisy vehicles, the problem of misheard information is likely to be 
greatly increased rather than eliminated. Indeed, the advantages of passive, silent visual signals have 
recently been shown in the responses by the military (who are not short of hi-tech audio-based solutions) 
to the spate of "blue on blue" or friendly fire accidents that have occurred on the battlefields of the 
Middle East. 
Thus, there would seem to be a considerable potential benefit to the NGVLAs, by the incorporation into 
their comms system, of something similar, or even based upon, the proven "Flag codes" as used by the 
PGVLAs. In Britain these evolved from Navy flag signals and started with the First War Coastal blimps 
who, in failing to reach their home base would fly a triangular 'forced landing' pennant to indicate that 
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their 'emergency landing crews' should start to run cross-country to retrieve them. By the time of the 
Imperial Airship Scheme this had become a reliable and simple code. 
"As soon as the Captain of the ship [R100] is satisfied as to trim [after main wire connection to 
the ground during landing sequence], he will order a white flag to be shown from the control car 
as a signal to the officer in charge of the mooring-tower, that he may commence to haul in on the 
main winch. As soon as he gives the order to haul in, a white flag is also shown from the tower 
platform. If for any reason either wishes the evolution to stop, a red flag replaces the white. " 
(Meager, 1970: 156) 
These flags were just as effective when substituted by coloured lights at night (Countryman, 1982: 124) 
and the need for both audio and visual signals was recognised by the US Navy towards the end of their 
airship operations. 
"l-21 
- 
It is essential that the GHO be easily identified and it is recommended that he have in his 
possession the following equipment: a) A metal police type whistle for maximum audio 
capability in attracting attention over the noise of the airship engines. b) Colored vest. c) 
Standard signal wands for use during night operations, and a Very pistol with red flares for 
signalling emergency on field. " (US Navy, 1958: 4) 
8.1.1.4 The siting of airship bases 
A further general point that has great implications for GH is the actual location of airship bases. As noted 
in Section 6.4.2 there were several different types of PGVLA base and the requirements for each are quite 
different. The historical records reveal that not only did luck apparently play a big part in the earliest 
PGVLA successes but that the factors governing a good location are extremely complex. Moreover, once 
a base is established, unless it is an expeditionary base, it is exceedingly difficult to do anything about it. 
"The influence of location and local characteristics on the value of an airship base is now 
beginning to be appreciated in this country although the Germans long ago sensed this factor 
keenly. The same general principle applies to harbours for surface ships 
... 
a harbour 
continuously beset by fog would never become popular or profitable. And so the location of our 
one present airship base cannot be passed over without comment. When Lakehurst was decided 
upon as an airship base, our knowledge of rigid airship operation was largely yet to be gained 
and in the absence of this proper operating knowledge, naturally other factors, strategical and 
economical, ruled the selection of a site. Lakehurst was intended largely as an airship 
construction and experimental station, but it happens that as an airship operating base, Lakehurst 
is rather unsuitable. Bear in mind the distinction between an airship operating base and an 
airship construction station; for the latter purpose Lakehurst can be said to be fairly satisfactory. 
But Lakehurst is handicapped by being in the path of practically every Trans-contincntal and 
Canadian border atmospheric disturbance and feels some effect from most passing tropical 
storms as well as from many secondary barometric depressions that form off-shore and move up 
the Atlantic Coast. The resulting percentages of undesirable and dangerous handling and flying 
weather, i. e. of unsuitable airship terminal weather, as viewed from our past and present needs, 
are therefore high. " (Rosendahl, 1927: 751) 
As with any airfield, the local weather conditions obviously play a big part in the success of LTA 
operations. However, they are not the only consideration. 
"Because of the limitation imposed on airships flying from a base at high elevation, it is 
remarkable that the most important development of the rigid should have been at Manzell and 
Friedrichshafen which are at 400m (1300 ft) above sea level. 
... 
Operating from Lake Constance 
... 
the Zeppelins suffered an unavoidable penalty in their payload/range capabilities because 
their pressure heights had to be that much higher than if they had been taking off at sea level. " 
Brooks, 1992: Note 13. ) 
"For the first time, [May, 1936] the Hindenburg landed at the new international airship base at 
Frankfurt am Main, where one hangar was finally ready. An advantage of operating from 
Frankfurt am Main was that since it was only 300 feet above sea level, the Hindenburg could lift 
13,500 pounds more than in a takeoff at Friedrichshafen, which lay 1000 feet higher. "(Dick & 
Robinson, 1985: 124/5) 
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But, despite the altitude penalty, there was a widespread belief in Britain and America that Count 
Zeppelin had actually chanced upon the ideal site for his first base. 
"T'he speed of development of the early airships was 
... 
largely controlled by the weather 
conditions prevailing at their operating bases, and without in any way wishing to diminish the 
credit due to Count Zeppelin 
... 
I cannot help feeling that his success was to a great extent 
assisted by the exceptional weather conditions that prevail at his base at Friedrichshafen. " 
(Richmond & Scott, 1930) 
"... weather conditions at Friedrichshaven are very ideal. " (US Congress, 1933 
- 
Harpham, : 448) 
"Weather conditions at German bases generally do not compare with the more severe conditions 
under which we have to operate airships. "(Rosendahl, 1927) 
Thus the NGVLAs would do well to pay careful attention to the intended sites for their various 
differently-purposed bases. Or more specifically to the micro-climate that prevails at them and to the 
exact orientation of their sheds. 
"Around every shed or building we find peculiar wind conditions. There is a falling down 
current at the leeward end of a shed, which extends out a distance about equal to the height of 
the shed, and curling inwards forins a back draught into the shed. The doors, if in the wind path, 
create eddies on their leeward side. Thus there is a danger zone to leeward of the shed structure. 
This zone can be minimized through careful shed and door design. " (Fulton, 1929: 56) 
'The location of an airship base, the orientation of the shed, if there be one, and the type of shed 
all have important bearing on the problem of handling airships. The base should be chosen 
where meteorological conditions are favorable. The shed, if of the fixed type, should be oriented 
so that the cross wind component will be a minimum under conditions when it is likely the 
airship will be docked or undocked. " (Fulton, 1929: 55) (GC emphasis) 
This last, emphasised, point is another that is often overlooked or misunderstood, for the direction 
indicated is not the same as that commonly termed as being "into the prevailing wind. " The prevailing 
wind is generally taken to mean the direction from which the wind most commonly blows. From the lay 
perspective it often means the direction of the strongest winds, as these are the most often noticed, and the 
shed builders are usually happy to align with this as it minimises the stresses on their roofs. However, the 
airship is unlikely to be undocked or re-docked in the strongest winds. Thus, in order to maximise the 
amount of time when docking will be possible, as correctly stated by Fulton, the shed should be aligned 
with the wind direction that is most common on the site when the wind is gentle enough to permit the 
procedure to be carried out in safety. However: 
"... we have found it will not be necessary to provide ships that will stand handling into hangars 
under unlimited conditions or gear capable of serving under extreme conditions, for a study of 
records has shown that even at Lakehurst on ninety-six per cent of the days of the year the wind 
drops to less than 20 miles per hour velocity for periods of 2 hours of more. " (Rosendahl, 1927) 
But it is the "prevailing direction7' of this perhaps infrequent, low-speed wind that is important in deciding 
the orientation of any new shed, and quite what the effects of the changing weather-patterns resulting 
from Global Warming will have in the future, on the validity of past weather records, remains to be seen. 
8.2 Issues relating to specific phases of GH 
In Section 5.3.2 
- 
What is Ground Handling? 
- 
it was shown that although there are at least 40 separate 
"Generic Tasks" which can be identified as being in some way part of GH, the topic can also be broken 
down fairly conveniently into just 8 sections. Moreover, these subdivisions or groupings can, for ease of 
memory, be labelled by their initial letters as PP MM LL CC 
- 
standing for Protect, Prepare, Move, Moor, 
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Load, Uunch, Capture and Camp-out. Study of the historical records reveals that all of these task--groups 
have one or more issues that were left unresolved at the closure of the previous large airship development 
programmes in the 1930's 
- 
although it should be kept in mind that these categories are far from adequate 
to cover all aspects of the topic and many others have had to be excluded for reasons of space. 
8.2.1 Protect 
It should be bome in mind that there are three separate components that need protection. Viz.: 
a) The Airship 
b) The GH Infrastructure 
c) The Personnel 
Moreover, as identified in Section 6.4 above, there are two aspects to protecting the airship. Firstly there 
is protection from damage, or interference, by unauthorised personnel 
- 
which in modern parlance might 
more properly be encapsulated by the term -security, " and secondly there is protection from the vagaries 
of the "weather. " Both of these are absolutely vital to the physical survival of the airship; both are greatly 
helped by the provision of a physical barrier or screen-, both require constant, unceasing vigilance on the 
part of those made responsible for the task, and both may require prompt intervention and strenuous 
physical action to be taken at short notice, in order to niitigate or minimise the impact of an -attack. " 
Security 
- 
Terrorism 
"As a point of interest, Santos-Dumont's No. 7, a small fast airship built to compete in the St 
Louis air race of 1904, was destroyed in its shed at Saint-Cloud 
- 
by vandals. That indicates that 
problems with law and order are not a recent phenomena. " (Mowthorpe, 1999: 3) 
"The Zeppelins and another airship, the Schuette-Lam-20, were destroyed in their hangars at 
Ahlhorn [5h January 19181. The case has remained a mystery. The cause of their destruction has 
not been definitely determined. The circumstances indicate, however, that it was due to sabotage 
- 
some criminally inclined member of the station crew at Ahlhorn, or possibly a small group 
bought with enemy money, must have purposely blasted the ships. 
... 
which could hardly have 
resulted from causes other than a deliberate attempt to cripple the airship service. - (Lehmann & 
Nfingos, 1927: 277) 
"One of his motives [Lehmann's for flying on LZ1291 although by no means the only one, was 
that a warning that an attempt might be made to destroy the ship had been passed to his office by 
the German Ambassador in Washington. Such warnings were not uncommon and were usually 
regarded as the work of cranks. A time bomb had, however, once been discovered in the Graf 
Zeppelin, and an attempt had been made in 1931 to sabotage the Akron. " (Collier, 1974: 213/4) 
Obviously a cordon sanitare can be thrown around the airship when it is on the ground, and in these days 
of terrorist threats, this is certain to be vigorously maintained. Nevertheless, those guarding the NGVLAs 
need to be aware that for every nutcase who wants to put a bomb on onboard the airship and destroy it, 
there are probably going to be a thousand who would rather steal a ride on it. 
81.1.2 Security 
- 
Stowaways 
Although seemingly a trivial problem, the ease with which stowaways could sneak on board and hide 
themselves proved to be a constant nuisance for the passenger-carriers of the past, especially for those 
large rigid ships which were moored inside sheds. 
"Tbe departure from Friedrichshafen, scheduled for II October 1924, proved troublesome. 
When Captain Flemming weighed the ship [LZ-1261, he found it puzzlingly tail-heavy. A search 
revealed two stowaways in the stern portion 
-a reporter from the International News Service and 
a photographer from International Newsreel who had sneaked on board in work clothes hoping 
for a scoop. " (Botting, 2001: 106) 
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"Not long after first light [Sunday, 28 October 1928], while making an inspection of the ship [LZ-127], Captain Hans von Schiller discovered a stowaway, a blond-haired, eightcen-year-old 
American from St Louis, Missouri, who had sneaked on board at Lakehurst carrying nothing but 
a toothbrush, and hidden himself among the mail sacks. " (Botting, 2001: 145-6) 
"rake-off [from Tokyo] was set for 4 a. m. on 22 August [ 1929] 
... 
During its time on the ground 
the airship [LZ 127] had been undergoing a thorough overhaul 
... 
The last items to be loaded on 
board consisted of fresh vegetables 
... 
and a parachute with which to throw any stowaway 
overboard 
- 
one had already been caught in the hangar earlier in the day, a seventeen-year-old 
boy dressed in a kimono. " (Botting, 2001: 188) 
And joy-riders are going to be just as hard to deter in the future. Furthermore, the enormous size of the 
NGVLA structures will offer many hiding places 
- 
and human beings were not the only stowaways: 
'The R34 is best remembered for her transatlantic flight 
... 
[she] took off from East Fortune at 
1.24 arrL on 2 July 1919 bound for New York. 
... 
On board were Brigadier-General E. M. 
Maitland, CMG, DSO, the officer commanding the British Military Airship Service, a crew of 
thirty, a kitten and a stowaway 
- 
an airman named Ballantyne. " (Jackson, 1971: 132) 
"Though the Graf [LZ 127] was carefully searched immediatcly prior to departure ( 15 August 
1929], a stowaway of sorts successfully eluded discovery until [the l7th]. Hungry, shivering and 
distressed, a small black kitten was found in the depths of the ship's vast and complex interior by 
a rigger on a tour of inspection 
... 
" (Botting, 2001: 174) 
There are also souvenir hunters to consider: 
"When SLI I was brought down... at Cuffley and L32 at Billericay 
... 
not only were items of 
value to the Government taken, but firemen and special constables looted the bodies of the dead 
crew, as it has been said that souvenir hunters did when Shenandoah crashed in the United States 
in 1925 
... 
On September 28th [1916] it was proposed [by British Admiralty Intelligence that in 
future] 
... 
around the whole of the wreck a barbed wire fence should be erected and manned by 
soldiers with fixed bayonets 
... 
At the same time special passes were made out for those 
authorised to visit a wreck 
... 
Official photographers were to be allowed in, but no neutral 
pressmen for at least two days after a ship was shot down. Any ship which fell within a town 
was to be treated by the local police and firemen as major fire and suitable precautions taken. 
Full printed instructions were issued to the Army in October 1916. " (Higham, 1961 : 155/6) 
8.2.1.3 Security 
- 
Crowd control 
Crowds will appear for all special occasions and control of them at these times can be planned for: 
"In the late afternoon of 4 September, [1923] with fifteen thousand spectators, dignitaries, 
reporters, and newsreel people on board the base, ZR-l [Shenandoah] was walked out for the 
first time. " (Althoff, 1990: 28) 
"With complete co-operation of the crowds, the Royal Canadian Dragoons troopers cleared a 
300-yard circle around the [St Hubert] mast. 
... 
[RIOO preparing for the 24 hour Canadian flight 
in summer 1930] " (Countryman, 1982: 83) 
However, in these days of instant communication, and easy personal transport, simply opening the shed 
door and revealing to the public gaze, the largest prototype aircraft the world has ever seen, is certain to 
draw a vast crowd. Thus, on the scale of the NGVLAs, everything will effectively have to be done in 
public, and the repercussions in terms of local traffic, of a week of even ground-based testing, for a 
gigantic airship that is visible from a nearby motorway, will have to be considered. 
"Soon, seemingly endless lines of automobiles were snaking from the main gate through the 
town and throughout the general area. The roads to the village were promptly jammed. This 
crush of Lakehurst-bound visitors was to be repeated for the arrival from Germany of ZR-3 that 
fall, and later for visits by Graf Zeppelin and Hindenburg. But this spring day [3 1" May] in 1924 
was the pacemaker. By 0930, perhaps twenty-five thousand spectators were on hand (Althoff, 1990: 40) 
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"rhe Graf Zeppelin's departure was scheduled for 10 October [1928], but the omens were bad. 
The Atlantic weather map was a nightmare 
... 
In the end he [Dr. Eckener] decided that the only 
option was to postpone the departure altogether. The crowd of many thousands wandered away, 
disappointed and disgruntled. " (Botting, 2001: 116) 
"[Graf Zeppefin's] take-off was set for 4 a. m. on 22 August [ 1929] 
... 
As the day progressed the 
crowd grew, many arriving on special trains from Tokyo, till around half a rrdffion people 
surrounded the airship field 
... 
" (Botting, 2001: 188) 
8.21A Security 
- 
Ground crew health and safety 
Even if the number of ground crew is reduced to a handful for economic reasons, the danger to those who 
remain will not diminish. Less people means more machinery, and bigger airships will need bigger and 
more complex machinery. Even with rigidly enforced codes of practice, along with high levels of 
training, careful planning and vigilance, big macl-dnes are still dangerous, but, for the ground crews of the 
past the biggest killer of all was something else that has not diminished 
- 
the force of gravity. 
"R34 herself [on reaching America in July 19191 was in good trim. She was moored by the 
'three wire' system at night, but during the day she was pulled down and held by the united 
efforts of the American ground-crew. Even for these hefty sailors it was an arduous task 
... 
The 
bright sunlight of the next morning again caused gas expansion 
... 
When the ground-crew tried 
to haul her down 
... 
they found the job almost beyond them. Men were lifted bodily into the air 
and dropped heavily back again as the ship rocked violently from side to side. " (Abbott, 
1973: 114) 
It she [the crippled R341 descended slowly into the hands of the 400-strong ground-crew, who 
led her, rolling and pitching, towards the safety of the hangar. They managed to haul her almost 
within reach of the doors, but because of the boisterous and uncertain wind it proved impossible 
to 
... 
enter. 
... 
vicious squalls repeatedly lifted her up and then dashed her down to earth again. 
During one of these gusts, the after car was swung 60 ft off the ground, with some of the 
landing-party still hanging on to it 
... 
" (Abbott, 1973: 140) 
"It took 500 men to hold a North Sea class airship in turbulent conditions and even then it was a 
struggle. Tom hands and broken limbs were common. At least five deaths were recorded from 
ground-crew members who held on too long, falling from a great height while controlling a 
bucking airship. " (Mowthorpe, 1999: 41) 
The instinctive human reaction to grip harder when lifted suddenly should never be underestimated. The 
tiny time taken by the mind to intellectually over-ride the body's in-built emotional response has proved 
fatal more than once 
- 
even for those who were 100% aware of the problem 
- 
both in the past and today. 
"One of Britain's pioneer airship pilots and most experienced airshipmen Wg Cdr Waterlow 
always persistently drummed it into his men: 'Never hang onto the guy-ropes if lifted off your 
feet 
- 
let go immediately. Once airborne the airship is the responsibility of its pilot. ' 
... 
Sad to 
relate, Waterlow disregarded his own maxim on 12 May 1917 
... 
SS-39 
... 
at RNAS Cranwell 
... 
suddenly broke free. All the rest of the party released except Waterlow who was carried up 
until he fell to his death. " (Mowthorpe, 1999: 21) 
-[On Sunday, February 26,1995 in Hayward, CA] The [Thunder and Colt GA421 blimp hit the 
grass short of the landing zone and bounced along the ground until it stopped 
... 
The pilot told 
the passenger to get out and hold the blimp down. The passenger tripped as he got out and 
... When he got back on his feet, the blimp was rising with the pilot holding on to a hold down rail. 
The pilot lost his grip and fell [to his death] from 200 feet. " (NTSB Ident. No: LAX95LA121. ) 
However, even modem methods and safety awareness cannot guard against all unforeseen events. 
". 
-. 
Mayfly needed well over 700,000 c. f. [of hydrogen], not counting what was lost when one of 
the bags ripped in early May [ 1911 ], an accident caused by Able-seaman Palmer falling through 
the ship! " (Higham, 1961 : 48) 
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"The twin engine [Aeros40B] airship was landing [Wednesday, June 28,2000 in San 
Bernardino, CAJ and there were two ground crew assigned to catch the mooring rope 
... 
the 
ground handlers collided with one another during this process and the second one fell back-ward 
and hit his head on the concrete ramp, which resulted in fatal head injuries. " (NTSB Ident. No: 
LAXOOLA242. )
"Marina Pasternak, 32, and Levon Sarnamyam, 35, both Ukranians, tragically lost their lives 
whilst working to repair leaks in one of the two ballonets in the envelope of a new four-seater 
Skydragon belonging to World Wide Aeros at San Bernardino International Airport on Friday 28 
January [2000]. 
... 
First reports suggest that 
... 
the victims ordered other crew members to shut 
off the air pump to collapse the ballonet so that they could reach the hole 
... 
With dwindling air 
in the ballonet they would soon have become confused and rendered unconscious. " (Airship, 
2000: 11) 
And if the GH procedures are ever successfully mechanised then there will be danger to ground crew 
from the big vehicles themselves, as demonstrated by this first previously quoted example and the 
accident statistics: 
"A large tow tractor [at Frankfurt Airport in October 2000] had just had its tow-bar uncoupled 
from the aircraft 
... 
and was moving back 
... 
The ramp agent in charge had just raised her hand 
for the "all clear" signal to the aircraft, turned and started to walk away, when she was hit by the 
reversing tow tractor. The force of the impact threw her to the ground and under the moving 
tractor. " (Lamprecht, 2000/2001: 46) 
"rhe air transport industry does not compare well with other industries. In the U. S., the lost 
workday incidents rate per 100 employees showed an industry average of 1.9 for 1998. The 
corresponding numbers were 3.2 for the construction industry, considered to be a high risk 
workplace, and a staggering 8.2 for the air transport sector. " (Lamprecht, 2000/2001: 47) 
There is also sod's law where the solution to one problem causes another one elsewhere. 
"The good ship [LbI responded instantly [to the dropping of ballast water] and glided gracefully 
... 
over the top of the dangerous building. I was extremely sorry that in lightening the ship I 
inadvertently gave a shower-bath to the dense crowds assembled on the landing stage 
... 
The 
stains made on clothes by ballast water are 
... 
extremely annoying, for the water placed in the 
bags and containers has an anti-freezing rnixture added to it which causes ugly patches with 
rings round them. " (Von Buttlar Brandenfels, 1931: 102/3) 
Thus the ground crew, (and the environment, ) will also need to be protected from the side effects of 
whatever it is that they use to protect the NGVLAs from the extremes of the weather. 
8.2.1.5 Protection 
- 
Forecasting the weather 
There are two aspects of protection from meteorological phenomena that need to be considered. Firstly 
there is defence against what is actually happening at the moment, and secondly, there is the forecasting 
of what is shortly to come. Both of these are enormous and complex subjects, and numerous books have 
been devoted to them 
- 
particularly in the latter case. A selection of books and papers that deal with the 
study of the weather, and with related phenomena as they apply to the GH of LTA craft are given in the 
Bibliography. 1 
In view of the fact that there will unquestionably be infinitely better, more accurate and more readily 
accessible weather forecasts available to the NGVLA operators than there were for their PGVLA 
forebears it is not deemed necessary here to go into any great detail of the services that were used in the 
past. Nevertheless, there is much in the archives that is of interest on the topic, particularly concerning the 
E. g. Smith, 2W2; Lapworth, 1994; Huijsmans, 1993; Hikami & Shiraishai, 1988; Watts, 1988; Fujita, 1985; Wallington. 1982; 
Holford, 1979; Welch, 1979; Viemeister. 1972. Harris, 0969; Lane, 1968; Davenport, 1963b; Sutton, 1962; Kimble & Bush, 1943; 
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lessons that had been learned towards the end of the PGVLA programmes and the way in which the 
ground handling procedures finally get the blame when all apologies for unreliable performance have run 
their course. Here are some examples: 
"For years the British have had available four daily weather maps, and there is no doubt that 
some day we must increase the number of our daily maps. " (Rosendahl, 1927) 
"When a flight of one of the large [US Navy rigid] ships was contemplated, the aerological 
officer making the flight 
... 
had charge of the preparation of the proposed forecast. He was 
assisted in this work by the station aerological officer, who had the weekly forecast duty. 
.-. 
The 
usual charts were prepared, and 
... 
analyzed by 
... 
the [airship] aerological officer 
... 
assisted by [the officer] who had station duty 
... 
and upon this analysis he made the forecast for the 
following 36 hours, that is, "today", "tonight" and "tomorrow. " This forecast was the usual Navy 
forecast, somewhat more detailed than the forecast sent out from the central office of the 
Weather Bureau, particular attention being paid to the detailed requirements of airship 
operation. " (US Congress, 1933 
- 
Maguire : 236) 
"The common conception of wind is that of a mere horizontal flow of air and were this idea 
always true, flying would be comparatively simple. " (Rosendahl, 1927) 
"Iliroughout the war the British had dwelt upon the fact that unfavourable weather, especially 
during the winter months, prevented the Zeppelins being sent out. Sometimes long periods 
would elapse before the North Sea patrol was resumed. But it was only on very rare occasions 
that it was a matter of inability of the airship to leave its hangar or remain aloft. Generally it was 
due to reduced visibility over the water. The North Sea in a fog or thick haze made 
reconnaissance impossible 
... 
" (Lehmann & Nfingos, 1927: 304) 
"rhe charge that the Zeppelin of 1914-18 was a fair-weather weapon is borne out by the 
following statistics showing the percentage of days on which reconnaissance flights were made 
in the North Sea: " 
Year Days flown Days total Percentaze 
1914 35 Out of 148 23.6% 
1915 124 Out of 365 34.0% 
1916 89 Out of 366 24.3% 
1917 96 Out of 365 26.3% 
1918 55 Out of 315 17.5% 
(Robinson, 1994) 
"rhey [airships] are all fragile and dependent on the state of the weather and the atmospheric 
pressure, though not so much as is generally supposed, for it was officially recorded that during 
1918 there were only nine days on which no airship flight took place in the British Isles. " 
(Vivian, cl920: 168) 
"It was not an auspicious departure [t/o from Lakehurst on 28 October 1928]. Crosswinds forced 
Eckener to put back the take-off hour twice, to the irritation of passengers and press alike. It was 
not until two the next morning, six hours after the scheduled departure that the Graf was heading 
once again for New York. " (Botting, 2001: 145) 
"A number of flights have suffered postponement and even abandonment because of our 
inability to handle ships in and out of hangars under any but comparatively good conditions. " (Rosendahl. 1927) 
'This opinion [that an airship is a fine weather craft], even with the earlier airships, was not true. 
An airship is capable of meeting and successfully navigating bad weather, but in the past owing 
to the handling limitations was seldom permitted to demonstrate this fact. " (Richmond & Scott, 
1930) 
However, regardless of the availability debate, there are also some very sensible ideas that would still 
seem to be good advice today. 
'5A 
- 
... 
In the lighter-than-air [pilot] training there is a ground school with a limited amount of flight training 
... 
I believe the course in aerology should be extended, there should be more 
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training in forecasting from maps and a more extensive training in forecasting weather from 
visual observations 
... 
>Q 
-I think your suggestion very wise, to wit, that the personnel in 
control of airships at least should have more fundamental and detailed study in aerology so that 
each commanding officer and those who may supplant him along the line of succession may be 
competent independent forecasters. >A 
-I believe that the airsl-ýp captain should make his own 
weather forecast, and he should be an expert. " (US Congress, 1933 
- 
Wcyerbacher: 361/367) 
There are also pertinent observations that are equally good advice for those who will be in charge of new 
generation airships when they are moored or when ground-based movements of them are planned. 
"Is it not true that the captain of a ship is always studying the weather, the captain of any ship, 
every ship I ever saw, the captain was studying the weather all of the time, looking at the 
barometer and thermometer. " (US Congress, 1933 
- 
Kean : 369) 
And this latter instrument may become of special interest to the GH team, and to the airship flight crew, 
when a flight is in prospect. For instance: 
"At Pulham, during the airship mooring mast trials in 1921, on several occasions a difference in 
temperature between the top and bottom of the mast (100 ft) of as much as 10* F was observed. 
This was at about 9 a. m. " (Scott & Richmond, 1923) 
Such events, which generally go unnoticed by all other forms of transport can have dramatic effects on an 
LTA vel-&1e. And there is much else under the broad umbrella of "the weather" that will need to be 
addressed by the NGVLA operators. Especially with regard to the measurement of it: 
"No reliable measurement of the weight effect of rain on an airship has been made so far in 
England. This effect is naturally less in a wind than in stagnant air, but in either case it rapidly 
reaches an equilibrium value. The maximum heaviness caused in R33 at the mast by rain appears 
to have been about 1.5 tons. " (Scott & Richmond, 1923) 
"Continuous records of humidity are difficult to make 
... 
For obtaining the humidity in the 
interior of gas-bags, a distant-reading instrument requires to be developed 
... 
The gas, when it is 
first fed into the airship, is probably highly saturated, but there is a certain amount of evidence 
that this high degree of saturation does not remain for long. It appears that a transference of 
moisture takes place from the inside to the outside of the bag or vice-versa at a reasonably rapid 
rate. Apart from any question of lift, the amount of moisture in the gas-bags has an important 
effect on their physical condition. " (Scott & Richmond, 1923) 
"2 Atmospheric up and down draughts 
... 
2.1 General 
- 
The information provided 
... 
has been 
derived from the small amount of published data on measured draught velocities in storms and 
theoretical work undertaken by the meteorological office. Since the data are related mainly to 
velocity measurements at high altitudes 
... 
and since the CAA has knowledge of only one 
measured velocity at low (2 kin) altitude 
... 
" (CAA : CAP 471,1979: 13) 
Then, too there are observations in the records that may be of use to anyone contemplating the 
construction of a GH and mooring facility, for there is no real point in building facilities that are very 
much stronger than the airships themselves. 
"... the accumulated experience of four years of war indicated that eighty miles an hour as then 
attained for the first time with airships was quite sufficient for all normal requirements with 
some speed to spare. Our studies in meteorology had shown that weather conditions by and large 
would not require much further increase in speeds. Since the war observations made throughout 
the world have confirmed that conclusion, so that a normal speed of eighty miles has now been 
adopted for the most recent designs for commercial and military Zeppelins. It is fast enough. " (Uhmann & Nfingos, 1927: 286) 
And finally, it should not be overlooked that the NGVLA ground crew personnel will themselves also be 
subject to the effects of the weather. They, like modem blimp crews, will have to stand out in the open air 
and are often expected to work for prolonged periods in the middle of an airfield away from any shelter. 
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In the summer they will be subject to dehydration and sun bum (see Risch, 2003). In the winter they are 
liable to suffer from wind chill (see Moyer, 2002a). Whereas little was done to alleviate these in the past, 
both are today recognised as problems in LTA sports such as hot air ballooning. 
8.2.2 Prepare 
As shown in the Prerequisites for this study (Section 5.1) the need to take a GH perspective of an airship 
project, and the advantages of doing so, have been neglected in the past. Moreover, the same is true with 
regard to the preparation of the airship (i. e. construction, assembly and inflation) for which the equally 
necessary need to have previously prepared the ground handling equipment (GHE) is again widely 
ignored. However, where the GHE is of itself a prototype, then the requirement for it to be tested and 
shown to be fit for purpose, prior to the airship's attachment to it, must appear as an issue at some time in 
any project with potential to involve considerable delay. ' The historical records of the PGVLAs reveal 
how they dealt with this same problem and many of their ideas and practices look to be still applicable. 
8.2.2.1 Testing and maintenance of GH Equipment 
Obviously much GHE will be specific to any new airship that is built, however, the overwhelming 
evidence that a mooring mast is the only sensible way for an airship to ride out the wind would indicate 
the likelihood of the need to test one in the future. For this, although the prolonged period of trials at the 
British experimental base at Pulham would be prohibitively expensive and unnecessarily repetitious, the 
methods of testing the last and largest of the British masts 
- 
the Cardington Tower 
- 
may be of use. 
"Extended trials under service conditions with SS Airships moored to one of these masts were 
made at Pulharn Airship Station. The system proved to be an unqualified success. Airships have 
since been moored out in all kinds of summer and winter weather, including winds up to 55 
miles per hour and heavy snow and thunderstorms. " (Pratt, 1920) 
'The ship [RIOO] had never landed before on that tower [Cardington] and the crew had been 
trained using a kite balloon! " (Johnston, 2001: 24) 
This tethered balloon enabled the nose latches in the masthead to be locked and released several times and 
permitted the crew to rehearse each step of the airship nose mooring procedure both cheaply and safely, 
and at their own pace. The tower itself was initially proof-tested for strength with a sideways pull at the 
top by the running a cable out on to the airfield and attaching the end to a ground-anchored winch. 
8.2.2.2 Assembly and rigging 
However, it is during the construction of the airship itself that other little lessons from history can be 
found useful. For example, this short and apparently insignificant entry in the US Navy's Erection 
Manual for their K-type blimps hides the fact that here is a superficially illogical modification of the 
installation procedure that could never have been envisaged by those who designed the ship. Neither 
would it have been adopted if only a handful of these blimps had been built. 
"Rigging the ship. 
... 
9. Installation of Bombardier's Window. The bombardier's window should 
be installed if it has not been installed prior to this time. The window opening is often used in 
gaining access inside the car at the time the ship is being rigged. There is also a possibility of the 
window being damaged if installed prior to this time. " (GAC, 1944) 
See also Figure 2.11 
- 
Generic NGVLA Development Schedules 
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However, small savings in time and cost that can only be distilled from numerous empirical cycles are in 
the end what make the difference between a project's success or failure. It is conceivable that one day a 
computer simulation will be constructed, by means of which such short-cuts might be identified for the 
NGVLAs, but it would need to be tremendously detailed and accurate. Meantime, such knowledge 
nuggets as the Bombardier's Window are the "horse-shoe nails" for the want of which kingdoms are lost. 
8.2.2.3 Gas management and buoyancy control 
One of the great debates within the airship community that always attracts much public attention is that 
concerning the advantages of one lifting gas over another. However, from the GH perspective the only 
really significant difference between hydrogen and helium is that one is flammable and the other is inert. 
This means that the fire regulations and the exact nature of the procedures applicable during the time the 
airship is in the ground crew's custody will be different - although not markedly so as there will still be 
the need to regulate all handling, storage and movement, of the fuel(s) for the airship and the GHE. Thus, 
apart from the difference in cost, with the more precious helium leading in general to more difficult and 
more protracted capture/landing procedures, there is little to choose between the two gases as far as the 
ground crew are concerned. Neither gas is toxic but both can asphyxiate and both need careful handling. 
'The problem of landing on a field is not particularly difficult with an intelligently handled 
airship, and provided an adequate ground crew is available to grab the handling lines 
... However, the maneuver is more difficult with a helium filled airship that is frequently "light" by 
several tons, than with a hydrogen filled airship where this light condition can be readily 
neutralized by valving out gas. " (Fulton, 1929: 58) 
"Helium losses occur in several ways. There is loss in transportation ; there is a loss whenever 
helium lies in storage in containers ; there is a loss whenever helium is re-purified ; there is a 
loss by diffusion when helium is in use in airships. There is a loss, or expenditure, whenever in 
course of operation it is necessary to valve helium. There are occasional accidental losses which 
it appears impossible to entirely eliminate. Based on past experience, it has been estimated that 
operating a rigid airship of the Los Angeles type will require one to one and one-half ship- 
volumes per year. 
... 
with good gas cells it will be less. " (Fulton, 1929: 46) 
"Hydrogen leakage was also bad as the bags [of RMA. No. 1] were by now nearly two years old 
and leaking at the rate of 474 pounds of lift per day (or 1.67 percent of capacity) 
... 
Footnote 
- 
Goldbeater's skin gasbags were reckoned to last about three years. The troubles experienced by a 
number of British ships were due to the fact that their bags were produced to meet the original 
constructional schedule with the result that when ships were delayed in construction, the bags 
were already part way through their lives before the ship ever flew. " (Higham, 1961 : 5015 1) 
Although Goldbeater's skin is unlikely to make much of a comeback in the future, nevertheless, the 
principle, whereby the design life of component parts can cause problems for projects that find 
themselves seriously behind schedule for any reason, remains valid. However, it is during the test 
processes that the ground crew can expect to play their biggest role in the preparation of the airship. 
8.2.2A Weigh-off, trim and systems testing for certification 
Testing has always been a time-consuming part in the preparation of airships. 
'The young inventor [Santos-Dumont in 1897] found a workshop and a suitable mechanic, in 
Paris, and here he built a two-cylinder motor that produced 3 V2 horsepower 
... 
It was tried out in 
an auto race and found wholly satisfactory. 
... 
[when] the basket and motor [for the Santos- 
Dumont No. ]] were finished; he suspended them from the rafters of the workshop, and tested the 
strength of the little propeller geared directly to the crankshaft. " (Hylander, 1931: 125) 
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However, it is clear that the NGVLAs will have to allow for an enormous test programme, not only of 
individual components but also of both the complete GHE and the airship 
-just as was the case for both 
the British and American PGVLAs. 
"When a [British rigid] ship was completed, a lift and trim test was undertaken in the shed with 
the ship floating free, but held down by weights and balances. An adjustment in weights could 
then be made 
... 
to insure either that the ship would leave the ground or to balance her in a fore- 
and-aft direction. Once this was done, an engine test in which all the engines were run was 
conducted either inside or outside the shed with the ship secured. Then out on the field, an 
inclination test was carried out to ensure that in a dive nothing would break loose and that the 
ship was properly rigged. " (Higham, 196 l: XXI) 
"In November 1929 the ship (R100) was finished 
... 
the day came when we ballasted her up in 
the shed for her lift and trim trials, determining accurately for the first time the loads that she 
would carry. It was a simple procedure; we mobilised a hundred men to hold her by the power 
cars and control car so that she neither floated up to the roof nor sunk on to the floor. After each 
readjustment of weights the men let go of her together on the blast of a whistle; we watched to 
see if she would rise or fall. After a few trials she hung motionless for a mdnute on end, poised in 
the air above the floor of the shed. Readings of barometric pressure and temperature completed 
the process 
... 
" (Norway, 1933) 
"There were a great number of tests made. The particular test to which I refer was 
... 
known as 
the test of the first bay, that is, the first section of the Akron which was built, had placed in it a 
gas cell, inflated with helium 
... 
and 
... 
measurements were made at all parts of the structure; 
tensions were taken of wires, as check both on the theoretical calculation as to stresses, and also 
as a proof test of the workmanship and materials used. On completion of the Akron, before she 
went into the air there were additional tests made on the completed airship. Of course, during 
construction there were hundreds of tests of materials, tests on various component parts, such as 
girders, that went into the airship. " (US Congress, 1933 
- 
Fulton : 340-341) 
"There are two ways [determining the weight of the ship] is done in practice: One way is to 
weigh on the scales everything that goes into the ship; that is done during construction and a 
record kept of every weight, every rivet that goes into the ship. The other way is with the 
completed ship, to fill the ship full of gas and actually balance the ship, determine all of your 
constants, gas, purity and temperatures, and make a weight determination in that way 
... 
11 (US 
Congress, 1933 
- 
Settle : 277) 
And there is reference to time-consuming tests and trials throughout PGVLA history from first to last: 
"... in July, 1900 the airship [Count Zeppelin's LZ-1] was ready for its trial flight. Needless to 
say, there had been much feverish energy expended and many weary hours of testing and re- 
testing during these two years. So much had to be done without precedent and on absolutely 
new ground. " (Hylander, 1931: 143) [GC emphasis] 
"Most striking view of all, perhaps, to the casual visitor, is the wonderful vista of light 
metalwork as one looks down from the nose the length of the central catwalk 
... 
So strong is 
this apparently light and airy framework, that the ship [LZ129 Hindenburg] was actually taken to 
a secluded valley in the Alps and turned right on her nose, as part of her final trials, without the 
slightest ill effect anywhere on her truly colossal body. " (Coke, c. 1937: 91/2) 
However such advanced tests can only be conducted after an airship has been taken out of it's shed. 
8.2.3 Move 
There are many issues concerning the movement of airships on the ground for which material from the 
historical archives can offer guidance and insight. These include: 
81.3.1 Undocking 
'There are two general situations with reference to wind: one a wind parallel to the shed axis ; 
the other, a cross-wind. Assuming the shed has two doors, there are two choices, to windward or 
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to leeward. We have also conditions of "stem out first" or "bow out first. " Thus a choice from 
among several conditions must be made. The most conservative practice has been to use the 
leeward door on the theory that in case something goes wrong the airship will be carried away 
from the shed. But on the leeward side of the shed there is always turbulent air which may cause 
more trouble than a wind of known direction. " (Fulton, 1929: 56) 
8.2.3.2 Rails v tracked vehicles 
"While the Graf [in June 1930] had then been brought into the [Lak-churst] hangar on a low 
travelling mooring mast mounted on crawler feet, [by the time of the Hindenburg's first visit in 
May 1936] the travelling mast concept had been developed further for the giant Akron and 
Macon airships into a massive affair rolling on railroad tracks 64 feet apart, while at the other 
end the ship's stem and lower fin were made fast to a ponderous "stem beam" 186 feet broad, 
which also rolled on railroad tracks. Out on the field the stem beam was to be transferred from 
the rails running straight out from the hangar to the "hauling up circle" on the field. " (Dick & 
Robinson, 1985: 125/6) 
"rhe suggested motorization of the stem handling equipment 
... 
is not considered a safe solution 
... 
It is believed that one of the most important basic principles for safe operations is that while 
going in and out of the hangar there should be only one source of power. The soundness of this 
principle has been demonstrated twice at Lakehurst, when use of such a scrvo-control might 
have resulted in damage to the ship. 
... 
a system of interconnecting tension and compression 
members has been designed and built which rigidly holds the beam a fixed distance from the 
mast and is stronger that the full tractive effort of the mast locomotive. " (Bolster, 1932: 119) 
'The [K-ship mast] tractor drivers were among the most important persons on the field. They 
had in tow an aircraft with a mass of more than twenty-five thousand pounds. If they stopped 
abruptly or turned too suddenly or sharply, the blimp's momentum would keep it moving, with 
results that could include over-riding the mast and puncturing the bag. " (Vaeth, 1992: 42) 
8.2.3.3 Broken airship 
It should not be overlooked that on occasion the ground crew may be called upon to move an airship that 
is damaged. For example, an airship that has rigid structure may be physically distorted: 
"R80 suffered major structural failure on her first flight - eighty-three girders are said to have 
broken and the ship was so distorted that she was returned to her shed with only the greatest 
difficulty. " (Brooks, 1992) 
Also the actual attachment mechanism between the ship and its GHE may break-: 
"On February 22,1932, the stem [of Akron] carried away from the stem handling apparatus 
while the ship was being taken out of the hangar at Lakehurst. The detaching of this apparatus 
caused certain damage to the fin, and the ship swung around in the air and the stem then hit the 
ground and caused further damage. The airship was taken back into the hangar 
... 
A somewhat 
similar accident occurred exactly 6 months later 
... 
the cause of the first [accident] was an 
unexpected gust of wind of force greatly exceeding that which might be expected 
... 
The cause 
of the second was the movement of the ship before the stem handling apparatus was out of the 
way, running the ship into the stem gear. " (US Congress, 1933 - Wiley : 54) 
A modem analogy to this event, and one that proves it's pertinence to the NGVLAs, was the delayed 
launch of a Space Shuttle in August 2002, which had to return to the construction dock after the giant 
crawler vehicle that was carrying it to the launch-pad developed cracks in its side panels. 
8.2A Moor 
There are also many lessons to be learned from the PGVLAs experiments and experiences with mooring: 
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8.2.4.1 High mast v low mast 
"In discussing the problem of mooring to a mast we are at once involved in the advantages and 
disadvantages of high and low types of masts. 
... 
At a high mast, the airship can take an angle of 
eight to twelve degrees, depending upon the height of the mast, before any part of the airship 
touches the ground. This angle can be kept to within two or three degrees as a rule. However, 
constant and careful attention to the trim of the airship is required while the airship is riding to a 
high mast. 
... 
However, carrying out the maneuver of mooring to a "stub" mast is more difficult 
than with the high mast. There is a danger of some part of the airship strMng the ground 
unexpectedly before the maneuver is completed and the airship is secured 
... 
With ample ground 
crew, the maneuver can be made but the idea in developing handling methods is to get away 
from using man power. " (Fulton, 1929: 58/59) 
"Cost and size of stub masts for larger ships do not increase as rapidly as would be the case with 
high masts for the same ships. High mast is the more easily standardized for various sizes of 
ships. A set of stem carriage tracks for each length of ship would probably be required at a stub 
mast. None is required at the high mast. Tail drag paths are required at high masts, but not at the 
low. More level terrain is required at the low mast. 
... 
Stresses. Moored to the low mast, the 
stresses during riding are probably greater that at the high mast 
... 
" (Rosendahl, 193 1 a) 
"... wind velocities nearer the ground are frequently much less than those at the level of the so- 
called "high' 'masts; the fact that gustiness is greater a few hundred feet off the ground than at 
the surface; and that while vertical currents often exist at the level of the high mast they cannot 
blow into or out of the ground. The lower position should therefore be relatively safer. " (Rosendahl, 193 1 a) 
8.2.4.2 Lightning strike when moored 
Curiously, although there are several instances in the records of airships that were struck by lightning 
when in flight, the author has thus far found no reports of any moored airship, nor of any large GH 
infrastructures, such as masts or sheds, ever receiving a strike, let alone being damaged by one. 
"Of the twenty rigids destroyed in fatal flying accidents (other than those lost by enemy action), 
it appears that well over half were lost from [violent vertical air currents in thunder storms] or 
from associated phenomena such as lightning strikes or static discharge. " (Brooks, 1992) 
8.2.4.3 Ground impact protection 
"However carefully the hauling-down be done, the ship is liable to be bumped against the 
ground by gusts, for though the landing party can prevent the ship getting away, it cannot 
deprive her of all movement. Small airships are usually not fitted with any more elaborate 
buffering apparatus than a pair of landing skids. But rigid and large non-rigid ships are in most 
cases provided with regular shock-absorbers, which usually take the form of buffer bags inflated 
with air under pressure. These effectively cushion the impact of the ship should she strike the 
ground, and, in spite of their essential simplicity, have proved more satisfactory than the 
landing wheels and spring or hydraulic buffers which have been given a trial. " (Pratt, 1920) (GC emphasis) 
8.2.4.4 Icing and snow removal 
"Although the K [-type US Navy blimp] was rugged, and easy to fly, it was difficult to ground 
handle and dock in strong and gusty winds. When docking in a strong cross-hangar wind, she 
would heel over on her single landing wheel and tend to dig her prop into the ground. When 
moored out in heavy wet snow, it quickly became top heavy, requiring Herculean efforts to 
remove the props before they hit the ground, and even then sometimes laying over so far that the 
outriggers were damaged. " (Nfills, 2004: 128) 
8.2.4.5 Gas valves 
Because gas valves for large airships need to be of large diameter to allow for a large volumetric flow but 
also need to operate at a comparatively slight differential pressure in comparison to the ambient air, it was 
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found quite possible for losses to be caused by two means. Firstly, by inertia, if the airship rolled in a 
particular manner, and secondly from wind pressure, as gusts and slipstream caused movements of the 
outer cover surrounding the valve. 
"There was still the question of the [RI01] gas valves. 
... 
The cover was also flapping 
... 
and it 
is considered possible that the gas valves may have been affected 
... 
When these tests were run, 
McWade found that the valves remained closed up to and beyond the angle of roll of three 
degrees 
... 
[but] did, however, begin to open at five degrees of tilt so that in extreme conditions 
of turbulence, with the airship rolling heavily, some loss of gas through the valves would be 
likely. " (Masefield, 1982: 228) 
Over a prolonged period the loss could be substantial, although the quantity of gas lost by this means 
depended largely on the specifics of any particular gas valve's positioning and design. When starting 
from scratch, as is likely for the NGVLAs, even eminent airship designers have been known to get things 
wrong with their gas valve systems: 
"After the first trial flight [in 1920] the ship [R-80] was returned for repairs and modifications. 
The gas exhaust trunks were modified to prevent the build up of valved gas in the keel 
(Kender, 2001) 
81A. 6 Storms and headstands 
"On Sunday, 10h November, [1929] with the ship [RIO]] at the mast [Cardington] the wind 
began to rise rapidly and 
... 
By the following morning 
... 
was gusting at up to 60 miles an hour 
accompanied by heavy rain and squalls 
... 
The peak of the storm came 
... 
the wind reached 75 
mph 
... 
and at 1600 it registered 83 mph. Then it began to swing and in a cold front line squall, 
with torrential rain and hail, the wind changed direction through 135 degrees in the space of little 
more than a minute while gusting up to 89 mph accompanied by a drop in temperature of ten 
degrees [Fahrenheit] 
... 
the airship swung with the wind and 
... 
rode comfortably at the tower 
without violent movement 
... 
" (Masefield, 1982: 137) 
"With an airship at the mast, sharp irregularities in wind velocity (speed and direction) may 
affect the ship. These are of three general kinds: (1) common gustiness; (2) vortices, such as dust 
whirls; and (3) large scale wind shifts, meaning wind shift lines and squalls which bring a wind 
shift of sufficient duration to swing the ship and cause it to watch [sic] into the new wind 
direction. " (Reichelderfer, 1935: 98) 
Which leads naturally to perhaps the most famous of the PGVLA GH events: 
"At about 1330, [on 25 August 1927) with the Los Angeles headed north-northwest, the stem 
started up 
... 
It was evident that a wind shift was taking place 
... 
as the stem ascended into the 
colder air at higher altitude, she rose even faster 
... 
[and] reached an up angle of 85 degrees and 
was standing on her nose atop the [Lakehurst] mast. Then, swinging gradually to port, the airship 
began to settle toward the horizontal 
... 
[she] had rotated through an angle of 150 degrees and 
was now heading approximately southeast 
... 
she was housed in the hangar for a thorough 
inspection 
... 
[and] could have flown immediately after her spectacular head stand, and all 
damage was repaired on the following day. " (Robinson & Keller, 1982: 152) 
"Even on the mast K-ships could act up and behave horribly. Wind flow over and around a 
hangar, superheat, or both could cause them to "kite, " lifting their stems high into the air and 
their cars well off the ground. Airships, when moored outside, had sandbags weighing thirty 
pounds [13.6 kg] on board for ballast. Even so, they sometimes kited eighty degrees, standing 
virtually on their noses. " (Vaeth, 1992: 42) 
The fact that modem blimps now conduct this manoeuvre as a matter of course, and that the Los Angeks 
survived it without any ill. effect, leads to the question of whether the VLAs of the future might not be 
designed to do so too, if they were suitably equipped for it 
- 
for instance, with gimballed control panels? 
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8.2.5 Load 
The loading of the NGVLAs will inevitably be airship specific, and in view of the lack of previous 
attempts at building large airships specifically for the transporting of freight, this is probably the area 
where least can be gained from historical research. However there are lessons to be learnt from the 
PGVLAs and from other branches of aviation. 
8.2.5.1 On the feasibility of in-flight loading 
"To such proposals as to eliminate mooring masts and landing fields entirely and land 
passengers from an airship hove-to several thousand feet in the air, by means of an elevator or 
bucket on a cable from the ship, it needs only be said that while they show a great faith in the 
airship, they also show a woeful lack of operating knowledge. " (Rosendahl, 1931: 307) 
From which it may be assumed that Rosendahl would not have been a great advocate of the Cargolifter. 
8.2.5.2 Vectored thrust 
"He [the director of the Superman films] wanted much smaller cartoon-style balloons with little 
metal seats underneath 
... 
we built them exactly as required and simply suspended them by wires 
from a helicopter... When the helicopter was stationary it created a horrendous rush of wind 
- 
even where we were, some 300 feet [91.4 m] below it. It made us shake uncontrollably and we 
felt desperately insecure. But when the aircraft was moving forward at just five knots the rotor 
wash dissipated behind us and all was well. " (Prescot, 2000: 126,133) 
8.2.5.3 Suspended loads 
"We ran through the same helicopter tests with some new barrels of water. The structure held 
fast. But what we had not contemplated was that each of the barrels on the ends of the three 300- 
foot-long wires would spin anticlockwise as the wires untwisted themselves. " (Prescot, 
2000: 130) 
8.2.6 Launch 
There is much in the PGVLA records concerning the controlled transition from mooring to flight. 
"Taking off from the field is not difficult but requires man power to hold the airship prior to the 
take off. Casting off from a high mast is comparatively simple. Casting off from a stub mast is 
more difficult, on account of the danger of the tail striking the ground before the airship is clear 
of the mast. However, the maneuver 
... 
is not so difficult as the maneuver of mooring to a stub 
mast. " (Fulton, 1929: 58) 
"The passengers paused long enough for photographs and then proceeded to the mast elevator at 
6 p. m. 
... 
Water ballast was dropped to trim the ship as two more stem rollers were uncoupled. 
The crowds 
... 
heard bells in the power cars acknowledging commands as three engines started 
up. A policeman stood guard on the passenger platform of the mast while above him four men 
on top of the mast head awaited the release of the mooring eye from the cup. At 6: 17 p. m. the 
gangway was shipped. Booth leaned from the control car window and signalled the release of the 
fourth stabilizing weight. One minute later cheers rose from the crowd of 200,000 gathered in a 
horseshoe which stretched two miles from tip to tip. 
... 
The R100 [preparing for 24 hour flight] 
... 
slowly withdrew from the orange and black mooring masthead and stopped 200 yards from 
the mast before reversing her Rolls-Royce engines. " (Countryman, 1982: 84-85) 
"We watched the [LZ-127 Graf] Zeppelin being slowly towed out of the hangar into the night 
and had we leaned out 
... 
could have touched the heads of the ground crew as they removed the 
heavy cement blocks which acted as ballast and which hung by hooks from a rail which circled 
the gondola. In perfect order, and in sequence, each man removed a block and took its place as 
equalising ballast on the rail. The exciting moment of "take-off' had arrived and at a signal the 
men on the rail heaved downwards and let go. " (Davies, 1998/99) [GC emphasis] 
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"The car party will lift the car clear of the ground while the linemen slack their lines. At the 
command and signal "Down, " the car party will let the airship [Aeros 40B Sky Dragon] 1 return 
to the ground and when the car is at the bottom of its downward travel, the crew chief commands 
"Up-ship, " at which time the car party thrusts the airship up and into the wind. " (Worldwide 
Aeros Corp. 2001: 03-19) 
"It is early morning 
-3a. m. to be exact - before we [Hindenburg at Frankfurt in May 1936] 
begin to show signs of definitely getting under way. The huge hangar is suddenly brilliantly lit; 
there are sounds in the distance of marching men and staccato military commands; and the 
passengers who have retired to rest begin to emerge 
... 
Underneath our windows appear a double 
row of hefty and khaki-clad youths; the atmosphere has turned noticeably cooler. and 
... 
we can 
see that the huge door at the far end of the hangar has been opened 
... 
Subdued whirring noises 
indicate the starting-up of the engines 
... 
Another half hour goes by 
... 
The ship's nose is firmly 
grasped in the cup of the moveable mooring mast, which stands on its rails ready to precede us 
out into the open. Almost another full hour elapses, however, before everything is finally judged 
to be in order; Zeppelin captains can afford to take no risks. At last a final whistle blows and, 
tugged along by the travelling mast and held in line by the rows of khaki-clad men below us on 
the ground we move slowly and majestically down the shed and out into the open landing 
ground. Once outside, however, all hesitation vanishes ; everything is now speed and animation. 
Swift command succeeds swift command ; in a twinkling, as it were, we are free of our mast, 
free of the two long lines of men beneath us, and soaring quietly into the upper air. Quickly the 
engines come into play and we climb 
... 
" (Coke, c. 1937: 86n) 
However, it is all utterly dependent upon the skill of an experienced ground crew: 
"... the experimenter with dirigible balloons must be continually on his guard against little errors 
and neglects of his aids. I have four men who have now been with me four years. They are in 
their way experts, and I have every confidence in them. Yet this thing happened: the airship was 
allowed to leave the aerodrome imperfectly inflated. Imagine, then, what might be the danger of 
an experimenter with a set of inexperienced subordinates. " (Santos-Dumont, 1904: 258/9) 
8.2.7 Capture 
So too, with the controlled transition back again from flight to mooring 
- 
the archives hold a wealth of 
thought-provoking material and reveal many issues that are not immediately obvious but which may have 
some profound effects on any future NGVLA projects. 
8.2.7.1 Wind speed and direction 
"... if during the mooring operation, the wind changes direction to any considerable extent, there 
is a danger of having the wires foul the hull of the ship and also of din-dnishing their usefulness if 
their anchorages cannot be readily corrected to the new wind direction. Also it has happened on 
occasion that the wind direction at the level of approach for landing is diametrically or widely 
divergent from that on the surface, so that the ship approaching into her own wind direction 
actually spirals down as she approaches nearer to the surface. " (Rosendahl, 193 1 a) 
"Even now, however, we [Hindenburg at Lakehurst in May 1936] are not completely 'home. ' 
Our old enemy the wind is especially strong on the ground, and great difficulty is experienced by 
our landing party in mooring the ship's nose to the grip of the landing mast. " (Coke, c 1937: 93) 
"It would appear that 
... 
[Akron's] vertical thrust might be of considerable value in overcoming 
vertical gusts; experience may substantiate this. However, from the suddenness with which gusts 
strike and from the relative sluggishness of human reactions, I believe the use of vertical thrust 
during the mooring operation in gusty weather will be a ticklish procedure. " (Rosendahl. 193 1 a) 
8.2.7.2 Static electrical charge 
"When a ship was corning in to land 
... 
the wire of the airship [R33 in 192 11 would be dropped, 
and a man standing in attendance would quickly couple the ends of the two wires together. He 
The Aeros 40B Sky Dragon : lengdi 43.5m (143 ft), volume 2.508 cu m (88.570 cu ft) -3 tonne mass 
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had to be careful to be sure that the airship wire touched the ground before he handled it in order 
to discharge any static electricity picked up by the airship in flight. " (Williams, 1974: 137) 
"rhe second problem was that as soon as the ground crew grabbed the [water-filled] barrels 
[suspended on 300-foot long wires beneath the helicopter] to guide them gently to the ground, 
they received a fairly aggressive electric shock as the static in the dry air built up in the wires 
and discharged itself into the ground. " (Prescot, 2000: 130) 
"Sadly, Schwaben was destroyed by fire on the ground at Dfisseldorf after an excursion flight. 
The cause was discovered to have been static electricity, which had built up while in flight and 
caused a spark when two of the rubberised gas-cells rubbed together, igniting hydrogen which 
was escaping through the valves. The conflagration consumed the ship. " (Mowthorpe, 1999: 74) 
8.2.7.3 Vertical deceleration 
A proven technique that would be hard to re-introduce in the light of current health and safety regulations. 
"The members of the crew were so trained that when approaching the ground [with a "heavy" 
ship], every dispensable man climbed outside of the car and hung suspended by his arms from 
the hand rail. At a distance of six or eight feet above the ground, a signal from me would send 
them jumping, thus relieving the ship of sufficient weight to check its downward speed. 
... 
The 
trick in making a safe landing had always worked nicely, although to the uninitiated it must have 
appeared like an "abandon ship" maneuver. " (Lehmann & Mingos, 1927: 3) 
8.2.7.4 International flights 
How will large freight-carrying NGVLAs that do not land when they deliver suspended payloads to 
remote locations at the end of international flights, conform to the rules of customs and excise? 
"... at the third attempt [Hindenburg's] nose tip is at last successfully clipped, and a few seconds 
later the gangway is let down, and the immigration and police officials clamber on board. " (Coke, c1937: 93) 
8.2.7.5 Stand-by and crew boredom 
"Simply put the tasks of a ground crew can be stated as three; 
to launch and capture the airship 
to keep the airship secure when it is moored, and 
to stay sober on days off. " (Backlin, 2002) 
Although this statement was made in jest by an experienced blimp pilot, it does bring to light a serious 
under-lying problem 
- 
one that faces all airships regardless of their size or the size of their ground crew. 
The life of a ground crew is not an easy one and in particular the long and unsociable hours of either 
waiting for an airship to return to base, or of simply keeping watch over it while it is moored, can be 
boring in the extreme. However, these irregular periods of enforced inactivity are interspersed with hyper- 
active bursts of work that are often very hard physically, (e. g. moving and loading ballast weight or 
installing ground anchors) and occasionally dangerous (e. g. running after mooring ropes and climbing 
inside or on top of the airship). Furthermore, periods of relaxation may be interrupted at any time by an 
emergency call for all hands 
- 
as when a storm arrives or a gas cell develops a leak. This unpredictable 
life-style with the conflicting stresses of boredom and adrenaline attracts fit young people for whom 
alcohol can become a problem 
- 
especially when the whole exciting circus then goes on the road. 
8.2.8 Camp out 
As explained in Section 6.4, airships other than blimps, and particularly the very large airships, have 
never actually been "battle-hardened" to the extent of being able to survive for any length of time away 
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from their sheds. The consequence is that there are many unanswered questions and unresolved issues for 
those NGVLAs intent upon such a cost-effective and independent way of life. 
8.2.8.1 Setting-up and removing temporary bases 
"The Preparation of the Bases 
- 
In Oslo, at Vads6 on the northern coast of Norway, and at 
King's Bay in the Spitsbergen islands, we [the Italians during preparations for the Norge North 
Pole crossing in 1926] had to create outright the whole organisation necessary for receiving the 
airship, refuelling it with hydrogen and petrol, and carrying out any repairs that might be 
necessary. The Oslo base, being simply intended to satisfy the desire of the Norwegian people to 
see the dirigible, was not particularly important in itself. Still, we had to install a mooring-mast, 
with all the accessory services and requisite materials. " (Nobile, 1961 : 19) 
"The most dangerous time for a blimp is while it's mooring mast is travelling down the road. " 
(Backlin, 2002) 
Or when it is caught out by the weather: 
"In the 1980's in upstate New York, he [Goodyear blimp pilot Don McDuffl and his co-pilot, 
trapped in a line of thunderstorms building up to 50 thousand feet, fought against updrafts 
carrying the airship to dangerous heights 
... 
and miles away from his own ground crew. but 
coincidentally (and luckily), another airship crew was in the same area, moving in the opposite 
direction. They provided a respite from the hair-raising adventure by landing Don's airship and 
refuelling him while the storm passed. " (Riley, 2003) 
"There exists also the additional need for having outlying servicing stations which are not so 
pretentious or expensive as those possessing a hangar and repair facilities, etc. In other words, 
airships require not only navy yards or docking yards, but harbours as well. The facilities at 
airship harbours are those comparable to wharves, moorings, and anchorages for surface vessels, 
including fuelling, watering, and provisioning arrangements. For an airship, these will consist of 
a mooring mast and certain servicing facilities that can be conveniently grouped around it. " 
(Rosendahl, 1931 a) 
"More important was the refuelling base at Vadsd, and still more so that in King's Bay. The 
preparation of the materials to be sent to these two bases was made in Rome with the greatest 
care and lavishness; so that when the time came we should have at our disposal everything 
which at the last moment might appear necessary. The wisdom of these precautions was shown 
by the fact that at King's Bay we had to change one of the [Norge] engines, replace the rudder, 
and repair the lower part of the keel. The mooring-masts at King's Bay and Vads6 were entirely 
built in Italy. The Vadsd mast was set up under the supervision of our chief technician Rossi, 
helped by three of our workmen. To King's Bay, where both mast and hangar, designed by us in 
Italy, were built by the Aeroclub of Norway, I sent several officers and workmen, and, to make 
meteorological observations, my brother, Amedeo, a doctor in physics. " (Nobile, 1961 : 19) 
" "Semi-portable" and "expeditionary" masts of either the high or stub varieties have been put 
into use after quick erection at outlying places. The "floating" mast and base, as represented by 
the installation on the airship tender Patoka, have been in use for a number of years. " 
(Rosendahl, 1931a) 
However, the record books show that in terms of living the outdoor-life, although they achieved some 
great feats and made many impressive flights, the PGVLAs were really very dependent on their sheds: 
"Technically, the Los Angeles's performance 
... 
had been impressive 
... 
for she had been away 
from the Lakehurst hangar for 27 days, based solely on mooring masts, and had travelled 14,500 
miles 
... 
This exceeded the time away from Lakehurst, and the distance covered by the 
Shenandoah in the West Coast flight in 1924. " (Robinson & Keller, 1982: 170) 
8.2.8.2 Breakaway and emergency pursuit 
Normally the term "breakaway" brings to mind an airship that is torn from its moorings. Thus the image 
is one of the R33 or ZR1 both of which successfully limped home with large holes torn in their noses after 
breaking away from their mooring masts. 
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'The break-away of the Shenandoah [ZRI] from her mooring mast in January 1924, was due 
primarily to the jamming of the spindle in its bearings so that the ship was deprived of its 
freedom to roll, and the large twisting force caused in part by the collapse of the top fin resulted 
in the longitudinals being tom from the bow cap which carried the bearings of the spindle. " (Burgess, 1927 : 282) 
However, there may be other circumstances that call for logistical ground support in the case of an 
unplanned or abnormal flight. These two examples from the list of "Unassisted landings" compiled by the 
author (and shown in sample pages in Appendix K) illustrate the point. 
SL I made her first flight on October 17th 1911. A control cable broke and the ship made a 
forced landing across the Rhine, lying overnight in an open field while repairs were being made 
and gas added. Next day the ship took off and after three and a half hours of circling over 
Mannheim, she returned to the Rheinau shed. 
German Naval Airship L. 15 (LZ. 48): October 14th 1915 : Forced landing through fog on 
moorland near Altenwalde after running out of fuel. Gondola struts and some girders broken by 
impact. Ground crew arrived by lorry within an hour and walked the ship three miles back across 
country to its base at Nordholz. 
Such events were common occurrences for the small blimps of the First World War and they were not 
uncommon for the large rigids either, although none of the real giants ever made one. The corresponding 
idea of "Forced flights" as opposed to forced landings was however conceived as a possible good reason 
for the abandonment of the British Imperial Airship Scherne. ' 
However, the idea of an "interinediate"2 or a forced landing is an alien concept to modem HTA aviation 
but the soft-impact, low-speed crash cannot be ignored as a possibility for the NGVLAs. For example, the 
question has to be considered of what would happen if a non-rigid, single-skin, VLA moored to a mast in 
a storm, had its nose cone tom off? A lot would plainly depend on whether the gas cell was ruptured or 
not and whether there were any crew on board at the time, would obviously play a big part in the events 
that followed. It can however only be conjectured how quickly the airship would deflate (bearing in mind 
that the wind will initially be trying to push the escaping gas back into any forward facing hole) and so 
too whether the ARDD (see below) would operate successfully after a major hull rupture? From the GH 
perspective, such questions are to a large extent irrelevant, because either the airship survives and then 
needs to make a landing somewhere, (and somehow) or it is crippled so badly that it crashes downwind of 
the mooring site. In either case the ground crew will have plenty of work to do. 
Moreover, from the GH perspective the difference between a rigid and non-rigid in such an event is again 
minimal as both will leave a trail of wreckage, of unknown length, that may or may not include crew 
members who are a) over-excited; b) traumatised; c) injured or d) deadL How far the damaged hull would 
actually drag, or roll, or fly again, across country is again unknowable but the time/costleffort involved in 
clearing up will obviously be affected by this and by other factors such as: 
the weather (visibility, precipitation, temperature, wind-chin); 
the terrain over which the damaged airship has passed (or is strewn, ) 
vehicular access to the crash path, and 
the time of day (dark or light? ). 
I See (Neon, 1927: 20) 
2 Regarded as a conunonplace and perfectly nornial procedure for sport baUoons of all types and sizes 
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In all such events the ground crew are most likely to be not only the first to know what is happening, but 
also to understand all likely repercussions and possible mitigation strategies. They will thus be best 
placed to alert emergency services, if needed, orjust to stand-by themselves with the right spare parts. 
8.2.8.3 Deflation 
A final issue that is not currently known or understood within the confines of the HTA world today 
concerns the controlled removal of the lifting agent without damage to the airship. This can take place in 
a planned manner 
- 
inside a shed 1- or as a result of an unplanned event 
- 
break-away or forced flight. In 
both cases, with small blimps, and hot air balloons, it has been found vital to fit them with a rapid 
deflation device (RDD) or "rip" system that is sometimes automated (ARDD). Whether such a device 
will be effective for the large gas volumes of the NGVLAs is debatable, and whether the risk of an 
essentially untestable rip-activating system not working when it is needed to outweighs its potential to go 
off accidentally when not activated, along with the costs of both in human and financial terms, is again 
something that will need to be decided. Here are some examples from past experience: 
With Second War Blimps: "... with practically a zero ground speed we decided that it would be 
impossible to get to the mainland. 
... 
it was decided the only thing to do would be to land the 
ship [US Navy blimp J-3] at Beach Haven. A crowd of from 50 to 100 people had gathered 
directly below us, and we dropped our trail Tope to the ground and shouted to them to hold on 
and act as an anchor, the intention being to hold the ship in the air high enough from the ground 
so that we could continue to run our motor without danger to the personnel and keep her directly 
over the ground crew and to let the gas out of the envelope by pulling the rip cord. 
... 
" (US 
Congress, 1933: Thornton, 429) 
With First War Blimps: "The captain of a non-rigid always had another choice. In extreme cases 
he could 'rip' the envelope, causing instant deflation. A seam sewn along the top of the envelope 
led to a 'ripping-cord' adjacent to the coxswain. A stout pull 
- 
about 30 lb. 
- 
broke this seam 
which then released the hydrogen into the air. Although the sudden loss of lift dropped the 
car(s), engine and crew violently onto mother earth, it seldom caused irreparable damage to the 
structure or serious wounds. However, this last-ditch operation was seldom used. " (Mowthorpe, 
1999: 20/1) 
With a modem Roziere long-endurance balloon: "However, Fossett [on one of his round-the- 
world balloon attempts] reported that the landing took place in 20 knot winds and that for a time 
he feared being "dragged forever" as an explosive squib designed to separate the envelope from 
the capsule failed to fire. " (Moyer, 2002) 
And with another equally problematical emergency system fitted to a similar Roziere balloon: 
"... the two men [Lindstrand and Branson] took particular care as they prepared to jettison their 
first empty fuel tank. As soon as the switch was thrown, and the explosive detonator had severed 
the tank from its housing, the balloon [Pacific Flyer] wrenched upwards 
... 
Branson and 
Undstrand knew that something had once again gone wrong with the system of holding the fuel 
supplies to the capsule. As well as dropping a single empty fuel tank-, they had jettisoned two 
further full tanks 
... 
" (Jackson, 1994 : 199) 
I Althoff, 1990: 261/2 
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A BRIDGE ACROSS THE KNOWLEDGE GAP 
The second aim of this thesis is to show that by studying the historical records it is possible to expose and 
correct some of the misunderstandings that have arisen over the years concerning the capabilities of the 
PGVLAs, the operational procedures that they actually used, and their the GH systems. Furthermore, 
extracting knowledge from such first-hand material as survives in the archives, also makes it possible to 
answer some of the difficult questions uncovered by the author during his participation in the CargoLifter 
project. These questions were seen to cause confusion and doubt in the minds of designers, regulators, 
financiers and expert engineers alike, and which thus appear inevitably set to aggravate the formidable 
task of tackling the NGVLA GH problems. It is the author's opinion that, these misunderstandings are 
among the generally unrecognised, but more serious, obstacles standing in the way of the development of 
future NGVLA GH systems. The aim of this section is thus to demonstrate that some of these difficult 
GH questions can be answered by HR, or at least, that sufficient information can be found concerning 
them, to enable decisions to be taken, which will greatly diminish the risks and improve the costs, the 
timings and the safety of any future VLA GH systems. 
9.1 Common airship fallacies 
The existence of myths, misapprehensions and plain wrong ideas concerning nearly all aspects of airships 
and their operations, is a well-known problem that has long been the subject of comment and lament by 
the cognoscenti: 
'7here is much rnisunderstanding and confusion regarding the loss of performance of airships 
resulting from decrease in the lift of gas, especially from the use of helium instead of hydrogen. (Burgess, 1927: 37) 
"Unfortunately too, incorrect information occasionally gets adrift and remains uncorrected, 
retraction as we know, being the height of uselessness. " (Rosendahl, 1931: viii) 
"So far as the layman was concerned the airship world at large might just as well have been a 
secret society, for all that filtered down to the level of Fleet Street in an age of wartime secrecy 
and an impoverished media, impoverished, that is in intellect. The result has been a legacy of legends and myths which have prospered and survived. The popular idea of fife in the world of 
airships was, at best, sketchy 
- 
while at the opposite end of the spectrum it has become 
universally ludicrous. " (Chamberlain, 1984: xiv/xv) 
"The biggest stumbling-block in the path of airships today is n-dsunderstanding. There is but a 
comparative handful of people in the world today who have first-hand knowledge of them. " (Rosendahl, 1938: 361) 
Nevertheless, there have been some previous attempts to rectify matters: 
"COMMON AIRSHIP FALLACIES 
- 
The following six inventions constantly recur, and have been submitted to the [US] Navy Department many times by aspiring inventors. It is hoped that 
the explanations of the fallacies of these inventions may save some future inventors much 
wasted efforts and subsequent heart-burnings. The six inventions are: 
1. The vacuum airship 
2. Compressing gas or air for ballast 
3. Artificial control of superheat 
4. Combined heavier and lighter-than-air craft 
5. Channel through the hull to reduce resistance 
6. Wind screen at mooring mast" 
(Burgess, 1927: 285) 
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While the first five of these inventions would plainly have varying degrees of impact upon G11, they are 
more properly to be classed as problems that affect the design and flight operations of an airship. Thus, 
only Burgess's answer to item six on his list is considered to be within the scope of this present work: 
"By far the most important stresses in an airship lying to a mast result from the transverse wind 
forces upon the ship, and in fact longitudinal tensions are usually desirable because they reduce 
the compressive forces resulting from the lateral bending due to the transverse air forces. A wind 
screen around the bow of the ship would undoubtedly reduce the longitudinal tension, but owing 
to increased turbulence which it would cause in the air flow it would probably increase, rather 
than decrease, the transverse forces along the greater part of the ship. " (Burgess, 1927: 290/291) 
Moreover, it should be noted that the truth of this assertion had been confirmed in practice some 15 years 
previously, when, in May 1911, the very first British-built rigid airship, No. Ir "Mayfly"was moored. in 
the Cavendish Dock at Barrow-in-Furness to a floating mast that was fitted with just such a wind screen: 
"This latter contraption [Mayfly's mooring] consisted of a pontoon secured by a pivot at its 
windward end to a concrete bollard sunk in the dock floor 
... 
On the pontoon was a 38-foot 
mast inclined 23 degrees to windward and attached to it was a cross yard with canvas strips 
designed to act as a baffle. It was calculated that in a steady 80-mph wind the strain on the nose 
of No. 1 [Mayfly] would amount to only 4 tons. However, as the screen showed a tendency to be 
steered by the ship, rafts and 5-foot sideboards in the manner of a Thames sailing barge were 
added to the pontoon. As this also proved inadequate, the baffle was removed and the ship then 
ceased to yaw so badly 
... 
" (Higham, 1961: 48)" 
However, despite their constant and frequent refutation, these, and similar misunderstandings persist. 
Worse still, they can be seen to be actually increasing in number as each new generation is further 
removed in time from the actual events, and unwittingly builds on previous distortions to add another 
layer of erroneous "Chinese whispers" to the mixture. 
9.2 Myths and nisunderstandings 
One recent example of this phenomenon, as already shown (in Section 2.2). is that there is today some 
misunderstanding as to the meaning of the term "flying moor" and what was actually involved when an 
airship carried out this procedure. As always with GH the devil is in the detail. Here again is the 
erroneous statement: 
"The airship [R101] was flown onto the mast which often proved to be a long and tedious 
process. Masts were also developed in the United States. For example, the last United States 
rigid airship, the 'Macon, ' used a large and substantial mast. The mooring line was attached 
prior to docking to enable it to be winched onto the mast. Such a technique is much less 
fraught with danger than that used by R101. " (Howe, 1999: 307) [GC emphasis] 
To investigate the misunderstanding it is first necessary to put the airships mentioned into context. The 
British R101 (along with it's sister ship RIOO) was operational from 1929 to 1930. The American Macon 
(ZRS-5) was operational from 1933 to 1935. Thus, as is correctly implied, the British system was the 
forerunner, however, the idea that the mooring methods used by these airships were very different, or that 
the technique used by the British was markedly inferior, is simply wrong. 
Furthermore, from this author's experience at CargoLiftcr, the worst part of this error is the implication, 
given in the first line, that the British were actually using a technique which permitted a large airship to 
fly directly onto a mast without the use of mooring ropes or lines. But, no such technique was ever used, 
and thus the assumption that one does exist, perhaps in a flawed state, and consequently that when found. 
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it may be amenable to modification by application of modem anal) fical methods. or be brou& to cost- 
effective perfection by means of some new computeriscd, GPS-guided4 thnist-control. is in itself fla%%, cdL 
What is true is that the RIO] (and RIOO) were moored to a high mast. %% hereas the Afacon (arid Akron 
ZRS4 before it) habitually moored to a low or stub mast. however, as shown by the following selection of 
quotes, the method by which they did so is not very different. Here is the real story. 
"In 1919, Pulliam finally erected a 'high mast'. especially for mooring rigid airships, together 
with a practical mooring method. This basically meant that the airship flew to the vicinity of the 
mast dropping a line. This line was connected to [a] line from the mast. laid out across the 
airfield, then the airship was winched in until a special fitting in the nose connected and locked 
with a mating piece at the mast-top. There the ship rotated with wind. secure. 
... 
It %%-as a highly 
refined version of this Pulham mast which was erected at Cardington. Montreal and Ismailia for 
the proposed Empire routes which the ill-fated P-101 and her sister-ship P-100 were to have 
use&" (Mowthorpe, 1999: 64) 
In fact, the R100 did use the high xnasts at both Cardington and at Montival and here. in sonm detail is the 
procedure that was used on the latter occasion, at the end of that airship*s 8*' flight. 
"With streaks of dawn showing in the eastern sky the R100 [on her first landing in Canada] 
swung in narrowing circles about the St Hubert field. A few minutes before 5 o'clock she turned 
toward the mooring mast. On the passenger platform stood Ueutcnant Commander Prcsscy, the 
landing officer, and his assistant at the cabinet controlling all the mooring machinery 
... 
The 
R100 had to valve little hydrogen, having collected almost 5 tons of rain water in her ballast 
bags. As she slowly approached the mast head from the cast at a height of about 500 feet. her 
900 foot long mooring cable snaked down in swinging loops to the ground. Her aft engines were 
put in reverse. Pressey*s 14 men, 3 of whom watched the winch drums. allowed the %%irc to 
discharge any static electricity in order to avoid a severe shock. 
... 
With not a breath of wind the 
main wire was secured by three of the ground crew and spliced to the U inch cable which bad 
been led from the top of the tower through the mooring arm to a spot determined by the direction 
of the wind 
- 
airships approached a mast head to wind. The ground crew signalled to the ship 
and the tower. As the engines eased off a little more the cable became taut. 
... 
At 5: 13 am. as the 
variable speed4 clectro-hydraulic winch was slowly reeling in the %%ire the airship dropped her 
first water ballast from frame 3 in the bow to keep an even keel. 
... 
The 750 foot starboard yaw 
guy was paid out 4 minutes later, coupled with a yaw winch cable from the base of the tower and 
carried to a snatch block on one of the 24 concrete blocks spaced at 15* intervals on the 
circumference of a circle of 750 foot radius. 
... 
The port yaw guy dropped and was seized by the 
waiting ground crew and coupled to the mast's second yaw cable. Mic last engine stopped at 
5: 25 am, but the ship continued to release ballast. sonic of the water drenching the ground crew 
and those on the passenger and searchlight platforms. 
... 
Dungarted mechanics climbed out of 
the silent engine cars as the ship's dew drop neared the mooring cup. 
... 
Pressey called -Ship 
secure" at 5: 37 am Friday, August I as the ram contracted and lock-cd4 allowing the airship to 
swing freely. 
... 
The mooring in a record 27 minutes versus 35 minutes at Carding-ton was a 
signal for rolling cheers from early risers and those who had remained all nighC (Countryman. 
1982: 58-62) 
This procedure is identical with that used, in the same year. by RIO] at Cardington. and as can be seen it 
was neither particularly "long7 nor -tedious7 - even when the Americans had first tried it out for 
themselves, six years previously and suffered an equipment failure in the process. 
"On the evening of 14 July 119241 Lansdowne made his first flying moor to the mast. using the 
English method. The wind was steady at 15 mph. and the ship was at all times under perfect 
control. The time from the dropping of the main mooring wire until die Shenandoah was secured 
to the mast was 46 minutes, a delay being caused by the failure of the part yaw guy winch to 
function. " (Robinson & Keller, 1982: 86) 
Thus, in summar)r 
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"ro make the usual "flying mooe'- as opposed to the more cautious approach in which a large 
ground crew would first take control of the ship and then walk it up to the mast 
- 
the airship 
would fly slowly towards the mast and drop three wires -a mooring wire and two yaw guys 
- 
from the nose. All three would be connected to lines leading to winches at the mast, the mooring 
wire to one through the top of the mast and the yaw guy lines through the most suitably placed 
pair in a ring of "snatch blocks" set into the ground in a circle around the mast. " (Mowforth, 
1991: 35) 
And here is American confirmation, written by one of those who, as a US Navy ground crewman, had 
real personal hands-on experience of large airship GH - up to and including LZ-129 Hindenburg. 
"The procedure for a high mast flying moor follows. The airship approaches the mast slowly 
headed into the wind at an altitude of about 200'. The mooring wire from the mast has previously 
been laid out on the ground some 500'to leeward from the mast. As the nose of the airship 
reaches a point above this mast wire she lowers her main wire to the ground where it is 
connected with a special coupling to the mast wire. The airship is allowed to rise statically taking 
the slack out of the mooring wire. The two yaw guy wires are then sent down to the mast head 
on messenger blocks and connected by couplings to the two yaw winch wires which have 
already been led from the winches at the base of the mast to fairlead snatch blocks located about 
60 degrees to each side of the mast on a 500'radius circle. One of these fairlead block 
anchorages is located every 7 1/2 degrees around this 500'circle so that the ship can moor headed 
into a wind coming from any direction. The slack is taken out of the yaw lines and all three 
winches controlled remotely from the mast head pull the airship slowly into the mast until the 
airship cone is locked in the mast cup. This procedure is an easy one and can be 
accomplished with a ground and mast crew of less than a dozen men. The ship can remain 
moored to the high mast for any desired length of time. " (Walker, 1975: 301/2) (GC emphasis) 
Thus the term "flying moor"in it's true meaning, indicates that the airship remains in flight while its 
mooring lines are connected to the GH equipment. This is to distinguish it from the method that preceded 
the use of a mooring mast but which remained that preferred by the German airship experts. Namely: 
"The original procedure with R-24 at Pulharn was first to walk the ship to the vicinity of the 
mast from the hangar, or after landing to a ground crew, connect the mooring wire from the ship 
to a wire from the mast head, allow the ship to rise statically, and then have the mast winch pull 
the ship into the mast connection. Later in 1919 the ship was able to make flying moors to the 
high mast using a ground crew of only half dozen men to connect the wires and operate the 
winch. Static takeoffs from the mast could be made with even fewer men. Riding out to the mast 
only one man was needed to operate the ballast pump, and two men aboard to attend the elevator 
and ballast the ship. " (Walker, 1975: 301) 
-The Hindenburg [in 19361 was equipped for either mechanical or manual ground handling: 
Luftschiffbau Zeppelin personnel, in contrast to the U. S. Navy's, preferred to fly the ship to the 
ground and walk it to the mast, rather than to make a "flying mooe' with the ship approaching 
the mast in the air and then being hauled down by the main mooring line. " (Dick & Robinson, 
1985: 95) 
However, the equipment used in both Britain and America was the same. 
--While different in appearance from the Pulham mast, the Lakehurst mast [completed in May 
19221 was designed on British principles, and the mooring equipment at the masthead was a 
copy of that designed by Major Scott for the mast at Pulliam. The Lak-ehurst mast was a stout 
three-legged steel tower measuring 148 feet to a large lower operating platform, and 160 feet 
high overall to the gimbals supporting the female cup into which the male cone on the bow of 
the airship fitted, to be held by heavy clamps. " (Robinson & Keller, 1982: 74n5) 
"The [US Navy] bureau certainly intended that mast mooring [for the Shenandoah ZR-11 should 
take place according to British methods, as set forth at length in reports by Land, Maxfield, and 
Hoyt on operations with R33 at Pulliam in the spring of 1921. This involved laying the main 
mooring wire from the mast head out along the ground for about 600 feet in the direction from 
which the ship was approaching at an altitude of 500 feet. The ship dropped the end of her own 
450-foot mooring wire, which was coupled to the mast wire on the ground, and she then released 
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500 lb of water from an emergency bag forward and rose to about 1200 feet. approximately two 
tons light and trimmed down by the tail. She was then hauled do-Am by the -Ainch at the base of 
the mast reelina, in the main mooring wire. At an altitude of 500 feet or so, the slip released two 
450-foot yaw lines made fast to the nose. Ilese %%vm coupled to the mast yaw wires and led to 
snatch blocks bearing approximately 60 degrees from the wind direction. and through the snatch 
blocks to the yaw winches at the base of the masL All three lines were reeled taut, then. while 
the main mooring wire gradually hauled down the ship*s nose toward the masthead4 the taut yaw 
lines ensured that she would not swing from side to side, or worse yet, move forward to impale 
herself on the masthead. " (Robinson & Keller. 1982: 75) 
But, the Americans suffered some unpleasant experiences with their high masts and this led to their 
devising the low or stub mast. Doubtless it is this that has fuelled so= of the misunderstanding as to the 0 
meaning of the term -flying moor" even though in truth the attachment procedure remained unchanged. 
"But before going into the low mast development, let us put the high mast to bcdL In 1925 and 
1926 the R-33 was put back in commission for mooring experiments to the old mast at Putham 
and the new permanent 200'mast completed in 1926 at Cardington for R-100 and R-101. The R- 
100 used the Cardington mast and the one at Montreal for flying moors on all her flights, and R- 
10] made all her flights from and to the very expensive Cardington high mast. It does not appear 
that the high mast has any real future for a rigid airship program based primarily on the 
excessive cost of permanent type high masm" (Walker. 1975: 3(r-) 
"As any future rigid airship program will almost certainly involve sonic t)Tc of low mast 
mooring, a detailed description of the procedure seems appropriate. 17he mooring mast is located 
in the exact center of the riding out circle. At Lak-churst two tracks were provided at circle # 1. 
one on a 438'radius for the Los Angeles and her rideout car and yaw guy cars, and a second track 
on a 643'radius for the Akron and Afacon. Making a flying moor to a low mast is a relatively 
easy maneuver. The main wire is laid out on the ground 5W to leeward from the mast cup with 
the coupling eye located at the landing flag. The two yaw guy anchor cars are spotted forty 
degrees to right and left of the landing flag, or about sixty degrees right and left from the mast 
cup on the railroad tracL" (Walker, 1975: 303/4) 1 
Ilus; there are still three wires (I main line, I port yaw guy and I starboard yaw guy) and these are 
dropped from the airship and connected by the ground crew to the ground-bascd winches. The only 
significant difference is that in the American system the yaw lines are attached to mobile. rail raounted 
vehicles ("anchor cars") whereas in the original British system these are fixed "anchor points7 that cannot 
be quickly or easily repositioned if the wind shifts. The importance of the yaw lines and the expensive 
consequences of not having something to prevent the airship over-riding the mast were demonstrated by 
an incident that may well have influenced Major Scott in the design of his patented mast head equipment 
"On 21" June [1921] after a thirteen hour trip 
... 
she [R36] came in [to Pulliam] for what at first 
appeared to be a normal mast landing in almost flat calm conditions. Having too much way on, 
the ship overrode the mast and her mooring wire fouled the winch. bringing her up with a jerk 
that was strong enough to cause the inadvertent release of two forward emergency ballast bags. 
The bows pitched up sharply, and the lightened ship rose to be brought up standing a second 
time at the full length of her cable. The severe jerk caused the bows to collapse aft of frame 1. 
Uter, Scottie [the captain] observed that he had experienced jerks just as severe in R33 without 
damage. R36 was brought gently to the ground by valving gas, and while a small handling party 
manned the guys Scottie examined the damage and 
... 
decided that it would not be safe to fly to 
the only vacant shed, which was at Howdcn. 
... 
work was immediately put in hand 
... 
to make 
room for R36 [in the Pulliam shed]. Unfortunately when R36 was halfway into L6-rs bcrth at 
4.30 in the morning the wind rose sufficiently to blow her sideways onto the shed door and 
damage her port amidships. She never flew again 
... 
[and] was dismantled in 1926. - (Johnston. 
1994: 47) 
I NB: The Cardington high mast wa3 613 m (202 ft) high. The Dose of CargoLifter C7,160 was esfimmed at 43 m (147 ft) agL 
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Moreover, the vital importance to the NGVLA projects of having experienced and well-trained crews, 
both on board the airships and on the ground, is also borne out by the American's experiences in learning 
how to use the tried and tested mast mooring system that they had acquired from the British: 
"Yet when McCrary [Captain of ZR-I Shenandoah] finally attempted a mast mooring, [the first 
ever in the USA and his first to the new Lakehurst mast] he rejected the well-tried British 
method and instead followed a procedure dreamed up by his German advisor, Anton Heinen, 
who had absolutely no experience with mast mooring and had never seen it done! 
... 
He 
proposed [in his paper 'The Operation of Securing an Airship to the Mooring Mast"] that the 
ship approach the mast "not more than 50 feet above the mast cone" and then check her way by 
running two engines in reverse. The yaw lines (not the main mooring cable) were then to be 
dropped and rove through the snatch blocks, after which the main mooring cable was to be 
dropped. During the process the ship, already dangerously close to the masthead, was free to 
move forward into the mast unless restrained by the engines running in reverse. 
... 
The moment 
of truth came on 5 November, [1923] when McCrary made his first attempt to moor to the mast 
using the Heinen method, and experienced total frustration. Late in the afternoon, at 1645, the 
ship took off after being carefully weighed off on the field. McCrary anticipated she would 
become heavy with the approach of sunset, but in two attempts to moor to the mast, the 
Shenandoah proved to be light and rose as the engines were set on "idle. " The only way to land 
her would have been to valve helium, which McCrary was not willing to do, and he finally 
abandoned the attempt owing to the onset of darkness. 'The failure to accomplish the mooring 
on these attempts was not due to any material failure or design, " wrote McCrary. "No, it was the 
method! " wrote Truscott [chief designer of ZR-11 on the cover sheet. " (Robinson & Keller, 
1982: 75) 
As to the origin of the "flying moor" myth there is a clue in the use of the words "long and tedious" 
which might indicate that the author has been influenced by the "axe to grind" problem, as explained in 
Section 3.4.2.6, wherein Neville Shute Norway in his memoir "Slide Rule"i makes sneering reference to 
the mooring system devised by his competitors. If true, this is evidence of a far older myth that is still 
spreading its malicious influence after 45 years, notwithstanding the many less famous, although in some 
cases far more authoritative, writings to the contrary, that have been produced since. For example, these 
references by the officer on-board the airship who was actually in charge of conducting the procedure, in 
contrast to Neville Shute who was only an occasional non-participating observer: 
"For an hour or so we [R100 on I' flight]" cruised in the neighbourhood of Bedford and 
Cardington, and eventually dropped our mooring-wire at a few minutes before 13.00 hours. Our 
cone was secure in the cup on the tower at 13.30. " (Meager, 1970: 155) 
"We dropped our wire at 15.45 hours and were secure at 16.15 hours 
... 
[RIOO 2"d flight]" 
(Meager, 1970: 163) 
" 
... 
we came up into the wind to make a mooring [RIOO 3d flight and V night landing]. As a 
mistaken aid, the searchlight was shone at the control car and so blinded the Cox'n that we had 
to request that it be shone [on the ground crew] 
... 
This they did at 22.05 and at 22.40 we 
received the 'Secure' from the Tower Officer 
... 
" (Meager, 1970: 169) 
This is not to say that the system was perfect. There were of course many times when there were 
problems that delayed matters, such as a broken winch or wire, however, in general the time taken seems 
to have been around half an hour, and contrary to Shute's myth-creating false witness, this is also borne 
out by independent unbiased testimony from the USA: 
"A "flying moor" can be made to a high mast in a few minutes time and with the assistance of 
only a handful of men. 
... 
the time for mooring to the Patoka mast has run from seventeen 
minutes to an hour with an average time of around thirty minutes. " (Fulton, 1929: 58) 
I Shute, 1954 
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And finally, while considering myths associated with mooring masts, it was thought by some at 
CargoLifter that mooring masts were actually totally unnecessary for the NGVLAs. However, HR would 
indicate that the builders of the first prototype would be wise to consider carefully such statements as 
these before setting off to design any brand new, unproven. untested mooring systems for their creations. 
"Several fundamental principles have been learned through experience. One is that the extreme 
bow or nose of an airship is the proper place for mooring attachment and is like%%ise the best 
point from which to tow the airship around the field. " (Fulton. 1929: 57) 
"During the [Pulham. mast] tests the [R24] lay out continuously for four weeks, during which the 
worst weather conditions of the British Isles prevailed. The ship was subjected to gusts of wind 
blowing with a velocity of up to 50 miles an hour from all directions. and to phenomenally 
heavy rainfall, three thunderstorms and snowstorms, interspersed with periods of sunshine. The 
behaviour of the airship was, however, all that could be desired. and demonstrated conclusively 
the practicability of this system of mooring. 
... 
The ship was steadier in a strong wind than in a 
light breeze, but perfectly stable under all conditions. " (Pratt, 1920: 82) 
-Riding to a mast is a comparatively old operation for airships. British airships in the early 
1920's rode for long periods to the high mast, remaining there through strong %%inds, wind shiftsý 
heavy rain, and other stormy conditions. Our Shenandoah and Los Angeles used the high mast 
frequently from 1923 to 1927, and the experience gained there led to the development of the stub 
mast and the improved mobile low mast, one of Lak-ehurst's outstanding contributions to airship 
ground handling. The Los Angeles and the Graf Zeppelin have made hundreds of moorings to the 
low type of mast and have ridden to the mast between trips as a steamship lies at its anchorage or 
pier, with no more than the infrequent minor mishaps to be expected in handling any large 
mechanical apparatus. The low mooring mast. mobile or fixed4 is therefore a proven part of 
airship ground equipmenL" (Reichelderfer, 1935: 97) 
"As to handling, the high mooring masts at Cardington. Mowreal and Lak-churst. and the 
experimental mast at Pulliam, of which I was in charge up to the cessation of activities 
... 
proved 
the soundness of the system. On these masts airships have ridden out gales of 83 miles per hour. - 
(Williams, 1974: 194) 
Thus it can be seen that by means of lEstorical Research it is possible to debunk some of the GH myths 
that have arisen since the demise of the FIGVLAs and in so doing to provide considerable insight into 
detailed procedures which have been tried and tested in the field. There are, in addition. many other 
misconceptions and false assumptions which will have to be investigated and which the NGVL. A 
developers will need to recognise and to have a clear understanding of. However, it is the difficult 
questions that are founded on such misunderstandings that are the more serious problem for them. 
93 Difficult questions 
To some extent the myths and the difficult questions can be seen simply as two faces of the same coin. 
For example, the RIOI*s stated ability to be "flown onto the mast7 obviously lies behind the question: 
-Why canI CL, 160 pilots just "fly" the airship directly onto the mast without groundcrew assistance? " 
However, as soon as it is known, that no airship in history has ever done such a thing. then the magnitude 
and the pioneering nature of the undertaking can be recognised, and the full scale of the tests, tirm- 
consurning trials and the expensive prototyping that will be necessary become evident. But each myth 
also does further damage because each one spawns a plethora of further questions that head off in all 
directions, affecting all sorts of decisions at all levels of development, and frequently linking up with 
other myths. Indeed many of the numerous "Unan wcrable Questions" that plagued the CargoLifter 
project. as given in Section 2, although they may appear at first glance to be quite separate and unrelated, 
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are often founded on one and the same absence of knowledge or lack of reliable experience concerning a 
specific topic. Moreover, some of these questions have huge cost implications for the NGVLAs. For 
example: 
" Is a mooring mast really necessary? 
" If it is, then should the mooring mast be a mobile or fixed structure? 
" If the mast is mobile, then should it move on railway-lines or crawler-tracks? 
" What other ground-based infrastructure will be required in addition to a mast? 
" What ground support equipment (GSE) will need to be integrated into the GHE? 
Furthermore, as shown in Section 3.2 above, these "hardware" questions immediately bring in their train 
the even more intangible "wetware" questions that are just as critical and potentially equally expensive: 
" How many ground crew personnel will be needed to operate the GHE? 
" What is the minimum number of groundcrew that will be required for each procedure? 
" Why do we need any ground crew at all? 
However, from the necessarily naYve view-point of the would be NGVLA GHE developer, where it is 
impossible to know even the extent of the "unknown unknowns" let alone to evaluate all the financial and 
technical implications of jumping to a false conclusion, the task of even prioritising the search for 
solutions and of deciding where the biggest risks lie is something of a challenge. Nevertheless, in order to 
demonstrate the value of HR. and prove that AEAA can help to fill the Knowledge Gap, or at least give a 
deeper understanding of the GH problems, it is necessary to select one or two specific questions and to 
examine them in some detail. 
Obviously there are some questions on the list that cannot be answered by these means. For instance, 
some questions are too vague, some are full of imponderables and some involve precise numbers that can 
only be guessed at. Others would require immensely detailed research or large resources which are 
beyond the scope of this work, and while some are simply open questions, others are too CargoLifter 
specific to be of general interest. In determining which questions to attempt to provide answers to, plainly 
such unsuitable questions can be excluded at this point. Examples of these include: 
If large airships are so perfectly suited for weight-lifting then why are they not already 
doing it? 
Alat skills will GH personnel require? 
How long will it take for the CL-160 payload to be loaded, and unloaded, or exchanged for 
ballast weight? 
How long will it take to physically move the CL-160 into or out-of its hangar? 
How many times each year will the CL-160 need to go into its hangar? 
" What are the wheel loads on a rail-mounted mobile mast large enough to hold the CL-160? 
" What will be the operational limits imposed by the weather? 
71ere are, however, some questions which would appear to be answerable, even from the limited amount 
of information that had been collected by the author up to the end of the CLOSHRP. Indeed, one such 
concerns the number of personnel who will really be needed on the ground for the first NGVLA. This 
question was actually addressed, albeit hastily, by the author in the aforementioned "Cambridge Paper of 
2002, which contained the following chart (see below) showing the numbers of groundcrew personnel 
that were actually used by the PGVLAs. In view of the fact that a proper understanding of what the 
PGVLAs really achieved, in terms of reducing their ground-crew numbers, will be a potentially useful 
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jumping-off point for an% planners of future N(j\ LA 6HE. it is deerned appropnate to imestigate it 
further in this stud\. Thus the first question to be addressed ý% ill be: 
1. Ho%% big 
-. %ere the WATA ground cre%%s? 
In choosing a second question. a slightlý broader topic that 
. 
%as imporiant to GH but. %%hich also had 
N%ider implications for the NGVLAs in general. was sought. It %%as recalled that at the end of the Air-ship 
Association's I" International Airship Conference at Bedford. England. in 19%. the author had been 
among those enlisted onto a panel of experv, v hich "... was converted in (in open. 1 . ()rijin. at the requt ýr of 
UKMOD (PE), to ansiver questions on airship ground handling and command and control. '* (we Section 
2.7 ý In \-ie%% of the fact that. in later vears. there %%as much debate at Cargol-ifter (in thiý. topic. and that 
there v, as no consensus as to \, \ ho \%as responsible for v hat. and that. as quoted in the -, ame Section 
abo% e. the problems of "Ground crew co-ordination: ground crevi chief and responsibilm sharing1hand- 
over between ground crew chief and pilot 
... 
and 
... 
on-mastloff-mast responsibilirN had been 
fla22ed as a serious issue b,, the German re--ulatorN authorities, it \xa, ý decided that the %econd question to 
be addressed should look to the PGVLA rc, ordý and ask 
2. Who"asincommand? 
9.3.1 HoNi big N% ere the PGNTA ground ere%% s? 
For the ý: (, 
-authorcd Cambridge Papei. thiN author prepared the hari to sho%k ho%% mam men 
had been used b, ý some of the lar2e,, t of the PG%'LAs. (Some groups ha%c h"n anialganiated tor 
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E% olution of ground cre%% size (re% ised) 
Although this chart %ý as prepared in haste, it did ser%e to ýho%k h-A the numherN (it ground cr;:, % had 
diminished over time, as experience %%as built up in the three major PG%LA-de% eloping counuies. The 
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(-anibnd, ze Paper text also pointed up the importance of trials and training. and of using dedicated Zý 
experimental airships as a factor in reducing -round crew numbers and enhancino cost 
-effect i vc GH: 
-The \% ide variations in the cre\ý numbers for R33 and Los Angeles can be explained bý tile fact 
that both \ý ere relati\ elý long IiN ed airships xý hich were used as test beds for much expcri mental 
\ý ork that included moorim! trials and crew traininz. The result was then- 111-OUndcre%As reduced in 
numbers as lessons were learned. " (Camplin & Schaefer, 2002) 
Ho\ýe\er. the chart did not sho\ý \cr\ cleark the ad vances made over the German svstem, in red tic inu the 
numbers. b\ both the British High Mast and the American Mechanical Handlim! systerns. Their progress 
can be better \ i,, ualised the same. but slightly updated data. is redrawn as a different chart. 
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Progress in ground cre,. i size reduction 
The nunibci,, Lj,, cd in preparing these charts vere derived from the numerous quotes that had been 
disco% ered and collected in the course of the HR prQjcct. These are a few examples of them 
- 
in an 
approximate chronological order with [GC emphasis thus]: 
-Ground-handling parties for the small SS ships numbered between fifty or sixty men, even in 
calm conditions. " (NIwa-thorpe. 1999: 21 ) 
"During the tests [of Pulharn mast] the airship [R24] lay out continuousiv for four weeks 
... Onb, four men at a time \k ere needed to look after the airship, and do the necessary gassing and 
balla-, tin2. - i Pratt. 1920: 82) 
-The number of men required to handle and operate a ship is commonlý believed to be large, but 
ith the aid of most priniitive mechanical appliances a 500-ft rigid has been safely secured to the 
mooring mast with the assistance of only six men on the ground. " (Cave-Browne-Cave, 1920) 
-The man power required to handle a rigid airship on the ground and get her into a shed is out of' 
all proportion to the object attained, as even under the calmest conditions a bod) ol'upwards of' 
300 men 
... 
must he kept standing by whenever a flight or landing is expected 
... 
" (Pratt, 1920) 
"in the late afternoon of 4 September [ 1923] 
... 
ZR-I was walked out for the first time. This 
demanding operation required 420 sailors, marines. and station civilian employees. " (Althoff, 
1990: 28) 
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"When the airship [the Graj] was over the field 
... 
Yaw lines 
... 
were drawn out to port and 
starboard by thirty men each, while twenty more on each side pulled the ship down with 
spiderlines 
... 
When the airship reached the ground4 fifty men held the control car rails and 
twenty held those of the after car. With thirty men in reserve, the ground crew totalled two 
hundred mem" (Dick & Robinson, 1985: 70) 
"Mooring crew. At the high mast 10 to 12 men have sufficed thus far. With vertical control 
added, this number may have to be increased to 16 or 18 men. No stub mast has yet been 
equipped for a full mechanical mooring, and therefore the number of men required by the 
present temporary combined manual and mechanical system cannot fairly be compared with 
the 10 to 12 men in the high-mast crew. - (Rosendahl. 1931 a) 
"During the period that the ship is being -walk-ed- across the landing field, [using the -Bolster 
bearrr] a single handling-line spider, manned by about 30 men, is used on each side of the 
stem of the ship. A group of about 12 men walk- along with the after taxiing whecl to help it 
over rough spots in the field and to hold the ship down if it becomes lighL These men also assist 
in holding the ship while it is being connected or disconnected from the beam. They perform no 
function during the hauling up or docking operations. and this may truly be said to be entirely a 
mechanical operation, since the only personnel involved are the eight men on each side who 
connect the side handling cables, the group mentioned who connect the lower fin support. the 
three 
-Ainch operators, and the locomotive operatorý" (Bolster, 1932: 116f7) 
"... Landing and mooring of the ZPG-3Wrequired only 10 to 18 personnel in the ground crew. 
Docking and undocking were performed with 11 to 12 men; tak-coff required approximately the 
same number... - (GAC/NASA, 1977: 53)1 
However, as can be seen there is some inconsistency in these numbers. This is in part due to the wide 
range of dates covered and also to the different aims and prejudices of the various authors. Nevertheless, 
there is also evidence that behind this there is another myth lurking that has great import for NGVLAs. It 
concerns the reality of the claims made for the numbers of ground crew that were used uith the American 
mechanised system. For example: 
"German airships were walked in and out of their sheds, and manhandled on the ground by 
trained teams of men. Three or four hundred men were required to handle the larger airships. 
Only with the "Hindenburg- and "GrafZeppelin Ir did the Germans use mechanical handling 
equipment 
-a travelling mooring mast. The U. S. Navy needed 157 men to ground handle the 
"Los Angeles, - but with the complete mechanical equipment de-vised for the "Akron" a dozen 
men could do the job. - (Robinson. 1973) [GC emphasis] 
This final statement is interesting because, if true, it would appear that one of the grew bugbears of GH 
- 
i. e. the large numbers of ground crew required for the big ships 
- 
had indeed been solved by the US Navy 
in the early 1930s. However, if, as stated, "a dozen men" were sufficient to handle the Akron, m hen it 
made its final (and fatal) flight from Lakehurst Naval Air Station WAS) in 193 1. then the question has to 
be asked 
- 
why, six years later, in May 1937, at that same NAS, a ground crew which reportedly 
comprised "92 naval personnel and 139 civilians7 2 was awaiting the LZI29 "Hindenburgý" for what was 
anticipated to be a perfectly normal and routine landing? 
Even allowing for the fact that the LZ129 was a foreign airship; that it was bigger than the Akron, and that 
the Americans were taldng the opportunity to conduct an expansive crew training programme. the 
provision of more than sixteen times as many men as is stated to be actuaUy necessary, would seem to be 
somewhat extravagant. 
NB 
- 
There is only one paragraph on the subject of GH in this 58 page 
., pcx 2 VWght. 1938: Sect IIL 4 
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It must be noted that this was not, as is also commonly believed, the Hindenburg's "maiden voyage to 
America. - It was indeed its "first flight to North America of that year" (1937) but the ship had already 
flown once to South America (in April) and had made ten landings at Lakehurst the previous summer! 
All of these had been conducted without serious incident, 2 and thus the landing of LZ129 at Lakehurst 
was a well-rehearsed evenL Either a dozen men could do the job or they could not. But the fact that there 
were more than 200 people standing on the ground underneath the LZ129 on the day of its final 
conflagration would suggest that these personnel were not merely supernumerary observers but were 
active participants with vital and necessary work to do. This needs to be investigated. 
The accepted answer is that the Germans, and specifically the all-powerful Dr. Hugo Eckener, were "not 
happy" with the American system and preferred to ignore the essentially British "flying mooe' and to 
land, as they had always done, directly into the hands of a large body of disciplined men. However, here 
again, as in all matters concerning GH, the devil really is in the details, and the interesting question is 
what exactly were the Germans unhappy about? Was it that the systems were too new, and untested, or 
that the airship was too long wavering in mid-air, controlled only by ropes, cables and winches? It cannot 
have been an objection to mechanisation in general because the Germans, at their own state-of-the-art 
home base at Frankfurt, used an 'A' frame mast to hold the airship nose, while rail-mounted 'laufkatzen' 
trolleys ensured the mooring lines held the tail central during entry and exit of the shed. 
Whatever Eckener's reason, and regardless of the low-mooring system's true reliability, there is evidence 
that the numbers claimed for it by the Americans are suspect and that they never ever got it down to "a 
dozen men. " Firstly there is Bolster's statement in the above listed examples, (Bolster, 1932: 116n). This 
yields at least 70 personnel but is in rough accord with this statement made in the following year: 
"About 50 men can handle the ship [Akron] in and out of the hangar with the present equipment. 
The ship's crew can do most of the maintenance work in the hangar. 
... 
We had 77 men on the 
Akron, but we flew only two thirds at a time. "(US Congress, 1933: Wiley, 64/5) 
These figures arc, however, themselves thrown into doubt by a report that turned up in the CargoLifter 
library and which is believed to have come from the University of Akron archives. This document is a 
photocopy of a typed report entitled simply "Ground Handling of Rigid Airships. " It is signed by Emmett 
J. Sullivan, dated 15'h February 1935, and it reveals that at the end of their development programme, the 
Americans were actually using more than one hundred men to ground handle the last of their PGVLAs - 
ZRS-5 Macon. Here are some pertinent quotes from this document: 
-Since qualifying as a Naval Aviator (Airship) I have been assigned duties involving ground 
handling of rigid airships. Accordingly, it is felt that I am more competent to offer constructive 
criticism in reference to this particular phase of the airship problem. 
... 
The exposition is brief 
and gives consideration only to those items which, in my opinion, are outstanding deficiencies in 
our present system of ground handling. " (Sullivan, 1935) 
-It is my opinion that the outstanding difficulty in our application of the three wire system is in 
the method used in handling the yaw guy lines. 
... 
The existence of contact between the ground 
and a large portion of the yaw line [when mooring is in progress] has been the cause of most of 
our troubles in mooring. 
... 
The Mooring Officer's principle difficulty has usually been 
... 
in 
transmitting orders to both units in time to obtain coordinative [sic) response. " (Sullivan, 1935) 
I In her short life LZI29 made a total of 63 flights of which 36 were Atlantic crossings to either Lak-ehurst or Rio de Janiero. 2 On one occasion the IX29 was slightly darnaged wW hW to be squeezed into the NAS Lak-ehurst shed for repair. 
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-An ideal tiding-out car is one which can under all conditions of weather provide a reliable 
means for holding down the stem; and at the same time, not interfere with the freedom of 
movement of the airship as she swings in azimuth. 
... 
An airship. riding at a circular track with 
its stem secured to such a heavy mobile ground attachment unit, is subjected to unnecessarily 
large bending loads in starting, stopping, and changing spee&- (Sullivan, 1935) C, 
"... the method used in securing the "X" frames to the Macon was crude of design. and 
unwieldy. Too much time was consumed and too much confusion and trouble has been 
occasioned in employment of the current method. " (Sullivan. 1935) 
-Manually Handled Spider Groups: Aft 
... 
these parties have not contributed a perceptible bit of 
worthwhile effort in handling the ship. It is suggested that such dead weight be discarded ... and 
in so doing cut down the ground crew by some seventy mem- (Sullivan. 1935) 
"Ground Crew Under Proposed System 
- 
No. Men 
... 
TOTAL 28. 
... 
Ground Crew Under 
Present System 
- 
No. Men 
... 
TOTAL 115.7 (Sullivan. 1935) JGC emphasis] 
"... I feel that we are now prepared to completely scrap manual handling and inaugurate an 
improved system of mechanical handling. 
... 
it appears more desirable to handle a ship by 
mechanical means with a small thoroughly indoctrinated ground crew than to place the ship at 
the mercy of a heterogeneous army of poorly trained hands and fect. 7 (Sullivan. 1935) 
Considering that Sullivan's report is dated three days after the ZRS-5 Afacon crashed into the sea. thereby 
abruptly terminating the US Navy's large airship project, it seems most unlikely that the Americans ever 
succeeded in this last stated aim, and that Sullivan's suggested improvements remain today as they were 
at the time, simply a frustrated, state-of-the-art wish list. They are. nonetheless. written by a real expert. 
However it is fairly clear that if the first of the new generation of supcr-large airships ever does get off the 
drawing boards then it is going to require a ground crew that is proficient in a large number of diverse 
skills, and for this reason alone, certainly in the early days, it %%ill inevitably involve large numbers of 
people. Whether, thereafter, the accumulation of NGVLA GH experience in the field4 -*ill ever allow 
these tasks to be condensed in the future so that the dream of employing one multi-talented4 "thoroughly 
indoctrinated7 super-person to do everything can be realised4 remains to be seen. 
Bearing in mind that there are 24 hours in the day, then a crew of 12 %ill inevitably become 36 if they do 
8 hour shifts. Moreover. allowing for sickness and holidays means that 48 will be a more realistic likely 
total. Thus, perhaps, when calculating their ground crew numbers. the NGVLA warns, instead of trying to 
modify HTA ground-handling practices, should turn to the Maritime world and ask the wealthy and cost- 
conscious oil companies how many men they use to berth, and to moor, their super-tank-ers and VILCCs? 
93.2 Who was in command? 
From the very start of airship ground handling there have been problems with the hierarchy. More 
importantly, for the NGVLAs, the historical records reveal that there is a very great risk of disaster 
occurring when authority is usurped by those whose knowledge of LTA vessels is either minimal or 
dominated by preconceptions; as is the case today with regard to blimps. Here are examples of both cases: 
"Evidently it would be a mistake to place the air-ship [1' flight of V airship from Paris in 18981 
at a [starting-off] point suitable for an ordinary balloon without motor and propeller. And yet it 
was there that I did place it, not by my own iaill, but by the will of the professional aeronauts 
who came in the crowd to be present at my experiment. In vain I explained that by placing 
myself -up strearrr in the wind with relation to the centre of the open space I should inevitably 
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risk precipitating the airship against the trees before I had time to rise above them 
... 
All was 
useless. The aeronauts 
... 
could not admit of its starting under other conditions than those of a 
spherical balloon 
... 
As I was alone against them all I had the weakness to yield. I started off 
from the spot they indicated, and with a second's time I tore my air-ship against the trees, as I 
had feared I should do. " (Santos-Dumont, 19(9: 78ng) 
"When. upon arrival [from France in October 1910], the Lebaudy was being docked in the shed 
at Farnborough, the Air Battalion officer in charge of the landing party of 160 Guardsmen and 
Sappers noticed as the balloon approached the entrance that the opening was a little too low, and 
halted the landing party 
... 
A big crowd of soldiers and civilians from far and near had collected 
... 
and the excitement at the arrival of the large airship was intense. An enthusiastic spectator, 
believed to be an officer of high rank in uniform, shouted to the landing party to go on, which 
they did. Ile envelope impinging upon the top of the doorway was punctured, and the airship 
collapsed on the ground 
... 
It transpired that the over-all height of the airship was 10 ft greater 
than the makers had specified. " (Broke-Smith, 1968: 43) 
Although this latter was an isolated incident it did foreshadow what was to come, particularly within the 
British airship community, which was plagued from the start by indecision and inconsistency. This 
confusion in both planning and action continued through First World War and became almost endemic 
right throughout the chain of command at every level. 
-17he reason why the Royal Navy had so few rigid airships in commission at the time of the 
[ 1918] Armistice was that policy and design underwent constant refinements. This left the 
manufacturers without consistent experience, reusable dies, jigs and parts, and without a stable 
work force skilled in the mass-production of a standard design. 
... 
every new ship or group of 
vessels had to have Cabinet approval, and this provided further delay. " (Higham, 1961: 146) 
This deep seated lack of trust, and the failure to delegate authority, may have been caused by insecurity 
that stemmed from a lack of knowledge. It was certainly in total contrast to the confident system practised 
by the far more knowledgeable and experienced Germans. 
"It is often said that the Germans are rigid, hide-bound bureaucrats who are logical to the point 
of self-destruction. But their procedures in [First World War] airship procurement gave the lie to 
this, and also make British methods look even worse. Whenever a major procurement decision 
had to be made, a conference was called at the Admiralty in Berlin. In the chair would be the 
admiral commanding the dockyards, of which the aeronautical section of the Navy was a part, 
surrounded by his technical experts. He would be joined by Captain Strasser, the operational 
commander, and a few of his captains, and representatives of the airship constructional firms. 
Ile admiral acted as chairman and was empowered to make final decisions after hearing what 
each group had to say. When the conference broke up, the constructors went away with a fairly 
clear idea of what they were to do, and were then left alone to get on with it. " (Higham, 
1961: 147) 
But the confusion in Britain was not limited to procurement, design and construction, it also affected the 
operational chain of command and this seems also to have been strongly influenced by friction between 
the various military and civilian services that got involved. 
-- 
.. 
if airships were to have any future at all that future would be bedevilled by the rivalry 
between the Admiralty and the Air NUnistry. Within months of the end of the [First World] War 
... 
it was agreed that the Admiralty was still to be responsible for the design and for the 
employment and housing of airship personnel but the size of the airship establishment was to be 
fixed by the Air Council after receiving recommendations from the Adn-dralty. The training, 
discipline and welfare of airshipmen was to be in the hands of the Royal Air Force. Although it 
was accepted that those who flew and maintained airships were Royal Naval personnel, once 
they were qualified for promotion 
... 
they were then to be transferred to the Royal Air Force and 
thus inevitably to aeroplanes. The origins of this confused and ludicrous situation ante-dated the 
Armistice. For example, it had been decided that 'no Court of Inquiry could be convened until its 
findings were known because whose responsibility it was to convene one was determined by the 
findings. " (Morpurgo, 1972: 85) [GC emphasis] 
215 
Thus the seeds for fundamental misunderstandings as to v6ho should take orders from whom. %%ithin the 
hierarchy of officers who came to take their places in the control cars of the British rigid airships, were 
long-sown and deep-rooted. Furthermore there is clear evidence that the British had not property sorted 
things out even at the abruptly terminated end of their large airsWp programme in 1930. as is shown by 
these extracts from memos held at the PRO 1 (lUggins. Colmre. et al. 1930). 
Extract from File 522050/30 
-Ile RI 
"The airship RIOO is to make a voyage to Canada next n-bonth 
... 
Major G. H. Scott who had 
charge of R34 when she made her voyage to America 
... 
in 1919. uill be in command of R 100. -
iiiiia+ 
Attached note from S. 9 
-It is stated in the above cutting from the 'rimcs! ' of 12d'inst.. that Maj. Scott %%ill be in 
command of R 100 during the forthcoming voyage to Canada. Will you please say %%hether this is 
correct. and what will be the posn.. of S/Ldr Booth (or FAL lr%%in)? [-Captains: " of R 100 and 
RIO I respectively] Sanction to the issue of a command allowance to these officers was obtained 
on the ground of the responsibility involved in the command of an airship particularly when in 
flight (see encs 9A and IOA). We then understood that Maj. Scott would not be in char= of the 
ship as in earlier flights. 
. .. 
Dated F. P. 14.4.30 Signed F. G. C. Young7 
iiiM0i 
Attached responses to above: -18 
- 
With ref to minutes 16 &17 both S/Ldr Booth and F/U Irwin 
will be in charge henceforth and uill carry out the duties and responsibilities as Captains of their 
respective ships. As far as the forthcoming Atlantic flight is conccmed4 SALAr Booth %ill be in 
command of RIOO but Maj. Scott will also be on board. It has always been the intention that 
Maj. Scott should accompany the ships on their preliminary long distance flights in view of his 
past airship experiences would prove invaluable should difficulties be encountered in event of 
emergency. On this occasion however he will be onboard in an advisory capacity 
... 
Signed 
TLN. B. Colemore, DAD RAW 2.5.19307 
Memo dated 28.7.30 to D. A. D. from J. H, AMSR 
-RIOO Atlantic Flight 
- 
Booth has been appointed Captain. He must exercise command and be 
responsible for the airship. In the unlikely event 
... 
circumstances make it necessary for Maj. 
Scott to take command of the airship then you should formally authorise him to take over from 
Sqn. Ldr. Booth and report in due course that this has been done and give reasoaL 
... 
You [i. e. 
Colemore as Director of Airship Development) %ill no doubt settle the route and times of 
departure and intended times of landing with Maj. Scott who can give the necessary instructions 
to the Captain of the Airship. During the flight I want Maj. Scott to watch and advise as to the 
general conduct of the flight and not to have any executive responsibility unless specifically 
authorised by you. Signed John Higgins" 
s; i0ai ffi 
Merno dated 28.7.30 to Press secretaa (through D. A. D. ) from J. H. MISR 
"It would appear that the press generally are under the impression that Maj. Scott %%ill command 
RIOO on her Atlantic Flight. THIS IS NOT THE CASE and I should like the position to be made 
clear before RIOO starts. RIOO on her Atlantic Flight %%ill be commanded by Sqn. Ldr. R. S. 
Booth AFC and Maj. G. H. Scott CBE AFC will be on board in his capacity as Assistant Director 
for Flying. Wng. Cmdr. P-B. B. Colemore OBE %%ill be on board in his capacity as D_A-D- and 
will represent the AirMinistry while RIOO is in CanaW 
Although it appears from this that things had finally been sorted out by the time of the R100s flight to 
Canada, in August 1930, in fact, the records show that on this voyage the problem actually took a new 
turn and it was far from resolved by the time the RIO] set off for India on October the 5th. 
Notes dated 24.10.30 
"Notes regarding the respective position of Maj. Scott Assistant Director of Airship 
Development (Flying) and the captains of R100 and R101 on flights to Canada and India. 
Press notes show Scott as "one of the officials from Cardington and seemed to imply that he was 
merely a passenger and had no responsibility for the flight but 
... 
- [Scott says] -if anything 
happens on the flight I will be held rcsponsibleý- [Furthermore] Scott was -rather hurt by the 
impression which had been formed in Canada that he had been superseded by BooW Signed 
C. P. Robertson [RAW Press Officerr 
I PRO: AIR 3/13 
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Here then is an example of a problem which was plainly never solved satisfactorily by the British. It is 
even conceivable that this lack of a clearly understood chain of command, and the consequent confusion 
as to area of responsibility, might have contributed to the R101 disaster. Obviously it will never be known 
who was in the control cabin at the time of the crash, let alone who was giving the orders. Nevertheless, 
in the light of the above memos it is revealing to speculate how, for example, the helmsman on R101, 
would have reacted if given simultaneous but contradictory orders by Irwin (the less experienced 
"Captain") and Scott (the more senior and more experienced officer who officially had "no authority"). 
Moreover, it must not be forgotten that such confusion has just as much potential to cause a disaster on 
the ground. If the NGVLAs are to avoid such problems then their ground and flight crews will need to 
know exactly who is in command at every stage of operations, and this will include all the GH 
procedures, as well as change-over to and from flight. A clearly defined procedure for the hand-over of 
responsibility will at the very least have to be established for each of these transitions to and from GH: 
0 Undocking 
- 
hand-over from either inflation or maintenance crew 
Re-docking 
- 
hand-over to either maintenance or deflation crew 
Release 
- 
hand-over to flight crew 
Capture 
- 
hand-over from flight crew 
To give the British some credit, it does appear that by 1930 they had at least sorted out the chain of 
command and the hand-over of responsibility for these vitally important GH transitions. The historical 
records contain many references sirrAlar to this one: 
-... when the airship [RI001 has been hauled down to a height of 500 feet the main winch is 
stopped until both the yaw guys are coupled and hauled taut. The Mooring Tower Officer now 
assumes responsibility and control of operations. " (Meager, 1970: 156) 
Plainly it would be quite useful as a starting point for the NGVLAs to know the exact details of this hand- 
over and doubtless detailed research could uncover them. However, it lies beyond the scope of this 
present investigation to research the full extent of all the responsibilities and of the established hand-over 
points, complete with confirmatory signals and fall-back altematives, that were used and proven, at every 
level of the PGVLA hierarchies, at the end of their development programmes in Germany, Britain and 
America. Nevertheless, it is certainly true that the US Navy had established who was in command by the 
time they came to be operating their large cold-war-blimps - although they still had some get-out clauses: 
"General Instructions 
... 
Responsibility. 1.4 Landing 
- 
Primary responsibility for the safety of 
the airship during landing belongs to the Ground Handling Officer (GHO) when the airship 
handling lines are fun-dy in the hands of the ground handling crew. The pilot is responsible for 
complying with signals of the GHO 
... 
Whenever, due to shifting winds, gusts, parted handling 
lines or other reasons, the airship lines are no longer firmly held by the ground handling crew, 
the primary responsibility, by necessity, shifts to the pilot. 
... 
1.5 Take-off 
- 
During take-off 
operations the primary responsibility for the safety of the airship is the Ground Handling 
Officer's until the handling lines have been released 
... 
If, after unmasting, because of adverse 
conditions, the ground crew lose control of the airship, primary responsibility will revert to the 
pilot 
... 
" (US Navy, 1958: 1) 
"1.6 Wherever conditions or circumstances indicate that the safety of airship's men or equipment 
may be jeopardized by proceeding with scheduled ground handling operations, it shall be the 
responsibility of the GHO to advise the officer scheduling the operation. Under such conditions 
or circumstances, the GHO may decline to assume responsibility for the consequences if ordered 
to proceed... " (US Navy, 1958: 1-2) 
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"Prudential Rule 
- 
1.8 In obeying and construing the procedures outlined herein. due regard &P V 
shall be given to all special circumstances which may render a departure from these procedures 
necessary to avoid immediate danger. " (US Navy, 1958: 2) 
These however are rules for airships that behave like HTA craft and whether the NGVLAs will be able to 
adapt to this regime is in considerable doubt. To this author it seems more likely that something 
approaching the old rigid airship systems will prove better suited and ultimately safer. even though this 
will entail the reinstatement of a Mooring Mast Officer, along with clearly defined powers and areas of 
responsibility. Consequently, the current accepted role and overarching authority of the pilot in relation to 
the GHO will have to be re-examined and modified accordingly. Them are sound practical reasons for 
this belief, as evidenced by this -rediscovery" made by the British MOD during their latest evaluation of 
the Skyship 600 as a possibly useful device: 
"It became apparent hat when the airship was in the hands of the crew. the pilot had less 
influence over the dynamics of the vehicle than the ground crew. - (1--fart)m & Brourn, 1996) 
The same will be true in the future even if the human ground crew is replaced by %%inches or purpose 
built-machines. Furthermore, if such review is undertaken, then the NGVLA developers would be well 
advised to keep in mind the airship's nautical roots and again to look to the sea for inspiration when 
seeking to redefine the roles and responsibilities of those officers and ranks of men within the chain of 
command that must link the airborne to the ground-based without any misunderstandings. 
"Unlike an aeroplane, airships, especially the huge Zeppelin-type rigids, have a great affinity 
with sea-going ships, especially sailing ships. Taking them in and out of their sheds, mooring to 
the mast, are reminiscent of guiding a ship to her harbour berth or dock. 
... 
Controlling an 
airship crew, whether three or twenty-three, demanded similar qualities to that of a captain and 
his ship's crew. " (Mowthorpe, 1999: xv) 
"On all ships, the man who really runs the vessel is the First Officer. his is the most effective 
daily authority on the ship, that which is niost active. Tbc mate, as he was known in the days of 
sail and even for much of the age of steani, is the one who must ensure that things are shipshaM 
that they get done, that the ship and its gear are in good running order, that the cargo is 
efficiently loaded and discharged, and that the crew is under control and doing its jobr (Mostert. 
1974: 136) 
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10 POTENTIALLY USEFUL IDEAS 
The history of LTA flight is long, and as this investigation has revealed, many of the problems that afflict 
airships in general and which will have to be addressed if future development of the NGVLAs is to 
proceed, can be traced right back to the very earliest days of the very first airships. If, as is the case, these 
intractable problems have withstood, for more than one hundred years, the combined and focussed 
attention of literally thousands of people, (some of whom are proven to have been exceptionally clever), 
then the author, who is not an engineer and who makes no claim to be one, has no illusions that he is 
about to offer any sudden or satisfactory solutions to them. 
Nevertheless, in the course of this research, many and various claimed solutions have come to light. Some 
are obviously dafL Some are from people who plainly do not know what they are talking about and some 
are for problems that do not, and never have existed. (For examples see Appendix G- GH Patents) 
However, there are also some that do appear to be worthy to further investigation. These range from ideas 
put forward by experienced engineers, (who for one reason or another were unable to prove or pursue 
their plans), to Patented concepts from knowledgeable companies, (which were left incomplete or only 
partially tested), to visionary imaginings (which were simply beyond the technology of their day, but 
which now, (or perhaps soon) may be realisable). 
limited space does not allow for more than a few of these suggestions to be examined here, but readers 
seriously intent on pursuing NGVLA development might like to bear in n-dnd that they represent only the 
tip of an ice-berg, and there are plenty more unrealised plans, untested schemes, incomplete trials, 
unfulfilled wishes and dreams where these came from. The author does not seek to promote or endorse 
(with one exception) any of the examples given below. They are chosen merely to demonstrate the variety 
of topics and diversity of potential sources wherein such information may be found. 
10.1 Innovations and untried concepts 
Firstly there are ideas concerning the airships themselves. For example, it seems that plans were made for 
bigger and better blimps, in both Britain and America, at the end of their respective major developmental 
eras, centred as they were on the First and the Second World Wars. 
"Note 
- 
On September 11,1917 an Admiralty conference decided they (North Sea class) should 
be superseded by the K-class, but these ships were never built. " (Higham, 1961: 118) 
-I'he [Goodyear] GZ-16 proposal: Outline specification OS-135 was issued 16 April 1954 for a 
"barrier airship" 
... 
Due to the size of 2,800,000 cubic feet, the proposal was comparable in size 
to the rigid airship USS Los Angeles. 
... 
GZ-16 reached the car mock-up stage 
... 
Eventually, the 
GZ-16 was abandoned as too expensive 
... 
" (Shock, 1994: 111-32/3) 
Whatever these designs were, they represent the wishes, ideals and cumulative experiences of the two 
most expert nations, as they were recorded immediately after the completion of their independent 
Programmes of intensive non-rigid airship development. Anyone contemplating building a large 
pressurised airship in the future would be well advised to see whether any designs or drawings from either 
of these projects have survived and, if so, to take a good hard look at the detail of them, before starting 
from scratch with their own sheet of blank paper. 
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Other inno% ative schernes ha% e been concerned v- ith %% aýs of housing the airship: 
"One fascinating proposal [for sol%ing the lack of sheds probleml. made bý Sir Robert 
NlacAlpine. v. as to dig enormous tunnels into con% ement hillsides, so creating safe shelters 
%ýhich could easily be enlarged as required. Neither this nor a similar proposal to use drý docks 
temporaril\ roofed o%er %%as e\er implemented. ho\%e\er. *' (Abtx)tt. 1989: 1101 
-Earlier in the year ( 19161 it had been thought that 
. 
some ships might be built in drý -d(-)cks. 
which could easilý ha, e been roofed o,, er. This %%a,, a step halfAaý bet%keen the nor-mal erection 
sheds and the tunnels proposed bý Sir Robert %IacAlpirk:. The discussion on this question %, as 
however. shori-li\ ed as it %A as disco,, ered that the papers had been lost. *' ( Highani. 1% 1: 143) 
Considering the progress that has occurred in the interini. in the construction and maintenance ot 
enorniousl-s large maritime vessels. such as -Supertankers- and \'LCC-.,. there %,. ould scern to bt: sonic 
scope for the future utilisation bý the LTA communitý of their e, en larger. and perhaps no%% disused or 
out-grown, dry-docks and other mooring and support facilities. 
"At the end of 1972. there %%ere still onlý t%%entý 
-one repair dock-., in emstence to handle them [VLCCsj 
... 
13% 1976ý it is eýtimated about forl\-t%%k) large docks throughout the \%orld \%i II , er\*e 
them 
... 
" (Mostert. 1974: 521 
Similarl), there \A, ould seem to be opportunities derning from progress \4ith the exc a% ation of large holes 
in the ground and the creation and maintenance of \ ast. subterranean chamber-, i i. e. the Chanrwl Tunnel) 
that are no%k regarded as commonplace b,. the mining. earth-moving and tunnel-building industries. 
Alternativek. there have been man% schemes for %erN large airship mooring facilities that are purpose 
built. One of the most famous is Commander Sir Charles Dennistoun Burne-Cs cradle 
- 
as described and 
pictured in his book -The World. The Air and The Future. " 
"Mooring and Docking raft 
... 
The ship is moored at a mooring mast in the usual %% aý. and as 
soon as this has been done. a number of clavs are rnechanicallý operated and clasp the ship 
firrnlý about the centre line. When the ship is securelý held in these ýAa%% s. the %,. hole structure 
embracin2 the mast, cla,, \s. and ship. is run into the shed on rails. " (Burneý. 1929ý21i i 
AX 
-, 
o I- 
41ý 
.1 -0010" 
BurneN and his Airship Guarantee Co.. actuallý applied to patent this idea in Octohcr I Bntlsh 
Patent No. 3 10,104 
- 
Improvements in or relating to Means for Berthin2 Airships i although there is Ilk) 
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e% idence that theý e\ er tried to build it. Nor is there such evidence for the German idea of combining a 
hangar and a mooring mast. \%hich appeared in the British Patent Office a few months earlier. Siemens 
- 
Schuckermerke Gn1bH "ere --ranted British Patent No. 256,924 for Improvements in or relating to 
Meaw, for Anchoring Airships" on 10 FebruarN 1927, having previously gained Patent protection in 
Ciernian% in 1925. An excerpt front their description explains the concept 
- 
"... The ship is brought in to a 
mast on a rotatable hangar. and is lowered bv the nose to... enable it to be run into the hangar... " 
Ho"e%cr. the idea of slidinL the air,, hip up and do\\n the mast had also occurred to the Americans: 
BRITISH PATENT SPECIFICATION 
- 
256,778 
Apphcation clate : Aug. 5,1925 No. 19,724/25. 
Complete Accepted : Aug. 19,1926. 
COMPLETE SPECIFICATION 
Improvements in Methods of and Apparatus for Mooring Airships 
Communication h om AIRCRAFT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, a corporation incorporated under the 
laws of the State of Michigan, United States of America, having a place of business at General Motors 
Corp. Bldg., Detroit, Michigan, United States of America. 
1, ALFRED ERNEST WHITE. A. I. Mech. E., Fellow of the Chartered Institute of Patent Agents, a subject of 
the King of Great Britain, of the firm of White, Langner, Stevens & Parry, of Jessel Chambers, 88-90, 
Chancerv, Lane, London, W. C. 2, Char-tered Patent Agents, do hereby declare the nature of this invention 
and ui what mariner the same is to be performed, to be particularly described and ascertained in and by 
the following statement :- 
"This mvention relates to a method of and apparatus for mooring airships. Among the particular objects 
are to provide better facilities for the practical operation of bringing the ship's nose to a secured relation to 
the mast and then to permit the swing of the ship completely around the mast if desired or at AU and 
, Alth great facility move the mooring connection down the mast for the purpose of allovang the airship to 
assume a lower position even to the extent of berthing the ship in contact with the ground. 
... 
... 
In mv [primarv] Specification No. 255,510. 
1 set forth the method and apparatus for the 
lowering of an airslup from the top of a mast 
bv means of a rotating guide. My present 
invention involves additional developments 
that mav be used in that connection or ma v 
be independently used, or mav be used in 
conjunction with modified masts or mooring 
tovmr construction. 
Some of the practical elements of this 
invention involve a guide rail running down 
the side of a mast. vAuch mav either be fixed 
with a rotating mast, or mav rotate on 
retaining connections completely around a 
fixed mast 
- 
but connected with the upper 
end of the rail is a continuation or horn 
preferably articulated, which curves from a 
vertical to a horizontal position over the axis 
of the mast. For connecting the bow of an 
airship to the niast by the usual cone on a 
ca ble extending from a nose spindle, I 
pro%ide a complementary cone or flower pot 
%kiuch is supported in a carriage and provide 
for the easy adjustment of the carnage from 
the apex of the horn and its ready 
manipulation to slide down the horn and to 
the vertical guide rail permitting any desired 
change in elevation of the airship. 
... 
" 
ý56 776 
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A to"er on this principle was actuallý built (and paid for bý Henrý Ford) at Dttroit Aiqkmt. Dearborn. 
%lichigan. USA in the 1920s (See Thaden. 1926). It %%as 2 10 feet high and. although three different 
airships moored to its masthead on separate occasions. the most interesting and inno% ati%c part of the 
tower. the "venical rail-, N-a%" vas ne\er actuall\ tested ;, ith an air%hip atta, hcd to it It remain, an 
extremel\ interesting idea. 
But whý stop at onlý one mast" A US Navý Lieutenant %%ho,, c name iý ýnonýnlouý %%Ith the most 
ad% anced mechanised system ever realised for ground handling large airships. Cal% in Bolster - m% entor of 
the "Bolster Beam- as used bý the Akron and Macon 
- 
suggested at the peak ol hi s arcer that t %% o masts 
might be better. 
"Although the author [Bolster] has \ i\ idl\ pointed out the di,, ad% antage,, (it am Niern handling 
structure \kith solid parts extending high abo\e the ground. there is one Such altemati\e \%hich 
has been gi,, en serious attention. This is a single stem mast on \%hich the stem of the ship v ould be moored somev-hat similarl\ as the bou is on the hov. mast. In thi', Lase. our studies hai6e 
shown that the stem attachment could pwsiblý be \%orked out so that it permit% sorne relatne 
motion and so that. in case of break-a%\ aý. the stem could -, %k iniz clear of the structure, Then the 
mast need not be collapsible. Of course a mutual fore-and-aft to%% s\ stem %% ith pro% ision for 
ample permissible relati,, e motion or an efficient and reliable ser\0 dn\c equipment must again 
he %%orked out. Neither solution seems to offer insurmountable difficulties. A stem mast 
equipment requires some strengthening of the stern of the ship %% hich ini c%tigation% ha% c shown 
%vould not necessaril\ be proh&ti%e in v-eight. 
... 
a single stem mast 
... 
is considered to be an 
excellent alterriative to the beam. 
... 
It has the important ad% antage. that it renA)\ es all handling 
stresses from the lom er fin. - (Bolster. 193 2: 118/9) 
A stem mast would also mean that the airship structure - ould be held in tension all the time it %,. as 
moored. This "ould seem to be a considerable ad,. antage as it %%ould automaticallý ren-k)%c the high 
stresses and point loads that deri%e from the fulcrum ine%-itabl% created %%hene%er andv. here %er an\. GHE 
is attached to the underside of anv airship. In addition. and co-incidentall\. such a s\stem %% ould pro\ ide 
m ice the number of access points for personnel. and it %A ould also allo%% for the supplý. and/or 
monitoring. of both ballast. and/or fuel. at both ends of the ship. simultaneouslý. Dus \1 ould make 
replenishment of these fluids quicker. as it v, ould sa\e pumping them the full length ot the ship. and it 
ýxould be safer. as there would be mo independent supplý sý stems. Ho\Ae\, er. this idea 
.% as not Bolster's 
own and it had previously been the subject of a British Patent (GB 187.036) granted on the I 6th OLtober 
1922 to Johns, G. W. and Johns. H. E. 
There would of course be some disad% antages. not least the fact that a stem mast for an NGVLA. u ould 
necessarily have to be a verý large and substantial structure. but would ne%ertheless, on occasion. be 
required to accelerate and mo\e quite quick],, - for instance if a strong wind %%ere to shift its direction 
-udclenlý. A stem mast would also be an obstruction during flight ops, and it would need a second ground 
crev. - to facilitate attachment to it during capture. Or when mooring. but the operational problems are 
reall\ no worse than they \A. ould be when using a more con\ entional bearn or a "doll\. " 
10.2 Forgotten or neglected ideas 
Hov, eý. er. there is a way in which many if not most of the more senous GH and nkýonnf difficulties for 
the NGVLAs might seemýinglv be fairly easily alleviated. It is a system that %k as used \%ith considerable 
success in the airship's earliest days. although. until ý-er\ recentl-, it ha,, been rather nevlected. 
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"In order to axoid am crashes to the ground. such as other inventors had had. he [Count 
Zeppelin] built a floating airship shed on Lake Constance. and planned to make his trial flights 
o\ er the \% ater. In mam such details. Zeppelin showed a thoroughness ofpreparation and a 
realization ofthe difficulties involved. which counted a lot towards his ultimate successes. " 
(H,, Iander. 1911: 1411 
"in duplicating the tuming. the airship [Count Zeppelin*s LZ-11 suddenly dropped at the nose, 
and in spite of all pre% entati\ e measures the front end of the airship dropped into the lake. After 
the ho%ý struck the %ý ater. which fortunately absorbed much of the shock. the forward car settled 
to the surface 
... 
The cause of the accident was a leak of gas 
... 
Had the accident taken place on 
land. the results %% ould ha\ e been much more disastrous. " (HvIander, 193 1: 148) 
The idea of mooring on. and of test-flying a prototype large airship over. kvater was given tip by Zeppelin 
in 119)9. after the natural-fibre ropes. and anchoring systems then available. had proved unable to cope 
with the sudden stornis that blew up on Lake Constance. However. the advantages ofthe idea did not 
escape the entrepreneurial eye ofCommander Sir Charles Dennistoun Burney some twenty years later. 
"The central idea of the nekk conception is to enable an airship to alight at unprepared places 
instead of making fast at a specificall\ constructed mooring mast. and the actual problem that 
has to he solved is to keep the ship under dynamic control by means of her rudders and elevators. 
until such time as the vessel is securely held and no longer in danger of being blown over by a 
side %kind. I doubt if it is possible to do this %k ith an\ svsteni operated on land. Ifhokvcver the 
scene of operations is nio\ed to the Nvater. a means ofsolution soon presents itself. Under the 
midship part of the vessel. t%vo long floats are constructed upon the same lines as the hulls of the 
present fly ing boats. onlý much lar2er. These floats are fitted with ballast tanks upon their lower 
side. and are fixed to the hull of the ship as far apart in the trans\erse direction as possible. At 
the same time the section of the ship is altered from the standard circular section to an elliptical 
section. 
... 
the ship kkill alight on the water in exactly the same manner as a flying boat. The 
ballast tanks in the boat hulls kk ill then be autornatically filled with 120 tons ofwater by means 
of scoops. and as soon as theý are full. the ship can be stopped, and will float stably oil the boat 
hulls. The ship can then be moored to a buoy in exactly the same way as a marine vessel, and 
,k ill lie approximately head to wind. 
... 
For a temporary stop, passengers can be embarked and 
taken off b\ boats. 
... 
Under normal circumstances it would be necessary to valve gas in order to 
bring the ship down from her 2.000 feet flying level to the surface. A ship, provided with floats 
as described. can he dri\en down by her engines. this not only allowing her to conserve gas. but 
automaticall% 2i\ inLý her the ability to resume her flying height without the discharge of ballast. 
In other \kords. the airship is given the mobility and ease of handling of the flying boat, whilst 
retaining her ad\ antages of great range and buoyancy. I do not see how this can ever be done 
upon unprepared land-. and therefore the airship, like the flying boat, becomes a water vehicle 
and not a land vehicle insofar as her bases are concerned. " (Burney, 1929: 237-240) 
Bume% ý, eerns e% ell to jjaý e L, ()t aý,, fý r as flNl* 
.1. ing some test models. as evidenced by pictures in his book. 
Figure 10.1 
- 
Burney's elliptical model (Burney, 1929) 
Thk idea reappeared and was further tested by Goodyear in 1930, and in 193 1, when experiments were 
made %kith %% ater-landings and tak-e-offs using full-size blimps fitted %vith a variety ot'different noats. The 
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work was picked up again in 1939 when the US Navy tested floatation gear on the blimp J-4, and it was 
studied in even more detail when they let a contract to Goodyear (Chaffe, et al, 1946) for a programme of 
further testing in 1946. 
More recently, in 2000, a radio-controlled UAV scale model, somewhat similar in appearance to that 
pictured in Burney's book, and named the "Skykitten" was successfully flown on several occasions from 
an artificial, purpose-built lake at Cardington by the Advanced Technologies Group. Thus far no-one 
seems to have found any really serious reason why this idea should not work just as well with airships of 
any size, and having been proven in the past, this system is one that the author would seek to endorse and 
to promote as a serious solution to the prototype NGVLA GH problems. 
"On 9th May [1918] the airship [blimp NS. 31 alighted on the sea in order to hail a trawler 
... 
On 
a subsequent occasion she again alighted on the water during towing trials with the destroyer 
HMS Vectis. These showed that the airship could be towed saftly at some 20 knots and that it 
was possible to transfer personnel or other items. " (Abbott, 1989: 76) 
"rhe water takeoffs and landings created no problems in themselves. In fact water landings by 
rigid airsl-ýips continued infrequently through the Arctic flight by the Graf Zeppelin in 193 1. It is 
felt that water landings and moorings are perfectly feasible for any future airship program on the 
surfaces of large protected bodies of water such as bays, lakes and wide rivers. Loading and off- 
loading cargo to boats and barges can be accomplished easily, and water landings are ideal from 
the standpoint of ease in ballasting airships as unlimited amounts of water ballast are 
immediately available. " (Walker, 1975: 298) 
A further progression of the idea of extending the comparison between AIR-ships and WATER-ships was 
also actively pursued in the form of "tugs" to assist with manoeuvres such as take-off and landing 
(equivalent to marine ships leaving and entering harbours). Most of the necessary systems were even 
tested and proven by all three of the PGVLA countries as part of a another long neglected programme - an 
equally alien concept which, although it strikes terror into the heart of modem HTA pilots, was accepted 
as perfectly normal practice in the 1930s by the USAF. 
'5Question 
- 
You made a number of airplane flights in the Akron? >Answer 
- 
Yes, sir. 
- .. 
>Q 
- How many would you say? >A 
- 
Some 350, that is 350 landings aboard the ship. >Q 
- 
How 
many on the Los Angeles did you make? >A 
-I made approximately 130. >Q 
- 
So you have a 
good deal of experience with the airship and with the airplane? >A 
- 
Yes; more experience with 
the airplane than the airship. I have had perhaps 800 hours in flight aboard an airship. 
.-- 
>Q 
- What position did you occupy? >A 
-I was senior aviator in charge of the airplane unit which 
was attached to the airship [Akron]. " (US Congress, 1933 
- 
Harrigan: 163) 
British trials of the airplane 'drop-off and hook-on* had begun as early as 1915 and had matured by 1918: 
"Senior airshipmen at Pulliam [the British experimental base] were not only concerned with 
releasing fighter aeroplanes to defend the mother airship. Thoughts about engine-cars and 
gondolas fitted with wings and tail units, which could be 'slipped' if required were under 
consideration. Maj Boothby, CO of RAF Pulliam proposed: 'That the centre car of R. 23 be 
replaced by a large aeroplane, constituting a unit which will normally contribute to the 
propulsive power of the airship but which could be released if it was required to attain maximum 
possible altitude or if the ship was seriously heavy when required to land'. " (Mowthorpe, 
1999: 67) 
Obviously, such a system would also work in reverse, allowing extra self-propelled weight to be added in 
the case of a light landing, thereby negating the need to vent helium from a superheated ship at the end of 
a long voyage. Also, it should not be forgotten that it was standard practice for Akron and Macon, (who 
by the 1930's had seen the mechanisms for hooldng and dropping aircraft honed to commonplace 
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reliability), to attach their cargo of four spotter aircraft, after they had tak-en-off. This procedurc enabled 
them to start their missions with much more fuel than would otherwise have been possible, and werc it to 
be adopted for the NGVLAs, hooking on of light aircraft would allow them to exchange crew members, 
or pick up spare parts, without either bringing the entire airship to a standstill, or diverting it from its 
course and thereby delaying its mission. 
"For large rigids a static takeoff from a mast is best. Additional payload up to 10% of the gross 
static lift of the airship can easily be flown aboard by hook-on plane once the airship is at 
cruising altitude and speed. " (Walker, 1975: 308) 
103 Successful failures 
However, the fact that this once widely accepted procedure has now fallen so far into disuse that it is all 
but forgotten means that suggestion of its re-introduction is viewed with incredulity by many of today's 
pilot's and regulators alike. And here is another big problem which the NGVLAs %%rill have to face 
- 
even 
with procedures wl-&h in their day were well-tried and tested, and proven to be successful, there will be 
resistance to adopting them simply because they are so far removed from what today is considered 
standard or safe practice. 
Nevertheless, there have been numerous trials of ideas, both for airship systems and their GH procedures, 
that have apparently been very "successful" but which, having been tried once, and seemingly proven, are 
then abandoned, or at least are not tried again for decades. Examples of these lost (and sometimes found 
again) ideas include (with GC emphasis): 
Vectored thrust: 
" 
... 
in the British Army airship 'Gamma'. 
... 
the engine power could be used to augment or 
reduce lift as well as providing a reverse thrust capability. The experiment (in 1910] was 
successful and 'Gamma' could lift off and land without the need for any provision except a 
small handling party. " (Howe, 1999: 304) 
The "metalclad" hull construction: 
"One small, but very successful, experimental metal-clad airship, the ZMC-2, belongs to the US 
Navy, and has now been in service for almost six years. " (Burgess, 1935: 57) 
Using gaseous fuel: 
"Interestingly, the most successful rigid airship "Graf Zeppelin P, minimised the need for 
venting hydrogen by using a fuel having the same density as air. " (Howe, 1999: 297) 
The floating mooring mast: 
"The very first British rigid, No. 1, the "Mayfly, " was designed to float on the water moored to a 
mast, and 
... 
did so for three days from May 22 through May 25,1911 
... 
The mooring trial was 
considered a success when the airship rode out winds blowing a steady Wi mph gusting to 42- 
45 mph. " (Robinson, 1973: 177) 
Blimps landing on an aircraft carrier (Britain): 
"During the surnmer of 1918 experiments were carried out with the Royal Navy's new aircraft 
carrier HMS 'Furious. ' Two Zeros, SSZ. 59 and SSZ60 operating out of RNAS East Fortune 
rendezvoused with HMS 'Furious' off the Scottish coast and both airships made several landings 
on her flight-deck. Although successful, they were never repeated. " (Mowthorpe. 1999: 38) 
Rigid ship landing on an aircraft carrier (USA): 
"The 'Los Angeles' moored to the ship 'Patoka' immediately after having made a successful 
landing on the aircraft carrier USS 'Saratoga' without the benefit of a mooring mast. " (Howe, 
1999: 307) 
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Indeed the "Patoka" itself seems to have done the job it was designed for perfectly well, but it has never 
been copied, and there have been numerous other interesting "one-hit wondere' which have had 
successful trials, and even operated for prolonged periods in the field. They include rotating sheds, mobile 
mooring winches (or "Mules") and the "Bolster Beam7' all of which were said in their day to be 
"solutions" but none of which have propagated very far from their point of origin. Quite why so many 
apparently successful ideas have fallen by the wayside lies beyond the scope of this present investigation. 
However, part of the problem is that none of the past Airship Development projects really got far enough 
down the line to establish much of an infrastructure. ' A glance at the records reveals a succession of 
prototypes and partly completed projects that had the plug pulled at a critical moment or which were 
forced to change tack before they were really ready. But there are more than financial and political risks 
facing the NGVLAs. 
10.4 The risks of pioneering 
While some of these aforementioned unproven, long forgotten, or neglected, ideas may seem a little far- 
fetched, it is nevertheless necessary to keep an open mind when starting from today's almost total lack of 
knowledge as to how the big rigid airships of the past actually behaved. This is. particularly so when 
evaluating suggestions, put forward by those who had considerable first-hand experience of the PGVLAs, 
and when trying to judge the suitability of such schemes for possible application with an unprecedented 
prototype aircraft 
- 
as the first of the NGVLAs will inevitably be. 
By its very nature, pioneering, in any sphere of human endeavour, is a risky business, and it is important 
to remember that many things we take for granted today only exist because their originators took big risks 
and got away with it. In some cases, these risks, were enormous, and by today's standards, unacceptable. 
However, it is hard to see how the NGVLAs can make much progress without taking any risks at all. 
Therefore, it is the author's opinion that if the NGVLAs are ever to become a reality then some sacred 
cows will have to be slaughtered. Particularly those which reside in the dominant world of HTA flight 
rules and the all-powerful totalitarian mind-set that seems to result whenever there is strict and unbending 
adherence to Health and Safety Regulations. If the NGVLAs are seriously intent on pioneering new fields 
within the world of aviation then some risks will have to be taken and the resultant triumphs and disasters 
from trying out innovative, and perhaps even weird, old and new GH ideas, will have to be lived with - 
always assuming that the regulatory authorities can be brought to see the light. 
"Moreover, it must be recognised that the number of ideas subýnitted to the authorities is too 
often out of all proportion to those which do prove feasible. After any considerable deluge of 
these inventor's fantasies, officials become incapable of discrimination and are apt to regard all, 
except those which modify or amend something with which they are familiar, as the work of a 
lunatic. " (Higham, 1961: 9) 
If ever there was an organised system for throwing babies out with the bath-water then this is it. However, 
it is clear that the PGVLA archives do hold a wealth of material and that this offers much food for 
thought to any NGVLA developers who have the courage to challenge the preconceptions that currently 
prevail in the modem HTA dominated world of aviation. 
1 Widi the exception of the DELAG 
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11 CONCLUSIONS 
There are two sets of conclusions that can be drawn from this investigation 
- 
those from the collection 
phase of the project and those from the analysis of the information that was collected. 
11.1 Conclusions from the CargoLifter historical research project 
The primary purpose of this study was to demonstrate that historical research or more specifically the 
analysis of historical airs1iip activities is a necessary and effective way of minimising the risks inherent in 
the development of any next generation very large airships because it offers a reliable source of practical 
information based on past experience. Such material can be used to mitigate the danger that is threatened 
by the lack of suitably trained or experienced very large airship personnel and to help fill, or bridge, the 
knowledge gap that was identified at the start of this work. The method selected to prove the importance 
of historical research and the effectiveness of the analysis of historical airship activities was by means of 
four stated aims, the conclusions to which are as follows. 
The first aim was to define the fundamental ground handling problems that are generic to all airships and 
to identify any unresolved issues that were encountered by the previous generation of large airships and 
which are specific to very large airships in particular. In Section 7, it was concluded that there are six 
fundamental and unavoidable ground handling problems that are generic to all airships regardless of size 
or type. Three of these problems are physical in nature, in that they stem from the basic structure of the 
airship and/or the laws of physics, and three are operational, being rooted in the practicalities of human 
usage of lighter-than-air vehicles. In Section 8, it was shown that there are indeed a large number of 
serious issues encountered by previous airship developers that remain either unsolved or which have large 
question marks against them. The conclusion is that historical research has allowed these to be identified 
and that all of those listed will have to be addressed somehow if a new generation of very large airships is 
ever to be successful in the future. 
The second aim was to expose and correct some of the myths that have proliferated since the demise of 
the previous generation of very large airships and to find answers to some of the difficult ground handling 
questions that arose at CargoLifter. These resulted directly from a lack of suitably experienced personnel 
and such questions will inevitably present themselves again as a serious obstacle to any future very large 
airships development programmes. In Section 9, it was shown that historical research can help to identify 
and to dispel some of these myths and, while it cannot of itself overturn or undo the damage done by them 
to the image of airships generally, both in the public mind and within the heavier-than-air community, it 
can at least provide real ammunition for those intent on correcting such erroneous information. Moreover, 
this work has shown that it is possible by carefully targeted investigation and analysis, to actually answer 
some of the difficult questions, and to provide sufficient information regarding others, for the risk posed 
by them to be better understood and thereby diminished. 
The third aim was to unearth projections, plans and potentially useful ideas concerning the ground 
handling of very large airships that have been lost or forgotten and which are lying neglected in archives. 
Section 10 has shown that there is indeed an enormous fund of untried and untested ideas hidden away, 
and many of them are of enormous potential benefit to next generation very large airships, providcd that 
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the context in which they were devised and the reason for their abandonment is properly understood. The 
conclusion is that historical research can thus protect next generation very large airship designers from 
repeating past mistakes and thereby unwittingly "re-inventing the wheel. " 
The final aim of this investigation was to suggest a strategy and establish guidelines for anyone in the 
future who seeks to develop a very large airship for any purpose. In view of the diverse nature and 
complexity of ground handling in general, and of the intricacies engendered by the different types and 
theoretically possible hybrid airships that may be envisaged, to say nothing of the bewildering number of 0 
possible specific uses for which they may be intended, these guidelines will be given as part of the 
recommendations that follow this section. The conclusion is that historical research does allow such 
guidelines to be established. 
11.2 Conclusions from analysis of information collected 
The conclusions from the analysis of historical airship activity are that, firstly, there has never been a 
totally successful all-weather mooring system for very large airships although in temis of achievement 
and reliability, the high mast mooring pioneered by the British and adapted by the Americans onboard the 
Patoka in the 1920's and 30's seems to have come as close to it as the rather different systems currently 
in use today by the very much smaller modem blimps. Simply rebuilding updated versions of the 1930*s 
designs would probably work for future very large airships, considering that better stress calculations are 
available today with stronger, more reliable materials. There is also an improved understanding of the 
weather and a greater ability to monitor and predict localised meteorological phenomena. 
However, the uncomfortable fact remains that in terms of proven reliability, as defined by number of 
cycles of use in the field, the only really successful ground handling system for very large airships was 
that devised by the Germans for their First World War Zeppelins. That such a labour-intensive, people- 
dependent, system is impractical in the modem world, both financially and in terms of safety, is beyond 
doubt 
- 
but as this study has revealed, for very large airships, the German ground handling system is 
undeniably the state of the art. It is an order of magnitude ahead of the rest, having been used thousands 
of times, against the hundreds of all other systems, and anyone intent on developing the next generation 
of very large airships must be aware that this is so and that the previous generation never really got 
beyond the prototype stage. 
Moreover, those who follow in this path should not assume that answers to the ground handling problems 
revealed by this investigation are going to be easily solved by mechanical or by any other automated 
means. Engineers have been working on some of these problems for more than 200 years without success. 
This does not mean that they are necessarily permanently insoluble, but neither can they simply be 
ignored in the hope that they will go away. 
And finally, this investigation has also revealed that although there is a wealth of historical data dealing 
with the flight aerodynamics of previous generation very large airships, there is very little that deals 
directly with ground handling, and what there is cannot readily be incorporated quantitatively into 
"modern" analytical methods. 
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Furthermore, while it appears that at the time of the previous generation of very large airship development 
programmes, some wind tunnel work and considerable mathematical analysis was carried out for the in- 
flight performance 
- 
and that much of this remains valid' today 
- 
apart from the seminal work carried out 
by Roxbee Cox (later Lord Kings Norton) in 1929, (see Chapter 5.4.2. ) the author could find few 
scientific studies, or mathematical analyses, of airships when they were either in contact with the ground 
or in a moored state. 
Moreover, as far as ground handling is concerned, all the work for this investigation has not unearthed 
any material that involves wind tunnels or water tank tests for scale model airships that were either 
approaching, or very close to, or being manoeuvred on, the ground. It is thus evident that all the previous 
generation large airship ground handling testing was done empirically. Therefore, unlike in flight, for 
ground handling there is no basis of experimental data that might be made available for use by next 
generation airship ground handling system designers. Doubtless a major reason why this is so is because 
of the complexity that stems from the number of unquantifiable variables involved in the ground handling 
procedures 
- 
as detailed in Chapter 2.5. However, the straight-forward difficulty of scaling when 
modelling such large, fragile and slow moving aircraft should not be underestimated. Whereas in flight it 
is relatively simple to separate the buoyancy and the aerodynamic forces, in the case of ground handling it 
is the combination of them that must be precisely replicated and the scaling laws make this impractical. 
In considering a scale model for ground handling, the main issues would be to accurately represent: 
The airship's ever-changing buoyancy and effects of solar heat, rain, inversions, etc. on intemal lift. 
The turbulent and sheared flow of the natural wind close to the ground in both intensity and scale. 
The effects of flow around large fixed protruding structures such as the shed, mooring mast, etc. 
The aerodynamic forces of drag, lift, moments, etc. 
The forces due to acceleration and mass, including the 'added' mass of the air displaced. 
The way movement relative to the ground is affected by the constantly changing air speed 
" The airship's power systems (including vectorable thrust, engine ramp up and ramp down times, etc) 
" The elastic forces in mooring ropes and cables, combined with the flexibility and strengths of the 
airship structure, mooring mast, etc. 
* The dynamics, stiffness and damping of the impacting bodies (a rigid airship meeting a rigid tower 
would produce an infinitely high impact force). 
As an example, a 1/100'h scale wind tunnel model of a 100 m long, 120 ton airship, would, because it's 
mass is related to the cube of the linear scale, require a model of I ni in length with a mass of the order of 
0.1 kg. This would obviously be very difficult to achieve but could, perhaps be done by a pressurised 
model in the style of a toy helium balloon. However modelling any meaningful on-board power systems 
for it would be very difficult and would be further complicated by the fact that the acceleration forces 
depend on movement relative to the ground, and the wind components (turbulence, etc) would have to be 
modelled separately. The aerodynamic scale parameter, (Reynolds number, ) could never be represented 
For list of selected works on this topic in Bibliography see Appendix B 
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and artificial flow control methods would have to be used instead. This is unlike modelling of the cruise 
condition where acceleration is so low that steady state can be represented. 
Of course, moving to testing in water would change the situation, but it would bring its own problems 
(the model would now have a mass of about one tonne and need to approach the mast, or enter the shed, 
at micro-metres per hour), and it would not affect the fundamental problem of using scale models 
- 
namely the fact that an airship's buoyancy, aerodynamics and acceleration all scale by different factors. 
Thus, if large airships are to undergo a renaissance in the near future, then a great deal of scientific work 
remains to be done and that associated with ground handling 
., 
offers a particularly urgent and difficult 
challenge. It is the author's opinion, given the complexity of large airship ground handling, and regardless 
of the present or future sophistication of computer assisted modelling, that the only way to accomplish 
this work, and to obtain any seriously useful experimental data, will be to restrict the variables and reduce 
the number of iterations that will be required. Moreover, the only viable means of achieving this, and of 
establishing a manageable and/or affordable research programme that has some basis in fact, is by means 
of historical research and the constant referral back to the real events and actual circumstances that were 
encountered by the previous generation of very large airships. 
However, if a new generation of very large airships is going to succeed then these problems will have to 
be addressed somehow, and unless a satisfactory and workable solution is found for the ground handling 
of the next generation very large airships then their chances of success are slim. 
"Man after man 
- 
some experimenting in darkness and stumbling on valuable truths, others 
scientifically searching after the answers to their problems in well-equipped laboratories 
- 
has 
set his mind and his hands to this problem of sailing in the air. The result is seen today. In the 
past Montgolfiers and Charles, Giffards and Renards, Santos-Dumonts and Zeppelins; in the 
future 
- 
who? Unless the knowledge of the past is handed on to those who will take the places of 
the workmen in this world of tomorrow, much will be lost: ' (Hylander, 1931: 305) 
............... 
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12 RECOMMENDATIONS AND GUIDELINES 
12.1 Recommendations 
In order to avoid both re-inventing the wheel, and falling into the computer-assisted-endless-design 
trap, the NGVLA developers should adopt the Hochstetler/CargoLifter proposal of 1998. This was 
for a three-pronged strategy that combined a properly structured programme of archival research with 
a programme of instruction from ex-US Navy blimp personnel (in order to capture as much as 
possible of relevant old techniques and science) in conjunction with a series of empirical 
experimental trials (in order to verify such scientific data as does exist and also to fill in, by the most 
reliable means possible, the gaps in this neglected area of aviation science that have arisen since the 
PGVLA programmes were terminated). Computer simulations would then play a properly controlled 
roll in testing specific theoretical parts, and/or sequences, of the model-to-full-size-scale-up 
programme, and in planning each stage of the project. Thus design teams should start small and build 
a sequence of ever bigger airships as their personnel skills and experience allow, and as the 
confidence of the regulatory authorities and of the general public increases. A planned programme of 
rebuilding both rigids; and large blimps is needed to regain knowledge that has been lost and in order 
to learn from past experience. HR reveals clear evidence that VLAs are best developed empirically, 
and allowing them to follow an evolutionary path of step by step development has been shown to be 
the safest and the most cost effective way to proceed. 
"... the official report of the R-38 disaster which proved that she was an engineering experiment 
on the part of British engineers who had tried to build a huge craft before they had learned how 
to construct small ones successfully. Their R-33 and R-34 had been copied from Zeppelins. It is 
one thing to make a copy and quite another problem to jump into larger sizes involving 
new types and formulas. " (Lehmann & Mingos, 1927: 323) [GC emphasis] 
"By 1918, RNAS Pulham, at this period an experimental as well as an operational station, was 
looking into the possibilities of mooring-masts. Many small masts were erected, old SS non- 
rigids being used to solve the various problems. Later that year, up to four airships could be seen 
at any one time, permanently moored for weeks on end, evaluating different systems. " 
(Mowthorpe, 1999: 64) 
From the start of their projects, the NGVLA developers should adopt a holistic view of their airships. 
The physical structures, together with the GH systems and all operational procedures that are vital to 
the safe and cost effective operation of them must be regarded as a single entity. To this end, the 
NGVLA developers should consider extending HR to problem areas other than GH, where PGVLA 
experience may be of benefit, and, for example, to apply the techniques involved in this investigation 
to the design and construction of the airships themselves. 
It is important to breakaway from the current horizontal landing and tak-e-off methods that have 
become so predominant and which are deeply ingrained in the public consciousness as a result of the 
small modern blimps* ability to use derivations of the HTA systems. Whatever is built as a learning 
tool for the NGVLAs, its primary objective should be to investigate the pros and cons of adopting the 
old "vertical" operational methods that were proven by the PGVLAs, and thus to move all personnel 
involved as quickly up the learning curve as possible. 
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The prototype NGVLAs should be developed in accordance with naval practice and under maritime 
regulations. All test flights should start from, and be conducted over, water until such time as the 
structure is proven, the operational procedures are established, and both flight and ground crews are 
experienced and proficient. Flights onto land, and the integration of the NGVLAs into HTA airspace, 
should be treated as fin-ther separate projects, which are extensions of normal operations, and the 
additional difficulties (and dangers) of achieving them should be recognised 
- 
as it was in the earliest 
days of airship development: 
"Zovelin 
... 
lands on Terra firma. 
- 
On Tuesday last the '7eppelin" [LZ 3 (Anny ZI)], made a 
successful landing on the ground. Hitherto, the Zeppelin craft have always descended upon the 
water, and this had been held to be a disadvantage of this type of airship. The craft, with Count 
Zeppelin at the helm, came down to within about eight feet of the earth, when it was held down 
by soldiers. Some of the steering planes were damaged by striking a tree, and they had to be 
removed. " (Flight, 1909)1 
The terminology of the NGVLA constituent parts, and of the operational and construction 
procedures, must be firmly established, and all areas of responsibility clearly defined. This is 
especially important with regard to the seniority, precedence and hand-over of authority within the 
design, construction and operational hierarchies. In order to save time, confusion and disappointment, 
these usages and relationships, along with ownership of all equipment, must be agreed internally 
between all departments involved in the development, before design of the prototype NGVLA 
conunences. This internally agreed terminology also needs to be accepted and agreed externally by 
all regulatory authorities prior to construction and certification. 
The material concerning the PGVLAs that is currently held in numerous disparate libraries and 
archives in Germany, Britain and America must be catalogued and cross-referenced so that the 
NGVLA engineers can learn quickly and efficiently whether their ideas have any precedent. Ideally a 
publicly accessible, world study centre dedicated to all facets of LTA flight should be established, in 
combination with a museum of artefacts from the PGVLAs. These should be housed at a single site, 
where the NGVLA developers can have access to documents, drawings, conference papers, books, 
pictures, patents, and etc., for all shapes and sizes of balloons and airships, including past attempts to 
hybridise them with HTA craft. 
12.2 Guidelines for a VLA development strategy 
The fourth aim of this thesis was to give guidance to potential NGVLA developers and to suggest a 
strategy based on the lessons of history in order to minimise the risks inherent in future large airship 
projects. 
The following suggestion is thus made by the author on the basis that it is his firm belief that it will be 
absolutely necessary, on grounds of cost and safety if nothing else, for those who will design and operate 
any future large airships, to relearn much of the forgotten knowledge and to regain some proficiency in 
proven VLA techniques before they begin to experiment with brand new GH ideas or to attempt 
unprecedented feats such as LEP manoeuvres. 
NB 
- 
this event did not take pLve until some Dim ysm after the first flight of Count Zeppelin's fim airship LZI 
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Moreover, this lost knowledge and skill can only be regained by a measured and carefully planned 
process of accretion, moving progressively in stages, from the small blimps of today to ever largcr 
airships, as the ground and flight crews' abilities grow. However, it must be emphasised that the strategy 
outlined below, would only be fully necessary in cases where an NGVLA development project is 
intending to be wholly or largely dependent upon procedures that have never ever been attempted or 
undertaken by large airships of previous generations. There is no doubt that airships, in themselves, can 
be made to function. The danger comes from unproven assumptions, such as, for example, that they can 
be used to pick up and transport heavy loads cost-effectively. 
Attention also needs to be drawn to the fact that, although the science of large airship development and 
operation has lain dormant for some 60 plus years, much has happened in other fields of human 
endeavour that is either directly applicable, or potentially of considerable use to anyone intent on 
updating the subject. An example of this is given at the end of Appendix B where the hydrodynamic 
theories that underlie the development of modem submarines can be seen to have much in common with 
very large airships. Similarly for the moored airship, where much wind-tunnel, and other theoretical and 
experimental work that has been conducted on buildings and large ground based structures since the 
termination of the PGVLA programmes, can be expected to offer much that will save time and money for 
NGVLA development teams. One or two works pertaining to this have thus also been included in the 
Bibliography of this investigation. 
However, as a result of this study, and based on the forgoing conclusions and recommendations, it is 
suggested that anyone intent upon the construction of any very large airship in the future, and regardless 
of the airship's intended purpose, should allocate, within their development programme, a considerable 
amount of both time and resources to the completion of two distinct but interacting research projects. 
These are: 
Firstly, to conduct a properly funded, in-depth study of the historical material held in LTA archives, 
bearing in mind that there are 2 angles from which to view the subject 
- 
the designer's and the 
operator's. This study should be done in a proper professional manner, preferably by a team of 
experienced historical researchers, in order to ascertain: 
a) whether the intended NGVLA project, or anything approximating it, has been 
previously attempted, and, if it has, then why it (or they) failed, or alternatively, if 
it has no direct historical predecessor, nor precedent, then whether there are any 
reasons given in the records as to why those past projects which might be adjudged 
closest in size, or scope, or in operational capability, to the intended project. were 
not so used, and why they too eventually failed or are not still operating today; 
and, 
b) whether there have ever been in the past any GH equipment or operational 
techniques that were proven in the field, which are not in use today, but which 
might be applicable to the intended project, and which if resuscitated might save 
either time, or money, or improve groundcrew safety or otherwise minimise the 
risks of the NGVLA development programme; 
and, 
233 
C) whether there have ever been any plans or proposals put forward by experienced 
personnel for similar or related schemes to that intended, or for improvements to 
relevant GH equipment, or for other interesting suggestions and ideas that have 
never previously been tried or tested, (perhaps for political reasons, or due to 
financial restrictions, or because of the limited technological capabilities of their 
dayj and thus which may have been forgotten or overlooked, but which now might 
be achievable, or are at least worthy of further investigation. 
Secondly, to carry out a properly structured, concurrent programme of empirical testing in order to 
establish the viability of their intended VLA GH systems at a small scale. This would simultaneously 
extend the team's "in-house" knowledge and build up individual skills and experience in 
manageable, incremental steps. Moreover, if this test or trials programme were to be run in parallel 
with the archival study, then relevant discoveries from HR could be confirmed or tried out affordably 
at a small scale. Such a programme would thus allow: 
construction teams to learn fast by experiment; 
GH and flight teams to feed back real results to the designers; 
designers to innovate with the confidence that they are not re-inventing the wheel, and 
the regulatory authorities, or those in charge of certification, to know with a degree of 
confidence that they were not simply being "rail-roaded7' into rubber stamping afait 
accompli that has no precedem 
The author's suggestion for one such incremental test prograrnme that would move by degrees from 
today's level of knowledge, progressively into unknown territory, as it might be applied in the case of an 
unprecedented weight-lifting airship, is appended here. It would begin with small models, and step-up, 
where possible, by use of extant equipment, and the application of already proven procedures, while 
allowing for the incorporation of some previously known but now forgotten, (or neglectedj ideas. Thus: 
Use a small UAV or flying model to perfect the GH and LEP procedures, indoors, in still air 
- i. e. practice and perfect the precise-point-pick-up (PPPU) and the precise-point-put-down (PPPD) at small scale with something like an egg. This will determine, with minimal financial 
risk, that the project idea does not contravene the laws of physics and is a viable proposition. It 
will also begin to build the practical skills of the operators (pilots and ground crews). 
Feed data to computer model and make projections to predict behaviour and the implications of 
the chosen procedures in real weather conditions and at full size, and to suggest experiments, 
improvements and/or modifications accordingly. This will allow the designers, theoreticians, 
programme planners, et al, to think outside the box, to make radical changes without such 
constraints as certification and to make early estimates of the likely costs of the finished project. 
When a workable procedure, which all departments are happy and familiar with, has evolved and 
the operators are proficient at it, then introduce variables such as pre-determined artificial gusts 
of wind and measured temperature changes inside the controlled environment to n-dmic the real 
world. This will define what physical systems the full-size airship structure needs in terms of 
propulsion, thrusters, winches, &c., and what GHE is necessary to support it and enable it to 
conduct the chosen LEP. It will also further increase the skills of the operators. 
Refine the physical and computer models accordingly. 
Involve the regulatory authorities. Agree incremental development programme that will give 
confidence to all parties and allow for ultimate incorporation of certified NGVLAs into today's 
highly regulated and restricted airspace. 
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When operators are skilled in chosen procedures take the UAV model and its GH system out of 
doors and repeat the LEP procedures in progressively worse, real weather conditions. This will 
test the accuracy of the computer predictions and build confidence of operators and regulators. 
Continue to refine the computer models with real data from the miniature scale trials and use 
them to make predictions for full size trials. 
It is strongly recommended that the media are not involved and press conferences are not called 
at least until this "small scale" stage is complete. This will mean that operators are skilled in 
control of the models and can demonstrate them without embarrassment, that at least some of the 
early models are expendable and can be used for publicity, that designers are free to make drastic 
changes along the way without the public humiliation of an apparent U-turn, that the costs of the 
project are kept to a minimum, that team confidence is kept at maximum and that the regulatory 
authorities are relaxed and conversant with progress and plans. 
Start full size trials with a real, weight lifting, person-carTying, airship - such as the hot air ship 
devised for and used during the "Radeau de Cimes" project - and try out the chosen procedures 
in calm conditions. 
" Compare results of full-size trials with computer predictions and feed real data back to improve 
the computer model. 
" Repeat the trials with a series of full-size, helium-filled, modem blimps, starting with a small 
Lightship that has no vectored thrust and comparing it with a larger Skyship that has increased 
hovering capability. This will reveal what systems the VLA pilots actually need in terms of 
vertical/lateral/reverse thrust, as opposed to what the designers think they will need, and allow 
for integration of ideas from experienced blimp operators. It will also allow an input of ideas, 
suggestions and/or criticisms from experienced blimp pilots and ground crews. 
" Also conduct trials of vertical take-off and landing from a mooring mast with an available 
aircraft and infrastructure e. g. Zeppelin 1VT landing vertically to the "Hydramast" or similar 
mechanical GH system. 
" Then open up construction process by building an updated copy of a US Navy ZPG, or similar 
proven large blimpi such as an M-ship, to regain lost construction and operational techniques. 
This should be a standard blimp with x fins and no vectored thrust to give performance as close 
as possible to its predecessors. Test flights and trials of this blimp will allow comparison of 
actual and theoretical performance with known performance of forebears and should aim to 
achieve full certification. This ship will finally become available for crew training and 
promotional work. 
Followed by a second similar blimp, but with a new configuration, perhaps adding vectored 
thrust to facilitate vertical landing, LEP, etc. This will enable the two designs to be compared in 
reality and a decision as to the desirable configuration for a large scale modem design to be 
made with confidence. The changes and innovations incorporated into the second ship will allow 
the certification process to take a further small step forward and success in this will increase the 
crew training and promotional possibilities available with perhaps a ship dedicated to each. 
Then build an updated copy of a proven small rigid airship, such as the "Bodensee" which was 
of similar size to the biggest of the US Navy's blimps. This will be a big and expensive step but 
by this time a fully operational assembly plant, with a partially skilled workforce will be 
available. The preceding work on the blimps will by this time also have provided a pool of 
partially experienced designers and operators, thereby reducing the risks in building such a 
prototype. An old proven design built of improved modem materials would allow verification of 
performance against the historical records. This data would further improve the computer models 
of even larger airships for the future and would allow a decision as to whether a rigid or a non- 
rigid airship was the most suitable for the intended NGVLA. 
I 
-The ZPG-3W required 120,000 square feet of drawings, 4,800 pages of handbooks and 26,000 pages of reports. There were 
102,000 hours of static tests, 130,000 man-hours for the flight test program, and 40,000 man-hours on the engine test stands. 
... 
The 
Goodyear project number was GZ- 17. Engineering effort consisted of 1.56 million man-hours, there were 378 engineers assigned at 
the peak in March, 1956. " (Shock. 1994) 
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Then go back to sea. Basing the large blimps and new small rigid at a water-based facility would 
allow all crews and designers to experiment with, and verify the claimed advantages for, some of 
the systems such as those envisioned in Section 10. This would facilitate planning for a new 
generation of even larger airships that might be allowed to operate as prototypes only from and 
over water, thereby alleviating much of the pressure on the regulators and removing some of the 
media attention by reducing the foreseeable threat of an accident affecting the public. 
By this time there would be sufficient knowledge and expertise available to then realise one of 
the Goodyear plans for a GZ-13 or a GZ-16 type blimp 
- 
something that is much bigger in size 
than the ZPG. These blimps were designed during the US Navy blimp programme in the 1950*s 
but neither of them was ever built. (Shock, 1994: 111-32) 
Compare actual weight-liffing performance of similar sized rigid and non-rigid airships and 
begin to experiment with a full-size Load Exchange Procedure as tested by the small UAVS at 
the start of the NGVLA programme. 
Such a test programme would plainly not be cheap. Neither would it be risk free, but it would be a lot less 
expensive and far safer than jumping into the darkness and starting straight out to assemble a full sized, 
theoretically conceived, weight-lifting, NGVLA directly from the drawing board (or from CAD 
software). Furthermore, if it is argued that such an incremental trial programme would of itself be either 
prohibitively expensive, and/or too risky to be allowed, or that current certification and/or regulatory 
requirements would prevent or disqualify it, then the whole idea of building the NGVLAs can simply be 
forgotten, because the historical records clearly indicate that the costs and risks at full scale are going to 
be immeasurably greater. 
........... 
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APPENDIX A: THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF AEROSTATICS 
THE ATMOSPHERE 
The US Navy pilots of large rigid airships were taught that: 
"Aerostatics is really a branch of thermodynamics and in its specialized aspects is based on 
general thermodynamic laws. Atmospheric air (as well as the ordinary lifting gases) throughout 
the range of conditions which we are interested in acts as an almost perfect gas, following 
Boyle's law and Charles's law with a high degree of exactness. " (US Navy, 1927: 11-6-18) 
From which it follows that: 
"The volume of a gas varies with the absolute temperature and the pressure: this consequently 
affects the density. 
Let V= volume of gas in cu ft. 
Let T= absolute temperature of gas. 
And let p= absolute pressure in lb per sq ft. 
Then; combining the laws of Boyle and Charles, 
Pv 
-=a constant T 
where T= (ordinary temperature+ 461) for Fahrenheit deg. 
T= (ordinary temperature + 273) for centigrade units. " (Lewitt, 1925 : 23) 
However, as is well known and understood in all fields of aviation, the atmosphere is an ocean of gas that 
is constantly in motion. This makes accurate time-based calculation all but impossible, and4 as a 
consequence the conditions of a theoretical "standard atmosphere" have been internationally agreed. Here 
is the CAA's definition of the International Standard Atmosphere or ISA as it is more commonly known: 
"ATMOSPHERE, INTERNATIONAL STANDARD 
An atmosphere defined as follows: 
- 
the air is a perfect dry gas; 
the temperature at sea-level is 15 * C; 
the pressure at sea-level is: 
1.013250xI05N/ M2 (29.92 inches Hg) or (1013.2 rnbar) 
the temperature gradient from sea-level to the altitude at which the temperature 
becomes 
-56.5 C is: 
3.25 C per 500 rn (1.98 *C /1,000 ft); 
the density at sea-level, po, under the above conditions is 
1.2250 kg/m3 (0.002378 slugsflý)" 
(CAA : CAP 471,1979: Chap. Q 1-2 Definitions 4) 
And just to keep an eye on reality: 
"The highest pressure ever recorded (reduced to mean sea level) was 1076.2 mb at Irkutsk in 
Siberia, 
... 
The lowest ever was 886.8 mb on a boat 400 miles E of the Philippines. The highest 
pressure recorded in Britain in the last 100 years [i. e. prior to 1979] was 1054.7 mb, and the 
lowest 925.5 mb. " (Welch, 1979: 36) 
THE WEIGHT OF ATMOSPHERIC GASES 
Thus it is the case that: 
'The air, like other matter has weight. A column of air weighing nearly half a ton rests on the 
head of each one of us. " (Cook, J. G. undated: 10) 
And, it therefore follows that under ISA conditions, the density of other atmospheric gases can also be 
defined, and the two that are most commonly used in lighter-than-air flight can be compared with air. 
Air (dry) 
- 
1.2250 kglm3 
Hydrogen 
- 
0.0846 kg/m3 
Helium 
- 
0.1693 kg/m3 
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Therefore: 
"Hydrogen has half the density of helium, while natural coal gas has about nine times the density 
of hydrogen and four and a half times the density of helium. The three gases 
- 
hydrogen, helium, 
and natural coal gas 
- 
have net lifts per thousand cubic feet at sea level of about 70,65, and 29 
pounds respectively. " (Overs, 1981 : 22) 
In metric terms these translate as: 
Lift of hydrogen (70 lbs per 1000 ft3) = 1.121 kg per I M3 
Lift of helium (65 Is per 1000 ft) = 1.041 kg per I rtý 
Lift of coal gas (29 lbs per 1000 ft) = 0.464 kg per I m3 
These are by far the lightest gases that are available for LTA flight and therefore: 
"All balloons and airships up to present time have used as their lifting gas hot air, hydrogen 
(either commercially pure or as coal gas), or helium. Other lifting media proposed from time 
have ranged from hard vacuum (De Lana, 1670 and Edgar Rice Burroughs, 1950's) to 
superheated steam (Pabst, 1970). " (Mowforth 1991 : 22) 
Moreover, because any gas filled body, such as a balloon or an airship, is entirely surrounded by a denser 
fluid medium, namely the air, it must follow that it will be subject to the Principle of Archimedes. 
ARCHIMEDES PRINCIPLE 
"When a body is immersed in a fluid, it appears to lose weight by an amount equal to the weight 
of the fluid displaced. This apparent loss of weight by a body is really the upward thrust on the 
body caused by the fluid. " (Lewitt, 1925: 22) 
VVhich means that, conft-ary to that which is commonly believed: 
'The true source of buoyancy is the surrounding air and not the confined gas. If the gas could be 
removed, leaving a vacuum, without collapse of the container, the lift or buoyancy of the airship 
would be increased by an amount equal to the weight of gas abstracted. " (Recks, 1977) 
And thus: 
"It should be clearly understood that no actual lifting power is obtained from the gas, its only 
function is to counteract the external pressure of the atmosphere on the structure 
... 
[and] The 
hydrogen actually presses radially outwards on all parts of the bag, with a greater pressure at the 
base... " (Lewitt, 1925 : 22/27) 
This is true for all balloons and airships regardless of type, size or structure. 
THE THERMAL PROPERTIES OF LIFTING GASES 
VA-dle it is commonly believed that there is little to choose in terms of lift between "dangerous" hydrogen 
and "safe" helium, from the point of view of the balloon or airship pilot, there is a great deal of 
difference, as the two gases have very different thermal properties. This becomes apparent when an LTA 
craft moves vertically through the natural pressure gradient of the atmosphere. Thus: 
"... rapid ascent allows little heat transfer from the surroundings into the contained gas as it 
expands and thus cools. The cooling rate is different for each of the gases. The reduction in gas 
temperature during the ascent is continuous. The net increase in positive buoyancy, (as when 
dropping a quantity of ballast) will thus be reduced differently for each gas during the climb. 
These reductions in buoyancy are significantly different and are related to the lapse rate of each 
gas and the lapse rate of the surrounding atmosphere. The lapse rate is the change in temperature 
for each gas for each 1000 feet change in altitude. The United States Standard Atmosphere has a 
lapse rate of 3.6* F for each 1000 feet of altitude below a level of about 36,000 feet. If a balloon 
containing a gas is raised rapidly upward through the atmosphere and is allowed to expand 
without superpressure, the reduction in temperature for each gas is as follows: 
Hydrogen 5.4* F 
Helium 7.3* F 
Methane 3.9* F 
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Since the lapse rate of the atmosphere itself is 3.60 F per 1000 feet, balloons inflated with these 
three gases will supercool by a value equal to the lapse rate of each gas, minus the lapse rate of 
the atmosphere as follows: 
Hydrogen 1.80 F 
Helium 3.7* F 
Methane OX F 
Methane having a lapse rate nearly equal to that of the atmosphere, supercools very little during 
a rapid ascent compared to helium and hydrogen. " (Overs, 1981 : 24/5) 
Which means that in practical terms balloons filled with different gases will behave differently: 
"... during ascent below pressure altitude, the methane balloon will rise with only a small change 
in buoyancy while the helium balloon will tend to arrest its own rise as the helium supercools. " 
(Overs, 1981 : 25) 
Naturally the same thing will happen in reverse following a rapid descent with the result that: 
"The lift of a balloon filled with helium will, after a rapid decrease in altitude, exhibit more false 
lift than will balloons inflated with either hydrogen or methane. The false lift will dissipate over 
a period of time, but can cause the pilot some degree of confusion. " (Overs, 1981 : 25) 
This false lift is known as "superheaf' and there are two causes of it that an LTA pilot needs to be aware 
of 
- 
that caused by the aforementioned change of altitude (adiabatic heating), and that induced by solar 
radiation (solar gain). When it comes to very large airsfýips the combination of these physical properties 
of the atmosphere can have dramatic effects upon the buoyancy of a vessel, although these may be 
exacerbated, or mitigated by the design and physical structure of any specific LTA craft. 
"In an airship of the rigid type, the hydrogen is protected from the heat of the sun by the outer 
cover and air space, and will not necessarily be the same temperature as the atmosphere. " 
(Lewitt, 1925: 23) 
BUOYANCY CONTROL AND EQUILIBRIUM 
Nevertheless, it is the case for all LTA craft that: 
"... a ship whose buoyancy or total lift is in excess of its weight will rise, and will continue to 
rise until it reaches an altitude at which the weight of air it displaces is just equal to the total 
weight of the ship, including the weight of the hydrogen. At this altitude a condition of 
equilibrium will be established. 
... 
If 
... 
the weight of the ship is decreased by a discharge of 
ballast, the ship will rise higher until the weight of air displaced is correspondingly decreased ;a 
new state of equilibrium is then reached. Tlus it follows that for every discharge of ballast the 
ship will rise into less dense air. " (Lewitt, 1925 : 24) 
GENERAL EQUATION OF MOTION FOR A FREE BALLOON 
Moreover, the foregoing can also be expressed in mathematical terms: 
"The general equation of motion of a free balloon may be most readily expressed by the 
following form: 
K w- 
dz 2-Md 2z 
+cz+F=O dt 
) 
dt2 
Where: 
z= vertical distance above given reference altitude 
m= total mass of the balloon including the mass of the gas and the hydrodynamic 
"virtual mase' 
K= the overall resistance coefficient of the balloon in question 
w= the speed of the vertical air current in which the balloon is placed 
c=a thermal constant whose magnitude depends on the volume of the balloon and 
the difference between the temperature gradient of the outside air and the 
adiabatic rate of change in the temperature of the contained gas per unit change 
of altitude. 
F= any arbitrary unbalancing force such as that due to discharge of gas or ballast, 
or radiation or conduction of heat. 
t= time from the position where z=0. " 
(Upson & Chandler, 1926: 14/15) 
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GENERAL EQUATION OF MOTION FOR FREE BALLOON WITH INITIAL VELOCITY 
"For the case where the balloon has an initial velocity 
zle 
-Z, =m log 
1+ e2b 
-- 
eb 
(t2- 
tl)(1 +e 2bt 
» 
Where: z, and Z2 the initial and final positions and 
tj and t2 the initial and final times respectively 
Measured from the point where v=0 
For a balloon of some other size, K above will vary as the two-thirds power of the volume and in 
and c directly as the volume. K, in and c (approximately) also vary directly as the air density for 
different temperatures and pressures. " (Upson & Chandler, 1926: 14/15) 
PRESSURE HEIGHT OR STATIC CEILING 
However, there is a maximum altitude to wl-&h any given balloon (or airship) will rise in any given set of 
circumstances. This is known as the pressure height or static ceiling: 
"Me height to which the ship will rise depends on the ratio of excess buoyancy over weight. 
Let B= total buoyancy of ship in tons, based on lift of hydrogen as 68 lb per 1,000 cu ft. 
Let W= total weight of ship in tons, which consists of weight of hull, fabric, engines, fuel, 
ballast and crew. 
Then, percentage of lift used =1X 100 B 
The curve in Fig. 21 gives the altitude to which the ship will rise, the base representing 
W 
BX 
100 and the vertical ordinate representing the altitude in feet. This curve is approximate 
only, it being plotted for normal temperature and pressure, but it is accurate enough for practical 
purposes. " (Lewitt, 1925: 25/26) 
THE EFFECT OF BAROMETRIC PRESSURE ON LIFT 
In order to demonstrate how some of this theoretical work impacts upon the planned next generation of 
very large airships (NGVLAs) it is revealing to take as the basis of an investigation two large airships 
- 
one real one from the past, and one that has been proposed as a theoretical concept 
- 
and to compare the 
effects that one aspect of Aerostatic theory has on them when they are moored. 
The real example is LZBO "GrafZeppelin IF' (the last and largest of the previous generation) and, for the 
theoretical example of the planned next generation it is convenient to use the published dimensions that 
were envisioned for the CargoLifter CL160.1 These dimensions are for an early version of the CLI60 
and were later revised, but they are adequate to give an idea of the magnitude of the resultant effects. 
Table A. 1 
- 
Dimensions of LZ130 and C1,160 
LZ130 "Graf ?, ýeelin IP CL160 "Capýqo! ýLler" 
Volume 200,000 m' 550, (M m' 
Length 245 m 260 m 
Diameter 41.1 m 65 m 
Speed 82 mph (131 km/h) 125 kn-L/h 
Engine power 4200 hp 8,000 hp 7 
If Archimedes Principle is now applied to these two moored airships, (and for simplicity measurement is 
transferred to S. I. units) then the different amount of lift that each of the two fixed volumes will yield can 
easily be calculated. Furthermore by keeping the temperature constant and varying the pressure it can be 
seen how the lift will change as the barometric pressure changes. Thus, for the purposes of this 
investigation it is assumed that these airships are moored in a temperature controlled environment at sea- 
level and that they are fully inflated with 100% pure hydrogen. 
Furthermore it is also assumed that: 
1 Everding & Reich "Neue Entwicklungen in der Luftschiffahrt 
- 
Table Y' in Meyer, Meiners, Post. et al. 2000: 234) 
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" the airships are permanently supplied with fresh gas so that they always remain totally full, 
" they have pressure relief valves so that the gas in them is never pressurised above atmospheric 
pressure, 
" the temperature of the gas contained within them is constant and uniform throughout each, 
" the gas temperature in each is identical with the ambient air surrounding them, 
" the humidity of both the gas and the ambient air are also identical, and that 
" the ambient air surrounding them conforms exactly to the International Standard Atmosphere. 
Given that the first and smaller of the two examples LZ130 "Grafzeppefin IP had a volume of 200,000 
cu m then the total theoretical lift can be determined thus: 
If the weight of air (dry) at ISA is 1.2250 kg/M3 then 200,000 cu m of displaced air will weigh 245,000 kg 
and if the weight of Hydrogen at ISA is 0.0853 kg1m3 then 200,000 cu in of hydrogen weighs 17,060 kg. 
Therefore, under ISA conditions, LZBO, filled with hydrogen has a theoretical gross lift of 227.94 tonnes. 
However, if all else remains constant but the atmospheric pressure drops from ISA 10 13 mb to 970 mb 
then the airship's lift will be similarly decreased and LZ130 lift win equal 227,940 / 1013 x 970 
218,264.36 kg or 218 tonnes. 
Conversely if the atmospheric pressure were to rise to 1040 mb then the lift would increase and LZ130 lift 
will equal 227,940 / 1013 x 1040 = 234,015.39 kg or 234 tonnes. 
Thus it can be seen that any potential mooring system for the hydrogen-filled LZ130 can expect to have to 
deal in extren-ds with some 15 tonnes of variation in lift (234 
- 
218 kg 
= 
15,751.03 kg). This difference 
will be caused solely by changes of the barometric pressure between 970 and 1040 mb and is regardless 
of whether these variations are due to fluctuations of the ambient pressure over a period of time at one 
location or, perhaps, to transferral of the mooring system to a new operational base at a different altitude. 
"The atmospheric pressure is due to the weight of the colunm of air above, and will consequently 
decrease at higher altitudes. As a decrease in pressure means a decrease in density, the weight of 
air displaced by the ship decreases as the altitude increases; the lift of the ship will therefore, 
decrease at higher altitudes. " (Lewitt, 1925: 24) 
THE EFFECT OF SIZE ON BUOYANCY 
Turning now to a theoretical airship, which is equal in size to the dimensions proposed for the CL160, it 
will be found that when filled with hydrogen at ISA there would be a gross theoretical lift of 626,835 kg. 
Furthermore this figure would vary with changes of barometric pressure to yield 600227 kg of lift at 970 
mb and 643,542.34 kg at 1040 mb, resulting in a range of some 43 tonnes (43,315.34 kg). 
In reality this figure can be expected to be somewhat reduced because it has been found impossible in 
practice to fill any airship with a 100% pure gas. Consequently, it would be more accurate to assume a 
95% pure gas which naturally enough will only generate 95% of the lift. Also, it seems currently unlikely 
that the regulatory authorities will permit hydrogen to be used as the lifting gas for the prototype 
NGVLAs and it is therefore interesting to note that doing the same sums again with 95% helium yields a 
calculated difference in lift due to changes of barometric pressure of some 38 tonnes (38,116.71 kg). 
It can thus be seen that, in order to simply accommodate variations of barometric pressure between 970 
mb and 1040 mb, any mooring system for an NGVLA of similar size to the CLI60 will need to have 
access to at least 30 tons of ballast to counteract the potential changes in the airship's lift from this cause 
alone. While this is not by any means an enormous number, it is a significant weight and it cannot be 
ignored. It is certainly far more than ground crew personnel can be expected to move by hand on a regular 
basis as is currently the case for today's small blimps. 
By way of comparison, one of the larger of the modem blimps, the Skyship 600, has a volume of 6600 m3 
and thus displaces 8085 kg of air under ISA conditions. This then gives: Helium = Ij 17 kg : lift = 6,967 
kg at ISA: Lift at 970 mb = 6,672: Lift at 1040 mb = 7,152: Resulting in a Difference of 480 kg. T11us 
barometric change is scarcely noticed in the course of today's blimp operations. Added to which: 
"Pressure changes are usually slow 
- 
often less than half a millibar per hour 
... 
in most 
meteorological contexts, a pressure fall of about 3 mb/h is considered to be rapid 
- 
such a fall 
would normally be indicative of the speedy approach of a vigorous depression. " (Wallington, 
1982: 14) 
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THE EFFECT OF WATER VAPOUR ON LIFT 
However, in the real world there are further complications: 
"The density of clean dry air at the pressure of 1,000 mb and temperature 290" K (17" Q is 
0.00 1201 grams per cubic centimeter. The formula for calculating the density of moist air at the 
pressure of p mb and temperature T* K is 
0.001201 290 
T 
where e is the vapour pressure of the water in the air in millibars. This shows that density 
increases with pressure and decreases with temperature, and also that if the proportion of water 
vapour is reduced, the air pressure and the temperature remaining the same, the density in- 
creases. Thus in general wet air weighs less than dry air. " (Sutton, 1962: 203) 
And furthermore, an airship that is filled with a moisture laden gas and submerged in dry air will generate 
more lift than one that is filled with a dry gas and submerged in wet air. Investigation of this however, 
depends on knowing something of the nature of water vapour. 
"Pure water vapor cannot exist under standard conditions; however, its specific weight can be 
calculated from theory. 
)Iwo = 0-7620kg /m3 
Adjusting for an average temperature of 29.4*C gives 
yw = 0.7252kg (Jones & Thach, 1995: 80) 
Where: .. rwo = specific weight of water vapor at STP, and 
rw 
- specific weight of pure water vapor. " (Jones & Thach, 1995: 77) 
It also depends on the rate at which water vapour is transmitted through helium retaining membranes. 
"In a previous paper' it was reported that humidity in both the helium and the ambient air affects 
buoyant lift and that water vapour penetrates modem Ian-dnated aerostat hull material rather well. 
Since water vapor is lighter than air it provides additional lift when the helium is moist. On the 
other hand, moisture in the outside air reduces the air density and decreases lift. Analysis shows 
that when the water vapor content of the helium is the same as that in the outside air, there is no 
net effect on lift, although there is an effect on gas volume. " (Jones & Thach, 1995.77) 
However, calculating the exact buoyancy of any particular airship at any specific moment is an 
enormously complex subjectý that is governed by the size and surface area of its gas cells. But some idea 
of the scale of the effect humidity will have on the lift of the NGVLAs can be estimated from work 
carried out on the TCOM 71 MTm aerostats. These are 71 metres long, have a helium volume of 10,246 m3 
and a material surface area of 4,280 m2. 
"It is apparent that [following inflation of a TCOM 71M aerostat with "initially-dry" gas] the 
water vapor pressure in the helium increased approximately as predicted 
... 
approaching that of 
the outside air in about 10 days. " (Jones & Thach, 1995: 79) 
In this case the rate of water vapor transmissivity was found to be "0.0165 kg/m2-hr at 29.4*C' and 
although this number may seem small it cannot simply be ignored by the NGVLAs because: 
"Study wiH show that the effect of humidity on the lift is the greatest under conditions that 
otherwise tend to make the lift of an airship the least. The larger we build airships the greater the 
attention we must pay to humidity effects. " (US Navy, 1927: 11-24) 
This effect will be most strongly felt by any NGVLAs that are intended to carry loads between the tropics 
and higher and colder latitudes (where, incidentally, condensation and liquid water accumulation within 
the gas chambers will also become a further problem! ). Humidity ingress will also affect the lift of any 
newly inflated airship, where gas has been freshly de-compressed from cylinders - or vaporised from a 
liquid state 
- 
and will thus contain very little any moisture initially. 
I Jonesý S. P, -rethered Aerostat Performance Modeling, " AIAA paper 86-2567-CP, October 1986. 
2 For a method of correcting airship lift equations by inserting humidity values see US Navy Rigid Airship manual. 1927: 11-24/25, 
paragraphs 50-53. 
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AEROSTATIC RULES OF THUMB 
Whle Aerostatics theory is not exceptionally difficult to understand it is nevertheless a complex subject 
and it is widely misunderstood largely because many of the concepts are not encountered elsewhere 
within modem aeronautical engineering. There are however some simplified "rules of thumb. " 
"HELIUM 
- 
AEROSTAT RULES 
Constants: (with all other factors equal) 
1. The lift of an acrostat varies with a change in volume. 
2. The lift of an aerostat varies with a change in barometric pressure. 
3. The lift of an aerostat varies with a change in temperature 
4. The lift of an aerostat varies with a change in humidity. 
5. The barometric pressure decreases approx. 1 
-in [2.5 cm] for each 1000 ft of altitude. 6. The temperature will decrease approx. I 
-degree of Fahrenheit for each 300 ft ascent. Chan2es: 
7. The lift of gas increases as barometric pressure increases, and decreases if pressure 
decreases. 
8. The lift of a fixed volume of gas decreases if the atmospheric temperature increases, 
and increases if the temperature decreases. 
9. The lift does not change due to a change in barometric pressure, if the gas is free to 
expand. 
10. The lift decreases as the Atmospheric humidity increases, for a fixed volume of gas. 
11. The lift does not change when air and gas temperature change in equal amount, if 
the gas is free to expand. 
12. An aerostat in equilibrium at any altitude will be in equilibrium at the surface, 
providing there is no superheating of the gas. 
13. An aerostat rising from the surface in equilibrium will be in equilibrium at any 
altitude below pressure height, providing no weight is lost and there is no superheating. 
Numbers : (if the gas is free to expand) 
14. The gas volume will increase approx. I% for each 375 ft [ 114.3 in] of altitude. 
15. The gas volume will increase I% for every 5 F-degrees [2.8"C] of temperature. 
16. The gas volume will increase 1% for every 5 F-degrees [2.8"C] of superheat. " 
(Rechs, 1977) 
"FORMULA FOR LIFr 
L= 
AsxPpx(I-Sg)xTs 
PP x PS 
Where: As = Standard air density (. 0765): Sg Specific Gravity of He gas (Sg of helium is 
normally 0.1381, but varies slightly by source) Pp = Present barometric pressure (Where 
'Present' means true readings at a specific altitude above Mean Sea Level 
- 
MSL) : Ps = Standard Pressure (29.92): Tp 
= Present Temperature : Ts = Standard Temperature (59). " 
(Rechs, 1977) 
THE IMPACT OF TEMPERATURE ON GROUND HANDLING 
The effects of adiabatic heating and externally induced super-heating (or super-coolingj due to solar 
radiation and changes of air temperature, are well documented because they play a large part in the flight 
operations of all airships. However, it is important to note that the effects of super-heating can be 
exacerbated on the ground when, for example, an airship is moved out of a heated hangar on a winter's day, or is held still on its moorings on a calm, summer's day when without any "wind chiir' the airship 
can "cook up" and any excess lift that is generated must be dealt with by the mooring system. 
Moreover, from the GH perspective, whereas the appearance of solar-generated superheat is fairly 
predictable for it occurs while the airship is static, the ramifications for GH from adiabatic heating are in 
some ways more complicated. By definition the airship is arriving from flight, and has thus been in 
motion. When it is brought under control and held still, the airship may well be positively buoyant but the 
proportion of lift resulting from its rapid descent will not be apparent until it has cooled and the time 
taken for this is dependent upon the radiative properties of the specific airship and the weather on the day in question. Consequently, the ground crew must plan for any ballast that is initially loaded on to the hot 
airship to be removed again as the airship cools or for this temporary excess lift to somehow otherwise be 
accommodated by the mooring system. 
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APPENDIX B: AERODYNAMICS AND HYDRODYNAMICS 
AERODYNAMICS 
The branch of Aerodynarf& Science that applies to large airships has been somewhat neglected. Little 
work was done on the subject between the seminal paper of Lord Kings Norton (Roxbee Cox, 1929) and 
the investigation at Cranfield Institute of Technology (Gomes, 1990). Thus: 
"The aerodynamics of the airship, particularly in transient flight conditions, 
- 
turning, briefly 
climbing or diving, flying through gusts 
- 
are far less well understood than the corresponding 
phenomena for the aeroplane and the helicopter. " (Mowforth, 1991: 27) 
Moreover, apart from the obvious fact that far greater effort has been applied to the study of heavier-than- 
air behaviour, since the demise of the large rigid airships some 60+ years ago: 
"Ile origins of this 
... 
rest with the ancient spectre of Scale Effect. " (Mowforth, 1991: 27) 
SCALE EFFECT 
The problem stems from the fact that all airsWps are large and they fly slowly. 
"Unfortunately, a model of a subsonic aircraft under test in an atmospheric wind tunnel can 
accurately reproduce the flow pattern over the full-size vehicle at its true flight speed only if. 
- (i) the product (size x speed) is the same for both, and 
(ii) the airflow velocity over the model is too slow to introduce compressibility effects, 
i. e. it is less than about 900 km/h (560 mph) 
- 
so to generate an accurate representation of the flow pattern over an airship 200 rn (660 ft) long 
flying at 100 km/h (63 mph), using a 1/100 scale model 2.0 rn (6.6 ft) long, condition (i) above 
would require the model to be tested in an airstream at 100 x 100 = 10 000 km/h (6 300 mph), or 
about 8 times the speed of sound, and this would be somewhat beyond the limits prescribed by 
condition (ii). " (Mowforth, 1991: 27) 
While techniques do exist for increasing the Reynolds (Re) number and reducing air viscosity by means 
of high-pressure and low-temperature wind-tunnels, these are costly and there has thus far been little 
incentive to apply them to airships. Thus the usual practice is still to carry out model tests: 
"... at more manageable speeds and [then apply] suitable corrections for scale effect; but [for 
large airships] the process of correction has always been a difficult one, becoming more so for 
cases other than those of steady flight at small angles of attack, mainly because of the limited 
pool of existing experimental data. Most of fl-ýs data was gathered during a period when wind 
tunnels were too small to accommodate, without serious flow distortion 
... 
airship models large 
enough to offer accurate measurements with the apparatus available... " (Mowforth. 1991: 27) 
Nevertheless, a large body of work has been produced over the years and much from the time of the 
previous generation of very large airships (PGVLAs) remains of value today. Here are some examples: 
"... if an airship model is placed in a wind tunnel so that it is free to turn about its c. g., it is 
found that it will increase its angle of inclination to the air stream up to about 40*, then steady 
down and remain in a stable equilibrium at about that angle. That is, at great angles of inclination 
the pressure on the leading side near the stem 
... 
becomes so great as to neutralize the other 
moments. However, up to about 40" the model is unstable. Therefore, it can be said, that an 
airship, regardless of its length, rigid or non-rigid, is in general aerodynamically unstable in all 
planes 
... 
Thus a light ship tends to dive and a heavy ship tends to climb ; also if ship yaws off 
its course it tends to increase the yaw. " (US Navy, 1927 : 111-7) 
"Proper stream lining makes it possible to reduce the total resistance of an envelope form to a 
remarkable degree, the resistance of the best hulls being less than 5 per cent of the resistance of 
flat plates of like projected area. " (US Navy, 1927 : 111-22) 
TYPES OF FORCE ACTING ON AN AIRSHIP 
'Ile aerodynamic forces acting on airships may conveniently be divided into drag and 
transverse forces. " (Burgess, 1927) 
"Forces 
- 
a) inertial effects of its own mass, b) steady wind, c) atmospheric turbulence" (Howe, 
1999) 
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"Transverse forces may be divided into two kinds: a) forces imposed through the rudders and 
elevators to control the direction and altitude, and to balance inequalities of weight and 
buoyancy; b) forces resulting from gusts when flying in rough air. " (Burgess, 1927 chap 5. : 68) 
'The dynamic forces on the hull are small in comparison with the static forces, excepting those 
due to turning, and usually are not very important. " (Lewitt, 1925: 59) 
ADDITIONAL MASS OF ENTRAINED AIR 
"rhe basis of Munk's theory is that the additional mass of air carried along by the motion of the 
airship is the same around any short length of the hull as around an equal length of an infinite 
cylinder of the same cross-sectional area, with a correction factor equal to k2 
- 
k, to allow for the 
difference between an infinite cylinder and an ellipsoid of finite LID. " (Burgess, 1927 : 89) 
SKIN FRICTION 
'It is known that the resistance of a body moving in a fluid is proportional to the square of the 
linear dimensions and to the square of the velocity! Some of this resistance is due to the skin 
friction of the body, and the remainder to head resistance, but the latter causes eddies in the 
fluid, and is eventually lost in friction. The frictional resistance of an airship cannot be 
accurately calculated from the coefficient of friction of the doped fabric. The resistance of the 
ship can only be treated as a whole, and must be obtained from the known resistance of existing 
airships. [GC emphasis. ] 
Let C= capacity of airship in millions cu ft. 
V maximum velocity of ship in miles per hour. 
k the resistance coefficient found experimentally 
Then, total resistance =a constant X C-31V 2 
And, as the horse-power is proportional to resistance x velocity, 
Total horse-power required = kC jV3 
aximurn horse 
- 
power 
, From which, k=ma (Lewitt, 1925: 236) 
CýV3 
However, the characteristics of airships in flight really He outside the scope of this investigation, and in 
view of the fact that there is not space here to do justice to the large body of work concerned with this 
complex subject, those seeking further enlightenment are referred to the Bibliography and specifically to 
the works of. Cheeseman, 1999; Cook, 1999; Gomes, 1990; Gibson & Laming, 1975; Von KkmiAn & 
Troller, 1940; Abbot, 193 1; Anon, c 1930; Anon. (undated 7); Roxbee Cox, 1929; US Navy, 1927; US 
Government, 1941; Harrold & Browning, 1968. 
EFFECT ON GROUND HANDLING 
Unlike the Aerostatic forces that are constantly at work on an airship from the time it is inflated until its 
eventual deflation, the Aerodynamic forces play a relatively, and perhaps surprisingly, small part in 
airship GH operations. From the ground handling (GH) perspective, the problems caused by Aerostatics 
need to be addressed constantly, day and night, summer and winter, regardless of whether an airship is 
inside or outside the hangar, whereas those caused by Aerodynamics are only applicable when an airship 
is out of doors and really only become a problem when there is a strong or gusty wind blowing. As a 
consequence, there are only four areas where Aerodynamics really has any impact on GH. These are: 
Undocldng in a side wind 
Realigruncnt with shed for re-docking 
Mooring 
Launch and Capture 
Considerable work was done both theoretically and in terms of practical experimentation during the 
golden era of the previous generation of very large airships (PGVLAs) and much of this work remains as 
state of the art today. Although, undocking/re-docking and launch/capture are all transitory procedures 
that in ideal circumstances would last only a few minutes in each case, and thus occupy a very small 
percentage of the GH time, it was found that these were in fact among the most dangerous time. Whereas 
those affecting the behaviour of the airship when attached to its mooring mast 
- 
such as "kiting" "surging" 
and "dutch rolr' 
- 
were in many cases more annoying than dangerous. 
I 
"See Authoes (I., ewitt] text-book on Hydraulics (Piunan). "
260 
Again this is an enormously complex and extensive subject that requires detailed explanation for which 
there is not space in this study. Nevertheless here are some items of interest from the archives: 
FIN DESIGN EFFECT ON MOORING 
"It was found from experience that R. 29 was over stable, it being very difficult to turn, and that 
R. 33 was under-stable 
... 
" (Lewitt, 1925 : 219) 
"When the ship is moored by the nose to a mast, the forces in the structure will depend on the 
wind velocity which is liable to reach the maximum speed of the ship, in which case the pull on 
the nose will equal the total engine thrust. " (Lewitt, 1925 : 69) 
HEADWIND AT MAST 
'Ile resistance of an airship may be found, providing the maximum speed and horse-power are 
known, by equating the work done per second by the engines to the work done per second 
against the resistance. 
Let R= total resistance of ship at full speed in tons. 
V= maximum speed of ship in miles per hour. 
H. P. = maximum horse-power of engines. 
Then. work done per second against resistance = work done per second by engines 
2240RxVL8 = H. P. x550 60 
R H. P. x550x6O 
2240xVx88 
Most of the resistance is due to the skin friction of the hull the remainder being due to head 
resistance and resistance of cars. " (Lewitt, 1925 : 60) 
SIDE WIND FORMULA 
"A number of formulae have been derived for finding the side wind pressure on an airship, but 
the one that appears to agree with service conditions is Formula No. 1. 
Side pressure = 0.00143 x SV2(l + Kr) + pressure on vertical fins. 
Where 
Side pressure = pounds 
V= wind inilhr. [mph] 
S= area of lateral plane = sq ft. 
r =fineness ratio. 
When 
r =2to4 K=0.01 
r =4to8 K=0.02 
r=8 to 12 K=0.03 
Pressure on vertical fins = 0.003 x (pressure area sq ft) V2. 
The foregoing is at standard density of = 0.00237 slugs/cu ft. " (US Navy, 1927 : 111-17) 
EXAMPLE OF USE OF US NAVY FORMULA NO. l: 
"Problem: Find resistance of [LZ1261 Los Angeles, axis perpendicular to a 10 midhr. wind. 
Lateral area = 46,800 sq. ft. 
V in miJhr. r= 
f5-8 
=7 approx. 90 
D=0.00143 x 46,800 x 100 (1 + 0.02 X 7). 
D=0.00143 x 46,800 x 100 (1.14) = 7,629 lbs. 
Fin and rudder area = 2,400 sq ft approx. 
R= KpSV2 = 0.03 x 2,400 x 100 = 720 lbs. 
Lateral resistance bare hull 7,629 pounds 
Lateral resistance of fin and rudder 720 Vound. j 
8,349 pounds 
Or general formula for this ship [LZ1261 is F= 83.49 V2. 
VinM. P. H. 
F in pounde' (US Navy, 1927 : 111-17) 
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NUMBER OF CREW NEEDED FOR GH OF LZ126 USS LOS ANGELES: 
"If each man on the windward side has an effective lateral pull of 45 pounds (from test run on 
spring balance in hangar) then 
Number of men = 
8349 
= 186 men required on windward side 45 
To just hold the ship [LZ126 USS Los Angeles] in an exactly steady wind (no inertia forces due 
to gusts to overcome). " (US Navy, 1927: 111-17) 
THUMB RULE FOR [LZ-1261ZR. 31 U. S. S "LOS ANGELES" ONLY 
"Number of men required = KV 2 where K= some constant 
186 
= 
KlOO 
K=1.86, call it 2 
77zumb rule. Number of men required = 2V2 for Los Angeles. 
V= wind, M. P. H. " (US Navy, 1927 : 111- 17) 
There is also much that is of interest to large airship designers in the theoretical work that was done on 
submarines during the 1940's, 50's and 60's at a time when very little work was being done on airships 
and also on behalf of the oil industry concerning their large supertankers (e. g. Wayne & others, 1997). 
HYDROSTATICS 
"FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FLOTATION: To naval architects the hydrostatic properties of 
vessels floating on the water surface represent a fundamental part of their stock in trade, and that 
familiarity readily reads across to submarines on the surface; the hydrostatic properties of 
submerged submarines are less familiar to naval architects in general, but they can identify the 
parallels without difficulty. For most other engineers the subject of hydrostatics may not be so 
familiar. " (Burcher & Rydill, 1994: 25) 
HYDRODYNAMICS 
"A submerged submarine has freedom to move in all directions that constitute the six degrees of 
freedom which, in naval architecture, are termed surge, sway and heave for bodily translations 
along the three axes of the vessel (namely, longitudinal, athwartships and vertical) and are 
termed roll, pitch and yaw for the angular rotations about those axes. Although there is usually 
some interaction between the motions, it is often a sufficient simplification to treat them in 
uncoupled groups. (Fig. 8.2) When that applies, surge (the change of speed of the submarine in 
the direction of its longitudinal axis) is treated as a single, independent motion related to the 
powering and resistance of the vessel; the motions in the horizontal plane, i. e. sway (the 
sideways movement) and yaw (the rotation in heading) are treated as coupled pair; the motions 
in the vertical plane, i. e. heave (the up and down movement) and pitch (the angular attitude) are 
also treated as a coupled pair; and roll (the rotation about the longitudinal axis) is treated as 
single, independent motion, even though it is closely related to the turning motion. " (Burcher & 
Rydill, 1994: 153) 
"Motion control. Looking at the motions in the coupled groups described above, the customary 
approaches to their control are as follows: 
(a) Surge: This motion is the outcome of the variation between two longitudinal forces, the 
thrust of the propulsor and the resistance of the vessel to the forward motion. When the 
submarine is proceeding, sufficiently deep, on a level path at constant speed, the forces are 
equal and opposite, but if it changes course and/or depth the other motions will alter the 
resistance and a speed variation will result. Control of surge is not usually attempted, but 
could be effected by changing the propulsor RPM. 
(b) Yaw and Sway: The means of control of this coupled pair is by rudders at the after end of 
the submarine. Rudder operation effects control of heading or rate of turn by causing the 
vessel to take up an angle of yaw; sway is a consequence of yaw and generally no attempt is 
made to control it directly. 
(c) Pitch and Heave: It is the freedom of a submerged submarine to move in the vertical plane 
that differentiates it from the surface ship, for which the pitch and heave motions are 
relatively small and determined by surface waves and the hydrostatics of the ship's 
waterplane. In submarines, the means of control of this coupled pair is usually by two sets of 
control surfaces known as hydroplanes, one set forward and one aft. With that approach, it 
is possible to control pitch and heave independently. In older, slow speed, submarines it was 
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common practice, in manual control, to have two planes men, one to each set of 
hydroplanes, with the forward planesman controlling the depth of the submarine and the 
after planesman controlling pitch angle. As we shall see later in this chapter there is sound 
logic in the practice at slow speeds, though at higher speeds the need for separation of 
control in that way diminishes and then coupled control can be taken over by the after 
hydroplanes alone, the forward hydroplanes being zeroed. 
(d) Roll: It is not usual to provide control of roll in submarines, unlike many surface ships in 
which roll stabiliser fins arc employed. In submarines, any asymmetric moment tending to 
cause roll is countered by the hydrostatic restoring moment due to the centrc of gravity 
being below the centrc of buoyancy. " (Burcher & Rydill, 1994: 153/4) 
"As the submarine approaches the water surface it may encounter the effects of wave action 
which generate disturbing forces tending to cause it to heave and pitch-, there will also be suction 
forces on the hull due to is proximity to the surface while underway. " (Burcher & Rydill. 
1994: 155) 
EQUATIONS OF MOTION OF A SUBMARINE 
The following should be compared with the similar Equations of Motion for airships in Cook. 1999: 76. 
"Conventions. 8.4 Although it is not our intention to go very far into the theory of submarine 
dynamics, it is desirable for a general understanding to provide 
... 
some preliminary discussion 
of the form of the equations of motion of a submarine. We do not go into their derivation, which 
can be found in a suitable textbook. To that end it is necessary to define sthe axes and coordinate 
system employed for the purpose and these are illustrated in Fig 8.2. The set of axes commonly 
used is aligned to the longitudinal, vertical and athwartships geometry of the submairine, 
assumed to be moving in three dimensions in hydrosapce, the centre of the set beign either at the 
geometric centre of the boat, or more conveniently, at its centre of gravity. This choice of axis 
system overcomes some of the problems of coupling between the various motion componenets, 
though it does lead to other complications as regards forces such as gravity which are related to a 
spatial set of axes. " (Burcher & Rydill, 1994 : 157/8) 
"The surge equation 
-mu "2 
XP +XU+ XM + XA 
This shows that the rigid body mass of the submarine times its acceleration in the direction of its 
longitudinal axis is equal to the sum of the forces acting on it in that direction. These forces 
comprise: the propulsor thrust; the hydrodynamic resistance appropriate to its motion in the 
direction of its longitudinal axis; the summation of additional drag forces arising from any lateral 
motion which might be occuring; and the hydrodynamic forces associated with accelerated 
motion in the direction of its longitudinal axis, commonly known as the 'added mass' term. 
Horizontal plane equations 
-m(v*+W)= Yv + Yv- + YR + YC"'t 
and 
Ij = Nv + NR + Nik + Nc,,,,, 
The first of these equations relates the product of the rigid body mass and its sideways 
acceleration to the summation of the hydrodynamic forces acting on the hull in the sideways 
direction. The second equation relates the product of the rotary inertia of this rigid body about a 
vertical axis through the centre of gravity and its angular acceleration in yaw to the summation 
of the horizontal moments of the hydrodynamic forces acting on the hull. 
Vertical plane equations -m( W- qU= Zw +4+ Zg, + ZC,., 
and 
lyyq' 
= 
Mw + Afa + M9 + Afc,,, 
The first of these equations relates the product of the rigid body mass and its acceleration in the 
vertical direction to the summation of the hydrodynamic forces acting on the hull in that 
direction. The second equation relates the product of the rotary inertia of the rigid body about a 
horizontal axis through the centre of gravity and its angular acceleration in pitch to the 
summation of the vertical moments of the hydrodynamic forces acting on the hull, augmented in 
this case by the hydrostatic restoring moment due to the departure of the axis of the submarine 
from the horizontal. 
Roll equation 
- 
ln-ý' 
= 
Kv +Kit + Kt 
This relates the product of the rotary inertia of the rigid body about its longitudinal axis and its 
angular acceleration in roll to the summation of the athwartships moments acting on the hull due 
to the hydrodynamic forces arising from the other motions, augmented in this case by the 
hydrostatic restoring moment due to the departure of the submarine from the vertical. " (Burcher 
& Rydill, 1994: 158/9) 
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CONTROL REVERSAL IN SUBMARINES 
-As Speed is I-CdLlCCd, h0%VCVCl. tile pitch ci*i'ccti\, ciics. s term reducc-, in maimitudc and at 
Sl. llfiCiellllý IOW Speed', tile al)ýLIIC 0l'pitCh (ILIC to after plane operation call be less than the drift 
anvIc causcd by tile plane 101-cc. At such low speeds. when and upward torcc is applied by the 
allcr planes. the boat will pitch down bill the dominant cifect will be a bodily up\, vards 
movcnicin. At some intcrinc(liate speed,, there will be a Cil-CLInistance in which ail aftcr plane 
force will CAISC a j)itCh angle Which exactly matches the drift angle and then the submarine will 
be unable to change depth cven though pitched. (Fig,. 8.8). This is known as the 'critical speed'. 
-it which after planes are inellcctivc for changing depth, and then forý, vard planes become 
ncccssary. 
... 
The change ofafter plane control effectivencss at the critical speed is sometimes 
known as the 'Chinese cilco". The critical speed is typically al-OLInd two knots or so and its 
si"llificalicc lies ill the fact that as it is aPpl-OaChCd With I-C(ILICint' submarine speed. the 
ct'l'cctivciicss ofthe after planes in controlling depth is progressively reduced. - (Burcher &, 
Rydill, 1994 : 168/9) 
-It should he noted that with after planes the direction ofthe control force is in the opposite 
sense to the rcsuhant pitch angle and the heave velocity component is in the opposite direction to 
that in which the pitch angle drives the submarinc. With forward planes on the other hand, 
because they are forward ofthc neutral point, the control force is in the same sense as the pitch 
MIgIC it CaLISCS. Whil-St the hCaVC Vclocity component is in the sine direction to that in which the 
pitch angle drives the boat. Ho\k, e\ci-. because the ricutral point is forvvard. it is not possible to 
get the forward plane.,, sufficicntly ahead ofthc 11CL111'al point For good control effectiveness. 
Nevvi-theles's. ow, inL! to the Chinese effect. Forward planes are essential to good slow speed contrl 
at depth 
- 
and necessary for control at periscope depth, as they greatly assist rapid depth 
changing when a suhniarinc dives from or close to the water surkice. - (Burcher & Rydill, 1994 
169) 
CONTROL REVERSAL IN AIRSHIPS 
-rhe game hccomc, even more interesting at Im\ speed when lot- example the elevators raised 
to initiate climb, may be struggling to get the tail down and the [lose Lip against the opposition of 
the Ship'S pCDdUlLIIII stability. Below a certain critical speed 
- 
LISII, 111ý between about 15 and 30 
kin/h ( 10 and 20 iriph) 
- 
the downward force on the elevator becomes greater than the dynamic 
lift indLICCd by the I-CSLI[tinýtl upvvard tilt ofthe bull, so that the net effect is descent rather than 
ascent. A simplified explanation ofthe phenomenon is offered with Figure 20. Even at speeds 
above this "'control reversal" range the tail must be depressed before the ship can begin to clinib, 
the I-C(lUi1-Cd "dip" being more pronounced at lower speed.,,. This would have posed sorne 
intcrestiriý, problems lot- the long, slow early Zeppelins when 11111110eUvring near the ground, had 
they not been iný, cniously furnished with separate clevators near the bows to lift the nose. instead 
ol 1mverin., the tail, to initiate clinib. These how elevators had, however, a destabilising effect 
-C Coll and Could lead to "porpoisirip" at hipher -speeds: they wei sequently phased Out as cruising 
Speeds increased and as ground handling strategies were developed to cope with low-specd C 
movcnients m ground levcl. - (Mowforth 1991 : 32) 
In conclusion, it should not bc overlooked that when moorcd to a mast an airship most closely resernhIcs 
a building 
- 
albeit one that call wcalhcrvanc into wind. Consequently, there is also much work that has 
becii donc in thc ficid of* building research oil (lie aerodynamics ot'structures that are close to the ground 
and Study of the acrodyllaillics ill low-level, and the ct'lects ot'airflow oil lightweight structures call be 
found in Such Papers as: Davenport, 1963a & 196W Harris, 1963 & c. 1969, Scruton, 1963 ý Shellard. 
1963, Sonntat% cK. WIT, 192-1. 
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APPENDIX C: CONTENTS LISTOFTAR Is1 DR., ki'T 
WITH AUTHOR'S ASSESSMENT OF MATTERS RELATING TO GROUND I IANDI ING ý lkiý 11 I(il II1 1) THUS 
Transport Airship Re(Inirements 
Drall I-I 
-Ith hnwtrý I()()() 
submitted b. N 
Lufffalirt-BLindesanit. Di% ision Nl. Cenification and En\ nonnicnial holection, Hell Illan BIL-11K 1111,111C 
-'(1.1 1 W" BI . 1till', l 11\1 Il 
Information: 
units (oanAormed into metric sysicill IS hý "tl Ile\ ell "\ allies ale I ot I lided \\I ICIC tIC In 
A question mark (? ) indicates an item "to be diNCIA. S. Wd" 
6. Durcliffihningsverordming zur Baitordming. ffir Luftliihngerdl (0.1)V1, uftl? auO-1, FI, S): 
AIRWORTHINESS REQUIREMENTS FOR TRANSPoR'I'(',, \'I'[--. "(ý, ()IZ) 
-AI 
R Sl II I'S 
INTRODUCTION 
These Air\% oribiness Requirements for Transport Airshipsoriginallý base oil (lie I Cp0r( ",. \u ship Deýigll( I lie] [. C A )I I lic W, 
Department of Transportation, Paper No. FAA P-81 10-2. clian., e 1. daled. lul. % 24.1992''I'llese clitelia Nkerc applikable 10 111ý111pý 
certificated in the nornial categorv that had a total seating configuration of 10scat., oI les, The clitelia \%Cie lefelclited in W\l'or% 
Circular (AC) 21.17-1. "Type Certification-Airships", as an acceptable means lot file type ceilification of kolikelillon'll. noll lit-id 
airships. 
13ý amending the FAA criteria. aimorthiness requirements t0l'tlJC type LCItifiLation of aiisliipý lit tile taiqorics Nonnal ovand 
Commuter were pro\ided. The numbering system ofFAA part 23 \%aS illlr0dLlCecL Himc\ci. ilicsc ictluncuient, Im noinial and 
commuter category airships were not published to date and therefore are not le., alk eftecike, 
With the upcome of several large airship projects a code foi Transport Cateyoi. \ Aii, hipý ITAR) iý tile\ uahlc ['lie aho\c mentioned 
code was upgraded to the level of JAR-25 were applicable. plus umiiý fe\ý element, tiom JAR-27 and JAR 20 t ImIN \\ eic 
transfornied into the nietric system %kcie applicable and rounded semiblý. 
In the run up to this draft close and fruitful cooperation bemeen the Air\korthiness Di% isions of RI-1) (NI-) and LBA i D) \%; is 
experienced and still is. Due to the pressure of tinie for both NAA's it \ýas agreed to share the \\oik load 1) 
*\ the 
RLD lot: usinp oil 
rigid airships and the LBA on non-rigid airships. Howevei, this draft code nnylil L'i\ e the inillic-ioll that [lie liýmd design lial 1101 
enough been taken into account. The apparent emphasis of the senii-riLids iý due to all allead 
,\ Submitted appliý ation to the I -B. -\ and therefore the rulemaking has progressed much further. It goes without saying, [flat rivids %\ ill catch ill) \Clý -soon \\ fill the I'AR dicil 
fullý embracing both design philosophies. 
The tollmk iny consolidated draft is inainlý based on the toll0\\ illýL' (10CUMCIVIS alld pallet N 
- 
Airworthiness requirements for normal and commuter categorý airships 
- 
IS. IW 1-tittBatio 11I. S. to late no( lerall. \ 
effect I\ c) 
- 
LBA-Supplentents to Transport Airship Re(litirernents (TAR) 
- 
Intioducin,, modified pataý, iapli, oI IAR 25. JAR 27 and JAR 
29 X%cre applicable 
- 
Concept for modern Airworthiness Requirements for the Large Airship category 
- 
P. L. ý an I)aalcn. Kl. l)/I, \\ Nla 
: 
\/. little 1498 
- 
Prelintinarý Cominents from RLD/Airworthiness Div. 
-J. P. Veeze. E. K. de la Rainhelic. P. L. \an kialell. RLD/lAt, 
October/Dezeniber 1998 
A Re%ieNi ofI-BA Airworthiness Requirements 
- 
Applicable to the Cargol. iftcr Airship 
- 
N. 
.1 Nla\ei -11,0clobet 190" Comments Large Transport Category Airships 
- 
Gfitibach, Hayenloclici. Nlandclý /Ll'Janti. n. \ IINQ 
AIRWORTHINESS REQUIREMENTS FOR r I'RANSI'OR'I'(': k'1'1-: (. ()Rl': kIRSIIII'S 
Subpart A- General 
§I Applicabifitý ý§2 Definitions. §3 Airship cale,, olA: §S Abble\ iations and s. \ 
Subpart B- Flight 
GENERAL 
-§ 1-1 Prool'ofcornpliance. § 22 1 Load distribution hinit's 25 \\ eight linvitsý § 27 Cenucol it. \ linins; § 21) Fuipt. \ 
weip, lit and conespondin., centei ot gia\ it. \: § 31 Removable Ballast, § 33 Propellei speed and pitch [fruit, 
PERFORMANCE 
-§ 45 General ,§51 Takeoff ,§ 0S Clinih: all engines operatiny: § 07 Clilub: olic e1q, 111c iljopclaji\cý § 1,11 
route flight pathsý § 75 Landing; § 76 Eninc tailuicý ý 7' Balked lalldiligý 
FLIGHT CHARACTERISTICS 
-§ 141 GeneraL 
CONTROLLABILITY AND MANEUVERABILITY 
-§ 143 Gcneialý § 145 Longiludinal toutrol; § 147 Duccuioual aud lateral 
control: § 149 Mininiuni control speed: § 153 Control durin, larldirlps 
TRIM 
-§ 161 Triiii 
STABILITY 
-§ 171 General 
MISCELLANEOUS FLIGHT REQUIREMENTS 
-§ 203 Stall characteristicsý § 207 Stall %Nainin, % § 117 \\ jud \clot flies; § 251 
Vibration and buffetin, ý § 
-153 Em elope pressure and distortion; § 255 Ground handling chaiuctcrist icsý s 
-1o I Flylu if, looph au Subpart C- Structure 
GENERAL 
-§ 301 Loadsý § 303 Factors of safetvý § 305 Strength and defornianon; §W Hool ol timitue, k. 101) Desipil 
Weightsý § 311 Design airspeeds 
FLIGHT LOADS 
-§ 
-121 General; § 333 Design nianeuvei loads: § 341 Gus( and tutbulence loadsý § lol Fnpinc and -XI't I Jol(loc, k 363 Side load on engine and APU mounts; § 367 Unsyninietri"d loads title to enyine tailuic. § I" I \1o"opl, load, 
CONTROL SURFACE AND SYSTEM LOADS 
-§3Q1 ('01111 A Sul face l0adS: ýTIICNI Iý§ WS ('0111101 N\ NJ cIII. (I onuol 
systein I oadNý § 391) 1 )if aI contio I s\slclrlý § 4Rý Set ondal\ kon I It d s\NICI I I, ý 407 TI-1 of falls Ifec IN. I 
Supplcinentai\ Londitions lot LonI101 SLIrtaCC1. § 415 Gmund vusl conditions 
OTHER LOADS 
-§ 505 Snow loads, § 507 Jacking loads. sý So() Stcpwction 
ENIERGENCYLANDIM; CONDITIONS 
-§ 561 General 
FATIGUE EVALUATION 
-§ 571 Gcneral: § 573 Damage folciance and fatu-nic c\aluation 
LIGHTNING PROTECTION 
-§ 581 Lightning protection 
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Subpm-t 1) 
- 
Design and Cmistruction 
GFNFRAL 
-§ 601 Genclal: ý 60" NlatcliAl '§ 60S Fabrication niellimis: § 607 Fastenersý § 609 Protection of structuieý § 611 
\"C'ý I I) iIi I% ploýi' lon,: § (ý I" Nla I eiia I ýncný, t Ii pjoperticý and deshl-m Nal Lies ý§ 619 Spec ia I factoisý § 621 CastinL factorsý § 623 
Beahn,,, lacioi. sý § 025 Fitow, lzmoiý, § 611 Budsttike 
CONTIML SURI-ACES 
-§ 051 hoof ot strengtW § 655 lrimaflationý § 657 Hinges: § 659 Mass balance 
CONTROL SYSTEMS 
-ý 671 Genciall § 072 Stabilil\ aLignientation arid automatic po%kei-opeiated svstenisý § 673 Priniarv flight 
contiols: § 675 Siop, ýý § 677 Tinn Sy, ýIeiml § 671) Contiol systern , list locksý § 681 Limit load static tests: § 683 Operation tests: § 
694; Control svsIcni detaik. § 687 Sprin, 
_, 
deviccsý § 681) ('able systemsý § 693 Joints 
Whccls: § 733 Tyrcs 
PIVY)NN FJ_ \N 1) ( ARGO ACCOMMODATIONS 
-§ 771 Pilot compartmenu § 773 Pilot cornparinient % ie\ý: § 775 
\ý in&ýhicldý and ýý indotv%ý § 777 Cockpit Lorujok, § 779 Motion and effect OfLOCKpit control,.,: § 783 Doors: § 785 Seats. berths. 
saleiN belts and liarncssesý § 787 Slowaý, e compartments: § 789 Retention of items of mass in passenger and cre%k compartments an(] 
,, allcý sý § 791 Passenger information signs and placards: § 793 Hoot surtacesý § 799 Water s\ stenis: § 803 Eniers! enc% evacuation: 
§ K'07 Emergency exilsý § 801) Fniergenc. \ exit arrangenientý §X 10 Ernergencý eviess assist means and escape routes: §8 11 
Fnicq, encý exit inaikingl §8 12 Fnici vent. ý lighting: § SI 3 Eniergcllcý exit accessý §8 15 Width of aisle: § 83 1 Ventilation 
EIRE. PROTECTION AND LIGHTNING EVALUATION 
-§ 833 Combustion heating systenisý § 85 1 Fire extinguishersý § 851 
Conipainnent inleriorsý § 854 [, it\ atory fire protection: § 855 Cargo or baLgage conipartrnentsý § 857 Cai jo compartment 
classification: § 851" Calgo compartment file detection systems: § 859 Combustion heater fire protection: 863 Flammable fluid fire 
protection: § 805 Iýuc protection of flight control-.,, engine niounts and other night structure: § 866 External load attaching means-. § 
869 Fire protection: systems 
MIS( FLI-ANFOUS 
- 
871 Lcýellniv, nicans 
LN VFI 
_OPE. ý 88 1 Envelope design § 88.3 Plessuie svsteiii: § 885 Ground handlin 8,7 S FlUttel 
MIS( 1-4-LANFOUS 
-§ 891 Lifting gas; § 893 Baflast systemý § 895 Externil load attaLhing means 
Stibpart E- Powerplant 
GE, NF. RAL 
- 
')Of hislallation ý 901 Engincsý k 905 Propelleis 
,§ 907 Vibrationý ý 908 Cooling fans; § 909 Ttlrbosuperchargersý § 
17 918 Shailinp critical speed § 1) 19 Shaffing joints, § 921 Control thrusters brakeý 923 Control thrusters dri\e svsten, 
and control mechanism tcýtý 924 Additional teslsý 925 Propeller clearance: § 929 Propeller de-icing § 933 Roersing systenis: 
917 Tuibopiopellci 
- 
dray limiting sysienis; § 939 Powerplant operating( characteristics: § 943 Negative acceleration; § 945 Thrust 
or powei atit nicnitalion sý sleni 
FUEL SYSTEM 
-§ 451 (; eneiaL § 952 Fuel svsteni analvsis anti test: § 953 Fuel systern indepenclenceý § 954 Fuel Svstern 
lightning protection, § 955 Fuel Flow; § 957 Ho%k between interconnected tanksý § 959 Unusable fuel supplý, § 961 Fuel system hot 
weather operationý § 96 ý Fuel tanks: venejalý § 965 Fuel tank tests: § 967 Fuel tank installation, § 969 Fuel tank expansion spaceý § 
97 1 Fuel tank sunip: § 973 Fuel tank h1ler connection. ý § 975 Fuel lank vents and carburetor vapor \ entsý § 077 Fuel tank otalm § 
979 Pieýsutc Itielliny ýý swiw § 98 1 Fite[ tank ternpei at Lire 
FUEL SYSTEM COMPONENTS 
-§ 99 1 Etiel Pumps, § 993 Fuel systern lines and fittings: § 994 Fuel system coiriponentsý § 995 Fuel %al%esý 997 Fuel suainci or filrciý 999 Fuel sysicin drains, § 1001 Fuel jettisoning s\ stern 
()If, SYSTEM 
-§ 1011 Gencial, § 1011 Oil tanksý § 1015 Oil tank testsý § 1017 Oil lines and fittingsý § 1019 Oil strainer or filter: § 
102 1 Oil system draursý § 1023 Oil radiaiorsý § 1025 Oil valves: § 1027 Propeller feathering systen, 
('()( )LING 
-§ 104 1 GenciaL § 1043 ( ooling teNtsý § 1045 Cooling test procedures; 
LIQUID COOLIN6 
-§ 1061 lnstallalioný § 1063 Coolant tank tests 
INDt ICTION SYSTEM 
-§ 109 1 An- intake: § 1093 Air intake system de-icinp and anti-icing provisions: § 1101 Carburetor air 
pielicater desiyw § 1101 Induction sy. stein ductsý § 1105 An- intake systeni screens; § 1107 Inter-coolers and after-coolers; § 1108 
Induction systern fillclýý §I lot) Turbocharger bleed an ýý ýteni: §IIII Turbine engine bieed-air system 
EXHAUST SYSTEM 
- 
ýý I 12 1 Generalý § 1123 Exhaust pipuw: § 1125 Exhaust heal exchangers: § 1126 Water recoverv systems 
POWERPLANT CONTROLS AND ACCESSORIES 
-§ 1141 Po%%erpiant controls: generak § 1143 Engine controK § 1145 
Ignition switches. ý 1147 Mixture controlsý § 1141) hopeller speed and pitch controls, ý § 1153 Propeller feathering controls: § 1157 
Carbuietor air tell iperai tire conuolsý § 1101 Fuel jettisoning system controlsý § 1163 Powerplant accessoriesý § 1165 Engine ignition 
sýsteinsý § 1107 Vectored ilijust controlsý § 1169 Auxiliary power unit controls 
POWERPLANT FIR E PROTECTION 
-§ 1181 Designated file /ones: repions uicludedý § 1182 Nacelle areas behind firewails. and 
engine pod anachin. v siniciures containiny flaniniable fluid fines: § 1183 Haniniable lluid-"irrying componerim § 1185 Flammable 
fluitfs 
,§ 1187 Diainare anti ventilanon of tire zonesý § 1189 Ventilatiow § 1189 Shuioffnieansý § 1191 Firewalls; § 1192 Engine 
acccssoiý conipajimem diaphragiw § 1193 Engine cowlingý § 1195 Fire extinguishing systems: § 1197 Fire extinguishing aggentsý § 
1199 F\tinyuiýhinp agent coruainersý § 1201 Fire extinguishing systern maierialsý § 1203 Fire detector systeniý § 1205 Vectored 
thiuýl 
,§ 120' Compliance. 
Subpart F- Equipment 
61-INFRAL 
-§IMI Eunclion anti instalkition: § 1303 Flight and navigation instrunienlsý § 1305 Powerplant instrunientsý § 1306 
Miscellaneous equipment instnunemsý § 1307 Miscellaneous equipmem § 1301) Equipment, systems, and installations. § 13 11 
hoiection from (lie effects of IIIRVý §I 110 System lighinin, piotection 
INSTRUMENTS: INSTALLATION 
-§ 1321 Arrangement and visihilityý § 1322 Warning, caution. and advisory lights: § 1323 
Airspeed indicating systerw § 1125 Static pressure systeriisý § 1327 Magnetic direction indicator; § 1329 Automatic pilot systern; 
I 110 FICCU10111L flight insirturient sy. %iejii &. 11S); § 1331 Instruments using a power supplý: § 1335 Flight director systems: § 1337 
Powerplani instruments 
ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT 
-§ 1351 Generalý § 1353 Electrical equipment and installationsý § 1355 
Di%uibution systeiný § 1357 Circuit proiective devicesý § 1360 Piecautions against injuryý § 1361 Master switch arrangement; § 
1 102 Electrical supplies lot cinergencv condiliorisý § 1361 Electrical system tests; § 1365 Electric cables and equipment: § 1367 
S" iti. hes 
EIGHTS 
-§1 191 Instrument lights; § 1383 Landing liylitsý § 1385 Position light system installationý § 1397 Position lightsvstern 
dihedral angles; § 1389 Position light distribution and intensities: § 1391 Mini"'Un, intensities in the horizontal plane ofbow, 
forward. and rear position lights; § 1191 Minimum intensities in any \ertical plane of how, forward, and rear position lights: § 1395 
Maximum inlensilicý in oveilappiny beanis of lor%kard and rear position light; § 1397 Color specificaiionsý § 1401 Anticollision 
light 
, vslern; § 1403 Icing detection lights 
SAFETY EQUIPMENT 
-§ 1411 General; § 1413 Safetv bcllsý § 1414 Electrostatic discharge equipmem § 1415 Ditching 
equipinentý § 14 11) Ice Protection; § 1421 Mepapliones 
MISCELLANEOUS FQUIPMENT 
-§I Public address system; § 1431 Electronic equipmem § 1435 Hydraulic systemsý § 
1437 Accessories for inultiengine airshil 1418 Pressurization and prietunatic systernsý § 1457 Cock-pit voice recorders; § 1459 
Flight recordersý § 1461 E&Iuipnient containing high energy rotorsý 
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Subpart G- Operating Limitations and Information 
GENERAL 
-§ 1501 General 
OPERATING LIMITATIONS 
-§ 150ý Maximum opelating limit spccklý sIýIS I'andinr rcat 
gra\ m and v%eight di,, Lributioný§ 15-11 Powerplant linfiuuionsý § 1522 Au\iIiar\ ), )\\Ct 111111 IIIIIIIation, I \11111111tilli 
crevý: 15-14 Maximum passen2ei-seatn-IL confiftlrafi0n: § 15225 Kinds of opcianon. ýý I ý21(, Niammum tatc, of 
. 
1" L-111 Ind 'I"', ('III. 
§ 15-17 En., ine \ ectorin.,: § 1528 Envelope and ballonet prcssurm § 132") lnýuuclion, Im ownined mmofflinw- 
MARKINGS AND PLACARDS 
-§ 1541 General: 1543 Instiument matknwý: Lencial. ýý I S4, AnNpced Immation mfoi mation, 
1547 Magnetic direction indicator § 1541) Po\\erplant insuwncntsý s 15S 1 ()if quarrim indicatoiý 15.53 Fuel tinarum indt, atoi 
15.55 Control markimvs: § 1557 Nljýcellancotl. s Inarkilms and placalds. § 1559 ()ipciatin" lunitation, placald. k. I S'61 SaICI\ 
equiprnentý § 1563, Airspeed placard 
AIRSHIP FLIGHT MANUAL 
-§ 1581 General: § 1,583 Operating limitations; § 1585 (lietaimy pitkedmc, l ý 1587 Pedonnance infonnation: § 1589 Loading information 
APPENDICES 
Table I DesiLm maneuver condition,,, 
Table 2 Pilot fol L C', 
Table 3 Take-off and landino conditions 
Table 4 Mooring and handlin- conditions 
Table 5 re% oked. ýce § 21 (d) 
Table 6 Maximum pilot forces 
Table 7 Ultimate inertia forces in units of gravity 
Table 8 Noncritical castings 
Table 9 Motion and effect ofcockpit controls 
Table 10 Mininiurn intensities in the horizontal plane position lights 
Table II Minimum intensities in any vertical plane position lighus 
Table 12 Maximum intensities in merlapping beanis 
Table 13 Minimum effective intensities for anticollision lights 
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APPENDIX D: INFLATION AND ASSEMBLY OF U. S. NAVY BLIMPS 
(Tbis list gives some idea of the number of detailed procedures that are involved in the construction and inflation of a pressurised 
airship of any size and is recommended as the basis of such procedures for anyone contemplating an NGVLA of this type. 
Most of the tasks listed here will have to be accomplished at some stage in the inflation process. ) 
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 
Extracted by GC from 
Goodyear Aircraft Corporation K-Type Airships 
- 
Erection Manual (June 1944) 
(NB 
- 
Ihis manual assumes blimp envelopes are tested and inspected by the manufacturerprior to delivery. ) 
Preparation 
" General 
- 
Inspect, weigh and arrange in order all component parts. 
" Space 
- 
Inspect and sweep clean the deck area, check vertical height clearance. 
" Equipment 
- 
Inspect all ladders, cranes, ropes, work platforms, ground sheets, and special tools. 
First Air Inflation 
" Laying out the Envelope 
- 
Remove envelope from its box, spread envelope out while pumping in a little air to prevent fabric 
pressing together, 
" Suspension of Starboard Extemal Catenary Curtain 
- 
Fold starboard side of envelope up with cranes to expose external 
catenary curtain car attachment points on the airship belly. pump in more air to ease access for riggers. 
" Installation of Accessories 
" Pressure Glands 
- 
check all small manometer holes are plugged. 
" Tying Off the Helium and Air-to-Helium Sleeves 
- 
make an sleeves air tight. 
" light Sleeve (Inspection window) 
- 
check rubber plug installed. 
" Gas-tight Links (Internal suspensions) 
- 
riggers enter envelope and work in teams to install gas-tight fittings in the sleeves 
through which the internal suspension cables will pass. 
" Attachment of Strap Cables (Internal suspensions) 
- 
internal suspension straps installed and adjusted to maximum lengths, 
tensioning straps locked-off with wire and metal parts covered in padding. 
" Installation of Gas-tight Fittings for Rip Cords 
- 
Rip lines installed and coiled ready for attachment. 
" Tying off the Sleeve for the Superheat Gas Element 
- 
Instrument entry sleeve tied off. 
Second Air Inflation 
" Laying out the Envelope 
- 
Starboard side lowered and envelope re-positioned, tunnel structure inserted beneath envelope to 
permit air from electric blower to enter via helium valve hole. 
" Laying out the Internal Suspensions 
- 
Increase air fill as the riggers attach internal suspension cables, cables require careful 
adjustment to prevent excessive envelope tensions during the inflation process. 
" Attachment of Rip Cords to Rip Panels 
- 
Rip cords attached to forward and aft rip panels and tied to correct lengths as air fill 
proceeds. 
" Superheat Meter-Gas Element 
- 
Temperature difference indicator suspended in position. 
Preparation for Helium Inflation 
" Removing Air from the Envelope 
- 
Remove tools and equipment, reverse blower and suck out all air, adjust position of 
envelope as it deflates to align top and bottom centrelines and centralise on floor space. 
" Net and Ballast 
- 
Connect helium fill sleeve, spread net over envelope to its marked centre line, lay out net in squares, check 
net lengthways fit with envelope, place 250 sandbags along each side of envelope. 
" Helium Valves 
- 
Fold back net and envelope to reveal valve holes, insert clamp rings, ensure valves are set to open at correct 
pressures, seal the valve clamps. insert the valves, attach temporary valve guards, turn envelope and net back flat again. 
" Control Surfaces 
" Preliminary Preparation 
- 
Prior to inflation inspect the control surfaces, ensure breather holes are open, set surfaces 
upright on padded blocks, secure from being blown over with guy lines. attach movable control surfaces and check 
hinges, bearings, etc. check elevator angle indicator is zeroed, fit counterbalance bungees, attach stay cables and base 
straps, attach control cables and reeve through tunnels etc. attach surge cables, attach handling slings and guide slings. 
" Attaching Surfaces to Envelope prior to Helium Inflation 
" Attachment of Upper Vertical Surface (Top fin) 
- 
Lift top fin with crane and suspend over base patch on envelope, 
adjust slings so forward end is higher than rear, secure chafing pads, lower onto envelope and connect base straps, 
secure surge cables and wrap adjusters to protect envelope, attach temporary brace cables, check all cables have 
sufficient slack for inflation, secure rudder hard over to prevent swinging. 
" Attachment of Horizontal Surfaces (Elevators) 
- 
suspend from cranes and move to position alongside the envelope 
clear of the deck, lift slack of envelope and secure top surge cables, set forward end of elevators 3 feet higher to 
balance propeller duust, wrap adjusters etc., connect base straps on top side only, connect foretaft brace cables 
allowing slack as for top fin. 
The Car (Preliminary Preparation) 
- 
Car should arrive anchored to a cradle, car should be made as complete as possible prior 
to its attachment to envelope. 
Car prepartion checklist tasks include 
" Check clamping bands on damper valves. 
" Install temporary cap on air-to-heliurn air chamber. 
" Install temporary wood panel floor boards to protect permanent surfaces. 
" Secure chafing strips and pads to car frame and any parts that may contact envelope. 
" Fit thimbles to car suspension cables. 
" Attach internal suspension shackles. 
" Check fuel lines and tanks, align hoses for envelope attachments. 
" Inspect seals, springs and hinges of damper and air chamber flap valves. 
" Test and calibrate gauges and instruments. 
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" Inspect control wheels, keys, shunt cables and tensioning devices. 
" Inspect all control cable sheaves and fairleads. replace if necessary. 
" Complete radio and other electrical installations. 
" Inspect pitot and purity tubes for leaks and condensed moisture, fill liquid manometers. 
" Service engines, do not attach propellers, run auxiliaries if desired. 
" Oil and clean the damper valve springs and cables. 
" Check elevator position indicator circuit. 
" Check all other installations such as, door safety bars and catches. car vents, slip tank releases. tank suspensions. 
hand pumps, etc. 
Check the mooring cone in the mast cup for fit and locking of lugs. 
Helium Inflation 
The Handling of Helium 
- 
Count cylinders and record temperatures and pressures, check manifold safety relief valve. 
The Volume of Helium Required 
- 
Estimate desired fill level considering seasonal temperature variations. calculate volume of 
gas required. 
Taking Helium 
" Inflating the Envelope with Helium 
- 
Check communication link between helium supply and hangar, inflate from nose to 
taiL use 6-7 men standing on envelope to control the gas bubble, 4-5 men on each side to adjust die sandbags. maintain 
nose up position. ensure internal suspension cables do not become tight, (this manual details the US Navy method of 
effecting repairs to envelope if fabric is torn by excessive suspension cable tension during inflation), fill until top vertical 
firi touches envelope, use cranes to raise tail firis keeping pace with inflation. adjust fin brace cables as envelope fills, 
keep fabric taut and free from folds, roll up deck cloths as envelope rises and remove to store when envelope leaves the 
ground. 
" Preparation and Attachment of Accessories during Inflation. 
" Insertine the Airline Frames into the Airlines 
- 
insert airframes into the ballonets via manholes and valve sh-eves, tie off 
sleeves. 
" Internal Suspension Sleeves 
- 
Inspect ISS and tie off fore and aft cables temporarily. 
" Inserting the Propeller Guards in the Apertures 
- 
Insert guards and lace in temporarily. 
" Attachment of Temporary Liquid Manometers 
- 
Tie temporary manometers to starboard curtain catenary ring. connect 
rubber tubes to corresponding valves. 
" Installing the Temporary Air Valves 
- 
Install temporary valves in forward and aft ballonet manhole sleeves. remove 
helium inflation tube and tie off inflation sleeve, adjust sandbags o that envelope is on an even keel. set temporary air 
valve pressures to suit seasonal variations. 
" Inflating the Air Ballonet 
- 
Check helium fill is complete and close valves. connect air blower and increase pressure. 
inspect ballonets by removing temporary valves and entering via manhole sleeves, estimate and record amount of air in 
ballonets. 
" Purity Tests 
- 
Test purity of helitun and record in log. 
Rigging the Ship 
41 The Envelope 
" Installation of Propeller Guards 
- 
Set helium to working pressure, lace PGs into apertures permanently. position PG 
covers and lace loosely, decrease envelope pressure, tighten laces, increase to working pressure and seal laces with 
cement. 
" Installation of Pitot Tube bracket 
- 
Lace three bracket legs to envelope, inflate fabric tunnel by blowing air. pull rubber 
tube through tunnel with pre-installed string, bond brackets, seal tunnel against moisture. 
" Installation of Remote indicating compass 
- 
Wire up electrical connections, fit transmitter and seal laces, check proper 
flying trim adjust and calibrate. 
" Installation of Superheat Air Element 
- 
Lace into position. pull wires through tunnel, bond air element after car is 
attached. 
" Suspension of M. A. D. Basket 
- 
Attach with cord suspensions, pull electric wire through tunnel to car. 
" Installation of Helium valve Accessories 
- 
remove temporary guards and install bridges, install valve shields on aft side, 
lubricate and connect control cables, check control cables orientation and function. 
" Attachment of Fiddle Bridge (Major controls) 
- 
lace into position, prepare surge cables for tensioning after major control 
lines have been strung and tensioned, bond electrical connections, allow slack to compensate for envelope stretch. 
" Suspending the Superheat Gas Element 
- 
secure blocking cord and shock absorber, open helium sleeve and hoist SGE 
into position, tie off sleeve and make gas-tight, tuck sleeve inside envelope and secure patch. 
" Attachment of Lower Vertical Fin to Envelope 
- 
Check tension of top and side fin temporary stay cables. align LVF with 
its base straps, attach safety guide ropes, hoist into position against envelope (>6 niený connect and tension temporary 
stay cables to hold fin firmly in place. adjust fin position with base straps and surge cables. 
" Installation of Airline Frames 
- 
Lace into designated shoes inside ballonets, tension bungees at ends of air curtain, allow 
for frame movement at pressure height, attach bonding wire and leave enough slack for later adjustment. 
" Installation of Nose cone and battens 
- 
Prepare battens and cables. move inflation net aft of envelope batten patches, bolt 
temporary stub battens to nose cone. attach piston and universal joint to nose cone, raise nose cone into position with 
crane and lace temporary battens in place, lace cone permanently, attach all battens and lace permanently. attach batten 
cables, cement sealing strip over lacings. 
The Car 
*Positioning 
- 
Disconnect hangar blower sleeves, tie off temporary damper and air valve sleeves, adjust sand bogs until 
envelope is high enough to clear air valve stems above the car, move car into position, place work stage around car. "Bag" 
envelope down and adjust car position to align with suspension sleeves. 
*Attaching the Car to the Envelope 
Attachment of External Suspen"fiaRd tighten all external suspension and surge cables, ensure distance from 
side catenary curtains is equal both sides, check turnbuckle alignments. 
Attachment of Internal Suspempoinsprdssure, bag envelope down so that all internal suspension cables can be 
reached and connected to suspension eyes on car frames, ensure turribuck-les are started In unison in correct 
orientation. 
Attachment of Damper Valve &WSIiieVes 
- 
remove temporary sleeves for damper valves and air valvesý pull 
valves sleeves over valves. tighten and lock clamping bands. 
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Forward and Aft Internal Susocnak)ns& off sleeves in airline for forward and aft internal car suspensions. 
Removal of temporary LiquidWafidi-And adjust manometers in car, disconnect pressure tubes from 
temporary manometers and reconnect to car manometers. 
Removal of Temporary Air valeastei4arary air valves from ballonet manholes sleeves and tie off sleeves, 
connect hangar blower sleeve to air intake duct on car, attach blower sleeve from air intake to LaDel Blower, ensure 
LaDel Blower is not operated when hangar blower sleeve is connected to air intake duct. 
Removal of Net 
" Ballasting 
- 
Add ballast weight to car according to seasonal temperature variations, check envelope still at reduced 
pressure. remove half the sandbags from the net, lower remaining sandbags to floor, increase envelope pressure to 
medium. remove remaining sandbags from the net. increase envelope pressure to fun. 
" Removing the Net 
- 
Ensure airship is in trim, secure fore and aft handling lines to mooring cleats, hoist a rigger in 
bosun's chair to attach three crane lines to net front edge, raise crane lines in unison and roll net back to centre line, 
repeat procedure for tail section, after whole net has been moved to transverse centreline rigger connects slings around 
whole net on each side of centre, three cranes in unison lift net and carry it forward off the airship, net is lowered to floor 
and stored away. 
Car suspensions 
" Weigh off 
" Static Lift 
- 
weigh off to determine static lift, add suspended sandbags to nose to compensate for bow 
mooring unit not yet installed, calculations should include other uninstalled and additional items such as car 
skid. 
" Attachment of Plumb bob Chains 
- 
Ballast car down again, adjust skid to make car floor level, attach plumb 
bob chains to nose and tail on centreline, equalise chain heights by blowing air between ballonets. 
" Differential Pressure 
- 
Read and record differential pressures between gas and each ballonet, pressures should 
be close to equal for internal suspension adjustments. 
" External suspensions 
" Tensioning the Cables 
- 
Adjust external suspensions to equalise distance from catenary ring to car frame on 
both sides, draw catenary curtain taut. ensure seam above catenary curtain is straight. 
" Use of Crank Type Come along 
- 
use crank type "come-along" to draw catenary ring to suspension eye on car 
frame when turnbuckles are taken up, ensure hook of "come-along" does not snag internal suspension sleeves 
where cables are attached. 
" Tensioning the Forward and Aft Surge Cables 
- 
Tension cables to locate car centrally on enveloM ensure air 
and damper valve sleeves are not too tight. safety wire and tape all external suspension turnbuckles, wrap felt 
strips around catenary rings to prevent chafing. tape and lash all thimbles, sew felt strips over suspension 
hook cables on all car frames. 
" Internal suspensions 
" Desired tensions 
- 
Cable tensions will change proportional to car weight, establish theoretical car weight for 
given gas fullness and operational intentions, weigh off airship and determine total car load, determine 
differential pressures of air vs. gas for fore and aft ballonets, consult inflation factor charts and graphs to 
calculate desired cable tensions, interpolate and apply correction factors for abnormal inflations. 
" Tensioning of Internal Suspensions 
- 
adjust turnbuckles to tension IS cables to their desired theoretical 
tensions beginning at fore or aft end of car, retension and adjust as necessary until desired tension is 
established, maintain airship in trim at constant gas pressure throughout the process, remove twists from 
suspension sleeves. 
" Safety-wiring the Turnbuckles 
- 
double lock wire all turnbuckles, tape and tie down felt sleeves over 
tumbuckles, check suspension cable sleeves for leaks, cement covers over the sleeves. 
Final adjustment of Control Surfaces 
" Desired Theoretical tensions 
- 
adjust Fin Brace Cables during inflation, (cable tensions are given in shed test report for 
each airship). 
" Final Adjustment of Horizontal Surfaces 
- 
attach measuring chains of equal lengths to surfaces, connect #1 and #4 
temporary stay cables to suspension points and adjust until fin is close to desired plane, check inclination with chains, 
position base with surge cables and base patches. use "come-alonge' and "hand-take-ups" to adjust stay cables until they 
are correctly loaded and the surfaces are level athwartship, maintain envelope pressure, adjust winches on "hand-take- 
ups" to obtain desired tensions. attach #2 and #3 permanent stay cables to respective finger patches, measure all cables, 
ensure all tumbuckles in "one-half-up" position to permit adjustment, make up permanent cables to replace #I and #4 
temporary cables, attach permanent cables before temporary cables are removed, adjust all stay cables to within tension 
tolerances, tighten surge cables of horizontal fins and secure with knots near finger patches, wrap knotted cables with 
tape, safety wire all turnbuckles and coner key all bolts and pins. 
" Final adjustment of Upper Vertical Surface 
- 
drop plumb line from overhead envelope top centreline just aft of rudder, 
slacken all stay cables, position base forward end of fin with base straps, tighten #1 temporary stay cable slightly, ensure fin is plumb veriical and #4 temporary cable remains slack. adjust aft base straps and check alignment with centreline, 
tighten #4 temporary stay cables to desired tension, tighten #1 temporary stay cable to desired tension, check alignments, 
attach and adjust permanent stay cables as for horizontal surfaces. 
" Final adjustment of lower Vertical Surface 
- 
copy procedure for upper fin except that temporary stay cables cannot be 
made slack due to the weight of the fin, keep stay cable tensions equal on both sides of fin, adjust final tensions in same 
manner as for upper fin. 
Installation of Bow mooring Unit 
" Assembly of bow mooring Disc prior to Installation 
- 
Assemble component parts including, thrust washer. cylinder, 
"spider", housing spacer, pulley cables etc. and ensure cables are correctly reeved through their sheaves and re- 
assembled with turnbuckles in correct orientation. 
" Installation of Bow Mooring Disc (or "spider") 
- 
Lubricate compression spring. insert into spindle (piston), connect 
spider to nose cone by fitting cylinder over the piston, attach safety stay cable, shackle batten cable to pulley cable, 
connect vernier links to batten link connector. connect turnbuckle. tension batten cables and double wire lock all 
turnbuckles, grease all bearing surfaces. 
" Installation of mooring cone 
- 
bolt "flower pot" to the end of cylinder extension. 
" Installation of Yaw lines 
- 
attach yaw lines to the splice ring on cables leading from mooring lugs on bow mooring disc 
as per blueprint. 
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Installation of Accessories Prior to Final Tests and Inspection 
" General 
- 
terminate all electrical connections on wires running from envelope to car in their respective junction boxes, 
ensure adequate slack in each wire, lace running lights onto envelope, cement sealing strips over lacings and make water- 
tight, connect pitot tubes ensuring sufficient slack under car fairing. 
" Attachment of Helium Valve Controls 
- 
connect valve control cables to pilot's instrument panel (the method of 
terminating these Bowden cables is detailed, it includes insertion of grease to prevent moisture penetration and how to 
leave sufficient slack to allow for adjustment as the envelope stretches). 
" Vent loop installation 
- 
check and insert vent loop into aft airline appendix, lash in place, wrap and tape metal pans. 
" Installation of Car Fairing 
- 
Clean and prepare the 8ft long sections, degrease the attachment strips. keep airship in 
constant trim. tie fairing temporarily to check alignments prior to permanent lacings, tension panels to remove wrinkles, 
use different lace stitches according to grommet hole alignments, apply five coats of cement allowing for drying times. 
seal with tape, put patches on all conduits that pass through car fairing to make watertight. paint sealing strips. 
" Outside attachment of Rip Cords 
- 
fit rip lines and secure against fluttering. 
" Attachment of Air-to-Helium Sleeve 
- 
remove temporary caps from duct. attach sleeve to duct with gunimed strip and 
metal clamp band, attach red warning tags to helium sleeves. 
" Final adjustment of Major controls 
- 
After fins have been aligned and during measurement of control cables. establish 
connections through aft end of car, (the method is detailed and includes setting of tensions and adjustments). 
" Removin- Skid from the Car 
- 
Ballast car to allow for weight to skid, disconnect skid suspension cables. weigh off light 
to allow removal of skid, extend landing gear and re ballast, carry out final weigh-off to determine static lift. check and 
record additional or missing items of standard equipment on board during weigh-off. 
" Installation of Bombardier's window 
- 
Fit window. Note 
- 
This window can be installed earlier but may be damaged 
because the opening is often used in gaining access to the car during the rigging process. 
" Installation of the Propellers 
- 
bond Propeller Guards directly to structural frame of car, lubricate all parts and slide 
propellers onto prop shafts, secure, tighten and check. Note 
- 
Manual assumes correct propellers already balanced. 
" Installation of the Drag rope 
- 
Coil drag rope and attach to cable leading from stem mooring lug at aft of car, insert rope 
in box and ensure rope is free to fall when door opens. 
Final Pre-flight Tests and Inspection 
General 
- 
Check all installations and rigging complete, test all parts and assemblies, check for chafing and safe tying. 
Helium and Air Valves 
- 
Pressurize envelope until relief valves open automatically. adjust settings to desired pressures. 
Slip Tanks 
- 
Remove covers and temporary safety devices. 
Fuel Dump Tanks 
- 
Check valve performance, check control cable connections and freedom of movement, inspect all fittings 
and check for leaks. 
Air chamber 
- 
Open dampers and check air chamber for leaks. 
Motors 
" Main engines 
- 
Run motors, check all functions (as per checklist). 
" Auxilliary motors 
- 
Test air blowers and electric generators. 
" Fuel Line 
- 
Check for leaks as fuel is taken on board, check hand pumps, check oil pumps. 
Major controls 
- 
Operate controls and ensure all correct, inspect tensioning devices. 
Airspeed Indicator 
- 
Blow through pitot tube to check indicator. 
Helium Tell-tale Mechanism 
- 
Set control panel lights, allow for valve seepage close to max pressure. 
Elevator Indicator 
- 
Check for neutral and orientation. 
Nfisceflaneous Items to be checked 
- 
List includes: 
" Electrical bonding and lighting circuits. 
" Instruments and Radio. 
" Fire extinguishers. 
" Landing gear 
- 
extend and retract, check tyre and cylinder pressures. 
" Handling line and drag rope releases. 
" Car vents and controls. 
The Shakedown Flight 
" General 
- 
The flight is made for the purpose of further checking the operation of all parts and equipment under actual flying 
conditions. It establishes the operational characteristics of the airship as a whole. Flight should be carried out according to 
instructions of officer in charge. 
" Customary Checks to be made during SF: 
" Operation of major and minor controls. 
" Maximum rate of ascent and descent and auxilliary blowers. 
" Maximum air speed. 
" Fuel consumption against RPM. 
" True airspeed. 
" Radio communication. 
Appendix 
" Special Tools and Equipment 
" List of Emergency spare Parts Idt 
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APPENDIX E: GLOSSARY (SAMPLE PAGES) I 
INCOMPLETE GLOSSARY OF AIRSHIP GROUND HANDLING TERMS 
(as defined by previous authors 
- 
see References and Bibliography) 
Note: English spelling has been used for consistency 
(eg. Center becomes Centre, Manoeuvre replaces Maneuver, Utilised instead of Utilized, etc. ) 
A*A*A*A*A*A*A*A*A*A*A*A*A*A*A*A*A*A*A*A*A*A*A*A*A*A*A*A*A*A*A*A*A*A* 
ACCIDENT 
- 
An occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which takes place between the time any person boards 
the aircraft with the intention of flight and all such persons have disembarked, and in which any person suffers death or 
serious injury, or in which the aircraft receives substantial damage. (NTSB 830.2) (FAA, 200 1) 
ADL4LBATIC HEATING 
- 
When a gas is compressed, its temperature rises, owing to the work done on it. (Ile opposite is true 
when the gas expands. ) With hydrogen the temperature of the gas changes approximately 5*F per 1000 feet of ascent or 
descent, with helium the adiabatic temperature change is somewhat over 7*F per 1000 feet. When landing. adiabatic 
heating of the gas could make the airship lighter than it otherwise might be. (Robinson & Keller, 1982) 
ADIABATIC PROCESS 
-A change in pressure and temperature (and therefore in density) of a substance is said to occur 
adiabatically if no heat enters or leaves the substance during the process. If a volume of air at 1,000 millibars pressure and 
170* C temperature were suddenly expanded so that its pressure fell to 900 millibars, its temperature would fall 
simultaneously to about S(YC. (Sutton, 1962) 
AERODROME 
- 
any area of land or water designed, equipped, set apart or commonly used for affording facilities for the 
landing and departure of aircraft and includes any area or space, whether on the ground, on the roof of a building or 
elsewhere, which is designed, equipped or set apart for affording facilities for the landing and departure of aircraft capable 
of descending or climbing vertically, but shall not include any area the use of which for affording facilities for the landing 
and departure of aircraft has been abandoned and has not been resumed; (CAA CAP 393 Art. 118: Sect 1/95 August 1995) 
AERODROME CONTROL SERVICE see CONTROL SERVICE, AERODROME 
AERODROME FLIGHT INFORMATION UNIT see FLIGHT INFORMATION UNIT, AERODROME 
AERODROME OPERATING MINIMA see OPERATING MINIMA. AERODROME 
AERODYNAMIC 
-A shape that streamlines or generates lift from the movement of air flow around it. (Recks. 1997) 
AERODYNE 
-A vehicle sustained in flight by aerodynamic forces generated by the forward motion of the vehicle through the 
air. Conventional aeroplanes and gliders are aerodynes. (Mowforth, 199 1) 
AEROLDGY 
- 
Old term for study of the weather. Meteorology. 
AERONAUT 
- 
One who operates or travels in a balloon or airship. (Ventry & Kolesnik. 1982) 
AEROPLANE 
- 
1. Aeroplane or airplane; 2. Cody kite (used by Cody); 3. Any aerodynamic liffing surface. (Walker, 197 1) 
AEROSTAT 
-A device supported in the air by displacing more than its own weight of air. (FAA, 2001) 
AEROSTAT 
- 
An aircraft, filled with a gas lighter than air, or hot airý which is supported in flight mainly from the buoyancy 
derived from the surrounding air. Balloons and airships are aerostats. as well as balloonists, who are also called aeronauts. (Kirschner. 1985) 
AEROSTAT 
- 
Any lighter-than-air craft, not necessarily navigable; this includes kite balloons. (Kinsey, 1988) 
AEROSTATIC 
- 
The branch of science dealing with mechanical properties of gases in equilibrium and the equilibrium of 
bodies held up by them, like balloons and other lighter-than-air (LTA) vehicles. Aerostation 
- 
is the science connected with 
LTA vehicles not provided with motive power. It is. by use of the balloon, a logical application of the Archimedes' 
principle. (Kirschner. 1985) 
AEROSTATICS 
- 
Branch of pneumatics dealing with the equilibrium and pressure of air and gaseous fluids, and of solid 
bodies immersed in them. (Ventry & Kolesnilr, 1982) 
AEROSTATION 
- 
The practical use of aircraft receiving lift from gas or hot air. (Kinsey, 1988) 
AIR LOADING see LOADING. AIR 
AIR. AMBIENT 
- 
Air surrounding the outside of a balloon envelope. (FAA. 2001) 
AIRCRAFT 
-A device that is used or intended to be used for flight in the air. (1" 2001) 
AIRCRAFT, PRESSURISED 
- 
means an aircraft provided with means of maintaining in any compartment a pressure greater 
than that of the surrounding atmosphere; (CAA CAP 393 Art. 118: Sect 1/103 August 1995) 
AIRCRAFT7, SMALL 
- 
means any unmanned aircraft, other than a balloon or a kite, weighing not more than 20 kg without its 
fuel but including any articles or equipment installed in or attached to the aircraft at the commencement of its flight; (CAA CAP 393 Art. 118: Sect 1/104 June 1996) 
AIRDOCK 
- 
Name coined by Goodyear for giant hangar built for construction of Akron & Macon. (Ventry & Kolesnik, 1982) 
AIRPORT 
- 
An area of land or water that is used for the landing and takeoff of an aircraft. (FAA. 2001) 
AIRSHIP 
-A power-driven, lighter-than-air aircraft. (CAA, CAP 471,1979) 
AIRSHIP 
-A powered aerostat with dirigibility. (Recks 1977) 
AIRSHIP OR AIR-SHIP 
- 
1. Airship; 2. Any self-propelled aircraf4 airship or aeroplane; aerial vehicle. (Walker, 197 1) 
ALBEDO The fraction of the incoming radiation which is diffusely reflected. Some typical values are: fresh snow, 0.7 to 0.9; fields and woods. 0.02 to 0.15; whole Earth, including clouds, 0.34 to 0.45. (Sutton, 1962) 
ALTIGRAPH 
- 
Old name for BAROGRAPH 
AMBIENT AIR see AIR. AMBIENT 
ANCHORAGE 
- 
Boating 
-a general term that refers to moorings and the bending of cordage (by means of hitches) to various 
attachments; climbing 
-a safe belay point (Budworth, 2004) 
ANCHORING POINT see POINT. ANCHORING 
ANCHORMAST/ ANKERMAST 
-A solid construction of a specified height to which the reinforced nose cone of an airship is 
attached to provide secure all-weather mooring. (Cargo OSG 01) 
ANEMOMETER 
- 
An instrument for measuring wind speed. (Sutton, 1962) 
ANOMALY 
- 
The difference between the value of a meteorological element, such as temperature, at a given time and place and 
its average or climatic value at the same place. (Sutton. 1962) 
ANTICIPATED OPERATING CONDITIONS see CONDITIONS, ANTICIPATED OPERATING 
ANTIFREEZE 
- 
Alcohol was invariably used in airship engine cooling systems. Glycerine was used in water ballast sacks by 
the Germans until shortages required the use of a substitute, calcium chloride, whose damaging corrosive effects on duralumin were not at first realised. American airships used alcohol exclusively in water ballast sacks. (Robinson, 1973) 
IA fuH list can be obtained from the author 
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APPENDIX 
- 
Bottom of gas chamber of a gas balloon. Usually a fabric sleeve through which the balloon is inflated and which 
can be tied shut when balloon is moored. It is released to hang open when balloon takes off (See APPENDIX BRIDLE) 
allowing excess gas to escape as the balloon ascends above its pressure height. See NECK. (Upson & Chandler. 1926) 
APPENDF%7liRII)LE 
-A number of thin cords attached to a ring of patches around the neck of a gas balloon. These hang down 
in a cone to join a single cord or rope which may be tied to the load ring to hold down the bottom of the balloon and 
prevent it from "parachuting" in the wind. The same cord is usually made long enough to serve as die appendix opening 
cord. For this use a break-able thread is tied amund the appendix and around a strand of the bridle cord. It is broken open at 
the start of the flight by a sharp pull on the appendix cord. (Upson & Chandler. 1926) 
APPLICANT 
-A person applying for approval of an Airship or any part thereof. (CAA CAP 471,1979) 
APPROACH TO LANDING see LANDING, APPROACH TO 
APRON 
- 
means the part of an aerodrome provided for the stationing of aircraft for the embarkation and disembarkation of 
passengers, for loading and unloading of cargo and for parking; (CAA CAP 393 Ali. I I$: Sect 1197 August 1995) 
ARAMIDES 
- 
The first commercial marimade (synthetic) fibres doe not met when heated. Their high cost limits them to 
specialized applications. (Budworth. 2004) 
ASSUMED HANDLING INFORMATION see HANDLING INFORMATION, ASSUMED 
ATMOSPHERE 
- 
Ile air which surrounds the Earth. (Kirschner, 1985) 
AVIATION 
- 
The branch of science, business, or technology that deals with any part of the operation of machines that fly 
through the air. (FAA, 2001) 
AXES OF AIRCRAFT 
- 
Three fixed lines of reference, usually centroidal and mutually perpendicular. The longitudinal axis in 
the plane of symmetry, usually parallel to axis of the propeller, is called the longitudinal axis; the axis perpendicular to this 
in the plane of symmetry is called the normal axis; and the third axis perpendicular to the other two is called the lateral axis. 
In mathematical discussions, the first of these axes. drawn from front to rear, is called the X axis. the second, drawn 
upward, the Z axis; and the third, running from right to left. the Y axis. (Burgess, 1927) 
AXIAL CABLE 
-A stranded wire cable running through the gas cells from bow to stem of the ship, and connecting the wire 
bracing of all the main rings at their centres, reducing the loads on the framework if there was an inequality in pressure 
between adjacent cells. (Actually the axial cable was not continuous; each gas cell contained a 10-meter segment which 
was attached to the centre bulkhead wiring of the main rings. ) A Schijtte-Lanz patent. the axial cable (Zentralverspannung) 
was introduced in the Zeppelin L 30. (Robinson, 1973) The Shenandoah was the only U. S. rigid airship so equipped. 
(Robinson & Keller. 1982) 
AXIAL GANGWAY 
- 
In some of the later and larger rigid airships. the axial cable was replaced by an axial gangway. A 
girderwork structure running from end to end of the ship, the axial gangway served the same structural purpose as the axial 
cable, while permitting riggers access to gas valves and gas cells. "Graf Zeppelin" was the first with a gangway through the 
gas cells, though this was below the centre line of the ship. R 100 had an axial girder but this was too small to serve as a 
gangway. "Hindenburg" and "Graf Zeppelin Il" had axial gangways. (Robinson. 1973) 
B*B*B*B*B*B*B*B*B*B*B*B*B*B*B*B*B*B*B*B*B*B*B*B*B*B*B*B*B*B* 
B. E. 2c TYPE 
- 
Body of aeroplane rigged to SUBMARINE SCOUT or "S. S. " blimp (Admiralty, 1917) 
BABIES 
- 
Nickname for small types of British airship (Middleton, 1920) 
BACKING WIND 
- 
Changes direction in a counter-clockwise fashion. A change in the opposite direction is called a VEER 
(Sutton, 1992) 
BACKSTAY 
-A STAY to keep a MAST from leaning (taking) forward. Can be either fixed or running. (Snyder, 1989) 
BAG, THE 
- 
The gas cell of an airship or the envelope of a gas balloon. (US Navy) 
BALANCED RUDDER 
-A control plane hinged more or less centrally to relieve the pilot of the full loads when in action. (Kinsey. 1988) 
BALANCING PLANE 
- 
Aileron-, separate aerodynamic surface for control of roll. (Walker, 197 1) 
BALLAST 
- 
Any substance, usually sand or water, carried in a balloon or airship and intended to be thrown out. if necessary, 
for the purpose of reducing load carried and thus altering acrostatic relations. Water is the only suitable ballast for rigid 
airships. (Burgess, 1927) 
BALLAST 
- 
For upward control of a gas balloon. Usually sand in canvas bags weighing about 30 lbs [ 13.6 kg] (UPSON & 
CHANDLER, 1926) 
BAI LAST 
- 
Expendable mass 
- 
usually water or sand 
- 
discarded by an aerostat to reduce its weight when necessary. 
(Mowforth, 1991) 
BALLAST 
- 
To enable the airship to ascend to higher altitudes, or to compensate for gas loss or increased loads on the ship 
owing to rain or ice, water ballast was carried, distributed along the keel in rubberised bags (Graf Zeppelin) or metal tank-& (1-Undenburg). (Dick & Robinson, 1985) 
BALLAST 
- 
Though the German naval airships briefly carried sand in I 10 lb. sacks early in 1917, water was the usual forni of 
ballast. (Robinson 1973) 
BALLAST 
- 
In American rigid airships water was the invariable form of ballast. (Robinson & Keller, 1982) 
BALLAST 
-A movable, usually expendable counterweight to a lighter-than-air craft's lifting gas. Sand or metal shot Is 
commonly used by gas balloons; water has been the preferred agent in rigid airships. Small sand-filled bags weighing 
twenty-five to thirty-five pounds are commonly used to "weigh off" (or balance by static equilibrium) most pressure 
airships. In an emergency ballast is anything with weight that can be separated from the vehicle. Ballast may be dropped by 
an airship to compensate for lost lifting gas. to counter adverse aerodynan-dc loads or to ascend more quickly than by use of 
propulsion or aerodynamic pressure on the hull or fins. (Topping & Brothers, 2001) 
BALLAST 
- 
Droppable ballast carried, water for rigid airships. and either sand or water for non-rigids and balloons. Dropping 
ballast enables a ship to ascend, or to compensate for gas loss or increased loads. (Ventry & Kolesnik. 1982) 
BALLAST 
-A quantity of weight used to compensate for changes in lift. (Rechs, 1997) 
BALLAST BOARD 
- 
Indicated the amount of water ballast at various locations throughout the ship. (Dick & Robinson 1985) 
BALLAST SACKS 
- 
Most of the ballast was carried along the keel in rubberised fabric sacks holding 2-100 lb. of water. 
Fourteen of these, arranged in pairs, were in the Los Angeles when she was delivered. Toggles in the control car were 
pulled by the elevator man to empty them as necessary with the time being taken with a stopwatch (in ten seconds 400 lb. 
of water would be released). The officer of the watch was responsible for keeping a running record of how much ballast 
had been released, and from which locations. (Robinson + Keller 1982) The big sacks drained completely in 60 seconds. In 
some of the later ships, water ballast was carried in tanks rather than bags. In "11indenburg" each ballast tank contained 
5500 lb. of water. (Robinson, 1973) 
BALLONET 
- 
Compartment of variable volume constructed of fabric 
... ... ... 
**** END OF SAMPLE FROM 54 PAGES **** 
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Appendix F: Comparison of Airship Classes by Length 
Identity No. Name Length ft Length m Type No. in class 
USN-H USN H-1 95 29 Blimp 
RNASSS SS 110 34 Blimp 
RNAS SSZ SS. Zero 143 44 Blimp 
USN-L USN L-type 148 45 Blimp 
ZMC 2 METALCLAD 149 45 Rigid I 
USN-E &F USN E-type 162 49 Blimp 
USN-B USN B-type 163 50 Blimp 
RNAS SST SST 165 50 Blimp 
USN-DN-I USN DN-I 175 53 Blimp 
USN-G USN G-type 192 59 Blimp 
SK 600 Skyship 600 193 59 Blimp 
USN-C &J USN C-type 196 60 Blimp 
_ COASTAL RNAS C-type 196 60 Blimp 
_ USN-D USN D-type 198 60 Blimp 
C-Star C-Star 218 66 Blimp 
TC-13 US ARMY TC-1 3 235 72 Blimp 
NT-07 Zeppelin NT 246 75 Blimp 3 
USN-K USN K-type 251 77 Blimp 
USN ZP2/3K USN ZP2K 256 78 Blimp 
NS North Sea Type 262 80 Blimp 12 
USN ZSG4 USN ZSG-4(ZP4K) 267 81 Blimp 
RS I US ARMY RS 1 285 87 Semi-rigid I 
USN ZS2G USN ZS2G- I (ZP5K) 285 87 
PL6&7 PARSEVAL 6 301 92 Blimp 2 
USN-M USN M-type 302 92 Blimp 
HMA-5 PL20 PARSEVAL20 304 93 Blimp 
HMA-4 PL18 PARSEVAL18 312 95 Blimp 
USN ZPN USN ZPN-I/ZPG-1 325 99 Blimp 
N4 ITALIA 341 104 Blimp I 
USN-ZPG 2 USN ZPG2 /2W 341 104 Blimp 
_ NI NORGE 348 106 Semi-ri *d I 
PL 25 PARSEVAL 25 369 112 Blimp 
M IV (b) GROSS-BASENACH 395 120 Blimp I 
403 feet xxxxxxxxxxxxx 403 123 xxxxxx xxxxx 
ZPG 3W USN ZPG3W 403 123 Blimp 4 
LZ2 ZEPPELIN 413 126 Rigid 3 
M IV (c) GROSS-BASENACH 417 12 7 BliLn2 I 
T34 ROMA 420 . 128 Semi-rigid I 
LZI ZEPPELIN 420 128 1 
LZ120 BODENSEE 426 130 Rigid 2 
SLI SLI 430 131 Rigid I 
LZ4 ZEPPELIN 446 136 Rigid 3 
LZIO SCHWABEN 459 140 Rigid 3 
GZ16* 463 141 Blimp (not built)  n 
LZ7 DEUTSCHLAND 472 144 id 2 
ý 
R 
SL2 SL2 472 144 RI 
j 
LZ 11 VIKTORIA LUISE 485 148 Rigj  id2 
SL3 SL3 500 152 Rigid 3 
No. Ir MAYFLY 512 156 Rigid I 
No. 9r R9 520 158 Rigid I 
LZ 17 SACHSEN 520 158 Rigid 6 
LZ 26 z x1l 528 161 Rigid I 
SL6 SL6 532 162 Rigid 2 
No. 23. r R 23 535 163 Rigid 4 
R 80 R80 535 163 Rigid I 
R27 R 27 (23 X class) 539 164 Rigid 2 
LZ 59 L20 561 170 Rigid 12 
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Identity No. Name Length ft Length m Type No. In class 
LZ 41 L11 561 171 Rigid 22 
SL 10 SL 10 570 174 Rigid 10 
R 31 R 31 615 187 Rigid 2 
R34 R 34 639 195 Rigid I 
R33 G-FAAG 643 196 Rigid I 
LZ 62 L 30 645 197 Rigid 36 
SL 20 SL 20 650 198 Rigid 3 
LZ 126 ZR 3- LOS ANGELES 656 200 Rigid I 
ZR I SHENANDOAH 680 207 Rigid I 
R38 ZR2 690 210 Rigid I 
LZ 112 L70 694 212 Rigid 2 
R36 G-FAAF 695 212 Rigid I 
R 100 G-FAAV 709 216 Rigid I 
R 101(a) G-FAAW 720 219 Rigid I 
LZ 114 L 72 
- 
DIXMUNDE 741 226 E! Lid I 
LZ 113 L71 743 226 Rigid I 
LZ 127 GRAF ZEPPELIN 777 237 Rigid I 
R 101(b) G-FAAW 777 237 Rigid I 
ZRS4 AKRON 784 239 Rigid 2 
LZ 129 HINDENBURG 803 245 Ri%! id 
-2 R 102* 814 248 Rigid (not built) 
* (not built) 
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APPENDIX G: LIST OF GH PATENTS 
British Patent applications relating to Ground Handling 1900 - 1940 NB 
- 
THIS LIST IS NOT EXHAUSTIVE 
and 
ENTRIES ARE IN APPROXIMATE CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF APPLICATION 
GB 123 24 AUG 1908 
Clement, A. Aerial machines with aerostats 
... 
Anchoring; collision buffer fittings 
... 
semi-rigid, keel, gas partitions, baffles with holes, retractable steeling planes, mooring cables, 
GB 157,198 22 AUG 1913 Not accepted 
Basenach, N. Anchoring 
... 
Airships are anchored in direct contact with the groundat a point on the keelframe orfrontgondola below thefrontpan of the 
airship... The elevator of the airship Is set to keep the rear end raised. 
GB 115.260 (6042/17) Ap 28 APR 1917 Gr 29 APR 19 18 
Saunders. Ltd. Porter, S. E.; Goatley, F. Improvements in Landing Runners for Airships and other aircraft 
... 
a pneumatic cushion or bufferfor use on aircraft... comprises an inner inflatable tube contained in a flexible but inextensible 
jacket secured to theframing of the craft andprovided with a shoe. 
GB 128,979 Ap 08 SEP 1917 
Aeronautical Instrument Co., and Brewer, G. A pressure relief device for balloons 
... 
comprises a sleeve in communication with the balloon and normally held in position by elastic cords, and increase ofpressure 
above a predetermined amount causing the sleeve to expand and tear of a ripping patch to a greater or lesser extent by pulling a 
cord. 
GB 130.691 14 MAR 1918 
McKechnie, Sir J. and Vickers, Ltd.; Cars and cabins 
- 
shock of landing, deadening; floats, arrangement of 
... 
One or more pneurruttic buffer bags are secured to the underside of the car by a water-tightfabric covering so as to provide a 
space of considerable volume around the bag to support the car on water. The bag is held in position by cords secured toflaps. 
Rubbing cords are provided on the covering. 
GB 131.072 (6533/18) Ap 17 APR 1918 Gr 21 AUG 1919 
McKechnie, Sir J., and Wallis, B. N. and Vickers Lid, of London 
Improvements in or relating to the Mooring of Ughter-than-air Aircraft 
... 
the aircraft is moored to the mast by means of a ball and socket device the socket member of which comprises a number of 
spherical segments adapted to open and to close upon the ball member when the latter enters the socket, one of the said members 
being carried by the upper end of the mast while the other is securely attached to the nose... A mooring rope passes through or 
alongside of the ball.. 
OB 147.162 20 JUL 1918 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., and Upson, R. The nose of a dirigible or like balloon is strengthened 
... 
to prevent caving-in by means of a metal plate spacedfrorn the envelope and secured by screws to the outer clamping-ring of the 
battens. ne battens are similar to those usually employed but terminate at the periphery of the metal plate instead of meeting at a 
common point. 7hey are clamped between the rings by bolts. 
GB 125.003 (13.227) Ap 14 AUG 1918 Gr 10 APR 1919 
Masterman. E. A. Improvements relating to Mooring Devices for Lighter-than-air Air Craft 
... 
mooring devicesfor lighter-than-air aircraft designed to enable such aircraft to be moored in the open without wind screens or 
other protection against the effect of wind... the aircraft is moored to the upper end of a vertical mast, ropes carried by the mast 
being attached when the craft is moored at points near the nose... syrntnetrically disposed on either side of the vertical longitudinal 
central plane 
GB 142.573 (3535/19) Ap 13 FEB 1919 Gr 13 MAY 1920 
Hasler. Henry Neville of RAF East Fortune, Edinburgh Apparatus for Mooring and/or Handling Airships 
... 
an apparatusfor mooring... doing away with airship sheds at "port" of call, for commercial airships, and also dispensing with a 
large number of men atpresent necessary to take an airship out of its shed 
.. 
consists of a turntable provided with a conical 
projection or a rotating pivot only, said turntable whichfloats in gimbals 
... 
whole being mounted on a triangular platform... 
moved on caterpillars 
GB 166,206 (3981/19) Ap 18 FEB 1919 Gr II JUL 1921 
Watt, William Hutcheon of RAF Airship Station, Pulham. Norfolk 
Method of Maintaining Angle of Trim of an Airship Moored to a Mast 
... 
consists of three or more inverted rails (a number could be laid at various distances to allowfor different sizes of ships) set in the 
ground at various radiifrom the centre of the mast and encircling same. A series of bridles... are madefast to the holding down 
positions on the keel, and set up on tackles to a ball swivel securing ball bearing rollers clipping the rails, andfree to run on them... 
GB 140,197 08 MAR 1919 
Birkbeck, T. E Anchoring 
... 
A dirigible is secured to a mooring arranged directly underneath the envelope andfree to adjust itself under the influence of 
wind pressure on the envelope to a position end-on to the wind. The mooring device... comprises a lattice girder or beam carried by 
twoframes mounted on bogies arranged to run on two circular rails so that the beam occupies a radial position. 
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GB 145,834 (7714/19) Ap 27 MAR 1919 Gr 28 JUN 1920 
Glazebrook-, Sir Richard T and Frazer, R. A. and Simmons, L F. G. of the National Physical Laboratory. Teddington 
Improvements In Mooring for Airships and the like 
... 
to employ three mooring cables of equal lengths connected at one end to a common swivel or connection upon the airship and at 
their other ends to threefixed bollards on the ground at the apices of art equilateral ground base... with air adequate reserve of 
buoyancy 
... 
the point of connection with the airship reinainsfixed and.. disadvantages will be obviated.. one or nurre swivelling 
pulleys.. 
GB 137,235 11 JUN 1919 
James, A. P. A topping-up valve for supplying gas to balloons 
... 
comprises a rigid close-ended tube with side perforations covered by a rubber tube secured at one end. A hose passing through a 
cover is led to the car. After passing the valve, the gas enters the envelope by way of a rigid cone and a collapsible tube, per ad fi rate 
on its lower side, which normally lies-flat upon tire bottom of the envelope. 
GB 146,852 
DE 22 JUN 1919 
Riedinger Ballonfabrik Augsburg Akt. 
-Ges., Captive balloons, cars; - Anchoring and Tow Lines 
... 
77ze anchoring cable and the car of a captive balloon are connected to the envelope through systems of looped cords with 
interposed rollers or similar members so that, for all ordinary attitudes of the balloon. theforces pass approximately through the 
same points on the longitudinal axis of the balloon. The rigging is designed so that, when the balloon is being hauled in and the 
nose consequently dips... 
GB 152,729 & 152,730 10 JUL 1919 
Roots, J. D. Aerial ways and guides 
... 
Grooved wheels secured to an airship fore and qft art each side engage two laterally arranged aerial ropeways, the airship 
running between the ropeways. 77ze wheels are preferably arranged in pairs, with the wheels of each pair staggered and engaging 
one above and the other below the rails... Rudders nWY be provided at each end of the airship to relieve the ropeway of lateral wind 
stresses... 
US 1,351,931 (321,526) Fi 04 SEP 1919 07 SEP 1920 
Ullmann. Emanuel S. of New York City, USA Apparatus for Mooring Airships 
... 
to provide means whereby such an airship, having arrived at a stopping place, may be easily moored to the ground in an 
expeditious and secure manner, and released in order to renew or resume itsjourney 
... 
if an appreciable degree of wind prevails at 
the time, considerable difficulty is experienced in mooring the airship to the ground 
.. 
requiring the services of a great number of 
men... 
GB 162,135 (5658/20) Ap 25 FEB 1920 Gr 28 APR 1921 
Moehl, Steffen of London Improvements in the Construction of Mooring Musts for Airships and the like 
... 
On or near the top of a self-supporting tower of reinforced concrete, steel or other suitable material should befixed oil or 
several circular horizontal rails with centres in axis of tower. Oil these rails a construction forming the head of the mast and 
suitablefor the mooring of the airship should be guided.. it is able to rum freely round the axis of the tower and to withstandforces 
in all directions. 
GB 163,172 09 MAR 1920 
Cave-Browne-Cave. T. R. and Rope, F. M. Anchoring 
... 
In mooring gearfor airships, of the type in which a cone or other coupling, within which afitting at the bow of the airship can be 
locked, is resiliently mounted on a turntable on a mast-head, the cone or other coupling can be angularly adjusted in a vertical 
plane, and means are providedfor indicating the lift exerted by the airship on the mast. 
GB 164,561 (9511/20) Ap 01 APR 1920 Gr 16 JUN 1921 
Ullman, Emanuel Salomon of New York City, USA improvements in or relating to Apparatus for Mooring Aircraft 
... 
to provide means whereby such an airship, having ar7ived at a stopping place, may be easily moored to the ground in an 
expeditious and secure manner, and released in order to renew or resume itsjoumey... there is provided a device for mooring 
aeronautical machines comprising a fixed support having a mooring member pivotally mounted thereon... to which the mooring 
ropes of an airship may be... 
GB 169,938 01 APR 1920 
Ullmann, E. S. Anchoring; Landing places 
... 
Dirigibles are moored by ropes secured to wheeled trollies running beneath circular and radial tracks on the ground so that the 
dirigible can swing round in the wind or be moved radially into hangars. Series ofpIates are secured to concrete blocks in the 
ground so as to leave concentric circular slots and radial slots. Channel members are secured beneath each slot to supportfour. 
wheeled trollies.. 
GB 170.839 28 OCT 1920 
Luftschiffbau Zeppelin Ges., and Merz, L Improvements relating to Nacelles for Lighter-than-air Aircraft 
... 
An engine gondola, which isjust large enough to contain the engine only, may be pulled against the side of or into, the body of 
an airshipfor repairs or when not in use. 77ze gondola is suspendedfrom the body of the airship by cables and may be pulled into 
position by removing a pivot and hauling on a rope by a winch. 
GB 178,568 (2652/21) Ap 20 JAN 1921 Gr 20 APR 1922 
DE 400367: US 1,448,088: FR 539576: IT 235880 : ES 87397 
Scott, G. R Improvements in Mooring hlasts and Mooring Gear for Airships 
... 
wherein a mooringfitting on the bow of the ship is coupled to a resiliently mounted mooringfining on the rnast-head with the aid 
of a mooring cable... an uprising lever carrying the mooring mastfitting at its upper end is mounted on thefixed mast-head with 
facility of a limited listing movement in any direction... under the restraining action of resilient means or of the tension of the 
mooring cable. 
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GB 162.280 (11.797/2 1) Ap 25 APR 1921 Or 25 MAY 1922 
DE 23 APR 1920 
Luftschiffbau Zeppelin GmbH, and Jaray, Paul Improvements relating to Alighting Gear for Lighter-than-air Aircraft 
... 
Shock absorbers. applications of, land wheels 
- 
For use when starting or alighting, and tofacilitate the handling of airships on 
the ground, wheeledfrarnes holding elastic nets are detachably and elastically secured to the gondolas of an airship. 77iefraine has 
two pairs of swivelling wheels and an elastic netfor engaging the undersurface of the car or car-buffer. Theframe is secured to the 
car.. 
GB 179,439 (13,803/21) Ap 17 MAY 1921 Gr II MAY 1922 
DE 400367: US 1,448.089: FR 540016 
Scott. G. H. Improvernents in Masts and Mooring Gear for Airships 
... 
relates to improvements in mooring mast gearfor airships of the type wherein thefitting on the bow of the ship is coupled, with 
the aid of a mast wire of the like, to afining carried at the upper end of an uprising lever mounted on the masthead withfacility of 
limited listing movement in any direction, about a neutral point under the restraining action of resilient means or of the tension of 
the mast wire 
... 
OB 187.036 (19.251/2 1) Ap 16 JUL 1921 Or 16 OCT 1922 
Johns, George William and Johns, Harold Edgar Improved means for Mooring AirsWps on Open Ground 
... 
An airship Is moored at both ends by means of a fixed most and one or more moveable masts working on a concentric track, the 
masts having meansfor raising and lowering the airship to enable passengers and goods to be transferred to andfrom the gondolas 
directly by means of lifts working through thefloors. 
GB 182,792 (18,270/22) Ap 04 JUL 1922 Gr 05 NOV 1923 
DE 08 JUL 1921 
Luftschiffbau Zeppelin GmbH Anchoring Devices for Airships 
... 
A pyramidalframe secured beneath an airship has a ball member adapted to be secured in a socket on the ground or on a 
scaffolding so that the airship can swing in the wind. Theframe also carries a beam which is adapted to rock within limits about a 
pivot and is provided with castor wheels to enable the airship to be moved into and out of its shed. 
GB 183,469 (19,768/22) Ap 19 JUL 1922 Gr II OCT 1923 
DE 20 JUL 1921 
Luftschiffbau Zeppelin GmbH An Anchoring Device for Airships 
... 
Trucks of the kind usedfor moving an airship into or out of its shed are rigidly secured beneath thefront and rearparts of the 
airship, and thefront truck is pivotally secured to a point on the ground, the rear truck. which is loaded sufficiently to prevent it 
from being lifted during wind gusts, running upon an asphalted or cemented track concentric with the anchoring point. 
GB 205,059 03 OCT 1922 
Chenu, A. J. J. The Lifting Gas of an Airship is Purified (1) 
... 
by passing it through a closed circuit containing a purifier which comprises an apparatusfor liquefying any air contained in the 
lifting gas. 77te purifying apparatus may be carried on a motor truck. 7he impurities may be replaced by additional lifting-gas 
which inay consist of Dowson gas after the elimination of the carbon-monoxide. 77te lifting-gas.. is circulatedfrom one gas 
chamber to another.. 
GB 208.5 11 15 DEC 1922 
Chenu, A. J. J. The Lifting Gas of an Airsbip is Purified (2) 
... 
77ze gaspurifying arrangement described in the parent Specification [GB 205,0591 is modified by the provision of reservoirsfor 
the impure and the purified gases respectively, thus enabling the purifying treatment and the movement of the gases to andfrom the 
receptacle to be effected in separate stages by branching the conduits to open into the receptacle at several points... by 
substituting... 
OB 212.882 12 MAR 1923 
Luftschiffbau Zeppelin Ges. Reinforced Nose Cone for Mooring Aerostats 
... 
An airship has a cone-shaped orpyramid-shapedframework at itsfront end to take mooring stresses, the greaterpart of the frame-work being within the streamlined covering. The re-entrant angle between the projecting part of theframe and the covering 
may be rounded off by afillet. 
US 1,478.747 (645.29 1) Fi 14 JUN 1923 25 DEC 1923 
Kinyoun, Floyd H. of Omaha. Nebraska Airplane Starting and Landing Device 
... 
comprising a turn table having an endless belt mounted thereon and guidable in triangularly shaped track-ways. 77ze turn table is 
provided with an electric motorfor driving the endless belt on which the airplane rests; the motor alsoforming means by which the 
rum table can be turned to various positionsfor receiving or launching an airplane. 
GB 222.310 24 SEP 1923 
Uhlendahl. P. Landing places, docks, and launching ways 
... 
An airship landing-place and shelter comprises a chamber capable of receiving the airship, mounted on a stage capable of being lowered into a pit and having sections of rail which, when the stage is raised, join with rails on the adjacent ground toform a 
circular track on which the chamber may be rotated to set it in a suitable directionfor the wind.. side-walls... are adapted tofold down... 
GB 223.746 (27.220/23) Ap 30 OCT 1923 Gr 30 OCT 1924 
Richmond, Vincent Crane and Scott. George Herbert Improvements in or relating to the Ballasting of Airships 
... 
To maintain the trim of an anchored airship automatically during loading and unloading, groups of tanks are connected to a pipe 
which has an open end and Is kept continuously supplied with waterfront the mooring-tower so long as any variation of trim is likely to occur. As the ory1ce rises orfalls the tanks, commencing at the rear group, fill or discharge... 
END OF SAMPLE FROM 10 PAGES 
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APPENDIX H: WHO WAS WHO (DRAFT OUTLINE) 
Knowing Who was NN'ho allows quoted opinions to be evaluated for bias and extent of knowledge at time of writing 
BIOGRAPHIES OF SIGNIFICANT AIRSHIP PERSONNEL 
(NB 
- 
This is a first draft outline of the intended list as provisionally compiled at time of CargoL! fter*s dernise) 
Arnstein, Karl of Goodyear-Zeppelin 
Bolster. Calvin 
- 
inventor of Bolster Beam for docking Akron and Macon 
Booth, Ralph 
- 
Captain of R100 
Brereton, Christopher Francis of Armstrong Whitworth, (Sir W. G. ) & Co Ltd, 
Burgess, C. P. author of Airship Design 
Burney. Sir Denistoun 
- 
Founder of Airship Guarantee Co. and R100 
Campbell 
- 
Designer of R38 
Cave-Browne-Cave, T. R. 
- 
engines of R101 
Coleman 
- 
Director of Airship Development (D. A. D. ) at Royal Airship Works, Cardington 
Collins 
- 
R101 Certification 
Davis, F. W. of Cleveland Bridge & Engineerin- Co., Ltd. 
Dický Harold 
- 
US representative on board LZ 127 
Dresel, Admiral 
- 
of US Navy 
Diiff, Ludwig of Luftschiffbau Zeppelin GmbH 
Eckener, Dr Hugo 
- 
the doyen of large airships 
Forlanini, Enrico 
- 
Italian constructor 
Frazer, R. A. of the National Physical Laboratory, Teddington 
Fritsche, Carl B of Aircraft Development Corp., Detroit 
Fulton, Garland 
- 
of US Navy 
Glazebrook, Sir Richard T of the National Physical Laboratory, Teddington 
Hall-Brown, Archibald of Babcock & Wilcox Ltd 
Hasler, Henry Neville of RAF East Fortune, Edinburgh 
Hehna, Paul of Goodyear-Zeppelin 
Hollick-, F. W. of Babcock & Wilcox Ltd 
Jaray, Paul of Luftschiffbau Zeppelin GmbH 
Johnston, Ernest 
- 
navigator of R100 and RIOI 
Jones, Edwin Walter of Babcock & Wilcox LAd 
Kenworthy 
- 
of US Navy 
Krell, 0. 
- 
designer of Berlin revolving shed 
Lehmann, Ernst 
- 
Graf Zeppelin Captain 
Lillienthal, Otto 
- 
pioneer of flight 
Loeser, Oscar Jnr of United States Navy 
Maitland 
- 
British innovator 
Masterman. E. A- 
- 
designer of early mooring mast 
McKechnie, Sir J. of Vickers, I. Ad. 
Meager, George 
- 
Officer of R100 
Merz, L of Luftschiffbau Zeppelin Ges., 
Moffett 
- 
US navy Admiral responsible for Akron and Macon 
Neon 
- 
Anonymous critic of rigid airships 
Nobile, Umberto 
- 
doyen of Italian scmi-rigids 
Norway, Neville Shute 
- 
author and member of R100 design team 
Pratt. H. B. 
-R 100 design team 
Richrnond4 Vincent Crane of Royal Airship Works, Cardington 
Riedinger Ballonfabrik Augsburg Akt. 
-Ges., 
Rope, Michael of Royal Airship Works, Cardington 
Rosendahl, Admiral Charles Emery 
- 
US Navy Commander of Lak-ehurst NAS 
Roxbee Cox, Harold (later Lord Kings Norton) of Royal Airship Works, Cardington. 
Schnitzer, Beno of LAiftschiffbau Zeppelin GmbH 
Scott, George Herbert of Royal Airship Works, Cardington 
Settle, Tex 
- 
US Navy 
Simmons, L F. G. of the National Physical Laboratory, Teddington 
Southwell, Professor 
Spanner 
- 
author and Critic of Rigid airships 
Strasser, Peter 
- 
Commander of German Navy First War Zeppelin Fleet 
Thaden, Herbert V. of Aircraft Development Corp.. Detroit 
Thompson, Lord Christopher Bird 
- 
Minister of Aviation who died on R101 
Upson, R. of Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 
- 
designer of ZMC2 Metalclad 
Usbourne, Neville 
- 
British pioneer airshipman 
Ventry, Lord 
- 
editor of Airship magazine 
Wallis, Barnes Nevil 
- 
British National Icon, designer of R 100 and R80 
Watson, Wilbur J. of GoDdyear-Zeppelin 
Watt, William Hutcheon of RAF Airship Station, Pulliam, Norfolk 
White, Alfred Ernest pp. Aircraft Development Corporation of DetroiL Michigan. USA. 
Williams, T. B. 
- 
author of Airship pilot No 28 
Zeppelin, Graf Ferdinand von 
- 
inventor of rigid airships 
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APPENDIX 1: CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF EVENTS (SAMPLE PAGES) 
(INCLUDING FIRST AND LAST FLIGHTS) 
" SECTION 1- EUROPEAN AIRSHIPS (pages 1- 7) 
" SECTION 2- BRITISH AIRSHIPS (pages 7.11) 
" SECTION 3- AMERICAN AIRSHIPS (pages 11 . 14) 
Section 1- EUROPEAN AIRSHIPS 
1776 Joseph Priestley's Experiments on Different Kinds ofAir published France 
1782 First experimental hot air balloons flown 
- 
Joseph Montgolfier Annonay. France 
1783 05 Jun. First public demonstration of unmanned hot air balloon 
- 
Montgolfier Bros. Annonay, France 
27 Aug. First public demonstration of unmanned hydrogen-gas balloon 
- 
Prof. Charles Paris France 
23 Sep. First tethered passenger ides in a captive hot air balloon 
- 
Joseph Montgolfier Paris France 
21 Nov. First human free-flight (hot air) 
- 
Pilatre de Rozier & Marquis dArlandes Paris France 
21 Nov. First pursuit of hot air "Montgolfiere" balloon on horseback 
- 
Duc de Chartres Paris France 
01 Dec. First human free-flight in hydrogen gas filled 'rharliere'- Prof. Charles Paris France 
03 Dec. Design for a ballonet to control airship pressure published 
- 
Lt. J. Meusnier Paris France 
1784 Design for fully formed airship driven by co-axial propellers 
- 
IA. J. Meusnier Paris France 
10 Jan. Ascent of first giant balloon, Le Flesselle 
- 
Montgolfier Bros. France 
22 Feb. First unmanned balloon to cross the English Channel (Sandwich to Warneton) England/France 
25 Feb First human free-flight in a "Montgolfiere" in Italy 
- 
Paolo Andreani Milan Italy 
(9 Jun. First free-flight by a woman in a "Montgolfiere'- Madame Thible Lyons France 
15 Jul. First ascent of cylindrical "airship" balloon with ballonets 
- 
Duc de Chartres Paris France 
19 Sep. First 150 mile flight in cylindrical "dirigible" 
- 
Robert Bros. & Colin Hullin Paris/Bethune France 
1785 07 Jan. First human flight across the English Channel 
- 
J-P. Blanchard & Dr Jeffries Dover/Calais 
15 Jun. First flight of hybrid "Montgolftere/Charliere' 
- 
de Rozier & Romain Boulogne France 
1786 18 Jun. First night-time flight in a balloon 
- 
Tetsu Brissy France 
1789 First plans for "fish-shaped" dirigible or navigable balloon 
- 
Baron Scott Paris France 
1791 18 Sep. First balloon display at a state occasion 
- 
Proclamation of new Constitution Paris France 
1794 26 Jun. First military use of a gas balloon L'Entreprenant 
- 
J-M-J. CoutelleBattle of Fleurus France 
1797 22 Oct. First successful parachute descent from a balloon 
- 
Andre-Jaques Gamerin Paris France 
1798 21 Oct. First free-flight on horseback under a cylindrical balloon 
- 
Tetsu Brissy Vffsailles France 
1812 First design for rigid keel to stiffen pressure airship 
- 
Leppich/Russian Govt. Germany/Russia 
1820 Muminiumt isolated as a rare metal 
1831 Proposal for metal hull vacuum balloon 
- 
Marey Monge 
1834 Regular passenger transport flights proposed London/Paris 
- 
Comte de Lennox Paris France 
1835 Eagle airship propelled by oars goes on public exhibition 
- 
Comte de Lennox London England 
1836 07 Nov. First long-distance intemational flight (480 nriles/772 Kin) 
- 
Monck-Mason et al. London/Nassau 
1843 Rigid spherical balloon of copper sheet built but not flown 
- 
J-F. Dupuis-Delcourt France 
1948-1849 Demonstration of dropping 'aerial torpedos' from balloons 
- 
Henry Coxwell Berlin Gennany 
1949 Jun. First aerial bombardment 
- 
Austrian Armed Forces Venice Italy 
1850 Streamlined model clockwork airship demonstrated flies indoors 
- 
Pien-e Jullien Paris France 
Man-powffed"locomotive balloon" with propellers tested 
- 
Bell London England 
1851 Proposal for large cylindrical rigid airship built of iron 
- 
Prosper Meller Bordeaux France 
1852 24 Sep. First flight of mechanically powered (steam-engine) airship 
- 
Henri Giffard Paris France 
1863 19 Aug. Graf Ferdinand Zeppelin'sfirst ascent in a captive balloon St Paul MN USA 
1870 23 Sep. First Air Mail delivered by balloon escaping from Siege of Paris 
- 
J. Duruof Paris France 
1872 02 Feb. First flight of airship with 8 men working hand-crýanked propeller 
- 
Dupuy de Lome France 
13 Dec. Trial ascent of Lenoir gas-engined balloon with tractor propeller 
- 
P. Haenlein Brunn Moravia 
1873 Patent for rigid airship with separate gas cells 
- 
Spiess Paris France 
1877 Proposal for vertical-axis airscrews to control airship climb/descent 
- 
Graf Zeppelin Gennany 
1881 08 Oct Trials of first electrically powered dirigible balloon 
- 
Tassandier Bros. Auteil France 
1894 09 Aug. First aerial circuit by electric-powered airship L4 France 
- 
Renard & Krebs Chalais-Meudon France 
1885 Metal covered rigid airship with variable volume proposed 
- 
Konstantin Ziolkovski Russia 
1886 Patent for steel rigid airship 
- 
Boyman 
Aluminium becomes commercially available 
1888 12 Aug. First flight by petrol-engined aircraft 
- 
Woelfert & Daimler Seelberg to Komwesthein Germany 
1891-1899 Concept of large rigid airship begins: men, money and materials sought 
- 
Graf Zeppelin Germany 
1892 Casein wood-glue cement (Kaltleim) invented and patented 
- 
Switzerland 
Metal-covered airship proposal published aftff wind-tunnel tests on model 
- 
KE. Ziolkovski Russia 
23 Aug. Contract signed for supply of first all-metal ahirninium airship 
- 
David Schwarz Vienna Austria 
1893 Swiss Military Ballooning begins (Hildebrandt. 1992) Switzerland 
1895 31 Aug. Patent application for multi-cell large rigid airship 
- 
Graf Zeppelin Gennany 
1896 First successful elongated Drachen kite-balloon- von Parseval & von Sigsfield Berlin Gennany 
1898 20 Sep. First successful flight of small pressurised airship No. 1- Alberto Santos Dumont Paris France 
1899 17 Jun. Construction of first multi-cell rigid airship UZI) begins 
- 
Graf Zeppelin Manzell Germany 
1900 First use of oxygen on balloon ascent to 35.500 ft 
- 
Berson & Soring Germany 
01 Jul. Inflation of LZI completed in 12 hours 
- 
Maj. Sperling Manzell Germany 
02 Jul. First trial flight of first rigid Zeppelin 121 on Lake Constance 
- 
Graf Zeppelin Manzell Germany 
15 Nov. Fourth and last trial flight of LZI 
- 
Graf Zeppelin Manzell Germany 
1901 30 Apr. First rigid airship LZI broken for scrap Manzell Germany 
1902 Stratosphere discovered by using sounding balloons 
- 
Teisserenc de Bort France 
19 Oct. Deutsch Prize for flying round Eiffel tower won by airship No. 6 
- 
Santos Dumont Paris France 
13 Nov. First Right of practical semi-rigid pressure airship Le Jaune 
- 
Lebaudy Bros. Moisson France 
END OF EUROPEAN SAMPLE OF 7 PAGES 
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Section 2- BRITISH AIRSHIPS 
1766 Hydrogen gas discovered by Henry Cavendish England 
1776 Joseph Priestley's Experiments on Different Kinds ofAir published France 
1783 04 Nov. First unmanned gas balloon flight 
- 
Count Zambeccari Cheapside, London/Walthain Abbey 
25 Nov. First public demonstration of gas balloon 
- 
Count Zambeccari Moorfields, London/ Petworth 
1784 17 Aug. First human free-flight in a "MontgOlftere" in Great Britain 
- 
James Tytler Edinburgh Scotland 
15 Sep. First human free-flight in a "Charliere" in England 
- 
Vincenzo Lunardi London England 
12 Nov. First flight in a "Charliere" by an Englishman 
- 
James Sadler Oxford England 
1794 cont. 30 Nov. First scientific observations from free-flying balloon - Blanchard & Dr Jeffries London England 
1785 07 Jan. 
29 Jun. 
1802 21 Sep. 
1803 
1810 
1811 07 Oct 
1816-1817 
1817 
22 Jul. 
1821 19 JuL 
1828 
1834 
1835 
1836 07 Nov. 
1848-1849 
1862 05 Sep. 
1866 
1868 
1878 
1879 
1883 
1884 
1891 
1895 
1900 
1901 
1902 22 Sep. 
1904 05 Sep. 
1905 
22 JuL 
30 Sep. 
1906 
1907 
10 Sep. 
05 Oct. 
1908 
JuL 
Sep. 
1909 
26 Nov. 
1910 
26 May 
06 Aug. 
07 Aug. 
16 Oct 
26 Oct. 
29 Oct 
04 Nov. 
28 Dec. 
1911 
22 May. 
24 May 
1912 
12 Feb. 
Jun. 
18 Jul. 
1913 
12 Jun. 
19 Jun. 
First human flight across the English Channel 
- 
J-P. Blanchard &, Dr Jeffries 
First ascent of an "English female aerial travellee'- Mrs Sage 
First parachute descent from a balloon in England 
- 
Andre-Jaques Garnerin 
"Treatise on the use of balloons in Military Operations" published 
- 
Maj. Money 
Proposal for fish-shaped balloon 
- 
Sir George Cayley 
Flight speed of 112 miles (180 Km) in one hour recorded 
- 
James Sadler 
First serious attempt to construct a dirigible balloon 
- 
John Pauly & Durs Egg 
Proposal for airship with separate gas-cells 
- 
Sir George Cayley 
First aerial crossing of the Irish Sea 
- 
Windham Sadler 
First balloon flight using coal gas 
- 
Charles Green 
Trail rope intrWuced to assist gas balloon landings 
- 
Charles Green 
Regular passenger transport flights proposed London/Paris - Comte de Lennox 
Eagle airship propelled by oars goes on public exhibition - Comte de Lennox 
First long-distance international flight (480 niiles/772 Km) 
- 
Monck--Mason et al. 
Demonstration of dropping *aerial torpedos' from balloons - Henry Coxwell 
Record altitude balloon ascent to 30,000 feet (9144 m) 
- 
Coxwell & Glaisher 
The (Royal) Aeronautical Society of Great Britain founded 
First aeronautical exhibition in England at Crystal Palace 
Helium first detected in light from the sun 
- 
Sir Norman Lockyer 
South Africa Boer war observation balloons 
First British military aircraft (gas balloon Pioneer) built 
War Ministry Balloon School founded 
- 
Col. Templer 
First military gas balloon made of goldbeater*s skin (Heron) 
- 
Capt. Templer 
First portable gas cylinders for compressed hydrogen introduced 
- 
Capt. Templer 
Balloon School moved to new premises 
Helium gas discovered on Earth 
- 
Sir William Ramsay 
(Royal) Aero Club of the United Kingdom founded 
- 
C. Rolls & Hedges-Butler 
First flight by powered airship in Britain Crystal Palace/Eastcote, 
- 
Stanley Spencer 
First flight of Willows No. I blimp (with swivelling propellers) 
- 
F. T. Willows 
Modified Willows No. 1a blimp makes many flights - F. T. Willows 
First and only flight of 77ze Barton blimp 
- 
Dr F. A. Barton 
Willows No. I blimp flies for 2 hours 
Modified Willows No. 1a blimp makes more flights - F. T. Willows (circa) F-T. WiRows Patent for swivelling propellers 
First flight of goldheater's skm pressure airship Nulli Secundus- Col. Templer 
Nulli Secundus cross-country flight and forced landing 
- 
Col. Capper & S. Cody 
Construction of small experimental Army blimp Baby 
- 
Col. Capper 
First flight of Nulli Secundus if 
- 
Col. Capper & S. Cody 
Nulli Secundus II dismantled 
Baby blimp enlarged and modified and renamed Beta I- Col. Capper 
First flight of Willows No. 2 blimp 
- 
E. T. WiUows 
First flight of Army blimp Gamma 
First flight of Beta I (ex-Baby) blimp 
- 
Col. Capper 
Willows No. 2 blimp starts cross-country overnight flight 
- 
E. T. Willows 
Dover/Calais 
London 
London England 
England 
Binningham England 
London England 
England 
England/Ireland 
London England 
England 
Paris France 
London England 
London/Nassau 
Berlin Gerniany 
England 
London England 
London England 
England 
England 
Chatharn 
Chatham England 
Woolwich England 
Aldershot 
England 
London England 
London England 
Cardiff 
Cardiff 
London England 
Cardiff 
Cardiff 
London England 
Famborough 
London England 
Farnborough 
Farnborough England 
Farnborough England 
Farnborough England 
Cardiff 
Famborough England 
Cardiff 
Willows No. 2 blimp completes 10 hour overnight flight 
- 
E. T. Willows Cardiff/LA)ndon 
Clement-Bayard 11 (Dail Mail) blimp : I' cross-charmel airship flight France/London England 
77ze Lebaudy (Morning Post) blimp cross-channel delivery flight France/Famborough England 
First flight of renamed Willows No. 2 blimp City of Cardiff- E. T. Willows London England 
City of Cardiff (Willows 2) blimp crosses English Channel - Willows & F. Gooden England/France 
City of Cardiff (Willows 2) blimp arrives in Paris after delays for repair and weather Paris France 
Clement-Bayard 11 enters service with British Army London 
Vickers No 1. Mayfly rolled-out for mooring trials in Cavendish Dock Barrow-in-Furness England 
Mayfly completes first mooring out trials on floating mast - Vickers Barrow-in-Furness England 
British order Astra-Torres from France London England 
British purchase Parseval (P. 18) from Germany London England 
Willows No. 4 blimp constructed with swivelling propellers 
- 
F. T. Willows Birmingham England 
First flight of Aircraft Factory Delta blimp 
- 
Col. Capper Farnborough England 
First flight of Aircraft Factory Gamma I blimp 
- 
Col. Capper Farnborough England 
Gamma I blimp modified to become Gamma 11 blimp 
- 
Col. Capper Farnborough England 
Admiralty purchase Willows No. 4 blimp: renamed HMA No. 2 Birmingham England 
Parseval (P. 18) (HMA No. 4) delivered Farnborough England 
RBF Beta I (ex-Baby) blimp rebuilt to become Beta 11 
- 
Col. Capper Farnborough England 
First flight of Astra-Torres (HMA No. 3) blimp 
- 
Col. Capper et. al. Famborough England 
Admiralty places order for rigid airship Vickers No. 9r London England 
*** END OF BRrrISH SAMPLE FROM 5 PAGES *** 
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Section 3- AMERICAN AIRSHIPS 
1793 09 Jan. First human free-flight in gas balloon in USA 
- 
J-P. Blanchard Philadelphia 
1834 First human-carrying gas balloon to be built of goldbeaters' skin 
- 
Louis Lauriat USA 
1839 27 Apr. First use of a Ripping Panel to rapidly deflate a balloon 
- 
John Wise USA 
1861 First successful portable hydrogen generator developed 
- 
Thaddeus Lowe USA 
First successful aerial reconnaissance from captive balloon 
- 
La Mountain Fortress Monroe USA 
IS Jun. First electric telegraph message transmitted from captive balloon 
- 
T. Lowe Columbia Arnioury USA 
03 Aug. First captive ascent of observation balloon from a ship Fanny 
- 
La Mountain James River USA 
1863 19 Aug. Graf Ferdinand Zeppelin's first ascent in a captive balloon St Paul Minnesota USA 
1868 First American airship Avitor built 
- 
F. Marriott California 
1903 12 Dec. First powered, sustained and controlled flight by aeroplane 
- 
Wright Bros. Kitty Hawk USA 
1904 First flight of blimp California Arrow 
- 
Prof. Baldwin Los Angeles CA. 
1905 First flight of blimp City of Poriland 
- 
Prof. Baldwin Los Angeles 
1908 First flight of US Army blimp Signal Corps I- Baldwin ?? 
1910 15 Oct. Stan of Transatlantic attempt by serni-rigid America 
- 
Walter Wellman Atlantic City NJ. 
1911 Second Tansatlantic blimp Akron built by Goodyear 
- 
Mevin Vaniman Akron OH. 
1917 Spring Construction of first USNavy blimp DN-1 in floating hangar Pensacola FL. USA 
20 Apr. First flight of USNavy DN-1 blimp (A-]) 
- 
Hans Otto Stagel Pensacola USA 
29 Apr. Last flight of VSNavy blimp DN-1. damaged by inexperienced handling party Pensacola USA 
24 May First flight of USN blimp B-1 (A-235) 
- 
Upson & Kraft White City, Chicago USA 
29 May USN blimp R-1 (A 
-235) distance record flight - Upson & Kraft Chicago/Akron Ohio USA 
1918 22 Jan. USN blimp B-2 (A-236) delivered to Navy Key West USA 
27 Apr. VSNaiy blimp AT-] completes 25+ hour convoy escort mission Paimboeuf France 
30 Sep. First flight of USN blimp C-1 (A 4118) 
- 
Smith & Han-den Win. 
-foot Lake USA 
Oct. First flight of training airship USN blimp E-1 (A4109) Wingfoot Lake USA 
12 Dec. USN blimp C-1 (A4118) carries and launches Army airplane Fort Tilden USA 
26 Dec. USNavy blimp B-2 (A-236) completes record duration patrol (40+hours) Key West USA 
1919 11 Feb. USN blimp B-15 (A-249) completes 2 week trial dropping torpedoes Pensacola USA 
14 May USN blimp C-5 (A4126) begins Atlantic Ocean crossing attempt Montauk USA 
15 May USN blimp C-5 completes 1.177 mile V leg of Ocean crossing St John's Newfoundland 
16 Sep. First flight of USNavy semi-rigid 0-1 ("Wop Ship") purchased from Italy Cape May USA 
1920 03 Jun. NS-7 blimp training American crews for rigid R38 (ZR-2) Howden England 
07 Jun. SSE-3 blimp training flight American crews for rigid R38 (ZR-2) Howden England 
08 Jun. NS-7 blimp training American crews for rigid R38 (ZR-2) Howden England 
06 Jul. Beardmore R34 completes outward transatlantic flight 
- 
G. H. Scott New York USA 
07 Jul. Beardmore R34 moored on 3-wire system for three days Long Island, New York USA 
10 Jul. Beardmore R34 starts return transatlantic flight 
- 
G. H. Scott New York USA 
13 Jul. First flight of USN blimp D-1 (A4450) Wingfoot Lake USA 
20 Jun. SSE-3 blimp training flight American crews for rigid R38 (ZR-2) Howden England 
28 Sep. First flight of US Army C-1 blimp Fort Bliss, TX USA 
1921 Apr. First flight of USN blimp H-1 (Towing airship) Wingfoot Lake USA 
09 Jul. Rebuilt VSNaiy semi-rigid 0-1 completes 4 days of a/a target glider drop trials Cape May USA 
05 Dec. First flight of a helium filled airship USN blimp C-7 (A-4127) Hampton Roads USA 
1922 24 Jun. Contract signed to build LZ126 (ZR-3) Los Angeles USA/Germany 
13 Aug. Helium inflation of US Navy ZR-1 (Shenandoah) begins (13,000 cylinders) Lakehurst NJ. USA 
16 Aug, Helium inflation of US Navy ZR-1 (Shenandoah) completed Lakehurst NJ. USA 
31 Aug. First flight of USN blimp J-I(A-6111) Wingfoot Lake USA 
04 Sep. First flight of helium rigid US Navy ZR-1 (Shenandoah) 
- 
Anton Heinen Lakehurst NJ. USA 
14 Sep, US Army C-2 blimp starts transcontinental flight Langley Field USA 
23 Sep. US A nny C-2 blimp completes transcontinental flight Ross Field. CA USA 
10 Oct. US Army C-2 blimp starts return transcontinental flight Ross Field, CA USA 
1923 Aug. USArmy blimp 11-type (A-1211011-1) hydrogen replaced by helium Wright Field OH. USA 
18 Sep. Rebuilt USArmy blimp D-3 (A-4453) nitplanettrapeze hook-on trials Langley Field USA 
1924 07 Oct US Navy ZR-1 (Shenandoah) begins 20 day transcontinental trip Lakehurst NJ. USA 
09 Oct. US Navy ZR-1 (Shenandoah) begins 2d leg of transcontinental flight Fort Worth TX USA 
10 Oct. US Niny ZR-l (Shenandoah) reaches Pacific coast: moored to portable mast San Diego CA- USA 
12 Oct. Start of first transatlantic flight by LZ126 Los Angeles 
- 
Hugo Eckener Friedrichshafen Germany 
15 Oct. Arrival of LZ126 after 81 
-hour trans-atlantic flight - Hugo Eckener Lakehurst NJ. USA 
15 OCL LZ126 Los Angeles walked into hangar LAk-ehurst NJ. USA 
18 OcL Hydrogen from LZ126 Los Angeles vented to atmosphere Lakehurst NJ. USA 
25 Oct. US Navy ZR-1 (Shenandoah) completes transcontinental round trip Lakehurst NJ. USA 
25 Nov. LZ126 formally christened USS Los Angeles after valving gas to land 'light' Washington DC. USA 
15 Dec. First aircraft hook--on to an airship: US Army blimp TC-3- IA. C. V. Finter USA 
1925 First flight of Goodyear blimp Pilgrim Akron 
1926 Design begins of ZMC-2 "Metalclad" aluminium alloy airship 
- 
R. H. Upson Detroit, ML USA 
08 Jan. First flight of US Army send-rigid RS-1 
1927 11 Jun. LZ126 (ZR-3) Los Angeles begins airplane hook-on experiments Lakehurst NJ. USA 
1928 06 Oct. US Navy/Goodyear sign contract for ZRS-4 & ZRS-5 Washington USA 
15 Oct. 65.000 spectators camp out overnight to see arrival of L212 7 Graf Zeppelin Lakehurst NJ. USA 
20 Oct. 20.000 visitors per day to see LZ127 Graf Zeppelin in hangar Lakehurst NJ. USA 
29 Oct. LZ127 Graf Zeppelin undocked for return passenger flight to Germany Lak-ehurst NJ. USA 
1929 LZ127 Graf Zeppelin flies around the world Germany/USA 
03 Jul. Serious aircraft/airship hook-on trials begin LZ126 (ZR-3) 
- 
Lt A. W. Gorton USA 
28 Aug. =26 (ZR-3) Los Angeles first public demonstration of airplane hook-on Cleveland OH. USA 
19 Aug. First flight of ZMC-2 "Metalclad" aluminium alloy airship 
- 
R. H. Upson Detroit, ML USA 
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" SECTION 1 
-EUROPEAN ACCIDENTS (pages 1-3) 
" SECTION 2- BRITISH ACCEDENTS (pages 3- 5) 
" SECTION 3- AMERICAN ACCIDENTS (pages 5- 9) 
Section 1- EUROPEAN ACCIDENTS AND GH INCIDENTS 
1784 11 Jul. 
1785 15 Jun. 
1819 07 Jul. 
1863 19 Oct 
1893 
1897 12 Jun. 
11 Jul. 
03 Nov. 
1900 
1902 12 May. 
13 Oct 
1905 30 Nov. 
1906 17 Jan. 
1907 
01 Dec. 
1908 01 JuL 
05 Aug. 
25 Aug. 
Nov. 
1909 16 Mar. 
07 Apr. 
30 May 
31 May 
01 Jul. 
03 Aug. 
30 Aug. 
1910-1914 
1910 01 Feb. 
25 Apr. 
13 Jun. 
28 Jun. 
08 Sep. 
14 Sep. 
1911 ?? 
1912 
1913 
1914 
1915 
14 Apr, 
16 May. 
16 Jun. 
Sep. 
28 Jun. 
19 Mar. 
03 Apr. 
12 Jul. 
17 Jul. 
09 Sep. 
17 Oct 
09 Apr. 
13 Jun. 
20 Jun. 
06 Aug. 
23 Aug. 
28 Aug. 
08 Oct. 
17 Feb. 
17 Feb. 
05 Mar. 
21 Mar. 
13 Apr. 
17 May 
20 May 
21 May 
07 Jun. 
07 Jun. 
06 Aug. 
IOAug. 
03 Sep. 
18 Nov. 
19 Nov. 
First riot by angry crowd at failed ascent 
- 
Marquis d'Arlandes & Abbe Miolan France 
First humans killed in balloon accident 
- 
Pilatre de Rozier & Jules Romain Boulogne France 
Fatal accident during firework display from gas balloon 
- 
Madame Blanchard Paris France 
Crash of the Geant balloon France 
Schwar, 
- 
I aluminiurn airship irreparably damaged during inflation 
- 
D. Schwar-z Volkhov Russia 
First airship fatalities after petrol engine ignites hydrogen 
- 
Woelfert & KnabeBerlin Germany 
First unsuccessful attempt to reach North pole by Balloon 
- 
Andree Danes Island Norway 
Schwar, 
- 
2 aIl-metal rigid airship destroyed by landing impact after first ascent Berlin Germany 
First floating hangar Pendelhalle breaks from its moorings and strands on shore Manzell Germany 
Pressure a; 
lip Pax bursts in mid-air and kills two pilots 
- 
Severo & Sachet Paris France 
Two more killed after control car falls from pressure airship 
- 
de Bradsky & Morin Paris France 
Rigid airship L22 damaged during "rollout" from floating shed 
- 
Graf Zeppelin Manzell Germany 
LZ2: destroyed by storm after landing on lake shore 
- 
Graf Zeppelin Bodensee Gemiany 
LZ3 survives undarnaged when Reichshalle sinks after storm damage Manzell Germany 
Lebaudy La Patiie torn from groundcrew by storm and blown out to sea Verdun France 
GrosslBasenach MI non-rivid forced landing and deflated in forest Berlin Germany 
LZ4 wrecked by storm after successful emergency landing 
- 
Graf Zeppelin Echterdingen Germany 
Lebaudy Republique wrecked after propeller cuts gasccll, 4 on board killed France 
GrosslBasenach MI forced landing on water at night in Ostsee and deflated Wollin Germany 
Tail damaged in first rigid on-land landing L. Z3a (Army Z-1) 
- 
Graf Zeppelin Fhafen Germany 
Blimp da Schio Italia I damaged beyond repair in accident Italy 
LZ5 makes intermediate landing to pick up passenger 
- 
Ludwig DUrr Bitterfeld Germany 
LZ5 survives impact with pear tree while refuelling on ground 
- 
Graf Zeppelin G6ppingen Germany 
L23a (Army Z-1) makes several intermediate landings 
- 
Maj. Sperling Germany/France 
LZ5 (Anny Z-2) makes several intermediate landings 
- 
Graf Zeppelin Germany 
LZ6 makes several intermediate landings for repair 
- 
Ludwig Darr Germany 
DELAG airships completed 1,600 flights and carried 34,000 passengers Germany 
Forlanini semirigid Leonardo do Vinci wrecked by tree branch after forced landi ng Pavia Italy 
LZ5 (Army Z-2) destroyed in a storm Umburg Germany 
Erbsloeh semirigid bursts in mid-air, 5 on board killed 
- 
Oscar Erbsloeh Elbetfeld Gertnany 
Wreck of LZ7 on first passenger cruise after tree-top crash 
- 
Capt. Kahlenberg Wallendorf Germany 
Yamada No I blimp wrecked on landing after first flight 
- 
Isaburo Yamada Japan 
LZ6a destroyed by accidental petrol fire in its shed Baden-Oos Germany 
Yamada No 2 blimp tom from mast by wind 
- 
Isaburo Yamada Japan 
Ruthenberg Il semirigid damaged after forced landing due to gas loss Berlin Germany 
LZ8 survives hangar door impact while undocking 
- 
Dr. Hugo Eckener DiJsseldorf Germany 
LZ8 wrecked while undocking in cross-wind with passengers 
- 
Dr. Eck-ener Dfisseldorf Germany 
Parseval PL5 non-rigid "Sport LAiftschiff'bumt during deflation Munich Germany 
GrosslBasenach Anny M111 destroyed by fire Germany 
DELAG*s LZIO Schwaben destroyed by fire on the ground 
- 
W. E. Ddff Dosseldorf Germany 
LZ15 (Ersat. 
- 
Z-1) destroyed in storm 
- 
Emergency landing of Army airship Z4 (LZ16) at French military base Uneville France 
Veeh semirigid deflated after forced landing Cologne Germany 
SchUtte-Lanz SLI forced down to ground and wrecked Prussia 
First Zeppelin fatalities: Navy airship L-I (LZ14) lost at sea 
- 
Heligoland 
Second Zeppelin fatalities: Navy airship L-2 (LZ18) destroyed by fire in flight 
- 
Berlin Germany 
Semirigid Forlanini Citta di Milano hit mountain in squall. split open and burnt near Como Italy 
LZI 9 (Desatz Z-1) destroyed in storm 
- 
Austrian Army M-111 blimp exploded in flightý 400m high, 7 on board killed Fischamend Austria 
LZ21 (Anny Z-6) shot down by a/a fire 
- 
L222 (Anny Z-7) and LZ23 (Army Z-8) both shot down by a/a fire 
- 
Enlarged L220a (Anny Z-5) shot down by a/a fire 
- 
L225 (Army Z-9) bombed in shed Dfisseldorf Germany 
L224 (Navy L-3) wrecked in forced landing 
- 
Denmark 
L227 (Navy L-4) wrecked in forced landing 
- 
Denmark 
LZ33 (Navy L-8) shot down by a/a fire 
- 
Belgium 
LZ29 (Army Z-10) forced down by a/a fire 
- 
St Quentin France 
LZ35 (Army) forced down by a/a fire 
- 
Belgium 
LZ39 (Anny) survives direct hit in mid-air bombing attack by aircraft Ostend Belgium 
LZ30 (Anny Z-11) burned on ground after blowing away 
- 
Posen Gerniany? 
LZ34 (Anny ) forced down by a/a fire 
- 
East Prussia 
LZ37 (Anny ) shot down by aircraft 
- 
Ghent Belgium 
Anny LZ38 bombed in shed Ev6re 
LZ28 (Navy L-5) forced down by a/a fire 
- 
Russia 
LZ43 (Navy L-12) damaged by ala fire over England and burned Ostend Belgium 
LZ40 (Navy L-10) burned in flight 
Navy SL6 explodes on ground after leaving shed Seddin Baltic 
Parseval PL26 non-rigid burnt in shed Bitterfeld Germany 
*** END OF SAMPLE FROM 3 PAGES 
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Section 2- BRITISH ACCIDENTS AND GH INCIDENTS 
1784 Crowd riot after failed unmanned gas balloon ascent Chelsea London 
1785 12 May First crash and rescue at sea 
- 
Richard MacGuire Holyhead Wales 
1869 28 May First break-away of a tethered passenger-ride balloon Captive 
- 
Henri Giffard London 
1902 Dirigible burned Cosham Portsmouth 
1905 22 Jul 77ie Barton blimp wrecked on landing 
- 
Dr F. A. Barton London 
1907 06 Oct. Nulli Secundus wrecked by wind when moored out after forced landing Crystal Palace London 
1910 26 Oct. The Lebaudy blimp damaged entering hangar (countermanded order) Farnborough England 
04 Nov. City of Cardiff (Willows 4) force landed for repair after Channel crossing Douai France 
28 Dec. City of Cardiff (Willows 4) blimp completes flight after bad weather delay Paris France 
1911 04 May The Lebaudy blimp misses landing party and crashes into cottage Famborou. -h England 
May Vickers No 1. Mayfly gas cell deflated by ablesearrian Palmer failing through it Barrow-in-Furness 
22 May. Vickers No 1. Mayfly rolled-out for mooring trials in Cavendish Dock Barrow-in-Furness 
23 May Mayfly on floating pontoon mooring mast with wind shields 
- 
Vickers Barrow-in-Furness 
24 May Mayfly completes first mooring out trials on floating mast 
- 
Vickers Barrow-in-Furness 
24 Sep. Modified Mayfly wrecked undocking from floating hangar 
- 
Vickers Barrow-in-Furness 
1913 Autumn British Army blimp Eta survives 50 mph gale moored in chalk pit Odiham 
1914 14 Aug. HMA No. 20 (Eta) damaged in landing after engine trouble aborted sortie Farnborough 
Sep. HMA No. 4(Parseval P. 18) blimp replaces propeller blade while on patrol England/Belgium 
14 Sep. HMA No. 20 (Eta) ripped in storm and repaired Roehampton 
19 Nov. HMA No. 20 (Eta) destroyed when blown from moorings into trees after forced landing Redhill 
?? End of HMA No. 18 (Gamma II) blimp after hull badly damaged in landing accident ? Famborough 
1915 summer Navy blimp SS-1 7 drifts rudderless across Irish Sea and makes balloon landing England/Ireland 
05 Aug. Navy blimp SS-27 wrecked by collision with church steeple Marquise ? 
10 Sep. Navy blimp SS-10 salvaged and towed ashore by trawler after forced landing in sea English Channel 
22 Oct. Navy blimp SS-18 break's u/c when landing, ship drifts away and is lost at sea England. /Ireland 
05 Nov. Navy blimp SS-22 survives 1,000ft dive in 56 seconds Anglesey Wales 
II Nov. SS-5 blimp towed to shore by destroyer after forced landing in sea England 
22 Nov. HMA No. 4(Parseval P. 18) collided with shed in dense fog Barrow? England 
1916 06 Feb. Navy blimp SS-34 damaged when shed was blown down Barrow England 
21 Feb. Experimental hybrid 'airship-plane 'AP-1 kills pilots 
- 
Usborne & Ireland Kingsnorth England 
12 May Coastal C. 1 blimp towing trials with light cruiser HMS Carysfoot Harwich England 
09 Jun. Coastal C. 8 blimp lost at sea, I out of 4 crew survived English Channel 
14 Jul. Coastal C. 13 blimp wrecked due to defective valve Kingsnorth England 
23 Jul. Coastal C. 9 blimp towed ashore by destroyer after balloon landing in sea Mullion England 
28 Aug. Coastal C. 16 blimp wrecked after engine failure, landed in sea, crew saved Berwick England 
03 Sep. Wooden rigid Army SLI I shot down by incendiary ammunition London England 
06 Sep. Coastal C. 1 blimp refuelling and crew exchange trials from ship Kingsnorth England 
15 Sep. Navy blimp SS-42 pilot survives 100 mile flight with inverted car Pembrok-e/Devon England 
24 Sep. LZ74 (Niny L-32) shot down by aircraft Billericay England 
24 Sep. LZ76 (AWvy L-33) forced down and burned by crew little Wigborough England 
02 Oct. LZ72 (Navy L-31) shot down by aircraft Potters Bar, England 
15 Nov. Coastal C. 17 blimp punctured by broken propeller during grapnel rope trials Pulliam England 
16 Nov. Newly built Vickers No. 9 damaged control car when leaving shed, rehoused Barrow England 
28 Nov, LZ78 (Navy L-34) shot down by aircraft W Hartlepool England 
28 Nov. LZ61 (Navy L-21) brought down by a/a fire and wrecked Yarmouth England 
27 Dec. HMA No. 4(Parseval P. 18) blimp damaged by down gust when landing Howden England 
1917 02 Jan. Navy blimp SS-23 landed on beach, held in gale for 3 hours until envelope ripped Anglesey Wales 
25 Jan. Navy blimp SS-23 salvaged after forced landing at sea Luce Bay Scotland 
16 Mar. RNAS SSP-3 blimp wrecked Faversharn England 
21 Mar. Coastal C. 22 blimp lost at sea due to engine trouble Pembroke Wales 
23 Mar. Coastal C. 6 blimp lost at sea due to engine trouble, crew saved off Lands End England 
14 Apr. Only recorded accident (explosion) at a Silicol hydrogen producing plant Pulliam England 
21 Apr. Coastal C. 17 blimp missing on patrol: assumed shot down, no survivors Pulliam England 
23 Apr. Navy blimp SS-32a experimental landing and taxying on water Barrow England 
23 Apr. Coastal C. 11 blimp wrecked Scarborough England 
26 Apr. Navy blimp SS-32a moored at sea Barrow England 
29 Apr. Navy blimp SS-13 salvaged and towed ashore after forced landing in sea Newhaven England 
01 May Coastal C23 blimp deflated by own top gun puncturing envelope Folkestone England 
05 May Navy blimp SS-32a wrecked in 30 mph [km]gusts when moored at sea Barrow England 
05 May Navy blimp SS-34 destroyed in gale during mooring trials Barrow England 
12 May Navy blimp SS-39 defective valve caused uncontrolled descent: force landed in am England 
16 Jun. NS-2 blimp wrecked Stowmarket England 
II Jul. Navy blimp SS-31 balloon landing after collision with rigid airship shed Cranwell England 
16 Jul. Coastal C. 15 blimp deleted as wrecked in towing trials East Fortune Scotland 
19 Jul. Coastal C. 11a blimp burst into flames in flight, 5 crew killed Humber England 
25 Jul. Navy blimp SS-39 broke away from landing party: I crew carried up on rope Cranwell England 
27 Jul. Coastal C. 1 blimp deflated after breaking away from handling party Cranwell England 
14 Aug. SSZero. 2 blimp engine failure, caught fire over funnel of assisting destroyer English Channel 
12 Sep. Navy blimp SS42a wrecked at sea after crashing into farm during night landing Pembroke Wales 
01 OCL Coastal C26 blimp forced landing 3 miles from base after running out of fuel Howden England 
27 Oct. SSZero. 14 blimp drifted across Channel after engine failure. landed in trenches Montreivil France 
29 Oct. Vickers No. 9 seriously damaged entering shed in bad weather Howden England 
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Section 3- AMERICAN ACCIDENTS AND GH INCIDENTS 
1861 20 Apr. First failed attempt to cross Atlantic Ocean by balloon 
- 
Thaddeus Lowe Cincinatti OK 
1862 Captive balloons under fire hauled down by galloping horses 
- 
J. R. Bryan Yorktown USA 
1905 Blimp City of Portland lands for 20 mins on roof of Chamber of Commerce Portland OR. 
1906 Blimps Califomia Arrow and City of Portland burnt in hangar 
- 
Prof Baldwin California 
1910 17 Oct. Transatlantic attempt by semi-rigid America ends in sea 
- 
Walter Wellman Atlantic Ocean 
1912 02 Jul. Tansatlantic blimp Akron explodes in mid-air on test flight, 3 killed 
- 
Vaniman Atlantic City 
1917 Apr. USNeny blimp DN-1 car sank on first undocking from floating hangar Pensacola FL 
29 Apr. Last flight of USNaiy blimp DN-1; damaged by inexperienced handling party Pensacola Fl. 
Dec. USN blimp B-5 (A-240) burnt after engine fire and release by handling party Akron(? ) Oll 
1918 25 Apr. USNavy blimp T-2 drifted ashore after sea impact during training Paimboeuf France 
08 Jun. USN blimp B-5 (A-240) hit power lines when landing, rip panel failed Chatham USA 
10 Jun. USN blimp B-3 (A-237) emergency night landing after rudder in-flight failure Sayville USA 
16 Jul. USN blimp B-12 (A-246) blown out to sea; rescued 3 days later by steamer Provincetown USA 
08 Aug. USNaiy blimp B4 (A-238) damaged by loss of rudder post Cape May USA 
08 Aug. USNavy blimp B-13 (A-244) envelope repaired after seam separated Montauk USA 
18 Aug. USN blimp B-13 (A-247) damaged undocking in cross-wind when rope broke Montauk USA 
07 Dec. USNaiy blimp B-10 (A-247) envelope damaged and deflated Cape May USA 
1919 23 Jan. USN blimp B-20 (A-5257) lost at sea Provincetown (? ) USA 
II Feb. USN blimp F-1 (A4348) ripped and deflated after problems on delivery flight Catlett VA 
19 Feb. USN blimp E-1 (A4109) damaged and repaired Wingfoot Lake USA 
20 Mar. USN blimp E-1 (A 4109) landed safely by instructor after rudder failure Pensacola FL 
21 Apr. USN blimp B-9 (A 
-243) envelope badly torn by engine failure Key West(? ) FL 
28 Apr. USNaiy blimp B-3 (A-237) slight envelope darnage due to engine problem Rockaway USA 
15 May USN blimp C-5 torn from 100-man groundcrew and blown out to sea St John's Newfoundland 
17 May USN blimp C-1 (A4118) accidentally deflated Key West USA 
03 Jun. USN blimp C-8 (A4123) survives niid-air carburetor fire 
- 
LA R. Paunack Cape May USA 
01 Jul. USN blimp C-8 burnt after emergency landing due to mid-air fin collapse Camp Holabird MD 
31 Dec. USNaiy semi-rigid 0-1 ripped after engine failure and free balloon landing Pennsville NJ 
1920 13 Jan. USN blimp B-19 (A-5467) envelope torn in strong winds Chatham USA 
08 May USN blimp C-10 (A4121) repaired after envelope seam separated Rockaway USA 
08 May USN blimp E-1 (A4109) damaged attempting to enter hangar Pensacola USA 
20 May USN blimp E-1 (A4109) made land after rip panel failed in-flight Pensacola USA 
17 Jun. USNavy blimp B-1 (A-235) slight envelope damage by engine problem Pensacola USA 
Jul. USN blimp D-1 (A4450) destroyed by fire in hangar Wingfoot Lake USA 
21 Jul. USN blimp C-10 (A4121) damaged while covering Americas Cup Race Jamaica Bay USA 
29 Jul. USN blimp C-7 (A4127) envelope damaged by impact with hangar doors Pensacola USA 
30 Sep. USN blimp C-6 (A4125) became lost in fog and crashed Laurel Canyon CA 
1921 10 Jun. USNavy blimp B-3 (A-237) damaged and repaired San Diego CA 
08 Jul. USN blimp C-3 (A 4120) burnt in flight. hydrogen ignited by engine spark Hampton Roads USA 
21 Jul. USArmy blimp D-2 (A-4451) made land after terminal damage by engine failure Langley Field USA 
05 Aug. USN blimp H-1 (Towing airship) ripped by farmer after flight without crew Scarsdale NY 
31 Aug. USN blimp C-10 (A4121) destroyed in hangar fire Rockaway USA 
31 Aug. USN blimp D-6 (A-5972) destroyed in hangar fire Rockaway USA 
31 Aug. USN blimp H-1 (Towing airship) destroyed in hangar fire Rockaway USA 
1922 USArmy blimp D4 (A4452) deflated while attempting to moor to mast Scott Field IL 
21 Feb. USArmy semi-rigid "Roma " burnt after power line impact: 34 killed Hampton Roads 
14 Oct. VSAr7ny C-2 blimp burnt after hangar door impact ruptured fuel tanks Brooks Field. TX 
1923 USArmy blimp D-5 (A-4454) wrecked when punctured during crew training Scott Field IL 
19 Jan. USArmy blimp D-3 (A 
-4453) badly damaged undocking from hangar Aberdeen MD 
06 Jun. USAr7ny blimp TC-1 destroyed by fire Wright Field OH 
1924 16 Jan. US Navy ZR-1 (Shenandoah) break-s-away from mooring mast in Sale (78mph) Lakehurst NJ 
17 Jan. US Navy ZR-1 (Shenandoah) returns to base with damaged top fin and nose Lakehurst NJ 
1925 03 Sep. US Navy ZR-1 (Shenandoah) broke up in flight during storm: 14 killed Ava. OH 
1927 Mar. LZ126 (ZR-3) Los Angeles trapped in hangar for 2 weeks by lack of ground crew Lak-churst NJ 
25 Aug. LZ126 (ZR-3) Los Angeles pitches 85* and swings 180* on mooring mast Lakehurst NJ 
1928 13 Oct. LZ127 Graf Zeppelin survives fin damage in violent squall in flight Atlantic Ocean 
1929 25 Aug. LZ127 GrafZeppelin drags tail on ground when taking off Los Angeles CA 
1930 31 Jul. R100 (G-FAAV) hit by extreme turbulence off Canadian coast Quebec Canada 
1932 Jan. USN blimp K-1 envelope damaged and returned to Goodyear by rail Cape May USA 
22 Feb. USS ZRS4 Akron tail damaged when weathervarting unrestrained NAS Lak-ehurst NJ. 
11 May USS ZRS4 Akron lifts 3 crew men on mooring lines during landing: 2 killed Camp Kearney 
1933 03 Apr. Goodyear ZRS4 Akron wrecked in Atlantic Ocean in storm Eastern seaboard USA 
04 Apr. USN blimp J-3(A-7382) deflated at sea after engine problem. 2 crew died Beach Haven NJ 
1934 21 Apr. USS ZRS-5 Macon survives top fin damage during cross-mountain flight Texas 
1935 12 Feb. USS ZRS-5 Macon loses top fin in flight and crashes into sea California 
May USN blimp K-1 envelope returned to Goodyear with 25 foot long tear Cape May USA 
1937 06 May First deaths of fare-paying passengers in LZ129 Hindenburg fiv 
- 
Pruss et. al. Lak-ehurst NJ 
1939 May USN blimp K-2 damaged and deflated after impact with ares Lakehurst NJ 
1942 One ground crew killed in handling accident USA 
USN blimp L-2 deflated during practice take-off after impacting trees Lakehurst NJ 
08 Jun. Goodyear G-1 "Defender"(NC-12A) collided with L-2 on night trial at sea Manasquan Inlet USA 
08 Jun. USNblimp L-2 collided with G-1 on secret mission night trial; 12 men died Manasquan Inlet USA 
Jul. USN blimp K-6 wrecked at mast during thunder storm, one ground crew injured Sth Weymouth USA 
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APPENDIX K: UNASSISTED LANDINGS (SAMPLE PAGES) 
(and rescue from emergency situations) 
The following is a list of incidents where airships and/or their crew-members survived ground contact 
without the use of their "normal" ground-handling systems. It is not a complete list largely because 
determining what is a "normal landing" in all circumstances for the different types of airship that have 
existed is far from easy. 
For example the British Army had proved before the First World War that their small non-rigids could be 
sheltered in quarries and behind copses. Owing to shortages of space and man-power the idea was 
adapted for the larger naval blimps that operated during the war. Mooring-out stations were established 
about the principal bases and the ships docked and secured in enclaves cut in the lee of woods. All that 
was required was a handful of men and some "screw-pickets" (ground anchors). The system worked very 
well and few ships were lost. 
But small blimps in wartime are one thing and large rigids in peace are another. Yet even here we find it 
hard to draw a clear line. The Germans preference for landing their Zeppelins directly into the 
outstretched hands of the ground crew, who then either held on to it (sometimes for days) or walked it 
into its shed, means that here too very little equipment or systems were required. The procedure for an 
airship landing "off-base" and having its ropes and rails held by local villagers until the real groundcrew 
arrived to take over and "walk if' home is not significantly different from the "normar' on-base one. 
In addition, there were occasions when airships were rescued without touching the ground 
- 
when they 
were towed behind boats or even by other airships. For example: 
"The idea of towing airships, rather than kite-balloons, at sea was one of the ways in which the 
Fleet hoped to be able to make up for the lack of range of British Airships. Astra-Torres No. 3 
was towed as early as November 2,1914, but the experiments were not resumed until March 
1916. Then a Coastal at Kingsnorth was tried out in this manner, and on May 12th the 
Adn-dralty gave approval for Coastal C. ] to be taken in tow in Harwich Harbour by the light 
cruiser Carysfort. By May 16th the technique had been developed to such an extent that during 
the picking up of the trail rope a speed of 22 knots was maintained. On September 6th, after 
experiments at Kingsnorth had developed the necessary techniques, refuelling and the 
interchange of crew at sea was accomplished from Canterbury, Coastal C. 1 again being the 
guinea pig. The pick-up was made at 26 knots, but speed was reduced to 12 while the ship was 
hauled down and the crews swapped over. In normal North Sea weather, it was found that with 
the blimp riding at 100 feet, one crew man at a time could be exchanged by bosun's chair and 60 
gallons of petrol pumped up to the blimp by compressed air in eight minutes. " (Higham, 1961) 
Whether this was actually done sufficiently often to make it "normal" is not known. How many airships (and lives) that would otherwise have come to grief were actually saved by throwing out a sea anchor and 
waiting for a boat to tow them to safety will probably also never be known. The point is that trying to sort 
out the "normal" landing for airships from the "emergency" in a time when holding onto their ropes, or 
tying them down in the woods and towing them home behind boats was commonplace is not a simple 
matter. That being said, there clearly were unusual occasions and what follows is a list in chronological 
order of some of the more notable unassisted landings that have been recorded. 
............... 
AIRSHIP IDENTIFICATION: Nulli Secundus 
DATE: 9th 
-II th October 1907 
AIRSHIP TYPEISIZE: British Army non-rigid / 112 ft long x 32 ft diam. 85,000 ft3 
INCIDENT: 
... 
her power was insufficient to get her back in the face of the breeze 
... 
decided to land in 
the grounds of the Crystal Palace.... A descent was made in perfect safety. and the vessel was moored to 
some stakes.... Here she stayed for two or three days 
... 
in an exposed position 
... 
with only very few men 
to look after her 
... 
the wind freshened, she dragged her moorings, bumped herself on the ground, and did 
a certain amount of damage to her frame-work, until the sergeant who had been left in charge, seeing that he could not control the tugging monster in such a wind, deflated as speedily as possible, thereby 
probably saving the airship.... 
OUTCOME: Airship damaged "solely due to the lack of experience and foresight of those in command. " 
................. 
AIRSHIP IDENTIFICATION: The Patrie 
DATE: November 1907 
AIRSHIP TYPEISIZE: Lebaudy non-rigid / 197 ft long x 34 ft diam. 111,250 W 
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INCIDENT: 
... 
during a flight near Verdun, the motor stopped 
... 
drifted with the wind to a 
village 
... 
where she was safely landed and anchored. The following day a strong wind sprang up and, 
tearing up some of the iron posts to which she was anchored, caused the airship to swing broadside 
on 
... 
then tilted over 
... 
and some ballast bags fell out. Thus lightened the vessel rose in the air. and despite 
the efforts of nearly 200 soldiers who were hanging onto her ropes, she dragged them along the ground 
until the officer in charge ordered them to let go, considering he was risking their lives 
.... 
the Patrie rose 
and 
... 
drifted out to sea and was never seen or heard of again. 
OUTCOME: Airship blew away. No serious injuries to crew. 
.......... ++ 
AIRSHIP IDENTIFICATION: S. M. S. Zeppelin Il 
DATE: 29th May 1909 
AIRSHIP TYPEISIZE: Zeppelin rigid / 446 ft long x 42.5 ft diam. 530,000 ft3 
INCIDENT: 
... 
descended just outside Goppingen, having been in the air for almost 38 hours 
... 
coming 
into sudden collision with a large pear-tree, which tore open two sections of the envelope and smashed 
the alun-Linium bows very considerably. Some attributed this accident to a sudden gust of wind, and others 
to the steersman having failed to notice the tree 
... 
wom out with fatigue.... Within 24 hours temporary 
repairs were carried out on the spot, and 
... 
she was enabled 
... 
to commence the return journey to Lake 
Constance. 
OUTCOME: Airship flew home with structural damage. No crew inj uries. 
................... 
AIRSHIP IDENTIFICATION: German Army Airship Zeppelin I 
DATE: 29th June to 3rd July 1909 
AIRSHIP TYPEISIZE: Zeppelin rigid 
INCIDENT: Airship encountered a heavy storm on a flight from Friedrichshafen to Metz in France. 
Forced to land 34 miles from start at Mittelbiberach "... and for 98.5 hours the giant vessel was held down 
by the united efforts of 150 soldiers. " Finally on 3rd July airship flew on to Metz covering 225 miles in 
8.5 hours. 
OUTCOME: Airship and crew survived. 
AIRSHIP IDENTIFICATION: German Army Airship Zeppelin III (LZ6) 
DATE: 30th August 1909 
AIRSHIP TYPE/SIZE: Zeppelin rigid 
INCIDENT : On a return trip to Friedrichshafen after a visit to Berlin the airship fought a strong 
headwind until a propeller broke and tore a hole in the hull. A descent was successfully accomplished and 
repairs commenced with great difficulty due to the strong wind. "... despite the efforts of a company of 
soldiers, disaster at one time seemed inevitable. Thirty men were packed like sardines in the rear of the 
car to weigh it down, while others clung on to it from below. Occasionally these were lifted in a body 
from the ground, and hung dangling in the air for several seconds at a time. As the front of the car was in 
danger of being battered to pieces against the earth, a detachment of soldiers was placed beneath it, 
forming a kind of living spring buffer. By these desperate means the vessel was saved, and the repairs 
being completed, Friedrichshafen was safely reached on the night of September 2 "d 
.. OUTCOME: Airship and crew survived. 
.......... 
AIRSHIP IDENTIFICATION: German Army Airship Zeppelin II 
DATE: 24th/25th April 1910 
AIRSHIP TYPE/SIZE: Zeppelin rigid / 446 ft long x 42.5 ft diam. 530,000 ft3 
INCIDENT: Following a review by the Kaiser at Homburg the airship fought a strong headwind and 
made a forced landing near Limburg. It was held successfully overnight but "... on the following 
morning 
... 
despite the efforts of the troops whose services had been requisitioned to hold down the 
airship, it was carried away by the gale, and wrecked by colliding with some trees at Weilburg. Several of 
the soldiers who were clinging on to the ropes and cars when the vessel was blown away were dashed to 
the ground and seriously injured. " 
OUTCOME: Airship destroyed. Flight crew survived. Ground crew injured. 
............ iýmii 
AIRSHIP IDENTIFICATION: Zeppelin VII "Deutschland" 
DATE: 28th June 19 10 
AIRSHIP TYPEISIZE: Zeppelin rigid / 
INCIDENT : Flew from her shed near Diisseldorf for a cruise with 21 passengers. Developed motor 
trouble and ran out of fuel as weather deteriorated. "... and navigation became impossible. The derelict 
vessel was finally blown into the fir-trees of the Teutoberger Wald, and was wrecked. Happily the 
disaster was attended by no loss of life or injury, every one of the thirty-three persons on board being 
safely rescued. " 
OUTCOME: Airship destroyed. 21 passengers and 12 crew survived without injury. 
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................. 
AIRSHIP IDENTIFICATION: SL I 
DATE: October 17th 1911 
AIRSHIP TYPEISIZE: SchUtte Lanz rigid 
- 
734,500 cu ft 
- 
432 ft long x 60 ft dia. 
INCIDENT: SL I made her first flight on October 17th 1911. A control cable broke and the ship made a 
forced landing across the Rhine, lying overnight in an open field while repairs were being made and gas 
added. Next day the ship took off and after three and a half hours of circling over Mannheim, she 
returned to the Rheinau shed. 
OUTCOME: Airship and crew survived. 
................. 
AIRSHIP IDENTIFICATION: SL I 
DATE: April 18th 1912 
AIRSHIP TYPE/SIZE: Schfitte Lanz rigid 
- 
734,500 cu ft 
- 
432 ft long x 60 ft dia. x ?? ft high 
INCIDENT: While approaching to land at noon, a vertical gust slammed the ship down on the ground, 
damaging all control and water ballast wires, the propellers and gondolas. The shock of the crash threw 
seven out of 14 crew members overboard and dumped all ballast. Lightened of all this weight, SL I no 
longer under control, ascended to 5,600 feet. Her momentum carried her well over pressure height; 
considerable gas was lost, the ship became heavy, and since there was no more ballast, SL 1, touched 
down on the far side of the Rhine. Troops from Mannheim and Speyer manhandled her back to her shed 
the same day. Old photos show the SL I floating several hundred feet in the air at the end of numerous 
lines; when soldiers reached the Rhine, the lines were made fast aboard a tug boat that took them over. OUTCOME: Airship and crew survived. 
................. 
AIRSHIP IDENTIFICATION: German Army Airship ZIV (LZ. 16) 
DATE: April 1913 
AIRSHIP TYPEISIZE: Zeppelin rigid (sister ship of Sachsen, ) 
INCIDENT: Forced down on a French Army drillfield on a factory test flight. The German aviators were 
most hospitably entertained by the gallant soldiers 
- 
but not without reason. Whilst the crew were diverted, French experts hastily photographed and made drawings of the ship and its equipment. OUTCOME: Airship and crew survived. 
.................. 
AIRSHIP IDENTIFICATION: British military Astra-Torres 
- 
No 3. 
DATE: June 12th 1913 
AIRSHIP TYPE/SIZE: Tri-lobe blimp 
- INCIDENT: On her first flight in England, at 2,000 feet, she buckled in the middle when engine failure 
caused loss of pressure. She made a forced landing "hinged in the middle with both ends in the air! " After fifteen minutes on the ground the ballonets were once again properly inflated, and she was flown back to Famborough despite the fact that several cables had snapped and it was not easy to control her. OUTCOME: Airship and crew survived. 
................. 
AIRSHIP IDENTIFICATION: SL I 
DATE: 15th July 1913 
AIRSHIP TYPE/SIZE : Schfitte Lanz / 131 in length: 18,4 m diameter: unladen weight 21,190 kg 
INCIDENT: BREAKAWAY 
"By the time the airship was handed over to the army on 30 December 1912, it had made 350 flights and had been in the air for about 120 hours. The end of SLI began when a fuel line flawed and the airship had to make an emergency landing on the parade ground near Schneiderniffil. In a storm the airsl-dp was 
torn from its anchorage and carried some kilometers away until it crashed in a forest on 15 July 1913. "OUTCOME: Airship destroyed. Crew survived. 
.............. 
AIRSHIP IDENTIFICATION: Willows (Naval No 2) 
DATE: August 20th 1913 
AIRSHIP TYPEISIZE: 
INCIDENT: The Royal Engineers airship "Eta" towed the small experimental Willows airship back to 
the Factory at Farnborough after its engines broke down at Odiharn 
OUTCOME: Airship and crew survived. 
*** END OF SAMPLE FROM 9 PAGES *** 
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APPENDIX NI : EVOLUTION OFGII INFRASTRUCTURE- ILLUSTRATIONS 
(Figures 6.13 to 6.52 from Section 6.4) 
PICTURES OFGII EVOLUTION 
THE PIONEERS 
ý TV 
Figure 6.6 
- 
1783 The first ascent of' 
a manned Niontgolliere 
All 
Hutire 6.9 
- 
1784 Llas ascent at Di. ion 
Figure 6.7 
- 
1784 Andreani ascends from Milan 
. 
r'. 
S 
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Figure 6.10 
- 
1785 Nlr Amos Arnold's ascent 
Figure 6.12 : 1788 Ill. mchard/Berlin 
-It 4 
Figure 6.14 : 1783 Nieusenier's design 1'01' I'll 
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UA OIJITION OFGAS BALLOON (. 11 SYSTFNIS 
MOO, 
Hinire 6.1-5 circa 1800'FralISDort methods 
50 
Aw 
Figure 6.18 : 1900'rransport illethods 
Figure 6.20 : 1915 Swiss Army 
- 
standard 
gas inflation with net and sandbags 
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111 VI 1I I III, IiI. Nit lk Uk 11. )%.: 1111) %ý I 11.111 
Figure 6.25 : 1896 Fort Logan, (T. USA 
Figure 6.27 : 1907 Zvppelin at Malizell 
, 
wýo 
FA (MAITION 
Figure 6.341: 1987 Goodyear GZ 22 inflated in shed as 
a standard gas balloon with net and sandba. -s 
'796 
EV01.1 ITION OFNIO(MINGAND LO MING 
Figtire 6.40: 1862 balloon 
moored on a river boat 
Figii re 6.38 : 1926 1, Z 126 
-it Ford's Dearborn -ast 
ý%ith "iertical 
Figure 6.39: 1936 Brazilian 
.. Cxpeditioimrý- mast used 1) 
both LZ127 Gral'Zeppelin and 
LZ129 Hindenburg. 
This mast is belic-, ed to be still 
extaw toda. y. 
'dI 
'' 
Figure 6.41 : 1930 LZ 126 moored to Patoka 
_'5 / 
ff -d %I 17- ff d-Iý-'NIýIb ff. .'4--NI. ýI1.1 4 %11 ý141 Lý %' L' 'V ff, '% IL 
Figure 0.50 : 1930 LZ129 "Ifindenhm-g- tail 
on "riding-out" car at Lakehurst NAS 
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